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MINUTES - 03111997 - SD6
Ato: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FROM: PHIL BATCHELOR, County Administrator STEPHEN L. WEIR, Clerk-Recorder DATE: March 11, 1997 SUBJECT: CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN FOR CLERK-RECORDER - ELECTIONS DIVISION ......................................................................................................................................... SPECIFIC REQUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION Recommendations 1 ACKNOWLEDGE that the problems and.errors that occurred in the 1996 General Elections have overshadowed the fact that Elections Office staff worked many additional hours, at great personal sacrifice, to ensure to all registered voters had an opportunity to vote in the 1996 General Election and that the election was completed accurately and timely. 2. ACKNOWLEDGE that circumstances just before and during the 1996 General Election .such as the retirement of the longtime Assistant Registrar, the retirement or absence of at least two highly experienced elections staff, the consolidation of special district elections with the 1996 General Election and the seismic retrofit of Elections Office facilities increased the challenge of conducting an error-free election. 3. ACKNOWLEDGE that the July 1996 consolidation of the County's trial courts that requir�./d the transition of approximately 83 staff members from the Clerk-Recorder to the courts, and the September 1995 arson fires which destroyed a major portion of the Clerk-Recorder facilities and files, temporarily suspended regularly scheduled meetings between the Clerk-Recorder and his division chiefs and management team causing a lapse in communication. 4. ACKNOWLEDGE that on November 14, 1996, the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator requested that an operational review be made in the Elections Office to detect the cause of procedural lapses that occurred in the 1996 General Election that Would culminate in a report with recommendations on improving elections operations. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: X YES SIGNATURE: ----------- —--—--------—-------- —--—---------—-------------------------------------- RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMMITTEE APPROVE OTHER SIGNATURE(S): ---------- --------------------ACTION OF BOARD ON March 11, 1997 APPROVE AS RECOMMENDED X OTHER X The following persons addressed the Board regarding this issue: William McDonald, Concord; and Sharon Arata,- Contra Costa Republican Central committee, Danville. Following comments from the public, the Board discussed the issues and took the following action: 1. ACCEPTED the report on the Election OfficO,'s action plan as presented by the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator; 2. APPROVED the recommendations contained in the report; and 3. DIRECTED the Clerk-Recorder to provide the Board with a status report on the Elections Division VOTE OF tbAWVM0Ays I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN X UNANIMOUS(ASSENT -------- AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE AYES: NOES: SHOWN, ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTESTED March 11, 1997 CONTACT: STEVE WEIR(510)646-2955 SUP 0 PHI BATCH IS IM CLERK OF THE BOARD T CC: COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR IF E� AND COUNTY CLERK-RECORDER AD I ELECTIONS TASK FORCE (via Clerk-Recorder) B -2- t t 5. ACCEPT report from the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator on the findings and recommendations of the Elections Task Force. (Attached) 6. DIRECT the County Administrator to continue to work with the Clerk-Recorder in the implementation of the corrective action plan. 7. ACKNOWLEDGE the Clerk-Recorder's corrective action plan comprising the changes he has already begun to implement and plans to implement in the near future: Actions in Progress The Clerk-Recorder is relocating his office into the Elections Office facility to increase his accessibility to staff and to provide more opportunity for direct supervision of elections functions. The Clerk-Recorder has identified an outside facilitator for team building and office communications and has made initial contacts to check on the facilitator's availability to work with the Elections Office. The Clerk-Recorder has resumed regularly scheduled meetings with the Department's management team, which were temporarily abandoned due to other crises. In recognition of low staff morale, the Clerk-Recorder has resumed one- on-one meetings with Elections employees, begun prior to the Task Force's study and temporarily suspended for the duration of the study, to hear employee concerns and feedback. As part of the staff recognition program and to facilitate team building, the Clerk-Recorder has sponsored two (privately-financed) barbecues to express his appreciation for the diligent efforts of the Elections staff in conducting the recent elections. The Clerk-Recorder has met with the system and printer vendors to resolve communications and procedural issues that arose during the November 5, 1996 election. The Clerk-Recorder is reviewing organizational models from other county elections offices to assist in the development of short- and long-term plans to restructure the Elections Office. The Clerk-Recorder has installed a new Recorder Information System employing a state-of-the-art, PC-based network which eliminates the competing demands on the Elections Office's MV1 5000 mainframe for capacity and speed, and prompts the separation of the data processing management for the Recorder and Elections Divisions. The computer room is being remodeled as part of the continuing seismic upgrade of the Elections facility. The Clerk-Recorder submitted a space plan to the County Administrator's Office in 1992 requesting that his three locations be consolidated into one location, with the long-term savings in rent expense offsetting the costs of construction. A request-for-proposal (RFP)was issued in mid-Summer, 1996, but no other action has occurred. I ' I J -3- Actions to Be Implemented. The Clerk-Recorder plans to: Develop short- and long-range plans for capital and personnel needs. Re-establish a formal chain of command and system for communicating essential information to staff; and continue to encourage staff to bring forth questions and concerns regarding office policies and operations. With the assistance of Alameda County Elections Office, develop a comprehensive training program for permanent and seasonal/temporary staff on elections procedures and the Elections Code, and for precinct workers by July 1, 1997. Schedule training to be conducted by DFM, the system vendor, to refine and enhance the knowledge of system users on the elections system requirements and capabilities. Establish and communicate employee performance standards and continue the current practice of annual employee performance evaluations. Review the recently implemented bar coding process for absentee ballot mailing to improve and streamline the process. Continue to seek out new facilities and secure a consultant to design telephone systems for interim use in the current facility and permanent use in any new facility identified. Review with staff the Elections Task Force's findings and recommendations and refine corrective action plan as appropriate to ensure the achievement of recommended changes. Background On November 14, 1996, the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator jointly submitted a report to the Board of Supervisors highlighting the dedication and performance of Elections Office staff in conducting the 1996 General Election and also acknowledging errors and irregularities which occurred during and prior to the election, and requested that the Board endorse the establishment on an Elections Task Force to conduct an operational review of the Elections Office. The Elections Task Force, which consisted of four County staff and five elections experts from Northern California counties and the Secretary of State's Office, conducted its review and provided its findings and recommendations 'attached) to the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator, The Clerk-Recorder, in recognition of the need to take corrective action, has developed a plan comprising the changes he will institute to improve office operations and management. i CONTRA COSTA COUNTY ELECTIONS TASK FORCE REVIEW OF THE COUNTY ELECTIONS OFFICE February 12, 1997 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 Commissioning of the Elections Task Force 1 11. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CLERK-RECORDER AND ELECTIONS OFFICE 2 Department Organization 2 Department Functions 3 Department Budget 3 Automated Systems 4 Recent Changes in Elections Laws 5 `III. FINDINGS ON SPECIFIC ELECTIONS ERRORS 8 IV. FINDINGS ON OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 13 Leadership 13 Operations 16 Automated Systems 19 V. RECOMMENDATIONS 23 Leadership 23 Operations 24 Automated Systems 26 r VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 29 VII. APPENDICES 1. Report to the Board of Supervisors from Phil Batchelor and Steve Weir 2. Press Release by Steve Weir Dated December 3, 1996 3. Elections Office Organization Chart as of December 2, 1996 4. Previous Elections Office Organizational Charts I. INTRODUCTION On November 14, 1996, the Clerk-Recorder and County Administrator jointly submitted a report to the Board of Supervisors highlighting the dedication and performance of Elections Office staff in conducting the November 5, 1996 General Election. The report (attached as Appendix 1) also acknowledged errors and irregularities which occurred during and prior "to the election, and requested that the Board endorse the establishment of an Elections Task Force to conduct an extensive operational review of the elections process in Contra Costa County. The work of the Elections Task Force has been a two-month process leading to the following report. The findings and recommendations contained herein are intended to assist the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator to meet the current and future challenges facing the Elections Office, and to overcome some significant avoidable and correctable mistakes which affected the 1996 General Election. The Task Force comprised four county staffers and five out-of-County elections experts. George Roemer, Senior Deputy County Administrator, County Administrator's Office, served as the Team Leader of the Task Force. Other team members were Bradley Clark, Alameda County Registrar of Voters; Janice Atkinson, Sonoma County Assistant Registrar of Voters; John Mott-Smith, Elections Division Chief, Secretary of State's Office; Rob Lapsley, Chief Deputy Secretary of State; Jerry Neeley, Sacramento County Assistant 'Registrar; Steven A. Steinbrecher, County Director of Information Technology; Julie Enea, Budget and Projects Coordinator, County Administrator's Office and Sara Hoffman, Senior Deputy County Administrator, County Administrator's Office. The goals of this review were: 1. To examine the organization, functions and operation of the Elections Office. 2. To review events leading up to and during the conduct of the 1996 General Election, and to determine the cause of the errors that occurred. 3. To formulate recommendations to assist the Clerk-Recorder and the County Administrator to improve the elections operations and to ensure that past errors are avoided in future elections. The Task Force conducted its first meeting on December 5, 1996 in Sacramento to discuss the goals of the review and begin developing a work plan. The Task Force met again on December 16, 1996 to finalize the work plan and schedule staff interviews. Prior to staff interviews, the County Administrator and some members of the Task Force met with Elections staff to explain the goals for the Task Force and to invite the participation of all "Elections staff. The Task Force conducted four days of staff interviews on December 16 and 30, 1996, and January 15 and 22, 1997, interviewing 15 employees. In addition to these interviews, a Task Force subcommittee focusing on technology also held extensive 1 T r interviews on December 20, 1996 with key data processing staff in the Clerk-Recorder Department and telecommunications technicians in the General Services Department. As a result of extensive interviews, the Task Force has concluded that the specific errors which occurred during the conduct of the 1996 General Election were symptomatic of an organization which is undergoing substantial change and adjustments related to the recent change in leadership, and the loss of several longtime, very knowledgeable staff members. The Task Force recognizes the dedication and admirable work ethic of Elections Office employees and is confident that with diligent efforts on the part of Department management and staff, the problems experienced in recent elections will not recur and elections operations will be conducted to.high standards of excellence. The Task Force wishes to commend the Elections Office staff for their cooperation and assistance. Their open, honest, and thoughtful responses were essential to the development of what we hope is a meaningful and useful report that identifies solutions and will lead to a more effective and productive organization. ll. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND BACKGROUND OF .THE CLERK- RECORDER AND ELECTIONS OFFICE Overview. The Elections Office is a Division of the Clerk-Recorder Department headed by Stephen L. Weir, the elected Clerk-Recorder. Until July 1, 1996, the Clerk-Recorder Department's primary functions or Divisions,were that of Clerk to the Superior Court, County Clerk, Recorder and Registrar of Voters. At that time, the Clerk to the Superior Court responsibility was transferred from the .Clerk-Recorder to the Coordinated Courts of _.Contra Costa County, reducing the staff under the Clerk-Recorder from approximately 146.5 to 63.5 full time equivalent positions. . The Clerk-Recorder has two appointed Division Heads: the Assistant Recorder and the Assistant Registrar. The current Assistant Registrar, Barbara Lee, assumed her position following the retirement of the prior Assistant Registrar, Bob Delevati in August 1995. Mr. Delevati worked in the Elections Office for 28'years, serving 12 years as the Elections and Registration Manager and 9Y2 years as the Assistant Registrar. Barbara Lee, the current Assistant Registrar, was appointed in October 1995 and assumed responsibility for an operation under less than ideal circumstances. At that time, job responsibilities and work procedures were undocumented and outside services agreements were sealed with a handshake:. Ms. Lee had prior elections experience in positions as a Government Program Analyst for 1'0 years with the Secretary of State's Office and as the Assistant Registrar for nearly three years with Yolo County. 2 7 The Elections Office has 23 authorized, funded positions but, because data processing staff are shared with the Recorder's Office, actually operates with about 18 full time equivalent permanent employees and a cadre of temporary and seasonal (returning for each election) staff, the size .4 which varies depending upon the type of election being conducted. An organizational chart prepared by the Elections Office dated December 2, 1996 is included in the report as Appendix 3. For information on findings related to 'organizational structure, please refer to Section IV, A, 3 in this report. The Elections Office performs the following major functions: ❖ Voter Registration - Maintain voter registration records, conduct voter registration outreach, verify and certify filed initiative, referendum and recall petitions. ❖ Conduct Elections - Issue, file and certify nomination papers, prepare and mail sample ballots, candidate statements, measures, arguments and absentee ballots, and conduct federal, state, county, city, schools and special districts elections. As of the-November 5, 1996 General Election, Contra Costa County had 555,734 registered voters, 975 voter precincts (179 of which were mailed ballot only) and 135 ballot types. Voter turnout was 64.1%, or 356,383 of all registered voters. More than 80,000 voters voted with an absentee ballot, the highest in County history. A press release prepared by the Clerk-Recorder highlighting the vital statistics from the November 5, 1996 election is attached as Appendix 2. Budggt. The Elections Office has an annual operating budget ranging from approximately $2 to $3.3 million annually over the four-year election cycle, depending on the type of election to be conducted during a given fiscal year. Primary cost factors are salaries and benefits, printing and postage costs. The Office typically recovers approximately 30% of its costs through revenues generated from reimbursement for performing state mandated services, election services fees to local government agencies and schools, sales of maps and documents, and charges to Recorder's Office for data processing management services. County budget cuts over the last decade have had minimal impact on the Elections Office. The primary impact of the cuts related to reductions in administrative, budgetary and personnel support for the Clerk-Recorder Department. Voter Information. Elections offices throughout the state are required to prepare voter information pamphlets containing candidates' statements of qualifications and local ballot- measure arguments and analyses. The Contra Costa County Elections Office is unique in that it is the only Elections Office in the state that uses inserts to provide voter information. Inserts are separate sheets of paper or sets of sheets containing the voter information to be included with the sample ballots. All other California counties have booklets prepared for this purpose. The primary advantage of using inserts over booklets is economy; inserts are considered by some to be less expensive and less wasteful than 3 r , f booklets. For example, in the'November 1996 election which comprised 135 distinct ballot types, each ballot type required different combinations of materials to be provided with the sample ballots. Through the use of inserts, the Elections Office assembled the exact number of inserts required for each of the 135 ballot types with relatively little waste. Additional ballots were assembled on an "as needed" basis for voters not receiving sample ballots. The use of booklets would have required the printing and binding of substantially more booklets that were actually required to ensure that enough booklets were on hand to create additional sample ballots as needed. The use of inserts in this County also increased the Elections Office's control of and accountability for the production of sample ballot materials. The Elections Office uses two large inserting machines purchased several years ago to collate the inserts and stuff the ballot envelopes. These inserting machines are located in the Elections Office Warehouse, and operated and maintained by an Elections Technician in charge of the warehouse. The assembling of ballot inserts is a labor-intensive process which adds somewhat to the overall costs of ballot preparation. The Elections Office will be making a cost comparison between booklets and inserts, factoring in labor and =_equipment maintenance costs. Computer Systems. The Elections, Recorder and Clerk Offices all employ the same physical computer sharing three sets of application software to perform the different business functions of the Department. The computer hardware and major portions of application software are located in the Elections Office. The Recorder and Clerk Offices' staff using the shared computer is located at another site. There are two primary computer applications available to run automated election systems Jn California counties today, DFM and DIMS. Counties not using these systems employ systems developed by their county data processing departments. The DFM system is a centralized "batch" system while the DIMS system is client-server based, "on-line" system. Both systems achieve the same results employing different information technology processing models. Contra Costa County's Elections Office uses the DFM system, which was installed in 1981. Being a "batch" oriented system, it requires stricter controls on those who use the various functions of the system, which processes and jobs are executed in which order and manner, and which people have access to run and control these batch jobs. For best results, batch oriented systems are usually managed by a dedicated data processing manager that coordinates processes and controls the security access levels to the system, i.e., who has access to run jobs. Most of the full-time permanent staff of the Elections Office are familiar with the requirements for running processes in proper sequence to avert errors. 4 v.. The Clerk-Recorder Department employs one data processing manager and one assistant data processing manager who oversee computer systems and applications for all offices. It is estimated that the data processing managers devote approximately 15% of their time to Elections Office systems. The Department employs eight data entry operators who primarily work on Recorder system applications but are shared by the Elections Office. In addition, a swing-shift computer operator is employed to run long, resource-intensive jobs "after normal working hours. Growing Complexity. Elections are unique from other county services in that they aren't conducted every day or even every month. It takes many years, with repetition of tasks and experience with the many different types of elections to garner a full knowledge of the process. It takes four years to complete one election cycle, that is, Presidential and Gubernatorial Primary and General elections as well as City, School and Special District elections. Because of the lengthy learning curve for elections functions, employee turnover, particularly in key managerial positions, can be devastating to an Elections Office. ..Elections functions are mandated primarily by the provisions of the Elections and Government Codes. The Elections Code is the primary governing document for elections rules, procedures and deadlines. Recent changes in elections laws have complicated elections processes to such an extent that the Secretary of State's Office has scheduled a Statewide Summit of Elections Officers in March 1997 to discuss the changes. Following .is a description of some of these changes. 4 Motor Voter - The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), commonly known as Motor Voter, requires that each person who applies for a driver's license or driver's license renewal be offered the opportunity to register to vote. An opportunity to register to vote must also be given when a person applies for or renews eligibility for various social services, such as food stamps, AFDC, MediCal and WIC. Voter registration must also be offered to persons at state-funded disability agencies, armed forces recruitment centers and certain other public offices specified by the Governor. In addition to providing for these opportunities to register to vote, counties are required to keep extensive statistics regarding the number of voters registered and the number of persons who decline to register under this law. The record keeping provisions of the Act have resulted in a considerable additional workload in election offices. The NVRA contains a provision known as "Fail-Safe Voting". This provision requires each state to establish procedures so that, if a voter moves from one address to another address in the same county and the voter does not inform the election office of the change, the voter must still be allowed to vote on election day. This is a significant change to California law which has caused a huge increase in 5 t e the number of provisional ballots' used on election day. These additional provisional ballots have further complicated the post-election canvass process and required additional staff and time to complete the process. ❖ Reapportionment - The reapportionment of 1992 created more competitive districts, resulting in closer races for state legislative and congressional offices. The increased competitiveness has led to closer scrutiny of the elections process by citizens, candidates, elected officials and the press, resulting in an increased public awareness of the elections process. •2 Consolidation of Elections -The consolidation of city, community college district, school and special district governing board member elections with primary and general elections has complicated the elections process considerably. Legislation to allow consolidation of governing board member elections was introduced in a piecemeal fashion over a period of five years, beginning with the cities' elections in 1981 and ending with school and special districts'elections in 1986. The arguments for consolidation are cost savings for the consolidating jurisdictions and higher voter turnout for these elections. Some of the major problems associated with consolidation are: e O Significant increases in the number of candidates which impacts workload, ` including providing services to candidates,' printing ballots, increasing the number of absentee ballot requests, and increasing the number of ballot cards to be tallied; ® The overlap of city, school and special district boundaries combined with Congressional, Senatorial and Assembly District boundaries resulting in: • a proliferation of unique versions of the ballot("ballot type") containing the appropriate races and measures for each combination of districts; • the dissection of voting precincts necessitating changes in polling places for many voters arid the creation of"vote-by-mail" precincts for others; and, 'Provisional ballots are issued in special envelopes at the polls on election day to voters when there is uncertainty as to whether the voter is properly registered, has already voted with an absentee ballot or has reported to the wrong polling place. Provisional ballots are counted only after the Elections Office has verified that the voter is properly registered and has not cast an absentee ballot. This verification process is highly labor-intensive. 6 ® The legal requirement that these local'government jurisdictions (with the exception of cities) not appear on the ballot if there are insufficient nominees to require an election, thus delaying the establishment of voting precincts and the procurement of polling places un:Jl after the close of extended nominations 83 days prior to an election. ❖ Absentee Voting and Mailed Ballot Precincts - The absentee voting process greatly expanded following 1978 legislation which eliminated the requirements for requesting absentee ballots. The use of absentee ballots has continually increased over the years. More than 20% of the ballots cast in the November 1996 General Election were cast by absentee ballot as compared to 4.4% in November 1978. Absentee ballots, while more convenient for some voters, are costly to produce, labor intensive to assemble, mail, sort, open and count. Thus, the challenge of providing accurate absentee ballots is greater than ever before. Mailed ballot precincts are voting precincts (or portions thereof)which contain fewer than 250 voters and for which no polling place is established. The creation of mailed ballot precincts are an unavoidable problem that.occurs as a result of the consolidation of school and special district elections with statewide elections. z Because school and special district boundaries divide voting precincts, the consolidation of these districts' elections results in small portions of precincts requiring different issues on the ballot. Often, these divisions result in voters being sent to a polling place other than the one with which they are familiar. If there are fewer than 250 voters in a portion, it is not logistically nor economically feasible to establish a polling place. In either circumstance it is confusing to voters, through no fault of the Elections Office. Because state law provides consolidation of local measures up to 88 days prior to an election, and school and special districts have "insufficient nominee" provisions, the Elections Office cannot know until approximately 70 days prior to an election what areas will be affected. Voters in mailed ballot precincts are automatically mailed their ballots; it is not necessary for the voter to request a ballot. Voted ballots may be returned by mail in postage-paid return envelopes provided with the ballots or to any polling place in the county on election day. The constant state of reaction brought about by the many recent changes affecting elections offices is taking its toll. Elections have traditionally been, and continue to be, conducted with the use of volunteers as poll workers. The increasing requirements have raised the complexity of precinct operations to a level which requires more intensive training to adequately prepare poll workers for the myriad of special situations they may encounter on election day. We are rapidly approaching the point in which precinct operations will not be able to be conducted with a volunteer workforce. 7 r III. FINDINGS ON ELECTION ERRORS In their November 14, 1996 report to the Board, the Clerk-Recorder and County Administrator pointed out several errors which occurred in preparation for and during the 1996 General Election and charged the Task Force to examine these errors and recommend the installation of safeguards to avoid repetition of the mistakes. Following is a discussion of those and other errors, and the findings of the Task Force. Section V of this report details the Task Force's recommendations. A. Wrong Carrier Route System. The Post Office changed its carrier route system for nonprofit mailing entities effective October 6, 1996, which was during the mailing cycle for the November 5, 1996 election. The Elections Office, prior to March 1996, did not take the change into account when-contracting for the printing of inserts. The sample ballot inserts (the card indicating a voter's polling place) were printed by an outside vendor, which was a fairly recent change; prior to the March 1996 Primary Election, sample ballot inserts were printed by the County. Since the carrier route change occurred during the County's mailing process and the outside printer did not have the software necessary to meet the Postal Service's new carrier route requirements, a waiver was negotiated for the November 1996 election resulting in no noticeable impact on the election process. =B. Proof-Reading Errors. Extensive proofreading .errors caused a five-day delay in ballot/sample ballot printing and resulted in an additional cost of$87,406 for printed materials that had to be destroyed_. The problem resulted from recent staff turnover, the fact that employees assigned to proofread the ballots did not receive adequate training and had no prior experience with this task, and the lack of management involvement in training and production. Additionally, there was an incorrect assumption on the part of the inexperienced staff that the State ballot measures did not need to be proofread. C. Duplicate Absentee Ballots - Due to the deletion of a batch of absentee ballot applications from the computer system, 97 duplicate absentee ballots were sent out. Applications for absentee ballots are entered into the computer system (via data entry or bar code) in "control batches". Batches are processed by running a job, which produces several reports and addresses absentee ballot envelopes. This job is time and computer resource-intensive in that it "reads" every absentee voter record and updates the statistical information. Additionally, the output of this job requires staff to pull and stuff absentee ballot envelopes. As a result, this job should be run only once each day;'or occasionally twice per day if the situation warrants it. The batch of absentee ballot applications was inadvertently mixed up with incoming applications which had not yet been entered. An inexperienced clerical employee, 8 unaware of how to identify and retrieve the applications from the processed batch (and apparently unaware that envelopes would be generated for the processed batch), deleted the batch of 97 applications from the system. The applications were then reentered, interspersed with the incoming applications. The computer system has several checks in place to avoid a batch being deleted in error. The screen warns the operator that two functions (including the delete function) are for the use of supervisors only. The function has an edit check query ("Are you certain you wish to do this?") and a warning that deleting the batch could result in serious consequences. The erroneous deletion of applications may have been avoided had more stringent system security access levels been in place. Most important, it should be noted that, regardless of the number of ballots mailed out, the system allows only one voted ballot to be entered as returned. Consequently, this error did not affect the integrity of the election results. For further discussion of system security access levels, please refer to Section IV, C, 2 (f, g). D. Incorrect Ballot Types Sent to Absentee Voters. There were three incidents of incorrect ballot types being sent to absentee voters affecting 294.voters. This is a regrettable, but common elections error occurring in many California county elections offices primarily attributable the numerous ballot types required due to the consolidation of local elections. Additionally, the staff was exhausted from working continuous 12-hour workdays with no relief. There were two employees supervising the pulling of the ballots with the assistance of a continually changing staff of temporary employees. Temporary staff had to be trained each day in the process, leaving little time for cross-checking work. Moreover, the two supervising employees had only limited experience in the absentee ballot process. The problem was exacerbated by the absentee ballot production job being run multiple times in a single day. The error was quickly remedied and, although it caused some inconvenience and confusion, did not prevent votes from being cast or accurately counted. E. Telephone System Failure. As a result of antiquated telephone equipment in the Elections Office and an unanticipated volume of telephone traffic (directly related to the operational errors described in this section), the capacity of the County's voice mail system was exceeded causing failure of the system. This problem is detailed in Section IV, C, 1 of this report. F. Non-Receipt of Sample Ballots. Through phone calls to the Elections Office, it was discovered that voters in six precincts in Moraga, Orinda, Concord and Walnut Creek did not receive sample ballots. The Task Force's review indicates that this error was most likely a human error caused by a lack of information as to the process of creating the computer tape from which mailing address inserts are printed. 9 Address inserts for Sample Ballots serve three purposes: O Provide the mailing address for the Sample Ballot and Voter Information Pamphlet. © Inform the voter of his/her polling place. © Serve as an absentee ballot application. Address inserts have historically been produced in-house by running a computer job which prints the necessary information on pre-printed continuous feed forms. Prior to the March 1996 Primary Election, bar code information was included in an effort to streamline the absentee application process. This necessitated modifying the job to produce a computer tape (as opposed to printing the forms directly) which was then sent to a vendor, who produced the inserts and returned them to the Elections Office for inclusion in the Sample Ballot mailing. The-output of this job includes a report which shows the dates of inclusion and the °} number of inserts produced for each precinct. Additionally, the report indicates if a precinct has no set polling place as of the run date. The reports are forwarded to the warehouse for use in the'mailing operation. This job is generally run two times prior to an election, once between 60 and 40 days prior to the election, and again after all affidavits have been entered following the close of registration. For a light election the job is often run only one time following the close of registration. Prior to running the job, the operator must enter a "cut-off' date on the elections definition screen. The first time the job is run prior to an election, the output includes all voters who are registered up to and including the cut-off date entered by the operator, with the exception of voters residing in precincts for which polling places have not yet been secured. During the processing of the job, the system records the cut-off date in each precinct's record to establish a new beginning date for the next time the job is run. For those precincts lacking polling places, whose voters were not included in the output, no date is entered in the precinct record. In connection with the November 1996 election, this job was first run on September 16, 1996. Prior to subsequent runs of this job, the operator must once again go into the election definition screen and enter a'cut-off date. The job will now select all voters between the date the system placed in the precinct record at the time the job was last run, and the date the operator has entered in the election definition screen. For precincts which did not have a secured polling place at the time the job was last run, but now do, the output will now include all the voters in that precinct. In connection with the November 1996 election, this job was run again on September 25, 1996, 10 y.. r r■ - nine days following the first run. This was ari interim run, as registration had not yet closed. This interim run had not been done historically, nor is it done as a matter of course in most counties. After each job, the computer operator is to check the "Syslog"to ensure that the job was completed successfully. After the final run of the job, the operator is to check not only to be certain the job was completed successfully, but also that there were no precincts without secured polling places. For the November 1996 election, this was done. The final run date of this job prior to the November 1996 election was October 12, 1996. The job was run once at 9:45 a.m. and then, again, at 10:12 a.m. The general consensus of staff involved in this process and the vendor was that the 9:45 a.m. job was "flushed" (stopped and deleted) shortly after it was started, because there were additional affidavits to be entered, which staff wanted to have included in the computer-generated mailing, to avoid having to manually produce inserts. Generally, if this job is flushed, or run to completion and the output discarded, the beginning date would have to be reset for each of the nearly 1000 voter precincts to the date of the last successful run of the job, and the beginning dates for those precincts which did not have polling places secured at the time of the last successful run of the job, would have to be reset to "00/00/00." It is apparent from the output report that the beginning date for the final run was the same as the date the job was last successfully run; that the beginning date for those precincts that did not have secured polling places at the time of the last successful run was incorrectly set to the last successful run date; and the beginning date for precincts in which the polling place had changed since the most-recent successful run date had been set to "00/00/00." All of the above happened during a time of high stress, heavy workload requirements, and during which a lot of overtime was being worked by Elections Office staff. There is some uncertainty as to the specific instructions given to the Data Processing Manager by the software vendor as to the procedure and method of resetting these dates. Due to conflicting accounts of what transpired, possible ambiguity of instruction, and, the passage of time since the occurrence, it is not possible to know precisely what transpired. However, the result was that no inserts were generated for voters who registered prior to September 25, 1996, the date of the last successful run, in those precincts for which no polling place had been secured by that date. G Late Sample Ballots. Due to last-minute software modifications requested by the Elections Office, the computer tape for address inserts was sent to the outside printer five days late. As a result, the outside printer responsible for printing sample ballot inserts delivered the finished inserts one day late on September 21, 1996. Inserts were packed in small boxes with standard chipboard separators between 11 carrier route and zip code breaks instead of colored paper separators to which the Office was accustomed. It should be noted that the Elections Office did not request paper separators from the printer at the time the order was placed. The chipboard separators would have caused jams in the inserting equipment and, therefore, had to be replaced with colored paper, slowing down the inserting process considerably. Because of the original delays, 100,000 more inserts due from the printer on September 28 were not delivered until October 1, 1996. As a result of having to process three runs of inserts instead of usual two, having to manually substitute the chipboard separators with colored paper separators and having the inserts packed in small boxes rather than large boxes, the entire procedure was more labor intensive than usual and resulted in delays. Previous described proof-reading errors which necessitated the reprinting of sample ballots also contributed to the delay. , H. Misalignment of Ballot Printing Plates. Contra Costa County Elections Office prepares "camera-ready" art for ballot production. This art is intended to be used in its entirety and printed exactly, front-to-back. Rather than use the art as prepared, because of the process employed in the printing of the ballot cards, the ballot printer inserted the text from the camera-ready art into templates which the printer had prepared in advance. In doing so, there was a slight but noticeable misalignment in the front-to-back registration of the ballot text and voting positions. This error was particularly difficult to detect because the timing marks were aligned properly and only the inserted text was misaligned. The error, which was discovered by the Department Data Processing Manager during standard, routine pre-election testing of the County's vote-count system, had the potential for a serious detrimental effect in the accurate automated counting of the votes. Because the error was generally consistent, the computer vendor was able to adjust the ballot counting hardware to compensate for the printing error in all but two very small ballot types which had to be manually duplicated onto generic duplicate cards. I. Measure KK on All Ballots Within the County. The East Bay Regional Park District submitted two resolutions to the Contra Costa County Elections Office placing two measures on the November 1996 ballot. The resolutions were unusual in that the measures were not called to be voted upon throughout the district. One measure, designated "W", was to be voted on throughout the district with the exception of the area that is included in the East Contra Costa Landscape and Lighting District No. 1. The other measure, designated "LL", was to be voted on only in the portion of the East Bay Regional Park District located within the East Contra Costa County °Landscape and Lighting District No. 1. 'As this would require the Elections Office to create a newly-defined district on the computer system, an exacting task, there is some responsibility on the part of the jurisdiction calling the election to call this to 12 the attention of the elections official. However,, it is ultimately the elections official's responsibility to read, interpret and administer the resolution calling the election. Subsequent to printing the ballots, it was discovered that Measure KK should not appear on the ballot in the same area as Measure LL. Because the ballots were printed with the measures on the same ballot, the system software vendor, DFM, was able to assist in identifying which ballot styles were affected. The ballot counting system was adjusted to ensure that no votes were counted for Measure KK in the East Contra Costa Landscape and Lighting District No. 1. Therefore, this error had no impact on the outcome of the election. J. Second Mailing of Sample Ballots to Ascot Drive. The identification of the problem responsible for non-receipt of sample ballots is difficult to isolate because it is common for voters to call to report missing sample ballots prior to an election. Sample ballots may have been delayed because of the problems discussed in Section III, G, "Late Sample Ballots", or because of the postal delivery. Further, many voters are unaware that sample ballots cannot be forwarded and expect to receive a sample ballot even though they have moved or changed mailing addresses. An Elections Office is able to identify the existence of this type of problem and isolate the problem area only after it receives a pattern of complaint calls. It was such a pattern that alerted the Elections Office to the fact that voters residing on Ascot Drive had not received sample ballots, and eventually led the Office to identify the precincts for which inserts had not been produced. It was originally believed that the voters on Ascot Drive had been sent sample ballots in the regular mailing. Because of the number of complaints received from voters in this area, a telephone survey was conducted and it was ascertained that voters along Ascot Drive had not received sample ballots. As a result, a special mailing was done to provide these voters with their election materials. Upon further investigation, the precincts for which inserts had not been produced were identified and included the Ascot Drive precinct. Unfortunately, by the time these precincts were identified, it was too late to prepare and/or mail sample ballots. The Clerk- Recorder, responsibly, requested the newspaper to print the polling places for these precincts. IV. FINDINGS ON OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES In the process of collecting information regarding the operations of the Elections Office and the specific errors which occurred in the 1996 General Election, it became apparent that many of the errors were a consequence of underlying weaknesses in the operations and management of the Office. Following are the Task Force findings on other elections issues and our recommendations for improvements. 13 A. Leadership. There is a widespread perception of a leadership crisis in the Elections Office. The Task Force finds that there are deficiencies in the leadership of the Elections Office which have contributed to low staff morale, loss of staff's confidence in their ability to successfully conduct a timely and accurate election, and many of the operational problems and procedural errors identified in this report. Deficiencies are identified in the following areas: 1. Communication. The Task Force has identified a remarkable lack of intra office communication as a serious deficiency and the single greatest barrier to improvement. There appears to be no identifiable system of communication between all levels of Elections staff as evidenced by the absence of regular staff meetings, one-on-one meetings between staff and supervisors, informational memos, procedures manuals, etc. The absence of good communication was the underlying source of many of the operational problems and errors identified during the November 1996 election. Moreover, staff time and energy required to react to situations arising from the absence of communication further contributed to communication problems. Part of this lack of communication is attributable to the management style of the Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar. However, communication problems were reported in staff interviews at all levels within the Department. 2. Office Management. The Task Force has identified the Office's lack of focused direction as a basic deficiency and,yet, the simplest to remedy. The Office continues to lack a strategic plan including goals and objectives, values, and short- and long-range plans for growth and adaptation to changes in elections laws, technology, office staff and resources. Due to the significant demands on the Elections Office in 1996, the Clerk- Recorder and Assistant Registrar utilized an ad-hoc approach to decision- making which was 'a source of confusion and frustration to staff. Staff consistently described a work environment of rapid, unannounced changes in assignments, service providers, work methods and policies which were radically different from their accustomed work environment. The Task Force found no evidence of a plan to facilitate the transition of the Elections Office from the old to the new work environment and management styles. 3. Office Organization/Lines of Authority. The Task Force finds that the multitude of reassignments immediately preceding and during the recent elections have resulted in confusion in assignments, roles and responsibilities and lines of authority. Nearly all staff reported that they were unclear as to what their current job duties were and, in some cases, to whom 14 a 1 they reported. Protocols indicated in the organizational chart are, as a rule, not observed. For example, several supervisors cited examples where staff was given assignments, assigned new functions or disciplined without the input or knowledge of the immediate supervisor. The Task Force found evidence of at least six distinct organization charts or sets of charts for the Elections Office disseminated since October 1995 which are attached as Appendix 4. Interviews with staff revealed that some staff had not seen the current organization chart and were working with an outdated concept of the office organization and chain of command. The Office continues to be amorphous, as office assignments have changed since the "current"organization chart(Appendix 3) dated December 2, 1996. 4. Accessibility to Staff. Elections staff complained that the Assistant Registrar is not sufficiently available to staff and other agencies to resolve problems, interpret complex Elections Code provisions, and provide general guidance. Staff consistently reported that the Assistant Registrar was frequently on the phone, in meetings or otherwise absent during critical periods when the need for guidance and problem solving was at its peak. Persistent delays and lack of responsiveness by the Assistant Registrar and other key managers diminished confidence in the office. The unavailability or unwillingness of the Assistant Registrar to provide guidance with some elections procedures required staff to excessively seek guidance from County Counsel, the Secretary of State's Office or other county elections offices, placing an inappropriate burden on staff as well as those agencies. Some staff indicated that they sought assistance from the Clerk-Recorder but that he generally supported the Assistant Registrar's management and policy decisions and was unreceptive to their concerns. 5. Management of Change. There is no apparent plan or schedule to implement changes desired by the Assistant Registrar and the Clerk- Recorder. The Task Force finds that organizational, procedural and system changes were implemented by way of management directives without sufficient study of impacts, input from affected staff members or sufficient preparation time to ensure that the changes could be assimilated and successfully integrated into the election process. Compounding the lack of planning and preparation for change is a staff that is somewhat resistant to change. Based on interviews, staff's resistance appears to be largely attributable to the long-time, relatively specialized and stable work environment in which they worked prior to the recent changes in office leadership, and management's exclusion of the staff in identifying 15 r f needed changes and reluctance to acknowledge staffs concerns with regard to impacts of proposed changes. B. Operations. An assessment of the Electioi:,s Office operations reveals a lack of staffs focus on their mission. The staff tends to operate as a group of autonomous individuals rather than as a team and does not avail itself of basic tools for guidance. The organization does not operate in a systematic fashion, lacking plans and procedures, performance standards and clear employer expectations, and a formal method to monitor, evaluate and improve programs. Employees have little or no sense of understanding or direction as to their day-to-day responsibilities in order to successfully perform their mission. Compounding these operational deficiencies are staff turnover, a sub-standard facility and a poor facility layout. 1. Public/Customer Service. There appear to be little structural emphasis or procedures to encourage employees to seek "continuous improvement' and training, and to view the office as a provider or "public service". While current management correctly identified a lack of training and depth of experience in the Office due to retirements and other staff absences, the methods utilized to train staff have not succeeded in increasing the confidence or knowledge of the staff. 2. Team ConceDt. Staff members report that although they have the desire to work as a team, the office environment is not conducive to teamwork. Instead, employees have sporadically been assigned to perform tasks in a specific part of the election process without awareness as to how their tasks affect the entire process. This is perhaps a symptom of communication problems in the office, however merits mention because teamwork is deemed an essential element in the conduct of a successful election. 3. Written Procedures. The office does not have written procedures for many of its critical functions. This; coupled with a lack of training and cross- training, creates unacceptable levels of vulnerability when key personnel retire or are otherwise absent. The Assistant Registrar has directed some staff to document work procedures, which is still ongoing. 4. The Elections Code. Due to their lack of training and experience in using the Elections Code, several staff members expressed a specific reluctance to use it as a guide to office procedures or problem solving. Employees indicated that the Assistant Registrar promotes reference to the Elections Code but does not provide sufficient guidance and support for its effective use. As a result, staff often must resort to seeking guidance from County Counsel and other county elections offices, resulting in sometimes conflicting interpretations of Elections Code provisions. 16 5. Job Descriptions/DeskiAssignments. "As previously discussed in Part "A" of this section, the office does not appear to have clearly defined job descriptions or desk assignments. Several employees reported some ambiguity in their assigned tasks as traditional job assignments were reconfigured and tasks that were formerly grouped together were reassigned to other individuals. 6. Quality Control/Accountability. Performance expectations and means have not been effectively communicated to staff by the Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar and the office lacks systematic procedures to check that work has been done timely and effectively, particularly during the conduct of an election. As a result of changes in assignments prior to and during the election process, some tasks "fell through the cracks" because employees were uncertain as to who had responsibility for those tasks. In some cases, failure to complete these tasks were not detected until the situation was near to being a crisis. The Task Force also has serious concerns regarding questionable decisions made during the elections process by the Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar. For example,two days following the March 1996 Primary Election, a ballot was issued to a voter who complained that, through an error of the Elections Office, she was not allowed to vote her political party preference. The voter was issued a ballot and secrecy envelope and advised that her vote would only be counted if the Elections Office found, after researching the question, that it was legally permissible to count it. By law, unused ballots are to be sealed or destroyed after the polls close on election day. Ballots should not be available for issue, nor should they be issued, after the polls close on election day. This voter should have been advised that regardless of the error, voting is not allowed after the polls close. Although, according to the Assistant Registrar, this wrote was not counted, the fact that a ballot was issued is cause for concern. In another example, the Assistant Registrar directed that ten additional employees be given a system security access level that would allow them to run computer processes at their own discretion. Because affected staff had no training or experience in this regard, this decision had the potential for causing serious problems related to the submission of computer jobs and processes. For further discussion about the impacts of changes in system security access levels, please refer to Sections III, C and IV, C, 2 (g). Additionally, representatives from the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) reported that a lack of response by the Elections Office to its several requests for missing information on filings prompted the FPPC to conduct a 17 review of both" the Elections Office and the Clerk of the Board's Office. Moreover, at the appointed time for the review, the Assistant Registrar was not available to meet with the FPPC representatives and directed that a Sei.°or Clerk recently assigned to the candidate filing function attend in her stead. Although no irregularities were detected in the review, the lack of one-on-one communication between the Assistant Registrar and the FPPC is cause for concern. A decision was also made to cancel the $3,000 maintenance contract on the inserting machines. These machines require periodic cleaning and maintenance to ensure dependable service. The Elections Office is highly dependent upon the inserting machines to do collating and envelope stuffing that would otherwise have to be done manually at added cost and time. Under this relatively low-cost annual maintenance contract, the machines are serviced at no additional charge at regular intervals and should a breakdown occur, are guaranteed to be serviced within one hour. Should a breakdown occur absent a maintenance agreement, service cannot be guaranteed for at least four hours. 7. Coordination With Other County Agencies. The Assistant Registrar has entered into formal service agreements with outside vendors through the County purchasing and contract process, which saved approximately $32,000 in drayage costs and improved the tracking and delivery of elections materials. 7 However, the office does not appear to avail itself of county resources for assistance in the areas of automated systems, budget and accounting, and business services. For example, advice was not sought from the County's Department of Information Technology with respect to the purchase and installation of PC equipment, education in the areas of software usage and maintenance, and how PCs might be integrated with the Clerk-Recorder Department's mainframe computer. In another example, advice was not sought from the Auditor's Office with respect to maximizing revenue recovery from state mandate reimbursement (SB 90) claims, yet the Auditor's Office has a costing unit which specializes in this area. 8. Facilities and Layout. The physical plant in which the elections functions are located is in a state of disrepair. Most obvious to any observer is the dilapidated state of the building. Water damage from roof leaks and annual flooding is clearly visible. Cracks can be seen in the inside masonry and are currently taped over with duct tape. Room temperature is inconsistent throughout the building. Computer and conference rooms contain exposed pipes and electrical wiring which are potentially hazardous. 18 The building layout creates structural barriers to'efficiency and work flow. For example, the public counter does not appear to be sufficient for peak activity. Due to limited space, staff, equipment and supplies are not positioned to effectively respond to business at the front counter. Additionally, some staff are located too far in proximity from their immediate supervisors for effective supervision and support. 9. Staffing Levels/Depth of Experience. Conversations with other counties and Elections staff did not indicate a need for more staff in the Elections Office. However, the Elections Office lost extensive experience due to the retirement or medical leaves of key personnel. This loss significantly impaired the office's ability to function in recent elections. In addition, the sharing of data entry personnel between the Recorder and Election offices does not appear to be efficient as there is no clear expectation as to when data entry staff are to be assigned to elections functions. 10. Procedures to Identify and Document Needs for Additional Resources. It does not appear that procedures or systems exist to monitor current programs to determine if more resources are needed e.g. employee workload statistics to document personnel needs, phone logs to document t> communications needs, etc. C. Automated Systems/Technology. 1. Voice Mail (Automated Attendant) System. The Elections Office began utilizing the County's voice mail system beginning with the March 1996 primary election. Several problems regarding the use of the system were identified: a. Due to the age of the Elections Office telephone equipment, telephone sets are not equipped with lights or other indicators to alert the operators that voice mail messages were waiting in the queue. The lack of these indicators required phone set operators to frequently check their voice mail boxes for messages in a manual mode. b. Because of the introduction of new staff in both the Elections Office and the Telecommunications Division of the General Services Department prior to the March 1996 election and between the March and November 1996 elections, and also because voice mail had never been used before the March 1996 election, there was no "history" of what to expect regarding telephone traffic for the November 1996 General Election. Furthermore, the prior Assistant 19 Registrar, during his tenure, arranged for additional telephone lines directly with Pacific Bell, bypassing the County's General Services Department. Thus, the General Services Department had no prior experience preparing for a County election. C. Other operational errors occurring during the November 1996 election such as missing or duplicate sample and absentee ballots, contributed to unexpectedly higher telephone and voice mail traffic during the two-week period prior to the November 1996 election. d. In an effort to cope with the high volume of calls during the most hectic period preceding the November 1996 election, Elections staff manually selected to "call-forward" incoming telephone traffic to voice mail first, to be answered at a later time. The call-forwarding, compounded by voice mail boxes not being checked and purged frequently enough, caused an overload in the fifteen percent safety margin built into the County's voice mail system. This overload was detected through service calls made by several County departments fi reporting voice mail problems. e. There is some evidence that non-public telephone numbers reserved for precinct workers to communicate with the Elections Office were distributed publicly by a voter advocate group(s). These non-public telephone numbers bypass the sequencing system which puts the incoming call in a queue, causing additional congestion on incoming telephone lines. f. A review of work orders and other related documents indicated that the General Services Telecommunications and Elections Office staff took the necessary and appropriate actions to plan and prepare for the telephone and voice mail requirements for the November 1996 election and responded quickly (working continuously over a 72-hour period) to correct the voice mail overload once it was detected. Telecommunications had a minimum of two full-time employees assigned to the Elections Office prior to the November 1996 election. There appear to have been few complaints about the telephone and voice mail system once the telephone vendor and telecommunications staff replaced the initial voice mail application with "Universal Call Distribution Group" application software over the weekend of November 2, 1996. The Universal Call Distribution Group system remains in place today. 20 r k+ i. 2. Computer Operation/Application. The Clerk-Recorder computer systems involve an extremely complex set of issues including technology philosophies, functions, application system designs, staff interaction with cowputers, and the integration of different computer applications and components with general office procedures. The Elections, Recorder and Clerk offices all employ the same physical computer sharing three sets of application software to perform the different business functions of the Department. The computer hardware and major portions of application software are located in the Elections Office. The Recorder and Clerk office staffs sharing the computer are located at a separate site. There appear to be no problems in running the multiple processes according to the Department's data processing staff. However, the Elections data processing manager reports there is not sufficient support dedicated to elections applications on a regular basis. Based on interviews and site visits, the Task Force observed the following: a. The physical- computer room is marginal at best. There were noticeable leakage spots in the ceiling, exposed communications wiring and equipment, and minimal physical security to the room. b. Data processing staff in the Elections Office has not received adequate training for the recent changes in the Elections Office { hardware,software and communications equipment, specifically in the desktop computing environment. C. The Assistant Registrar, Assistant Recorder and Department data processing managers do not meet on a regular basis. This lack of communication has resulted in a lack of knowledge by the Assistant Registrar about the requirements for the operation and security of the elections (DFM) application system. The Assistant Registrar appears to be making decisions based upon her knowledge of the DIMS system model used at Yolo County which is technologically quite different in design and operational requirements from Contra Costa County's DFM system. The DIMS system is designed to allow users to run their required processing functions from their desktop, without the assistance of or coordination by a central system administrator. The Assistant Registrar prefers the DIMS system model to DFM, and appears to be attempting to make the DFM system work like the DIMS system, which is technically impossible. d. There is a lack of knowledge and understanding on the part of all Elections Office staff members as to their -expectations of the 21 capabilities of the DFM system as opposed to its actual capabilities, and how to achieve the desired products and results from the system. e. There are a lack of written ��rocedures and training on operating the DFM application system on a day-to-day basis. Only those employees who "have been around a long time" understand how the system operates. The existing documentation is located in only two places within the Elections Office, is highly technical and difficult to read, has been annotated by longtime staff members for ease of understanding and is too cumbersome for new staff to easily understand. Therefore, it does not get used by new staff. f. The Assistant Registrar modified existing security procedures for system use against the advice of Elections data processing staff. The vendor was apparently not consulted about the potential consequences of this action, although the vendor was asked about the effects of doing certain things with the system at a later time. g. Security procedures governing the access to and operation of the system by Elections Office staff members were not consistent with the design of the system. Staff had the capability of initiating jobs from their own workstations without respect to system protocols governing the proper timing and sequence of jobs, which resulted in certain functions not working properly or security routines being overridden. h. A potential exacerbation of the aforementioned systems issues was identified as a result of the introduction of desktop laser printers which may be inappropriate for the application as designed. The utilization of the printers reduced the efficiency of the system, tying it up for hours at a time, and required constant attention during job processing, frustrating users and other office staff. L There was no preparation or advice given to staff prior to purchase and installation of 13 new personal computers (ten were installed and three are still in boxes). There is corroboration between the Assistant Registrar and staff that the desktop units were introduced into the office without the prior knowledge of departmental data processing staff, and that the staff has received no training on the use and maintenance of the machines or software. The last three PCs were not installed because of the expense of having an "outside" party install them and because there is uncertainty as to how they are to be connected to the centralized elections system nor how they are to be 22 maintained. The fact that the tasks to be run on the new PCs could have been accomplished with the current DFM system employed by the office was not investigated by the Assistant Registrar or Clerk- Recorder. j. Backup procedures for the PCs are not in place. k. Another Elections employee, who has no formal PC technology training, has"networked"the PCs together and maintains this network on a part-time basis, as time allows between accomplishing his regularly assigned tasks. Elections data processing staff apparently have no involvement with the PC network or its maintenance. V. RECOMMENDATIONS The Task Force recommends that the Elections Office prepare a short- and long-range organizational improvement plan based upon an agreed-upon mission statement. The improvement plan would identify activities required to meet the goals and objectives embodied in the mission statement and take into account the findings contained herein. The plan should include time lines and deadlines for completion for each activity. The 4, essential elements of the planning effort are: A. Leadership 1. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should work with Elections Office staff to develop a mission statement which reflects the statutory and regulatory charge of the office, its goals and values, and which is understood and accepted by the employees, and supported by the County Administrator and Board of Supervisors. A well defined mission statement would provide all Elections Office employees with a common goal, and support team development within the office and assist in clarifying expectations for service and performance. 2. The Clerk-Recorder, Assistant Registrar and office supervisors should ensure that the office's activities are directed towards achieving its goals and objectives and should continually reinforce the goals and objectives with all staff. 3. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should set clear expectations for effective communications within the Elections Office and must implement an overall office communication structure including regular meetings between: 23 • The Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar • The Clerk-Recorder and Elections Office staff. • The Assistant Registrar and the management team. • The Assistant Registrar and Elections Office staff. 4. The Clerk-Recorder should obtain the services of a facilitator from the County Training Institute or a qualified outside agency to promote communication and teamwork within the Elections Office. 5. The Elections Office should establish, with meaningful employee participation, an organizational structure which reflects clearly defined office functions and lines of authority. The Assistant Registrar should ensure that lines of authority are observed. 6. The Assistant Registrar needs to allocate her time to ensure that she is accessible to staff to provide guidance and support, particularly during peak periods of activity which require quick and decisive response. 7. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should establish a process which takes full advantage of the knowledge and input of staff to create a vision of what and where the office wants to be in the next two to five years, the changes necessary to achieve that vision, and a plan to gradually implement and accommodate those changes. Prospective changes need to be effectively communicated to all levels of staff. B. Operations. 1. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should establish standards for employee performance, including employee evaluation and recognition programs. 2. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should establish standards for customer service and should communicate these standards to all staff. Performance in this area should be monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. 3. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar, with the assistance of an outside facilitator, should involve the staff in team building exercises to restore cohesiveness, mutual respect and confidence among elections staff members. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar must, by their own example, promote teamwork and effective communication. 24 4. The Elections Code and other governing codes should be a basis for office procedures and problem solving. Staff should, at the minimum, be trained on sections of the Elections Code which affect and govern its specific functions. Ideally, staff shoul6,receive broad training on the Elections Code and its application to promote a sound working knowledge of the entire elections process. 5. The services of experts on the Elections Code should be obtained to provide assistance to Elections Office staff in the documentation of Elections Code requirements and procedures. These written procedures would assist in the training of new or reassigned staff and serve as a reference for non-routine procedures that can be forgotten due to lack of repetition. Interpretations of the Elections Code relating to specific situations that arise in the preparation of or during an election should be documented and communicated to affected staff. 6. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar, with assistance from the management team, should establish written desk manuals with clear performance expectations and task completion deadlines for every employee. Written task descriptions are vital for a well organized office and to ensure that no part of the process gets overlooked. z 7. The'Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar should establish an employee training program including: ✓ Project planning skills and training for specific tasks. ✓ Visits to other counties to observe elections procedures. ✓ Regular "round table" discussions of areas of the Elections Code or issues identified by staff as timely. ✓ Regular"briefings"for clerical staff on issues which, due to the timing of the election cycle, may be raised by members of the public. ✓ Proofing guidelines and standards. ✓ Regular "post mortems" on problems and successes following each election, incorporating ideas to improve future elections. ✓ Regular discussion of new laws relating to elections. ✓ Attendance by key staff at meetings of the County Clerks' Association, including participation on subcommittees assigned to specific issue areas of elections. ✓ Attendance by key staff at meetings with the computer vendor. ✓ Regular routing of communications from the state to all program or team leaders, for discussion with their teams. ✓ Computer/PC training from the County's Department of Information Technology or other qualified agency. ✓ New employee job training and orientation. 25 8. The Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar, working with their management team, and the Human Resources Department, should institute procedures to assess office functions to ensure that :here is appropriate personnel and other resources. 9. The Clerk-Recorder and Assistant Registrar, with employee input, should identify quality control check points throughout the critical steps of the elections process and incorporate these checkpoints into the routine operating procedures. The Assistant Registrar should take an active role in monitoring the checkpoints and ensuring that the staff has the necessary resources to complete critical tasks successfully and on time. C. Automated Systems/Technology. 1. The Elections Office should consult with other counties with comparable telephone usage levels to determine: a. Approximate number of telephone calls or "traffic hits" usually received during the elections process. b. The best process for deveioping a flow process/staffing model that will provide for the efficient and quick distribution of incoming telephone traffic to different positions within the office, depending upon the nature of the inquiry. C. Whether an automated attendant is an appropriate telephone 4 communications tool during the last 30 days prior to an election and under what circumstances an automated attendant should not be used. 2. Work with the County's Telecommunications Division and the telephone vendor to develop a telephone usage model by testing: • "Busy Study" at the main incoming line. • Usage study for overall call volume. • Call volume on a "per-line" basis. • "Holding Pattern" limits on incoming lines. This study can be set up with the vendor within two weeks of request by the County. 26 , 3. The Elections Office should consult with the County's Telecommunications Division and the County's telephone/voice mail system vendor to: a. Upgrade the Elections Office telephone system with telephone sets capable of giving operators some sort of visual or verbal indication that voice mail messages are waiting for attention in that line's mail box queue. b. Develop a model for estimating the amount of voice and voice mail traffic flowing through the system on a monthly basis. C. Develop a plan that allows for a minimum 25% voice mail queue safety margin for future elections. d. Eliminate problems within the phone system that cause incoming calls to be disconnected when transferred. 4. The Assistant Registrar should initiate periodic meetings with the Clerk- Recorder, all departmental data processing staff, DFM business and technical staff and, when appropriate, the ballot printer, which would focus on: a. Re-establishing and maintaining appropriate system security procedures for all staff members. b. The sharing of knowledge and education about DFM application software functions, specifically with respect to the elections applications. Emphasis should be placed on developing key managers' understanding of the abilities of the application and its report output capabilities, the results and consequences of running jobs out of sequence, the appropriate individuals to be afforded access to high level functions (security), the disaster recovery of crucial system functions, and the integration of the work flow process and application software. C. The development and.maintenance of job schedules to be performed by data processing staff to ensure that all functions of the system are utilized appropriately, that the system meets the needs of both the Elections and the Recorder Divisions and that there is optimum support for all application functions. d. Assessment of the integration of existing desktop technology with the existing centralized system and the future impact of such integration. 27 e. Assessment of the laser printer set-up and function, and its impact on the work flow process and application programs. f. Development of a triage function to be employed when there are system problems. This procedure should include a roster of persons responsible for carrying a given problem through to resolution, depending upon the nature and severity of the problem and staff available to respond. g. The mechanics of automated ballot counting with the DFM Mark-A- Vote system. h. The requirements for printing Mark-a-Vote ballots including the importance of front-to-back registration, the effects of skew and how to ensure that the ballots have been properly printed. i. The possibility of enhancing the ballot layout/camera-ready art subsystem to produce art in a format more easily adaptable to the printer's process of ballot printing (full ballot, one side, up to five cards across, as opposed to individual cards collated and stapled at a later point). 5. The Clerk-Recorder Department should focus on upgrading data processing skill sets to include desktop technology(hardware,software,communications requirements, local area network maintenance, integration of existing computer platforms, and back-up methodologies that team desktops with the central computer). 6. The Clerk-Recorder Department should make no precipitous decisions to convert from the existing mainframe system to-a distributed processing system without a full assessment of both types of systems, including a cost/benefit analysis, by the County's Department of Information Technology, working in concert with department data processing staff. Moreover, no additional desktop equipment/software should be purchased or installed by the Elections Office until department data processing skill sets are upgraded to support these new technologies. 7. In order to allow sufficient time for testing and training, any changes made in any of the Office's automated systems should be implemented well in advance of an election. 8. Unless and until such time as the computer vendor is able to modify the system to provide full ballot artwork, it is imperative that the ballot printer use 28 the camera-ready art as provided and not employ the "template" method used in past elections. 9. The Clerk-Recorder, and key management and data ;processing staff members should consult with the County's Director of Information Technology to develop a two-year tactical plan to accomplish the following- a. Identification of requirements to either remodel the existing computer room or relocate the computer equipment to a more secure and physically reliable environment. b. Development of appropriate long-term system security procedures. C. Identification of education requirements for management and technical staff in the Department. d. Development- of an infrastructure requirements model for the Department. e. Connection to the County's Wide Area Network to provide County- wide automation capabilities among Elections staff. f. Development of staffing requirements commensurate with technology needs and funding availability of the Department, including the analysis of dedicating data entry staff to the Elections Office. g. Analysis and discussion as to the desirability, feasibility and cost- benefit of changing computer and/or vote counting systems, and switching from producing sample ballot inserts to booklets. VI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE The last 18 months has been a demanding and challenging time of transition and adjustment for the Elections Office. Unfortunately, the problems and errors that occurred in the recent elections have overshadowed the fact that the basic goals of the election process were accomplished despite the many challenges facing the Office. The Elections Office staff was completely dedicated to its mission of conducting an accurate election and worked diligently, at great personal sacrifice, to ensure that it was accomplished. The ultimate success of the elections, despite the errors, is a credit to a staff which has a strong work ethic and a sense of moral obligation to the public. 29 The elections process is a classic example of a team effort. No one person can successfully conduct an election; it requires the cooperative efforts of many. In order to .revitalize the Office, Elections staff will be faced with challenges to improve communication, create a vision of the kind of organization it wants to be, and nurture a work environment in which the knowledge, experience and special skills of each individual are appreciated and utilized. Timing is critical. Preparation for the next major election in November 1997 will begin in July. Moreover, one city election is scheduled for April 1997. Much remains to be done for the Office to get itself on the right track to conduct the next election. It is recommended that the assistance of an outside facilitator be secured as a guide to help the Office on its journey to re-create and revitalize itself. The Task Force has attempted to provide a "road map" identifying important stops along the way. But the power to reach the destination is ultimately in the hands of the drivers, the Clerk-Recorder and the Assistant Registrar, and the engine, the Elections staff. 30 APPENDICES l APPENDIX 1: Report to the Board of Supervisors from Phil Batchelor and Steve Weir TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 6 Contra PHIL BATCHELOR, COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR .;. FROM: STEPHEN L. WEIR, COUNTY CLERK-RECORDER Costa DATE: November 14, 1996 °°�i, J County UUN SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL AUDIT OF THE ELECTIONS DIVISION AND OF THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 5, 1996 SPECIFIC REOUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. ACKNOWLEDGE that the staff of the Elections Division worked for 28 straight days prior to the November 5, 1996 election and COMMEND the staff for their dedication, tireless effort and willingness to go beyond normal expectations in an effort to insure that all registered voters had an opportunity to vote on November 5, 1996. 2. ACKNOWLEDGE that the November 5, 1996 ballot was one of the most complex!-,rer handled by the Elections Division staff,with 135 different ballot types,975 different precincts, 796 different polling places, 555,734 registered voters, and over 360,000 voters having cast ballots, over 84,000 of which were cast by absentee and provisional ballot. 3. ACKNOWLEDGE that the County Clerk-Recorder negotiated the delivery, set up and dismantling of precinct materials in 1996,for a savings of$32,000 for this election over the previous method of handling this function and a four-year savings of between$100,000 and $200,000. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: -YES SIGNATURE: RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR -RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMMITTEE ,APPROVE OTHER SIGNATURE(S): PHIL BATCHELOR 1EIR ACTION OF BOARD ON NeyembEIF 19,1996 APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED OTHER_ VOTE OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE UNANIMOUS(ABSENT t AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN AYES: NOES: AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD ABSENT: ABSTAIN: OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN. ATTESTED Contact: County Administrator PHIL BATCHELOR.CLERK OF THE BOARD OF cc: - -County Clerk-Recorder SUPERVISORS AND COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR - Assistant County Registrar BY ,DEPUTY 4. NOTE the installation of an optical disc signature retrieval system that allows rapid sirInature checking on. absentee ballot envelopes. In addition, RECOUNIZE that a bar coding system has been implemented on all absentee ballot lot applications and on all absentee ballot return envelopes. When combined with the signature retrieval system,the Elections Division staff were able to p ?cess og absentee ballots received by Elections eve on November 4, 1996 - some 60,000! This success is unprecedented in Contra Costa County. 5. At the same time, RECOGNIZE that there have been some significant avoidable and correctable mistakes which plagued the operation of the 1996 General Election. AGREE that these mistakes are too numerous,too serious and avoidable to be dismissed as typical election mistakes. 6. CONCLUDE that these mistakes included the following: + Wrong carrier route system. The Post Office changed their carrier route system July 1, 1996 and Elections did not properly take this into account in sorting voting materials by carrier route. A waiver was negotiated for this election. Staff responsible for the mailing operation should have known this. + Extensive proofreading errors causing a five day delay in ballot/sample ballot printing. The printer is billing the Clerk$87,406 for materials that had to be destroyed. + Three incidents of incorrect sets of absentee ballots being sent out which impacted 294 voters. + One incident of 97 duplicate absentee ballots being sent out. + Due to faulty design and lack of capacity, and excessive calls due to citizen complaints,mainly regarding sample ballots, massive failure of the telephone system. + At least 3,600 voters not receiving sample ballots in six precincts due to human error. 7. In response to these mistakes, ENDORSE the fact that an "Elections Task Force"has been established to conduct an extensive operations review of the elections system in the County. A review team consisting of staff from the County Administrator's office, the Secretary of State's Office and other counties'election offices will conduct a thorough review of the elections office and recommend the installation of safeguards that will avoid a repeat of the problems described above. 8. ENDORSE the establishment of a Citizens Advisory Group to be appointed by the County Clerk as a permanent group to advise him on elections policies, procedures, and operations. 9. REQUEST that the County Clerk and County Administrator follow up with a report to the Board of Supervisors on the changes which will be made in the Elections Office once the review has been completed. -2- BACKGROUND: It has been clear from media accounts and individual complaints that some substantial problems have caused questions about the November 5, 1996 election in Contra Costa County. There have been problems. There have also been a number of improvements and cost-saving features installed over the past year or so. Despite the substantial improvements and cost-savings, it remains an inescapable fact that problems have occurred which should not have occurred. In order to assure the Board of Supervisors and the voting public that everything possible is being done to conduct fair and accurate elections in this County,we are forming an Elections Task Force. This Task Force will be charged with the following: • Determine what errors occurred in the November 5,.1996 election, including the days and weeks leading up to election day and during the days following the election. • Determine what systems or management practices were in place that may had led to or contributed to these errors. • Determine what changes should be made in the operation and management of the Elections Division to reduce the likelihood that the same type of errors will reoccur in the future. Determine in at least general terms the cost of any changes that are recommended in order to improve the operation and management of the Elections Division. This Task Force should be strictly time limited in duration and should address only the issues relating to the November 5, 1996 election. The County Clerk is also establishing a more permanent Citizens Advisory Group that will meet on a regular basis with the County Clerk to assess the status of the Elections Divisions and its systems, operations and management and make recommendations to improve the systems, operations and management of the Elections Division. APPENDIX 2: Press Release by Steve Weir Dated December 3, 1996 From: Steve Weir Date: December 3, 1996 Re: November 5, 1996 General Election in Contra Costa Phone: (510) 646-2955 This is a preliminary report on the Elections held in Contra Costa November 5, 1996. ♦ Contra Costa had the highest registration on record, 8.8% higher than the Primary. (See "Vote History for Contra Costa", Attachment"A".) ♦ Voter turn out was the second highest in Contra Costa history(numerically lower than four years ago). ♦ Absentee voting was a record 102,188 ballots issued and 90,409 returned. ♦ Of the 90,409 returned, 2,8751 absentee and mail only ballots were not counted because they arrived after November 5, 1996. (Close to 81% of those ballots were post marked on or before November 5, 1996. Post marks do not count in determining timely voting.) (See"Late Arriving Mail", Attachment`B".) ♦ Under the"Disposition of Challenged Ballots", 2,576 absentee and mail only ballots were challenged at the first level of review for a variety of reasons. Some ballots had multiple problems. 1 Numbers that are not part of the official canvass(were not counted for various reasons cited) represent a quick hand count. Some have a variety of problems and may fit into more than on rejection category. Page 2,press release December 3, 1996 After two levels of review, 1,569 were approved for counting. Of the remaining 1,007 that were not permitted to be counted, 468 had no signatures' and 247 had signatures that (would not match. Non matched signature voters will receive a new affidavit of registration to capture their current signature. (See Attachment"C"). ♦ 3,923 people cast provisional ballots at the polls. This number is twice the number cast in previous elections. 2,603 were good. .1,320 were rejected for a variety of reasons. (See "Disposition of Provisional Ballots",.Attachment"D"). The three main reasons for provisional ballots to be rejected are: 1) 296 cases where poll workers did not write down motor voter identification, 2) 549 claimed rights under motor voter did not have previous registration in Contra Costa County, and 3) 207 voted in wrong precinct. The"No I.D." category is clearly a training issue for poll workers. A record number of poll workers were trained for the November Election. In the past, we had 10 to 20% attend training. Close to 65%went to training for this election. A hands on training section will be designed for motor-voter provisional ballots in the future. Aggressive attention was given to try to qualify motor voter ballots. However 549 were not previously registered in Contra Costa and thus could not be qualified to vote. (They 2 Election Office practice is to return absentee ballots without signatures to,the voter. Due to mail constraints, we stopped this mail back six days before the election. Page 3,press release December 3, 1996 did fill out new affidavits and will be registered for future elections.) The 207 who voted in wrong precincts were disqualified because they voted a different ballot type that contained races for which they were not qualified to vote. If voters voted a ballot less than or equal to their home precinct ballot type that ballot was counted. Of the"good" provisional ballots, 831 people claimed that they had requested absentee ballots but had received none. We investigated their provisional ballots, found that they had requested an absentee ballot but none had been returned. (We logged in virtually all absentee ballots prior to checking provisional ballots to avoid allowing people to double vote.) Twenty six provisional ballots were rejected because the voter had already cast a valid absentee ballot. (A post-election voter history is being conducted to check for any cases of double voting.) Of note is the 94 envelopes that did•not contain ballots. Some of these ballots could have been placed in the ballot box. Special investigation to check for potential double voting is planned. ♦ 179 mail only precincts were established where 8,759 people were designated to vote by Page 4,press release December 3, 1996 mail only. Voter turn out was 5,708 out of 8,759 or 65.2%. Over all turn out for this election was 64.1%. This was the highest"Vote by Mail Only" in Contra Costa's history. Several mail only precincts were new due to special districts, such as the Contra Costa Central Sanitary District election which split up several central county precincts. Voters not accustomed to mail only precinct voting confused the mail only ballot with sample ballot and set it aside. Future mail only precinct voters will receive a warning post card prior to receiving the mail only ballot. Mail only ballots will be redesigned to include the official seal of the county clerk to draw attention to the ballot. ♦ Of the 356,383 Contra Costa voters in this election, 2,289 did not vote for president, 864 voted for two or more candidates for president and approximately seven hundred wrote in someone/something for president. There were five Secretary of State approved write-in candidat&. Seven people wrote in one of these names. The remainder wrote in such candidates as Mickey Mouse, Jack-In-The-Box, Frank Zappa, Bob Green, Collin Powell, Bob Hope, Ronald Reagan, Pat Paulson, Bill Gates, Pat Buchanan, Edward Kennedy, Yogi Bear, God and many more. More than one person wrote in Ralph Nader. While he was not a qualified write-in 3Willie Felix Carter, Charles E. Collins, Joel Gary Neuberg, James E. Harris and Isabell Masters. Page 5,press release December 3, 1996 candidate and thus the write in can't be controlled,.his name does appear on the ballot! ♦ The Election's Office conducted an under vote review for the 7th Senatorial District and 15th Assembly District. Our interest was to detect machine reading problems. Antioch precinct 6042 was selected for a hand count of under votes due to 48 under votes in the 15th Assembly District. Also, it was noted that there was a 200 under vote for City Council (Vote for two option). The hand count did reveal an 11.l% under vote for the 15th Assembly District. In addition, there was a 10.2%under vote for Council. We found that 62%voted for two, 28% voted for one, 9% did not vote and 1% did other, like write-in on over vote. ♦ Six precincts were identified as not having received sample ballots. One was identified early enough to receive a sample ballot mailing during the week preceding the election. Of the 3,000 plus complaint calls received and logged by the Elections Office, the vast majority concerned not having received their sample ballot. A duplicate was sent first class each day to any voter who called to complain. (Several callers were voters who had moved and did not re-register. Sample ballots are not forwardable. While many callers were from the six excluded precincts, most of the callers were from hundreds of precincts Page 6,press release December 3, 1996 located throughout Contra Costa. Voter turn out lagged that of their local community as a whole. However, the same pattern existed for these six precincts in the March 26, 1996 Primary. (See Attachment «E» Attachment"A" Vote History for Contra Costa County Election Voter Total % Absentee %Voting # Date Registration Tum Out Turn Out Vote Absentee Precincts Nov. 5, 1996 555,734 356,383 *80,819 975 64.10% 22.70% March 26, 1996 510,990 216,359 52,798 839 42.30% 24.40% Nov. 8, 1994 492,562 305,529 67,316 953 62.00% 22.00% June 7, 1994 475,884 169,670 36,071 821 35.70% 21.30% Nov. 3, 1992 507,451 389,391 76,624 946 76.70% 19.70% June 2, 1992 452,315 216,287 44,902 800 47.80% 20.80% Nov., 1990 453,435 277,999 58,115 906 61.30% 20.90% June, 1990 431,802 200,263 35,742 791 46.40% 17.80% Nov. 8, 1988 452,491 341,149 54,424 75.40% 16.00% " Does not include 5,708 mail only ballots returned. Attachment"B" Late Arriving Mail (after November 5, 1996) Date Absentee Mail Out of Received Voters Federal Only County Total ................. Wed. Nov. 6, 1996 . 1265 5 35 314 1619 Thu. Nov. 7, 1996 487 5 67 122 681 Fri. Nov. 8, 1996 152 15 35 94 296 Tue. Nov. 12, 1996 91 20 .10 43 164 Wed. Nov. 13, 1996 15 3 4 11 33 Thu. Nov. 14, 1996 9 0 5 6 20 Fri. Nov. 15, 1996 6 0 0 5 11 Mon. Nov. 18, 1996 2 1 0 10 13 Tue. Nov. 19, 1996 1 0 0 0 1 Wed. Nov. 20, 1996 2 0 0 1 3 Thu. Nov. 21, 1996 0 0 0 1 1 Fri. Nov. 22, 1996 3 0 0 7 10 Mon. Nov. 25, 1996 5 0 0 4 9 Mon. Dec. 2, 1996 11 0 0 3 14 . ..... . :.t56...::. ......521 . ....: .2875 Attachment"C" Disposition of Challenged Ballot: No Signature 468 Wrong/Bad Signature 247 Delivered Without Authorization 31 Changed Address 59 Voided Affidavit 17 Duplicate Ballot 18 Submitted not under penalty of: Perjury 123 Voided 1 Miscellaneous 37 Canceled 1 Not enough information 5 Total 1007 Also,logged in 138 ballots surrendered at polls,3 Primary Election ballots and 19 out of county ballots dropped off at Contra Costa polling places. A Attachment"D" Disposition of Provisional Ballots: 3,923 Cast 2,603 Good 1 1,320 Rejected 2 Category of Rejected Provisional Ballots: Not Registered to Vote 33 Motor Voter-No I.D. 296 Motor Voter-Not Registered 549 Wrong Precinct(greater than) 207 No Name 18 No Address/Incomplete 8 Double Ballot 6 Absentee Voter Ballots Surrendered at Polls (Provisional Envelope) 12 No Signature 2 Printed Signature not Signed 7 Miscellaneous 16 Out-of-County Address 19 Out-of-County Move 27 Had Good Absentee Voter Ballots Returned 26 No Ballot 94 1320 Of 2,603"good",831 were people who applied for an absentee voter ballot, were issued one and who did not return the absentee voter ballot. 2 26 of these were people who had received and voted an absentee voter ballot. Attachment"E" Turn Out Precinct Primary General Community Community 24,088 28.40% 41.50% 40.20% 58.20% 48,006 23.80% 54.2010 50.50% 64.70% 48,013 33.20% 52.80% 50.50% 64.70% 62,016 27.80% 57.20% 52.80% 66.80% 62,019 32.70% 56.90% 52.80% 66.80% 96,520 39.60% 59.00% 50.40% 64.90% APPENDIX 3: Elections Office Organizational Chart as of Dec. 2, 1996 Elections Department Steve Weir Clerk-Recorder Jeannie Ziegler Executive Secretary Barbara Lee F- Assistant Registrar Jeanine Mangewala *Secretary Voter Registration Unit Precinct Services Unit ElectiorWR-4cwdac 1J�t Roxy Dunning Davis Russ Fernandez -;r"Kay Sasek Election/Registration Manager -Election/Registration Manager DP Manager Candidate/Campaign Services Polling Place/Rover/Precinct Officers Services Elections/Recordc s Services Sue Olvera George McKeever ****Gwen Saxon Election Processing Supervisor **Election Technician Assistant DP Manager Precinct Officers Campai6n Dorabeth Sutterfield ***Gladys Robinson ++Joarm Kinzel Virginia Harguth Senior Clerk Data Entry Operator Data Entry Operator Experienced Clerk MBPPmB Ballot Layout +SerVacant Drafter ***Emiko McGee ++Pearlie Slaughter Lois Berry Data Entry Operator Data Entery Operator **Sr.Clerk Warehouse Candidate Tony Sincich ***Alice Chien —Dorothy Chavez Vacant Election Technician Data Entery Operator Data Entry Operator **Sr.Clerk Registration/Petition/Absentee s**Sookja Chai ++Vacant Dennis Heckart Data Entry Operator Data Entry Operator +Election Processing Supervisor ++****David Lew Karen Fears Computer Operator Senior Clerk Nidia Santos Experienced Clerk `New upgraded positions **Proposed upgrade ss.},�c�a.1eS faded by the Recorder's and staff spends 10-15%of their time working in the Elections Department "**15%of time spent working in the Elections Department +New authorized positions ++Recorder's Staff and on Recorder's payroll rev.12/02/96 APPENDIX 4: Previous Elections Office Organizational Charts ,-7 wƒ! \� � . � . ` • ' ' � . � � { � % ' � 9 » � � . � a . \ k -s9 . \ �� . \ \ � \ � , k ` � k , \ ° \ \ . / n � ® �k �\ . � ` ! \ . \� ! \\ � . t! . _ � `� . � 7 . � . .( � . � �f \ � � �k . . �, ° \ A . . > � \ . £ � � S \ \� � � . 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O w r � r w O O O ' A } C (1 M • r n p oo '~Los r K Z O Y N r j c A A A O O V < G O p N 1 < p 7 O p Y Q O 3 n N CL c rn a t = VN tI1 m m m m � n f m Cg N w m t0 tL7 F tiL 4 F c y v m m C to m.� n < o 4 5 N W � � c� ;v o ro , o mm c� w rn-o < 0 CD VI m n n w m ;n to to w t/f N � epi T7 ^ 11 O N co C) iy tl m m w O m ^ o c w 7 m Q m 9 Li- A.- m ° p b � �� P m w w m ^o 0 o Dv Qo -•� QvNi p n O N w w w •(N ti ^ Q wCD W CD ^ of m o �� c o m w m .. o SPP COSTq CO RESTER Gyi STEPHEN L WEIR CONTRA COSTA COUNTY comny CLERK REGISTRATION-ELECTION DEPARTMENT BARBARA LEE MARTINEZ.CALIFORNIA 94553-0027 sisr�w10 646�isrxaR VOTE st cccr'oN DEPPP�� P.O.BOX 271 October 4, 1995 To: All Elections Staff Fr: Barbara Re: Staff Assignments Effective as of today, Russ will be acting Election and Registration Manager. Any matters that you would have normally brought to the attention of Roxy should be addressed to Russ . Also, there will be some matters that you have addressed to Bob in the past that will be reassigned to Russ. Even though Russ, will be acting manager, he will still be responsible for the Mapping/Precinct/Warehouse Operation. Some of you may be assigned additional tasks because of the shortage of staff. Attached is a temporary organizational chart for the duration of this November election. During this change in assignments, I will attempt to look at the overall organization of the office. Russ or I may be asking for your functional statements/task description/procedures during this process. This will then give me a clearer picture of each of your tasks and the appropriate job classifications for those tasks . I know this is a busy and difficult time with the shortage of staff and the upcoming election. I appreciate all the support and dedication you have shown during this transition. CC : Steve Weir ADDRESS BY SHARON ARATA TO CONTRA COSTA BOARD OF SUPERVISORS MARCH 11, 1997 Good morning (afternoon?)..My name is Sharon Arata, and as chair of an issues subcommittee for the county's Central Republican Committee, I have organized 4 to 5 dozen poll watchers for each of the last 3 elections, with particular attention paid to the last 3 elections. Speaking for'a group of citizens who have invested considerable time and money conducting our own investigation of Election Department practices, I request a few extra minutes beyond the normal limit.... My husband and I both appreciate the Task Force Report and its conclusions about — and I quote — "the underlying weaknesses in the management and operations of the Elections Department" and the Report's conclusion that operational difficulties in the Department begin owithpoor administrative delineation of the staff's duties and functions. r- s I wish the investigation had included the November, 1995 election—in articular the Measure rn a P C ballot issue in that election. Measure C was a school bond issue which involved, in the __ c view of its opponents, absolutely outrageous projected expenditures and an expensive interest oZ scheme as well. During the extensive investigation of roster books and other records which _. -0 occurred.before and during our citizen-sponsored recount we found the sta to be courteous, atient,:helpful, and diligent. We found the on-site administrator — i.e., Barbara Lee — to e unreliable, arbitrary, and capricious. Our look at the Measure C election began with a process unperformed or underperformed by the Election Department: a rigorous and comprehensive precinct-by-precinct reconciliation of all the various signature and ballot counts and other records. In the first precinct we then selected for recount, 42 previously uncounted ballots turned up — and those alone were enough to reverse the election result. Amon other ther problems, our additional investigations turned up 6 double voters, and at least 4 dozen absentee ballots that had been admitted and counted despite signatures that bore no relation to those on file in registration affidavits. At least 3 — and possibly many more — deliveries of absentee ballots by ineligible 3rd parties occurred; and the response of the Elections Department has been to end the reasonable practice of logging drop-off absentees, making it now practically impossible to track ineligible and therefore illegal 3rd party absentee-ballot deliveries. During the School District's subsequent courtroom challenge of Measure C's defeat, in which the District has so far spent $230,000 in legal fees — only to lose at the Superior Court level to my husband and Ernie Scherer, another non-lawyer, both representing themselves — Barbara Lee's testimony provided additional concern. Among numerous other problematic elements in her testimony, she stated that she accepts changes in domicile, implicitly in or out of precinct, by phone without an affidavit or notice of re-registration — in other words, in violation of Election Code sections 2116 and 2119. She said she was unfamiliar with a critical law, Elections Code section 2024, which governs determination of residence (or domicile) for voting purposes. She testified that in checking abseptee envelope signatures, she requires that only one letter match the signature on file in order to count the ballot. With large numbers of unpurged, deadwood voters that I find every time I walk my precinct, such a lax non-standard for signature matching is a frightening prospect for close elections. It should not be a point-of pride that so few absentee ballot envelopes are rejected. So we are not eoncerned as much about a tightening of the roles and functions of Election Department administrators and staff personnel as we are about the integrity of the ballot count and delivery of a valid, reliable, and accurate election result. It shouldn't take a citizen- initiated recount and pro per citizen-sponsored courtroom contest to obtain that kind of result. Contra Costa County is not the only location for such concerns. A Stanislaus County race in was decided in November with a difference of only 74 votes when one candidate could not afford a recount. As the Task Force Report indicates, Contra Costa County in particular operates its Election Department in a way that is expensive, arbitrary in its decisions, easily manipulated through various loopholes and a lack of security measures and safeguards, and admittedly marred by . "errors and inaccuracies." It is therefore incumbent upon the Board of Supervisors and the Election Department to minimize the number of occasions on which our citizens are left questioning election results, results that seem to change by the day and the hour. We cannot afford, and should not pay precious tax dollars for the kind of attitude attributed to our Assistant Registrar in a newspaper quote last fall, when so many ballot problems occurred: "Even if those people had voted or not voted it wouldn't change the election results." There's a troubling echo of that attitude that is noticeable in the Task Force report: whenever irregularities are cited, ---postal service snafus, sending duplicate absentee ballots, mistakenly deleting ballot applications, sending incorrect ballot types sent to absentees, telephone system failure, non-receipt of sample ballots, etc.-- the final, and probably unsupportable disclaimer is always added, " [this error] resulted in no noticeable impact on the election process," or words to that effect. In a system such as California's, where no voter ID or proof of citizenship is required or requested to resister or to vote (in other words, where less certification is required than for cashing a check — and California, by the way, is the largest by far of only six states with such lax policies); in a state wherein prosecutions for Election Code violations are practically non-existent; in a wide-open electoral system....... the burden of proof in providing accurate election results ought not to rest on volunteer citizen poll watchers or impoverished candidates but rather on elected and appointed election officials, placed into that position of trust and paid sizable tax-finance salaries for it. The Task Force fails to address the need for a voter deadwood purge. Computer experts have shown my committee that simple commands will sort out duplicate registrations by name, 2 address, date of birth. The cost to taxpayers to send our ballot information to voter deadwood is astronomical at $6.00 per person— especially given an estimate by the Secretary of State's own task force that up to 24% of California's registration rolls consist of deadwood, i.e., electors who have died or moved out of county. I hope that you will not consider mail-in-only ballot elections as an allegedly cost effective solution to current problems. Your report admits (as did Bob Delevati in a 1993 Contra Costa Times article) that absentee ballot counts — now up to 20% of the county's ballots — are labor intensive, with many hidden costs — and complicated — which is not to mention, easier sources of voter fraud. Note that many or most of the "errors and irregularities," those costly problems enumerated in this report, center around that 20% absentee vote count. The Task Force also states ominously, at page 7, that because of a perception of increased complexity in our electoral process, "we are rapidly approaching the point in which precinct operations will not be able to be conducted with a volunteer work force." The implicit . solution seems to be an unaffordably large cohort of election professionals. Here and there, we've heard rumblings of all mail-in balloting or use of modem connections for voting data transmission between the individual precincts and the Election Department. Both such approaches would cause significant security and reliability problems. Please avoid. We believe that voting should be once again perceived as a sacred privilege, purchased with the blood of patriots, granted to citizens who meet the proper qualifications.for registration. We believe that precinct-level administration should be retained by volunteer citizen neighbors who are recruited continuously and given simple study materials in advance, perhaps get tested by mail on common election situations. Whenever possible, paper ballots should receive an initial hand count at the polling place itself, with bipartisan oversight permitted and advertised well in advance. Absentee ballots should to be verified and counted a week beforehand (with improved notification of interested parties) at the Elections Department. The election which installed Mr. Netanyahu as Israel's leader took three days to be counted; but citizens in that beleaguered corner of the world believed he'd won fair and square — and no trouble ensued. Consolidation of elections, where not absolutely required by statute, only increases the complexity of the process, as noted in the Task Force Report, and makes precinct level counts and reconciliations all the more prohibitively difficult. But without them, there are insufficient checks and guardrails. Hand counts at the precinct level — in multi-ballot elections, perhaps choosing a particular race for precinct-level sampling verification— may take longer and*may require a fresh set of local citizens to replace the fatigued poll workers; but at least the final count would be more believable and acceptable. Let us not sacrifice vote accuracy, election integrity and voting credibility for the false promises of economy and expedience as the major selling points of new, and supposedly more efficient systems. Let's tighten, not loosen, the system in every regard — and let's hope you local elected leaders will help lead the battle at the state level for reliable elections, including registration and voter ID, so that people will begin to believe in our election process again. 3