HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 05211996 - D5 D. 5
TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
Contra
FROM: Mark DeSaulnier / Cid
May 21, 1996 ,••r, Tyy` County
DATE: f'cT•.._..__-.: �:
Reaffirm Opposition to Selection of Concord Naval Weapons
SUBJECT: Station as the West Coast Port of Entry for Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Rods; Direct County Counsel to Develop a Litigation Plan; and Invite
California Attorney General to Consider Joining County in Potential Litigation
SPECIFIC REQUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
RECOMMENDATION
1) REAFFIRM the Board's opposition to the Department of Energy's (DOE) decision in selecting
the Concord Naval Weapons Station (CNWS) as the west coast port of entry for shipments of
spent nuclear fuel rods; 2) DIRECT County Counsel to develop a litigation plan for a potential
lawsuit regarding the federal government's decision in selecting the CNWS for the west coast
port of entry, said plan to be provided within 60 days for consideration by the Board in
Executive Session; and 3) INVITE California Attorney General Daniel E. Lundgren to consider
joining Contra Costa County and surrounding local jurisdictions in any potential litigation
involving the federal government.
BACKGROUND
The Board is on record as unanimously opposing the transport of the spent nuclear fuel rods
through the CNWS. Now that the Record of Decision has been published by the DOE, it is
appropriate once again to reiterate the Board's continuing opposition to this policy.
Over the past several months, County Counsel has been researching the issue of possible
litigation on the selection of CNWS. Given the finalization of the Record of Decision, it is now
appropriate to request that County Counsel develop a litigation plan within 60 days for
consideration by the Board in Executive Session. The plan should include information about
potential co-litigants.
Additionally, it seems appropriate for us to contact Daniel E. Lundgren, the California Attorney
General, and invite his participation in any potential litigation.
CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: YES SIGNATURE:
RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMMITTEE
APPROVE OTHER
4
SIGNATURE(S): 1
ACTION OF BOARD ON May 21 , 1996 APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED X OTHER
VOTE OF SUPERVISORS
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE
.X.UNANIMOUS(ABSENT ) AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN
AYES: NOES: AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD
ABSENT: ABSTAIN: OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN.
ATTESTED MaY 21. 1996
Contact: Karen Mitcho f f, Dist. IV PHIL BATCHELOR,CLERK OF THE BOARD OF
cc: CAO SUPERVISORS AND COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR
County Counsel
Community Development
Health Services Dept.
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The Under Secretary of Energy
cf Washington, DC 20585
May 13, 1996
The Honorable Gayle Bishop
Member Contra Costa County
Board of Supervisors i
651 Pine Street, Room 106 MAY 2 0 r
i =�
Martinez, CA 94553 — _
CLERK BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
Dear Ms. Bishop: CONTRA COSTA CO.
Enclosed please find a copy of the Department of Energy's Record of Decision on
a Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.
In the Record of Decision, the Department of Energy, in consultation with the
Department of State, announces its decision to accept and manage foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United
States. This spent fuel acceptance policy furthers the United States' goal of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, a major national security
objective.
Approximately 20 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel will be received and managed
at the Department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. The spent fuel will be shipped to the United States over
13 years through two military ports. A maximum of approximately 150 to 300
shipments through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and five shipments
through the Concord Naval Weapons Station will be necessary during the 13-year
spent fuel acceptance period. Shipments through the Charleston Naval Weapons
Station are expected to begin in the summer of 1996. Shipments through the
Concord Naval Weapons Station in California are expected to begin in the
summer of 1997.
Thank you for your interest in this matter.
Sincerely,
1
Thomas P. Grumbly
Enclosure
RECORD OF DECISIOPJ
............
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel
May 13, 1996
ENT Op���G
��TATES OF A
United States Department of Energy
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
Washington, DC 20585
I -
�, . a
The Under Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
l�ff
May 13, 1996
Dear Interested Party:
Enclosed please find a copy of the Department of Energy's Record of Decision on
a Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.
In the Record of Decision, the Department of Energy, in consultation with the
Department of State, announces its decision to accept and manage foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United
States. This spent fuel acceptance policy furthers the United States' goal of
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons worldwide, a major national security
objective.
Approximately 20 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel will be received and managed
at the Department's Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. The spent fuel will be shipped to the United States over
13 years through two military ports. A maximum of approximately 150 to 300
shipments through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and five shipments
through the Concord Naval Weapons Station will be necessary during the 13 year
spent fuel acceptance period. Shipments through the Charleston Naval Weapons
Station are expected to begin in the summer of 1996. Shipments through the
Concord Naval Weapons Station in California are expected to begin in the
summer of 1997.
Thank you for your interest in this matter.
Sincerely,
Thomas P. Grumbly
Enclosure
i
I
RECORD OF DECISION
on a
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor
Spent Nuclear Fuel
May 13, 1996
NT op
STATES OF P
United States Department of Energy
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management
Washington,DC 20585
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear
Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
AGENCY: Department of Energy
ACTION: Record of Decision
SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State,has decided to implement a new
foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative
contained in the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel(the Final EIS,
DOE/EIS-218F of February 1996), subject to additional stipulations specified in Section VII of this
Record of Decision. The new policy applies only to aluminum-based and TRIGA (Training,
Research, Isotope,General Atomics) foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material
containing uranium enriched in the United States. The purpose of the acceptance policy is to support
the broad United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy calling for the reduction and
eventual elimination of the use of highly enriched (weapons-grade) uranium in civil commerce
worldwide.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The new policy set forth in this Record of Decision is effective upon being
made public on May 13, 1996, in accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations
(10 CFR §1021.315).
ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear
Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
(DOE/EIS-0218F, the Final EIS) and this Record of Decision are available in the public reading
rooms and libraries identified in the Federal Register Notice that announced the availability of the
Final EIS (61 FR 6983, February 23, 1996), or by calling 1-800-736-3282 (toll free).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the management of foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel or this Record of Decision contact:
Mr. Charles Head, Program Manager
Office of Spent Fuel Management(EM-67)
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585
Telephone (202) 586-9441
1
For information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact:
Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director
Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42)
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585
Telephone (202) 586-4600, or leave message at 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Synopsis of the Decision-The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State
jointly issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS,
DOE/EIS-218F) on February 16, 1996. In this Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State
considered the potential environmental impacts of a proposed policy to manage spent nuclear fuel
from foreign research reactors. After consideration of the Final EIS,public comments submitted on
the Draft EIS and concerns expressed following issuance of the Final EIS,DOE,in consultation with
the Department of State, has decided to implement the proposed policy as identified in the Preferred
Alternative contained in the Final EIS, subject to additional stipulations specified in Section VII of
this Record of Decision. This implementation will involve acceptance of approximately
19.2 MTHM(metric tonnes of heavy metal)of foreign research reactor spent fuel and approximately
0.6 MTHM of target material into the United States over a 13 year period,beginning on the effective
date of the policy. The spent fuel will be received from abroad through the Charleston Naval
Weapons Station in South Carolina (about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in
California(about 5%). Most of the target material and some of the spent fuel (about 15%) will be
received overland from Canada. Shipment through Charleston is expected to begin in the summer
of 1996 and through Concord in mid-1997. Shipments from Canada have not been scheduled at this
time. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target material could be safely transported
overland within the United States by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either
transportation mode may be used. Nevertheless,based on initial input from the public near the ports
of entry indicating a preference for shipment by rail, DOE will generally seek to use rail for
shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho. The particular mode of transportation to be
used will be determined after further discussions between DOE and State, Tribal and local officials.
After a limited period of interim storage,the spent fuel will be treated and packaged, or chemically
separated, at the Savannah River Site and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as necessary to
prepare it for transport to a final disposal repository.
II. Background - Beginning in the 1950's, as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program, the United
States provided nuclear technology to foreign nations for peaceful applications in exchange for their
promise to forego development of nuclear weapons. A major element of this program was the
provision of research reactor technology and the highly enriched uranium(HEU) needed in the early
years to fuel the research reactors. Research reactors play a vital role in important medical,
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agricultural, and industrial applications. Nevertheless, the highly enriched uranium initially used in
the fuel elements for these reactors can also be used in nuclear weapons. In the past, after irradiation
in the research reactor, the used fuel elements (often referred to as "spent nuclear fuel" or "spent
fuel') were transported to the United States, where they were chemically separated to extract the
uranium still remaining in the spent nuclear fuel. In this way, the United States maintained control
over disposition of the HEU that it provided to other nations.
Before 1964, bilateral agreements with the countries operating research reactors provided for the
lease of the enriched uranium, with explicit provision for the return of the spent nuclear fuel to the
United States. After 1964, most agreements provided for the sale of this material to the foreign
nation, and the United States began to operate under a policy'known as the "Off-Site Fuels Policy",
under which the United States continued to accept, temporarily store, and chemically separate the
spent nuclear fuel.
Research reactors have become the major civilian users of HEU. To further reduce the danger of
nuclear weapons proliferation, the United States in 1978 initiated the Reduced Enrichment for
Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which was aimed at reducing the use of HEU in
civilian programs by promoting the conversion of foreign and domestic research reactors from HEU
fuel to low enriched uranium(LEU)fuel(LEU cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons). As part
of the RERTR program, DOE developed LEU fuel and worked with foreign research reactor
operators to convert their reactors to run on such fuel.
The foreign research reactor operators who converted to LEU fuel did so in support of nuclear
weapons nonproliferation objectives, even though such conversions were expensive and generally
resulted in reduced reactor capabilities and increased operating costs. From the beginning of the
RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators made it clear that their willingness to convert
their research reactors to LEU fuel was contingent upon the continued acceptance by DOE of their
spent nuclear fuel for disposition in the United States.
The United States accepted foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel until the "Off-Site Fuels
Policy"expired (in 1988 for HEU fuels and 1992 for LEU fuels). At that time, DOE committed to
conduct an environmental review of the impacts of extending the program for accepting foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel. In 1991, DOE issued an environmental assessment of the
potential environmental impacts of the proposed extension.DOE received numerous comments from
the public stating that a new, long-term policy should not be implemented until an EIS had been
prepared. DOE decided in mid-1993 to prepare an EIS to evaluate the impacts of implementing a
new foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel acceptance policy.
On October 21, 1993, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) (58 FR 54336) to prepare an
environmental impact statement on a proposed policy for the acceptance of foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. The NOI announced public
scoping meetings and requested public comments and suggestions for DOE to consider in its
determination of the scope of the EIS. Nine public scoping meetings were held in November and
December 1993. DOE received a total of 2,215 scoping comments from 493 commentors.
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On April 21, 1995, DOE published a Notice of Availability (60 FR 19899) of the Draft EIS. The
Draft EIS analyzed three Management Alternatives for implementing the proposed action:
Management Alternative 1 - Accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel in
the United States;
Management Alternative 2 - Facilitate the management of foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel overseas; and
Management Alternative 3 - A hybrid, or combination, of elements from the first two
Management Alternatives.
During the 90-day public comment period(April 21, 1995 to July 20, 1995), about 900 individuals
attended 17 public hearings held in' or near candidate ports, management sites, and in Washington,
D.C. In addition to oral comments,DOE received approximately 5,040 written comments contained
within approximately 1,250 comment documents on a wide range of policy,economic, and technical
issues. Many commentors supported the United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy
objective of seeking to reduce the use of HEU (i.e., nuclear weapons-grade uranium) in civil
commerce. However,the comments also reflected a wide range of views as to which Management
Alternative should be adopted. Some commentors supported management of the spent nuclear fuel
in the United States. Other commentors questioned the need to accept spent nuclear fuel from allies
of the United States and those countries that appear to have the capability to manage their own spent
nuclear fuel abroad. These commentors generally believed that such spent nuclear fuel should be
managed overseas. With regard to implementation of the policy in the United States, some
commentors preferred the use of military ports, a practice DOE has followed in the recent past based
on strong public preference. Risks during transport, including those from terrorism, a sunken cask,
severe shipboard fires, and the level of emergency preparedness at ports were frequently raised as
matters of concern.
In consideration of public comments, DOE added information to the Final EIS, including:
clarification of the proposed United States policy on accepting spent nuclear fuel from allies;
examination of the consequences of sabotage or terrorist attack; safety of transportation casks;
re-examination of the shipboard fire analysis; and general descriptions of transportation and
emergency response regulations and management activities related to safe transport of the spent fuel
and target material. In addition, the Naval Weapons Station at Charleston, South Carolina was
analyzed along with the other terminals of the port of Charleston that had been included in the Draft
EIS.
On February 23, 1996,the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency published a Notice of Availability
(61 FR 6983) of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
(DOE/EIS-0218F of February 1996), after DOE had distributed approximately 3000 copies of the
EIS and/or the EIS Summary to government officials and interested groups and individuals.
4
DOE has prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality for Implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA
Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel(the Final EIS). In making the decisions
announced in this Record of Decision, DOE, in consultation with the Department of State,
considered environmental impacts and other factors, such as nuclear weapons nonproliferation
policies; public comments received on the Draft EIS and concerns expressed following issuance of
the Final EIS; analysis of impacts and alternatives in the DOE Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement(DOE/EIS-0203-F of April 1995,
the "Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS") and the Records of Decision for that EIS (60.FR 28680,
June 1, 1995 and 61 FR 9441, March 8, 1996).
III. Policy Considerations-A key goal of United States'nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy
is to reduce international civil commerce in HEU, since HEU can be used directly in the production
of nuclear weapons. The proposal by DOE and the Department of State to adopt a policy to manage
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States is
intended to support efforts by the United States to convert foreign research reactors from HEU to
LEU fuels (the latter cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons) and to gain worldwide acceptance
of the use of LEU fuels in new research reactors.
Failure of the United States to manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel could have a
number of adverse consequences. Foreign governments and research reactor operators have
participated in the RERTR program in large part because the United States previously accepted the
spent nuclear fuel from their research reactors. The United States has not accepted HEU spent
nuclear fuel for more than seven years, with the exception of recent limited shipments made after
completion of the Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EA-0912, April 1994). As a result, several foreign research
reactor operators are running out of space to store their spent nuclear fuel, and others will run out
soon. Under such conditions, the foreign research reactor operators must either shut down their
reactors, construct new storage facilities, or ship the spent nuclear fuel offsite for storage or
reprocessing. Many of the reactor operators do not have the option of increasing their storage
capacities due to local regulatory restrictions. Moreover,construction and licensing of new storage
facilities cannot be accomplished in time to support continued operations. The most realistic
near-term option for a limited number of the reactor operators (particularly those in countries with
power reactor programs that have an infrastructure to accept the return of the radioactive waste
generated during reprocessing) is to ship their spent nuclear fuel offsite for reprocessing.
The current practice followed in overseas reprocessing of research reactor spent fuel results in
separated HEU that is placed back into commerce (some or all of it may be refabricated into new
HEU research reactor fuel), a result that undermines United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation goals. Furthermore, none of the foreign reprocessing facilities have the capability
to reprocess the new, high density LEU fuel developed under the RERTR program. Thus, in the
5
absence of action to resolve the question of the disposition of spent nuclear fuel, many foreign
research reactor operators who could reprocess to control their spent fuel inventory would likely
continue to use,or convert back to,fuel containing HEU. In such a case,the foreign research reactor
operator community as a whole would have little incentive to convert their reactors to LEU fuels.
This would have the effect of encouraging the foreign research reactor operators to use HEU
(weapons-grade uranium) as fuel for their reactors, would increase the amount of HEU in
international commerce, and would inevitably increase the opportunity for diversion of HEU into
a nuclear weapons program.
DOE and the Department of State do not seek to indefinitely accept or otherwise manage spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Rather, the purpose of the new policy is to recover as
much HEU that originated in the United States as possible from international commerce, while
providing the foreign research reactor operators and their host countries time to convert the reactors
to LEU fuel and to make their own arrangements for disposition of subsequently generated LEU
spent nuclear fuel. The foreign research reactor operators and host countries must be prepared to
implement their own arrangements for disposition of their spent nuclear fuel after the policy expires
(i.e., after 10 years of spent fuel generation following the effective date of the policy).
IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS - DOE evaluated the following alternatives for
management of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel:
A. Management Alternative 1: Accept and Manage Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
in the United States
Under Management Alternative 1, foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium
enriched in the United States would be transported to the United States in casks designed to comply
with international regulations that are essentially identical to those promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and certified by the U.S. Department of Transportation. In
accordance with the Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS, all of the
aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel accepted by DOE (about 18.2 MTHM)
would be managed at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and the TRIGA elements (about
1 MTHM) would be managed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, pending ultimate
disposition.
The basic implementation elements of Management Alternative 1 provide the foundation for the
analyses of impacts presented in the EIS. They are:
Policy Duration -The policy duration would be 10 years. Spent nuclear fuel that is currently being
stored or that is generated during a 10 year policy period would be accepted. Actual shipments of
spent nuclear fuel to the United States could be made for a period of 13 years, starting from the
effective date of policy implementation. A five year policy duration and an indefinite duration for
acceptance of HEU (with a ten year duration for LEU) were also analyzed as alternatives in the EIS.
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Amount of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel- The amount of foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel that would be accepted under the basic implementation of Management
Alternative 1 is up to about 19.2 MTHM in up to approximately 22,700 individual spent nuclear fuel
elements. These spent nuclear fuel elements would be received from 41 countries. Alternative
amounts of spent nuclear fuel considered as implementation alternatives were: receipt of spent fuel
only from countries that do not have high-income economies, acceptance of HEU spent fuel only,
and acceptance of target material in addition to spent fuel.
Marine Transport-Under the basic implementation alternative, the spent fuel and target materials
would be transported by sea in either chartered or regularly scheduled commercial ships. DOE
estimates that 721 cask loads of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (a cask load is one spent
fuel shipping cask loaded with spent fuel) would be sent to the United States by ship over a 13-year
acceptance period under Management Alternative 1. Acceptance of an additional 15 cask loads of
target material by sea is also analyzed.
Potential Port(s) of Entry for Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel - The following
potential ports of entry were selected for analysis because they met basic criteria designed to identify
the most appropriate ports for use in accepting foreign research reactor spent fuel:
Charleston, SC (includes Charleston Naval Weapons Station and Wando Terminal, Mt. Pleasant)
Concord Naval Weapons Station, CA
Galveston, TX
Hampton Roads, VA (includes Terminals at Newport News, Norfolk, and Portsmouth, VA)
Jacksonville, FL
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, NC
Portland, OR
Savannah, GA
Tacoma, WA
Wilmington, NC
Ground Transport - The basic implementation of Management Alternative 1 would involve
transporting casks containing foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel by truck,rail,or barge from
the ports of entry or Canadian border crossings to potential management sites.
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Sites - The analysis considered five
potential management sites selected to be consistent with the management sites evaluated in the
' Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS (i.e., the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, the Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee, the Hanford Site in Washington
State, and the Nevada Test Site). The Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS
subsequently eliminated the last three sites from consideration as management sites for spent nuclear
fuel from foreign research reactors.
Storage Technologies - During the first few years, storage would take place in existing storage
facilities that use either wet or dry storage technologies. Under the basic implementation of
7
Management Alternative 1, any new storage capacity that would be built would be dry storage. Wet
storage was also evaluated as an alternative to dry storage.
Near-Term Conventional Chemical Separation in the United States - As an alternative to storage of
the spent fuel in the United States, the Final EIS evaluated chemical separation of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material in existing facilities at the Savannah River Site or the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The HEU could be blended down to LEU to preclude its
use in nuclear weapons. The resulting high-level waste could be vitrified and managed onsite until
a geologic repository becomes available.
Developmental Treatment andlor Packaging Technologies - As another alternative for management
of the spent fuel, the Final EIS discussed a potential development program that DOE could conduct
leading to a decision on whether to construct and operate a new treatment and/or packaging facility.
The objective of this technical strategy would be to treat, package, and store spent nuclear fuel in a
manner suitable for direct placement into a geologic repository without necessarily separating the
fissile materials, while meeting or exceeding all applicable safety and environmental requirements.
Financing Arrangements - Under the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1, high-
income-economy countries would be charged a competitive fee. The United States would bear the
full cost of transporting and managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel received from other
countries. The Final EIS also evaluated alternatives in which:
1) All countries would be subsidized;
2) All countries would be charged a full-cost recovery fee; or
3) Countries with high income economies would be charged a full-cost recovery fee, while other
countries would be subsidized.
Location for Taking Title-Under the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1,the United
States would take title to spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors at the limit of United
States territorial waters or continental border (for shipments from Canada). The Final EIS also
evaluated alternatives in which the United States would take title prior to shipment, at the ports of
entry, or at the DOE management sites.
Ultimate Disposition -The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (as amended) authorizes disposal of
the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository. DOE is working with staff
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that the spent fuel management actions it is
undertaking for all of its spent fuel, and actions that would be undertaken for any additional foreign
research reactor spent fuel to be accepted, will allow either direct emplacement of the spent fuel in
a geologic repository or acceptance of the spent fuel in a treated form at a geologic repository.
Decisions regarding the actual disposal of DOE's spent nuclear fuel would follow appropriate
environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act.
8
B. Management Alternative 2: Facilitate the Management of Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel Overseas
Under this Management Alternative,two subalternatives were analyzed. In the first subalternative,
DOE and the Department of State would provide assistance, incentives, and coordination for spent
fuel storage at one or more locations overseas, with appropriate storage technologies, regulations,
and safeguards. In the second subalternative, DOE and the Department of State would provide
nontechnical assistance, incentives, and coordination to foreign research reactor operators and
reprocessors to facilitate reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel overseas in facilities operated under
international inspections and safeguards. Facilities operated by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy
Authority at Dounreay, United Kingdom,and by Cogema at Marcoule,France might be used for this
purpose. After reprocessing, the recovered HEU would be blended down to LEU at these same
facilities. The wastes resulting from this reprocessing would be sent to the country in which the
spent nuclear fuel was irradiated. If the reprocessing wastes could not be sent to the country in
which the spent nuclear fuel was irradiated, such wastes would be accepted by the United States for
storage and ultimate geologic disposal. It is important to note that the foreign reprocessing facilities
do not have the capability to reprocess the new, high density,LEU fuel developed under the RERTR
program.
C. Management Alternative 3: A Combination of Elements from Management Alternatives 1 and
2 (Hybrid Alternative)
Under Management Alternative 3, DOE and the Department of State would combine elements from
Management Alternatives 1 and 2 to develop new alternatives for management of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel in the United States or abroad. For example, DOE and the Department of
State could combine partial storage or reprocessing overseas with partial storage or chemical
separation in the United States. Implementation alternatives for the portion of the spent nuclear fuel
from foreign research reactors to be managed in the United States would be the same as those for
Management Alternative 1.
D. No Action Alternative
In the No Action Alternative, the United States would neither manage foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States, nor provide technical assistance or
financial incentives for overseas storage or reprocessing. In this case, there would be no foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel shipments to the United States and no assistance to foreign
countries for managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas.
E. Preferred Alternative
Under the Preferred Alternative (which is a combination of the implementation elements of
Management Alternative 1), DOE would accept and manage in the United States up to 19.2 MTHM
of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel in up to approximately 22,700 individual spent fuel
9
elements and up to an additional 0.6 MTHM of target material. This spent fuel and target material
would come from the following countries:
Table 1 - High-income economy countries:
Australia Finland Italy Sweden
Austria France Japan Switzerland
Belgium Germany Netherlands Taiwan
Canada Israel Spain United Kingdom
Denmark
Table 2 - Other Countries:
Argentina Indonesia Peru South Korea
Bangladesh Iran Philippines Thailand
Brazil Jamaica Portugal Turkey
Chile Malaysia Romania Uruguay
Colombia Mexico Slovenia Venezuela
Greece Pakistan South Africa Zaire
The types of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target Material that would be
accepted under the Preferred Alternative are as follows:
• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors operating on LEU fuel or in the
process of converting to LEU fuel when the policy becomes effective.
• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors that operate on HEU fuel when the
policy becomes effective but that agree to convert to LEU fuel. (Spent nuclear fuel would not
be accepted from research reactors that could convert to LEU fuel but do not agree to do so.)
• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU) from research reactors having lifetime cores, from research reactors
planning to shut down by a specific date while the policy is in effect, and from research reactors
for which a suitable LEU fuel is not available.
• Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors that are already shut down.
• Unirradiated fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from eligible research reactors would be accepted as spent
nuclear fuel. (This material could be a particular nuclear weapons proliferation concern because
it is not highly radioactive and thus can be handled manually. Thus could allow it to be stolen
more easily.)
10
For research reactors with both HEU and LEU spent nuclear fuel available for shipment, LEU spent
nuclear fuel would not be accepted until all HEU spent nuclear fuel has been accepted, unless there
are extenuating circumstances (e.g., deterioration of one or more LEU elements sufficient to cause
a health or safety problem if acceptance were delayed). Spent nuclear fuel(HEU and/or LEU)would
not be accepted from new research reactors starting operation after the date of implementation of the
policy.
The duration of the policy under the Preferred Alternative would be 10 years. Shipments of spent
nuclear fuel to the United States could be made for a period of up to 13 years, starting from the
effective date of policy implementation,as long as the spent nuclear fuel had already been discharged
prior to the beginning of the policy period or is discharged during the policy period. The additional
three years in the shipping period were included to provide time for the radiation levels of the last
spent fuel discharged during the 10 year policy period to decay enough to allow its transportation,
to provide time for logistics in arranging for shipment of the last spent fuel discharged, and to allow
for potential shipping delays.
The aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (about 18.2 MTHM) and target
material (about 0.6 MTHM) would be transported to and managed at the Savannah River Site and
the TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (about 1 MTHM)would be transported to and
managed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, in accordance with the Records of Decision
for the Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS and the settlement agreement reached between DOE and the
State of Idaho [Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Batt, No. CV 91-0035-S-EJL (D. Id.) and United
States v. Batt, No. CV-91-0054-S-EJL (D. Id.)]. According to this agreement, DOE could accept
up to 61 TRIGA spent nuclear fuel shipments from foreign research reactors prior to December 31,
2000 for management at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Before DOE would accept any
shipments, the Governor of Idaho would be notified and the Secretary of Energy would certify that
the shipments are necessary to meet national security and nonproliferation requirements.
The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material would be shipped by either
chartered or regularly scheduled commercial ships from the foreign ports to the United States.
Although all of the candidate ports listed in Management Alternative 1 above would be appropriate
ports to use for receipt of the spent fuel and target material shipments, DOE would prefer to use the
military ports in proximity to the spent nuclear fuel management sites (i.e., Charleston Naval
Weapons Station and the Concord Naval Weapons Station) to take advantage of the characteristics
of these ports to increase the safety and security of the spent fuel transportation process. (Note:
Section VII of this notice designates these two ports as the ports of entry.)
DOE would take title to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material that is
shipped by sea after it is unloaded from the ship at the port of entry, and to the spent nuclear fuel and
target material shipped solely overland (i.e., from Canada) at the border crossing between Canada
and the United States.
11
The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material would be transported from the
United States ports to the management sites by truck or rail.
The financing arrangement under the Preferred Alternative would be to charge high-income-
economy countries a competitive fee and for the United States to bear the full cost associated with
acceptance of spent fuel and target material from other countries. The fee policy for countries with
high-income economies would be established in a Federal Register notice to allow DOE flexibility
to adjust the fee policy to account for inflation, or further development of spent nuclear fuel
management practices in the United States.
For the aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, the following three-point
management strategy would be implemented:
1. New Technology Development/Dry Storage-DOE would embark immediately on an accelerated
program at the Savannah River Site to identify, develop, and demonstrate one or more
non-reprocessing, cost-effective treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel for ultimate disposal. The purpose of any new facilities that
might be constructed to implement these technologies would be to change the foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel into a form that is suitable for geologic disposal, without necessarily
separating the fissile materials, while meeting or exceeding all applicable safety and
environmental requirements.
In conjunction with the examination of new technologies, variations of conventional direct
disposal methods would also be explored. After treatment and/or packaging,the foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel would be managed on site in "road ready" dry storage until transported
off-site for continued storage or disposal. DOE would select, develop, and implement, if
possible, one or more of these treatment and/or packaging technologies by the year 2000. DOE
is committed to avoiding indefinite storage of this spent nuclear fuel in a form that is unsuitable
for disposal.
2. Potential Chemical SeparationlWet Storage-Despite DOE's best efforts,it is possible that a new
treatment and/or packaging technology may not be ready for implementation by the year 2000.
It may become necessary, therefore, for DOE to use the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site to
chemically separate some foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel elements, while the
F-Canyon is operating to stabilize at-risk materials in accordance with the Records of Decision
(60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995 and 61 FR 6633,February 21, 1996) issued after completion
of the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Final Environmental Impact Statement
(DOE/EIS-0220 of October 1995). Under current schedules, this chemical separation of foreign
research reactor spent fuel could take place between the years 2000 and 2002. In that event, the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be converted into LEU and wastes. The high-
level radioactive wastes would be vitrified in the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing
Facility, while other wastes (all low level) would be solidified in the Savannah River Site
Saltstone facility. In order to provide a sound policy basis for making a determination on
whether and how to utilize the F-Canyon for chemical separation tasks that are not driven by
12
health and safety considerations,DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the
nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. The study will be initiated in mid-1996 and will be
completed in a timely fashion to allow a subsequent decision about possible use of the F-Canyon
for chemical separation of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel to be fully considered by
the public, the Congress and Executive Branch agencies. Pending disposition of the foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel by either a new treatment and/or packaging technology or
chemical separation in the F-Canyon, the spent nuclear fuel would be placed in existing wet
storage at the Savannah River Site.
3. Spent Nuclear Fuel Monitoring (Wet Storage) - DOE would conduct a program of close
monitoring of any foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material that would be
accepted for storage in existing wet storage facilities. DOE is presently unaware of any technical
basis for believing that this spent nuclear fuel cannot be safely stored until one or more of the
treatment and/or packaging technologies becomes available. Nevertheless, if health and safety
concerns involving any of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel elements are identified
prior to development of an appropriate treatment and/or packaging technology, DOE would use
the F-Canyon to chemically separate the affected spent nuclear fuel elements, if it is still
operating to stabilize at-risk materials.
Because the F-Canyon is only configured to handle LEU, under no circumstances would it be
possible to produce separated HEU that is suitable for a nuclear weapon. Instead, depleted
uranium would be added to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel near the beginning of
the chemical separations process, so that only LEU would be produced when the uranium is
separated from the fission products. The trace quantities of plutonium in the spent nuclear fuel
would be left in and solidified along with the high-level radioactive wastes. This would further
the President's policy to discourage the accumulation of excess weapons-grade fissile materials,
to strengthen controls and constraints on these materials and, over time, to reduce worldwide
stocks.
The TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be stored at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory in the Fluorinel Dissolution and Fuel Storage facility (wet storage) or
preferably in the dry storage Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility and the CPP-749 dry storage area. After
2003, all foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
would be managed in accordance with specific provisions of the settlement agreement between DOE
_ and the State of Idaho, until transported off-site for ultimate disposition. Depending on the nature
of any new treatment and/or packaging technology that might be developed, the TRIGA spent
nuclear fuel would also be processed using such a new technology, if necessary for disposal.
V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives - CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require
identification of the environmentally preferred altemative(s). The analysis of alternatives presented
in the EIS indicates that the three Management Alternatives and the Preferred Alternative (a
modification of subelements of Management Alternative 1) would have only small impacts on the
13
human environment on or around the DOE management sites, the populations near the cask
transportation routes, or the affected ports of entry. Using conservative assumptions (i.e.,
assumptions that tend to overestimate risks), the only measurable potential impacts from
incident-free operations are associated with low radiation exposure to workers near the loaded
transportation casks,particularly during transportation cask loading or unloading, or near the spent
fuel during storage, and, to a much lesser degree, to the general population in and around the ports
of entry and the transportation routes. These conservatively calculated impacts are extremely small,
and are well within regulatory standards for health and safety.
Although the impacts would be small for each alternative considered, there are differences among
the estimated impacts for the various alternatives. Besides the no-action alternative and overseas
storage subalternative of Management Alternative 2, which would generate no direct environmental
impact in the United States because they would result in no activity in the United States, the lowest
impacts in the United States would be associated with implementing the proposed policy overseas
under the overseas reprocessing subalternative of Management Alternative 2. In the overseas
reprocessing subalternative, the foreign research reactor spent fuel would be reprocessed overseas
and only the vitrified reprocessing wastes would be accepted in the United States. This alternative
would have a very small environmental impact in the United States since only a small volume of
waste in an inert, vitrified form would enter the United States. This would require only a small
amount of transportation, handling, and storage in the United States and therefore would result in
very little radiation exposure in the United States. Hence, Management Alternative 2 is the
environmentally preferred alternative, next to the no action alternative. Both of the other
alternatives, the hybrid alternative and the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1,
would have relatively higher, but still extremely low, radiation exposure impacts because of the
acceptance of a greater volume of material in the United States, resulting in more shipments and
increased handling and storage requirements.
Among the Implementation Alternatives to Management Alternative I discussed in the Final EIS,
accepting foreign research reactor spent fuel into the United States only from developing nations
(i.e., the"Other Nations" listed in Table 2 above) would present the lowest radiological risk in the
United States. This is because this subalternative would deal with the least amount of spent fuel.
The remaining subalternatives and implementation alternatives discussed in the EIS (including the
acceptance of target material in addition to spent fuel, a policy duration of five years instead of ten
years,use of wet storage, and chemical separation) do not measurably change the overall potential
radiation exposure impact. The chemical separation subalternative would generate slightly higher
accident and incident-free radiological exposure risk to the general population, but once again, this
is a small variation within the overall small impacts from each of the alternatives.
Implementation of the Preferred Alternative would result in relatively higher,but still extremely low,
environmental and health impacts because of the acceptance of the target material (in addition to the
maximum amount of spent fuel), resulting in the maximum number of shipments and increased
handling and storage requirements, and because of the potential chemical separation of a limited
amount of spent fuel.
14
VI. Comments on the Final EIS - After issuing the Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State
received approximately 35 letters commenting on the Preferred Alternative. These included letters
from Governor Beasley of South Carolina, Senators Feinstein of California and Glenn of Ohio,
Congressmen Baker and Miller of California, and Clyburn of South Carolina, California State
officials, mayors and other local officials from the areas around the Charleston Naval Weapons
Station and the Concord Naval Weapons Station, and several members of the public. Many of the
comments covered issues previously addressed in the Final EIS, such as the following:
• Why is the new spent fuel and target material acceptance policy required?
• How were the preferred ports of entry chosen?
• Why are military ports preferred?
• Has DOE adequately considered the risks associated with shipments through the Concord Naval
Shipyard due to its proximity to the highly populated San Francisco Bay area and the potential
for seismic activity?
• What kinds of training and other assistance would be provided by DOE to prepare local
jurisdictions to deal with the spent fuel shipments?
All of these issues are covered in the Final EIS, either in the body of the EIS or in the responses to
comments submitted on the Draft EIS. In the interests of brevity, readers are requested to refer to
the Final EIS for information on these issues. In addition, individual responses will be sent to each
of the commentors.
The comments on the Final EIS also raised several new issues (i.e., issues not raised during public
review of the Draft EIS), as follows:
A. Many commentors from the area around the Concord Naval Weapons Station were concerned
that the cost of services required from local police or other city and county departments (e.g.,
services associated with emergency response, crowd control, etc.) to prepare for or respond to
events associated with the spent fuel shipments would unfairly be left to the local communities
to fund. The comments stated that DOE should provide funding to cover these additional
expenses. To address this concern,DOE has replied that it is willing to enter into an appropriate
agreement to reimburse local agencies or provide the incremental resources, either in kind or
financial, that would be necessary to enable emergency response personnel to respond to an
incident involving the proposed shipments of spent fuel,to provide for public safety in situations
that are attributable to the shipment of spent fuel from foreign research reactors, and to allow a
greater level of assurance of the protection of the health and safety of the public.
B. Several individuals commented that the Final EIS did not identify the specific local streets and
roads over which the spent fuel shipments would travel and did not include site-specific analyses
of the risk of the shipments through the ports of entry. DOE replied that the Final EIS does
estimate the potential radiological and other health-related impacts (e.g., traffic accidents) of
transporting the spent fuel through the ports of entry (see, for example, Volume 1,Table 4-7 in
Section 4.2.2.3 of the Final EIS). However,the Final EIS did not address specific characteristics
of local streets since local street,or rail,conditions could well change between the time the Final
15
EIS was written and the time the shipments would be made. As a result, the actual route that
would be taken for the overland transportation, whether by truck or rail, would be chosen closer
to the time the transportation takes place. Selection of the actual route would be accomplished
in consultation with the affected States, Tribes, local officials, and the carrier, and considering
the conditions of the potential shipment routes at that time. Any route that is chosen would have
to meet specific requirements imposed by the Department of Transportation, taking into account
specific characteristics of local streets. Thus, when potential impacts are estimated, certain
assumptions can be made about the transportation route, without knowing the actual route.
Indeed, because the Final EIS analyses are conservative (i.e., they tend to overstate the
transportation risks), changes in local conditions would be unlikely to result in changes in
transportation risks that would exceed those analyzed in the Final EIS. The Final EIS contains
enough information to accurately assess the foreseeable impacts so that the public and
Government decision makers are adequately informed of potential consequences.
The same can be said about emergency services, personnel, emergency preparedness and
facilities(i.e., specific circumstances may change between issuance of the Final EIS and the time
an actual shipment would take place). For this reason, DOE is required to prepare a detailed
Transportation Plan in cooperation with State, Tribal and local officials before a shipment is
made. The Transportation Plan would specify details concerning how the shipments will be
carried out and the routes to be used, planned shipment schedules, roles and responsibilities of
emergency response personnel for jurisdictions along the transportation route, emergency plans
and communications strategies. The Transportation Plan would also discuss any training to be
carried out in preparation for the shipments,and would identify any equipment or other resources
required to allow local responders and law enforcement personnel to be adequately prepared for
the shipments. This procedure ensures that local officials would be well informed and prepared
to handle any contingency before a shipment would be made.
C. One commenter questioned whether an alternate.West Coast port would be required if
scheduling conflicts occurred at the Concord Naval Weapons Station. DOE explained that this
issue had been discussed with the Commander of the Naval Weapons Station and that he had
informed DOE that they currently have about 20% slack time available, and that this should be
more than adequate to accommodate 5 shipments over 13 years.
D. Recently, new information has come to light regarding the ability of the F and H Canyons
(chemical separations facilities used at the Savannah River Site) to withstand a severe
earthquake. One commentor requested that DOE delay issuance of the Record of Decision on
the proposed acceptance policy until completion of an on-going detailed safety analysis of the
facilities. The commentor noted that the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS would allow
chemical separation under certain circumstances, and that chemical separation followed by
vitrification of the high-level radioactive wastes remains the one proven means of stabilizing
spent fuel and preparing it for ultimate disposition.
16
In response, DOE explained that, until the on-going analysis is complete, it will not be known
with certainty whether the new information will result in a significant change in the range of
potential impacts of chemical separation described in the Final EIS. Analysis to date, however,
provides reasonable assurance that completion of the seismic analysis will soon demonstrate that
chemical separation in the F and H Canyons remains a viable alternative for management of
spent fuel. DOE had not contemplated chemical separation of foreign research reactor spent fuel,
if at all, until approximately the year 2000, and the Canyons will not be used if the seismic
analysis indicates that they pose an unacceptable risk. Chemical separation however,may never
need to be pursued because the Preferred Alternative provides for an aggressive new program
to develop and implement new treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the spent fuel
for ultimate disposition without the use of the F and H Canyons. In light of these factors, and
in order to encourage the research reactor operators not to withdraw from the Reduced
Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program(and resume or continue using HEU fuels),
DOE and the Department of State believe it is necessary to issue the Record of Decision now,
rather than awaiting completion of the seismic analysis. Because research reactors are the major
users of HEU in civil programs, it is essential that they support the Reduced Enrichment for
Research and Test Reactors program if the United States is to achieve the goal of eventually
eliminating the use of HEU in civil commerce, thereby reducing the threat of nuclear weapons
proliferation worldwide.
DOE further notes that the Final EIS discusses the potential impacts of chemical separation as
merely one means of managing the foreign research reactor spent fuel. Under the Preferred
Alternative, chemical separation would be considered only after completion of a study of the
impacts of chemical separation on United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy, and
then only if DOE is not ready to implement a new technology to prepare the spent fuel for
ultimate disposition in approximately the year 2000 (see Section IV.E.). Even if both chemical
separation and a new technology were not available in the year 2000, the Final EIS fully
analyzes the potential impacts of storing the spent fuel in wet and dry storage facilities for up to
40 years, so that the full range of reasonable alternative management options is covered in the
Final EIS. Therefore, the decision of whether to accept foreign research reactor spent fuel into
the United States does not depend on the availability of chemical separation as a management
option.
E. Several commentors objected to the fact that DOE spent Government funds to print and mail the
Final EIS (or its Summary) to members of the public. DOE explained that the regulations
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act require agencies to provide a copy of a
Final EIS to any individual who submits "substantive" comment on the draft of that EIS. DOE
limited the cost of printing and mailing to the greatest extent possible by mailing only the
Summary of the Final EIS to commentors from locations other than Augusta, Georgia, and the
States of California,Idaho, and South Carolina who had not specifically requested a copy of the
full Final EIS (all individuals and organizations who were sent only a Summary were offered an
opportunity to receive the entire Final EIS).
17
VII} Decision-DOE, in consultation with the Department of State,has decided to implement a new
foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy, as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the
Final EIS, subject to the additional stipulations noted below. In summary, implementation of the
new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy will involve acceptance of aluminum-based
spent fuel,TRIGA spent fuel, and target material containing uranium enriched in the United States,
as defined in the Final EIS. This material will be accepted from the 41 countries listed in Section III
of this notice. The spent fuel acceptance will involve approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric tonnes of
heavy metal) of foreign research reactor spent fuel in up to 22,700 separate spent fuel elements and
approximately 0.6 MTHM of target material. This amount of material is the amount that is currently
in storage at the foreign research reactors, plus that which DOE estimates will be discharged over
the next ten years. Shipments of this spent fuel into the United States will be accepted over a 13 year
period,beginning on the effective date of the policy. The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
will be shipped by either chartered or regularly scheduled commercial ships. The majority of the
spent fuel will be received from abroad through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South
Carolina(about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in California(about 5%). Most of
the target material and some of the spent fuel (about 15%) will be received overland from Canada.
Shipment through Charleston will begin in the summer of 1996 and through Concord in mid-1997.
Shipments from Canada have not been scheduled at this time. After a limited period of interim
storage, the spent fuel will be treated and packaged at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory as necessary to prepare it for transportation to a final disposal
repository.
DOE will apply the following additional stipulations to implementation of the new spent fuel
acceptance policy:
A. DOE will reduce the number of shipments necessary by coordinating shipments from several
reactors at a time (i.e., by placing multiple casks [up to eight] on a ship): DOE currently
estimates that a maximum of approximately 150 to 300 shipments through the Charleston Naval
Weapons Station and five shipments through the Concord Naval Weapons Station will be
necessary during the 13 year spent fuel acceptance period.
B. Target material containing uranium enriched in the United States will be accepted only if a
reactor operator wishing to ship target material formally commits to convert to the use of LEU
targets,when such targets become available (a program to develop LEU targets is underway as
an adjunct to the RERTR program). To demonstrate this commitment, DOE will require that
the affected reactor operators enter into an agreement with DOE that sets forth the milestones
and schedule for the conversion. Reactor operators currently operating on HEU fuel will be '
required to enter into a similar agreement regarding conversion of their reactors to operate on
LEU fuel. _
C. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target material could be safely transported
overland within the United States by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either
transportation mode may be used. However, based on input from the public in the vicinity of
the ports of entry, there appears to be a strong preference for the use of rail. Therefore, DOE
18
will seek to use rail for shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the Savannah River
Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho, pending further
discussions with the States, Tribes and local jurisdictions along the proposed transportation
routes.
D. During the period starting with initial implementation of the new spent fuel acceptance policy
through approximately the end of 1999, the Department will aggressively pursue one or more
new technologies that would put the foreign research reactor spent fuel in a form or container
that is eligible for direct disposal in a geologic repository.
Should a new treatment or packaging technology not be ready for implementation by the year
2000, DOE has under active consideration chemical separation of some of the foreign research
reactor spent fuel in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site, where it would be blended down
to LEU and potentially placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The
Department intends to conduct a study that will look in more depth at the issues associated with
a decision to chemically separate this spent fuel. Issues to be considered include minimizing any
potential proliferation risks, cost and timing. The State of South Carolina will be invited to
participate in the study.
A subsequent Record of Decision will be issued at approximately the end of 1999 (or sooner if
possible)to announce DOE's future management plans for the foreign research reactor spent fuel
and target material based on the results of the Department's program to develop the new
treatment and/or packaging technologies by that time (including any necessary environmental
reviews), and the study discussed above.
Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have agreed to undertake an independent review
of any new technology, or application of existing technologies, that DOE proposes to develop,
to provide a high degree of confidence that implementation of such a technology would produce
a product that will be acceptable for disposal in a geologic repository.
VIII. Use of All Practicable Means to Avoid or Minimize Harm - Implementation of this
decision will result in low environmental and health impacts. However,DOE will take the following
steps to avoid or minimize harm wherever possible:
A. DOE will use current safety and health programs and practices to reduce impacts by maintaining
worker radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable and by meeting appropriate waste
minimization and pollution prevention objectives.
B. DOE will require that the shipping contractors implement a system to keep records of which
ships are used to transport foreign research reactor spent fuel and target materials and which ship
crew members, port workers and land transportation workers are involved in the shipments.
DOE will include a clause in the contract for shipment of the spent fuel and target material
requiring that other ship crew members, port workers and land transportation workers be used
19
if any worker in these categories could approach a 100 mrem dose in any year (the regulatory
limit set in 10 CFR Part 20 for radiation exposure to a member of the general public).
C. DOE will reduce the risk associated with shipment of the spent fuel by shipping multiple casks
per shipment, up to a maximum of eight, whenever possible, thus reducing the total number of
shipments.
D. DOE will implement a process of detailed transportation planning, involving States,Tribes and
local jurisdictions through which the shipments will pass, to ensure that all organizations that
would respond to an accident involving a foreign research reactor spent fuel shipment will be
fully prepared and informed prior to any shipment taking place.
E. DOE will conduct the program to identify and develop an improved means of treating and/or
packaging the foreign research reactor spent fuel with the intent of providing a technology to be
used to prepare the spent fuel for geologic disposal that has less environmental impacts than the
technologies that are currently available.
Items A, C, D, and E above will be accomplished under existing business practices in the normal
course of implementing the new spent fuel acceptance policy. For item B, DOE will prepare a
Mitigation Action Plan under the provisions of DOE's NEPA implementation procedures
(10 CFR 1021.331).
IX. Basis for the Decision - The elements of the decision discussed in Section VI above (i.e., the
Preferred Alternative with additional stipulations) have been selected based on the following
considerations:
A. Management Alternative -The various management alternatives considered are discussed in
Section 2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in Section 4 of the Final EIS demonstrate that the
impacts on the environment, involved workers, and the citizens of the United States from
implementation of any of the management alternatives or implementation alternatives analyzed
(other than beneficial impacts associated with support for United States nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy) would be small and within applicable regulatory limits, and would not
provide a basis for discrimination among the alternatives. As a result, the process for selection
of the elements of the action to be taken focused on programmatic considerations:
1. DOE,in consultation with the Department of State,concluded that the No Action Alternative
and Management Alternative 2, Implementation Alternative 1 a(Overseas Storage)would be
unacceptable since these alternatives are not consistent with United States nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy objectives.
2. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, also believes that Management
Alternative 2, Implementation Alternative lb (Overseas Reprocessing) would not provide
an incentive for reactor operators to switch to LEU fuel or continue using LEU fuel. Since
there is no overseas reprocessing capability for the new, high density LEU fuel developed
20
by the RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators would have to continue using
HEU fuel in order to be able to rely on reprocessing as a spent fuel management approach.
In addition,reprocessing could result in the continued production of HEU, which could then
be made available in civil commerce. Furthermore, the two countries that provide
reprocessing require that the resulting wastes be returned to the countries of origin. Many
of the countries in which the foreign research reactors are located do not have the technical
or regulatory infrastructure to manage these wastes. Finally, the United States would not be
able to impose conditions on the reactor operators or reprocessing firms to assure that its
nuclear weapons nonproliferation objectives would be met.
3. The sample hybrid alternative (Management Alternative 3) analyzed in the Draft EIS
involved partial reprocessing overseas coupled with partial management in the United States.
Even though the use of overseas reprocessing would be more limited in this alternative,many
of the concerns raised above with regard to reprocessing would apply. Because of these
concerns and uncertainties, DOE and the Department of State do not believe it would be
prudent to rely on the use of overseas reprocessing to meet United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation objectives.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has concluded that a modification of the
basic implementation of Management Alternative 1 as specified in the Preferred Alternative
balances policy, technical, cost and schedule requirements, and provides the strongest support
for United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives because all aspects of the
alternative will be under the control of DOE, either directly or through the spent nuclear fuel
acceptance contracts with the reactor operators.
B. Management Technology - The alternative spent nuclear fuel management technologies
considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.7 and 2.6.5 of the Final EIS. The approaches fall into
four broad categories, as follows:
Wet Storage -Wet storage is a proven technology,that has been used for decades to safely store
research reactor spent fuel from both domestic and foreign reactors. The impacts of continued
use of wet storage would be small, and completely within applicable regulatory limits.
Furthermore, DOE currently has wet storage facilities in operation at the Savannah River Site
and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory that can be used for storage of foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel. The water chemistry of the wet storage pools is carefully controlled
to minimize the possibility of degradation and allow continued safe operation of the pools.
Dry Storage -Dry storage is also a proven technology that would also have no more than small
impacts, completely within applicable regulatory limits. It is the storage medium that is being
selected at all commercial power reactor sites where additional storage capacity is being built.
Dry storage capacity could be provided at the management sites in time to meet the program's
projected needs, if initial spent nuclear fuel receipts were placed into the available wet storage.
21
Chemical Separation - Chemical separation is also a proven technology, the impacts of which
would be small, and completely within applicable regulatory limits. However, DOE is phasing
out its chemical separation activities and is currently conducting chemical separations only at the
Savannah River Site to stabilize materials for health and safety reasons. Because these chemical
separations facilities could be used to treat the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, they
provide a contingency to be considered pending availability of an alternate means of treating
and/or packaging the spent nuclear fuel prior to ultimate disposition.
New Technologies - In order to prepare the spent fuel for ultimate disposition, some form of
treatment and/or packaging may be required. Several promising new technologies, as well as
variations of existing technologies, have been proposed and are under evaluation. Relatively
simple technologies appear to be feasible, although they require more development work to
confirm their viability and the cost of their implementation. This development will take place
before DOE makes a decision on implementation of any of the new technologies.
In order to effectively accept and manage the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel in the
United States, DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, developed the three point
strategy for management of aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel discussed in the description of
the Preferred Alternative(see Section W.E.). This strategy draws on the strengths of each of the
spent nuclear fuel management technologies discussed above, while avoiding sole reliance on
any-of them. Due to the relatively more robust nature of the TRIGA spent nuclear fuel, DOE
believes that minimal additional development may be needed to prepare it for storage and final
disposition. Accordingly, the decision specified in this Record of Decision is to place the
TRIGA spent nuclear fuel in existing dry storage facilities at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. However, the analysis to determine what treatment, if any, will be necessary to
qualify the TRIGA spent fuel for geologic disposal will continue and the appropriate treatment,
if any, will be identified and implemented.
DOE will issue a second, separate Record of Decision at approximately the end of 1999 (or
sooner if possible) to provide assurance to the States hosting the DOE spent fuel management
sites that DOE will place sufficient priority on the new technology development effort, and to
ensure that the decision on which spent fuel management approach to adopt for use past the year
2000 receives appropriate scrutiny by Executive Branch agencies, Congress and the public.
C. Duration of the Policy -The alternatives for the duration of the policy that were considered are
discussed in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 of the Final EIS. In analyzing these alternatives, DOE
concluded that the 5-year option is unlikely to provide sufficient time for the reactor operators
to arrange for alternative spent nuclear fuel disposal mechanisms, and thus might result in some
reactor operators refusing to participate in the program to convert or continue to use LEU fuel.
That would substantially undermine the goal of eliminating civil commerce in HEU.
On the other hand, the analysis determined that there was insufficient benefit to be gained from
extending acceptance of all foreign research reactor spent fuel containing HEU into the
indefinite future because such an approach would be unlikely to provide sufficient incentive for
22
other countries to proceed expeditiously with development of alternative arrangements for
disposal not involving the United States.
The approach selected provides the incentive needed to gain the reactor operators' cooperation,
while specifying a definite cut-off point. This alternative provides sufficient lead time to allow
the reactor operators to make other arrangements for disposition of their spent nuclear fuel, and
provides sufficient time to accept all spent nuclear fuel containing HEU enriched in the United
States.
D. Amount of Material to Manage -The alternative amounts of material that might be covered by
the proposed policy are described in Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.2.1 of the Final EIS. DOE, in
consultation with the Department of State,concluded that management of spent nuclear fuel only
from countries that do not have high income economies would strongly encourage the resurgence
of the use of HEU in the high-income economy countries, as well as opening the United States,
fairly or unfairly, to charges that it was not living up to commitments under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Management of only spent nuclear fuel containing HEU
would penalize those reactors that have already converted to the use of LEU fuel, and would
provide an incentive for reactors to continue to use HEU fuel, or switch back to its use.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that management of all of the
aluminum-based and TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel currently in storage or
projected to be discharged during the policy period, and target material containing uranium
enriched in the United States, will provide the best support for United States' nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy. Implementation of this approach will provide an opportunity for
removal of all United States origin HEU from civil commerce and will provide an incentive for
the continued conversion to and use of LEU as fuel for foreign research reactors, in place of
HEU.
DOE added the stipulation specifying that target material will be accepted only from foreign
research reactors whose operators who formally agree to switch to use of LEU targets,when such
targets become available,to provide an additional incentive for the reactor operators to make the
switch to LEU targets.
E. Marine Transport - The alternative approaches to marine transport of foreign research reactor
spent nuclear fuel are discussed in Section 2.2.1.5 of the Final EIS. The analyses in the Final EIS
demonstrate that the impacts to the environment, workers, or the public from transport of the
spent nuclear fuel using any of these types of ships would be small, and within applicable
regulatory limits. The analyses do not identify any difference in the small impacts that would
result from the use of purpose-built vs. general purpose ships. In addition, "military transports"
are in fact the same type of ship as chartered commercial cargo ships and are crewed by civilians,
use of"military transports" would not actually result in any difference in impacts. DOE, after
consultation with the Department of State, believes that use of actual warships would be
unnecessary from a security standpoint.
23
The approach selected by DOE, after consultation with the Department of State, (use of
chartered or commercial ships),provides maximum flexibility for marine transport.
DOE has decided to specify the additional stipulation on reduction of the number of shipments
as a means of responding to public concerns regarding the risk of the shipments and to reduce
shipping costs.
F. Ground Transport - The ground transportation alternatives (i.e., truck, rail and barge) are
discussed in Section 2.2.1.7 of the Final EIS. The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the
impacts to the environment, workers, or the public, from any of these modes of ground transport
(counting barge as a mode of "ground transport") would be small and within the applicable
regulatory limits. Furthermore, the differences in potential impacts between the truck, rail and
barge alternatives were not significant.
Both the truck and rail transportation options have been used successfully to transport foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel in the past. Truck transport was the predominant mode used
for over twenty years, until the old "Off-Site Fuels Policy" lapsed in 1988. Rail was the mode
used for both shipments under the Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. Since neither of the ports of entry (see item H
below) can reasonably provide barge transport to either of the management sites,barge transport
was not included in the preferred alternative.
The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target material could be safely transported
overland within the United States by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either
transportation mode may be used. However, there appears to be a strong preference by some
members of the public in the port areas for the use of rail. Therefore, in response to this
preference, DOE has decided that it will seek to use rail for shipments from the ports of entry to
DOE facilities at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory in Idaho as a general matter, subject to further discussions with the States,Tribes and
local jurisdictions along the proposed transportation routes.
G. Title Transfer Location - The alternative points at which DOE might take title to the spent
nuclear fuel and target material are discussed in Sections 2.2.1.4 and 2.2.2.4 of the Final EIS.
The point at which title will be transferred has no effect on the physical processes that would
take place, and thus will not have any effect on the impacts on the environment, workers, or the
public. The Price-Anderson Act would provide liability protection in the unlikely event of a
nuclear accident in the United States, whether or not DOE has taken title to the spent nuclear
fuel at the time of such an accident. As a result, DOE, after consultation with the Department
of State, concluded that the selection of the title transfer location could be made solely on
programmatic considerations.
Acceptance of title at the foreign research reactor sites could make the United States
Government liable for any accident that might occur in the country of origin, or on the high seas.
DOE has been unable to identify any advantage to the United States of taking title outside the
24
United States. Taking title at the limit of United States territorial waters would make the title
transfer depend solely on when the ship enters United States waters, which could be difficult for
DOE to control in certain circumstances (e.g., during a storm). Acceptance of title when the
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel actually enters the land mass of the United States (the
approach selected) provides the most certainty for implementation. The approach selected
ensures that liability for accidents during the transportation process outside the United States
will remain with the reactor operators, while reinforcing in the minds of the public that the
United States Government will be accountable in the unlikely event of an accident within United
States territory.
H. Ports of Entry -The alternative ports of entry considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.1.6 and
3.2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in the EIS demonstrate that the impacts on either the
environment, workers, or the public due to use of any of the potential ports of entry analyzed
would be small and within applicable regulatory limits.
Although any one or all of the ten ports of entry described in the Final EIS would be acceptable
ports of entry, DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel marine shipments to the United States should be made via the
military ports (selected from among those analyzed in the Final EIS and found acceptable) in
closest proximity to the spent nuclear fuel management sites(i.e.,the Charleston Naval Weapons
Station and the Concord Naval Weapons Station). DOE will seek to transport multiple casks per
ship to keep the total number of shipments as small as possible, as well as to reduce risks and
costs.
Use of military ports will provide additional confidence in the safety of the shipments due to the
increased security associated with the military ports. This could also require much of the spent
nuclear fuel to be shipped via chartered ships because commercial ships do not schedule stops
at military ports. Use of chartered ships will increase the cost of shipping spent nuclear fuel.
This additional cost will be borne by the reactor operators for shipments from high-income
economy countries, and by the United States for reactor operators from other countries. The
additional cost will be kept to a minimum by shipping as many casks as possible on each ship
(up to a maximum of eight per ship).
I. Management Sites -The question of which sites should be used for management of all of DOE's
spent nuclear fuel was addressed in the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS, including
consideration of the potential receipt of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The
initial Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (60 FR 28680,
June 1, 1995), specifies that any aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel
accepted in the United States will be managed at the Savannah River Site; and that the remaining
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel will be managed at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. This decision was not affected by the second Record of Decision for the
Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (61 FR 9441, March 8, 1996). The site for management
of the target material was left to be decided under the Final Environmental Impact Statement on
a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor
25
Spent Nuclear Fuel(i.e., the Final EIS). All of the target material currently in DOE's possession
is managed at the Savannah River Site. The approach selected (i.e., management of target
material at the Savannah River Site)is not inconsistent with the decision specified in the Records
of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS.
The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts to either the environment or the
public through use of any of the sites for management of the foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel and target material would be small, and well within applicable regulatory limits.
J. Financing Arrangement - The alternative financing arrangements are discussed in Sections
2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3 of the Final EIS. The financing arrangement selected will have no effect on
the physical processes that will take place, and thus will not have any direct environmental
effects. However, it could affect how many foreign research reactor operators elect to ship spent
nuclear fuel to the United States. For instance, if DOE and the Department of State were to
charge a full cost recovery fee to all reactors, some of the reactors in high-income countries and
many, if not all, of the reactors in other countries would not have the financial resources to
participate. This would reduce the amount of spent fuel to be accepted and also reduce the
potential environmental impacts that would be associated with shipment and management of the
spent fuel, but would result in an increased risk of,diversion of highly enriched uranium into a
foreign nuclear weapons program. On the other hand, if the United States subsidized all of the
reactors,the United States would bear the full financial burden, even for reactors that can afford
to pay their fair share.
DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that, to encourage that reactor
operators in countries with other-than-high-income-economies to participate in the program, the
United States should subsidize receipt of their spent nuclear fuel. DOE and the Department of
State also concluded that DOE should strive to recover as much of the cost of managing the spent
nuclear fuel as possible from high-income economy countries. DOE concluded that it will
announce the fee policy in a Federal Register notice(separate from this Federal Register notice
announcing the Record of Decision), so that the fee policy may be changed from time to time as
necessary to reflect changes in cost or new information that may be relevant to the policy.
Such an approach will recover as much as possible of the United States' expenses for
management of spent nuclear fuel from high-income economy countries (without encouraging
any of them to resort to reprocessing of their spent nuclear fuel), will encourage participation by
other countries, and will provide a mechanism through which to account for changes in cost and
future definition of program details.
X. Conclusion - DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement a
new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material acceptance policy, as specified in the
Preferred Alternative contained in the Final EIS, subject to the additional stipulations noted in
Section VII and including the mitigation activities identified in Section VIII. This new policy is
effective upon being made public, in accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations (10
CFR §1021.315). The goals of this policy are to support the United States' nuclear weapons
26
nonproliferation policy calling for the reduction, and eventual elimination, of HEU from civil
commerce, and to encourage foreign research reactors to switch from HEU fuels to alternative LEU
fuels developed under the RERTR program. In reaching this decision, DOE has considered the
concerns expressed by the Department of State, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Council, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency concerning the need for such a policy. A critical result of implementing this policy
will be the continued viability and vitality of the RERTR program because foreign research reactor
operators will have a continued incentive to participate. Similarly, implementation of programs
similar to the RERTR program in Russia, the other newly-independent states of the former Soviet
Union, China, South Africa, and other countries, and the establishment of a world-wide norm
discouraging the use of HEU depends on a commitment by`the United States to action such as that
embodied in the new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material acceptance policy. At
the same time, the impacts on the environment, workers, and the public from implementing the
acceptance program are estimated to be small and well within applicable regulatory limits.
The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at
40 CFR Parts 1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.
Issued in Washingt n, D.C., this 13th day of May, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary
Secretary of Energy
27
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