HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 03261996 - D4 D.4
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
Adopted this Order on March 26, 1996, by the following vote:
AYES: Supervisors Bishop, DeSaulnier, Torlakson and Smith
NOES: None
ABSENT: Supervisor Rogers
ABSTAIN: None
SUBJECT: Department of Energy's Proposal to Ship and Unload Spent Nuclear Fuel
Rods at the Concord Naval Weapons Station
On March 19, 1996, the Board of Supervisors continued to this date
consideration of the U.S. Department of Energy's proposal to ship and unload spent
nuclear fuel rods at the Concord Naval Weapons station for subsequent shipment
by rail or truck to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Supervisor DeSaulnier introduced the attached letter he received from Jill
Lytle, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization
Environmental Management, Department of Energy, responding to questions he
asked in his March 18, 1996 letter.
Chuck Zahn reported on the County's transportation access corridor and the
environmental impact report regarding the transportation routes for spent nuclear
fuel rods.
The following speakers commented:
Dr. Kathryn Smick, Physicians for Social Responsibility - Groundswell
Coalition, 1115 Oak Hill Road, Lafayette;
Julian Frazer, Vice Mayor, City of Martinez, 2415 Alhambra Avenue,
Martinez;
Kathy Lafferty,. Director, Director, Cambridge Community Center, 1344
Sherwood Drive, Concord.
William Walker, M.D., Health Services Director, addressed the issue of the
costs the County will incur for emergency and security services on this issue.
Following discussion the Board took the following actions:
IT IS BY THE BOARD ORDERED that:
1 . Acceptance of shipments of spent nuclear fuel rods at the Naval Weapons
Station or anywhere in the Bay Area is opposed;
2. Letters to cities acknowledging their support, and urging they develop a
legal plan with the County to fight the proposal are authorized;
3. Letters to the Governor, state legislators, and federal delegation soliciting
their support are authorized;
4. A letter to President Clinton relaying the County's concern regarding the
federal policy surrounding the proposed shipment is authorized.
1h certify that this Is a true and correct copy of
en action taken'=entered on the minutes of the
Board of Supe�rtsprs on the date o�q
ATTESTED: `7'K_,k/4.r fi I R*9(0 ..
PHIL BATCHELOR,Clerk of the Board
c.c. Supervisors of Supervisors and County Administrator
County Administrator
County Counsel By 'O�'u�
Z002
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Depwtnzerit of Energy �I
. ' • - Wasi�totr,,QC 20595 i •
NtA� Z d 1996 I � ,
Mr. Mark DeSaulnier
Supervisor, district IV
Contra Costa County Board of Supervisprs
2425 Bisso taro. Suite 110
Concord, California 94320-4837
Dear Mr. OeSaulnier:
Thank you for your letter of March 12, 1996, concerning the-
proposal to accept shipments of foreign research reactor spent
fuel through the Concord Naval Yeapons Station. Your iettier
enclosed several questions for which your requested answers� in time
to support a Board of Supervisors meeting on March 26, 1996. Our
responses to each of your questions are contained in the e+ciosure
to this letter. I
If you nave any additional questions, please do not hesitatVe to
write again, or call me on (202) 586-5151.
Sincerely, i
, . art
uty Assistarnt Secretary for
Nuclear, Naterial and Facility Stabilization
Environmental Management
.Enclosure I
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QUESTIONS FROM MARK DESAULNIER & DOE RESPONSES
March 26, 1996
Risk C`teria:
a. Q What was the criteria used for determining risk in the San Francisco Bay Area?
A: The calculation of risk associated with shipments of foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel through the Concord Naval Weapons Station was Performed in two parts
-risk associated with normal passage or"'incident-free"t:ra uportation, and risk
associated with accidents. The incident-free risk calculation considered the risk to
people who come close to the transportation cask, such as inspectors and workers at
the Concord Naval Weapons Station,and.members of the public who might be near
highways or railways. The accident risk calculation assumed a major accident
occurred in San Francisco Bay and at the Concord Naval Weapons Station and
considered the effect on all people within 50 miles of the accident site. Both the
incident-free and the accident calculations indicate that the risk of the shipments
through the Concord Naval Weapons Station is extremely small,less than I chance in
250,000 that a member of the public in the vicinity of the Concord Naval Weapons
Station would contract a latent cancer fatality as a result of performing the entire
multi-year program(see Appendix D to the EIS, Section D.5.5,Table D-46 [direct
shipments],for more details).
b. Q: How does DOE justify increasing the risk in the area around the Concord Naval
,Weapons Station over other sites which do not have the types of acutely hazardous
materials in their commiWties?
A Because of the nature of their business andproximity to metropolitan areas,most
major ports have hazardous materials in their vicinity. Furthermore, as noted above,
the calculated accident risk to a member of the public in the vicinity of the Concord
Naval Weapons Station, expressed as the probability of a latent cancer fatality, is very
low-less than 1 in 250,004, even in the unlikely event of a very severe accident.
There would be advantages and disadvantages'.in using any of the candidate ports of
entry evaluated in the EIS. When considering the other favorable characteristics of the
Concord Naval Weapons Station(e.g., added security, years of experience-in handling
hazardous cargo,physical separation from the public), the advantages of using this
port were determined to be significant in comparison to-most other ports.
c. Q: Will DOE provide a cumulative risk analysis which factored in the health and safety
risks posed by existing land uses;i.e.,military faciilities,oil refineries, chemical plants?
A: DOE evaluated the cumulative risk due to radiation exposure in Volume 1, Section
4.21.4 of the Final EIS. The chemical risks that already exist in the Bay Area would
not be increased or decreased by the spent nuclear fuel shipments, even in the unlikely
event of an accident. This is due both to the physical separation that would exist
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between the spent fuel shipment and the existing land uses,and due to the extremely
robust nature of the spent fuel shipping casks. Thus,DOE did not attempt to quantify
the risks to the public due to existing military facilities, oil refineries, or chemical
plants because these would be unchanged by the proposed spent fuel shipments.
Benefits to Our CommUnities:
a. Q: Will DOE agree to entering into a Memorandum of Agreement with Contra Costa
County and any other local jurisdiction(similar to the MOA with the Department of
Defense Navy)that any costs'b= ed by local agencies to insure public safety and
enscrgency response will be reimbursed 100 percent by DOE?
A: DOE would be very willing to begin negotiations with Contra Costa County and other
local jurisdictions near the Concord Naval Weapons Station concerning the drafting
and execution of an appropriate agreement that would, among other things, define
how DOE would provide incremental resources,either in kind or financial,that would
be necessary to ensure public safety and emergency response. DOVs normal practice
in other similar cases has been to arrange for this type of assistance as part of the
Transportation Plan that would be prepared prior to the shipments.
To support this effort,DOE commits to pursuing negotiations in good faith and using
best efforts to reach a timely agreement. In this regard,DOE agrees to send a
representatives)to Contra Costa County no later than May 1, 1996,to begin
formulating the agreement. It is DOE's intention to enter into an agreement by
September 1, 1996. It is DOS's preference to eater into one agreement that includes
the State of California, Contra Costa County and any other appropriate local
jurisdictions.
1. Shippsnr Through San,Frnncis,co Bgv:
a_ Q: How did DOE evaluate and rate the risks for accidents due to narrow and shallow
channels,proximity to other vessels,bridge abutments and other navigational
installations, piers and docks,and the adjoining land uses?
A: DOE's risk evaluation reflects the general finding that the number of ship mishaps is
not proportional to the amount of ship traffic, but rather,is associated with
navigational hazards and distances from the port to the open ocean or,a large bay.
Therefore,the port selection process focused on favorable transit from the open water.
In evaluating the favorable transit from open water,bridges,narrow channels, and .
other hazards were considered, and the transit to the Concord Naval Weapons Station
was found to be acceptable. See EIS Appendix D, Section D.1.9.2 for a discussion of
the transit from open water criterion.
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The most severe accident,while unlikely,is considered to be the.collision of the ship
carrying the foreWa research reactor spent nuclear fuel with a petroleum tanker. In
this accident the transportation cask is assumed to be damaged in the collision,then
subjected to afire that resulted from the collision(Section D:5). The potential for
such a.collision to occur is extremely remote as the Coast Guard would be escorting
the vessel to the Naval Weapons Station, and because the shipping cask is designed to
withstand such a collision. More details regarding the assumptions that went into the
port accident analysis and the results of those analyses are provided in EIS Section
4.2.2.3.
Neither the port selection criteria nor the severe accident analyses considered the
impact of land-based facilities such as refineries,or other land use because such uses
would have no direct impact on the risk associated with the shipment of foreign
research reactor spent nuclear ford due to the distance between the ship carrying the
spent fuel and the land-based facilities.
b: Q: Would DOE be willing to accept Association ofBay Area Governments(ABAG)data
on population along this shipping route and,further,would DOE accept ABAG's
projections about future population growth over the 13-year period?
A: DOE used population data to determine the risks due to accidents at the ports and
along ground transport routes. In order to make a consistent comparison of all the
ports,DOE chose to use a national-level data source: the U.S. Census. The
calculations showed that the risk associated with transporting spent fuel through the
Concord Naval Weapons Station would be very low. Even if the ABAG population
data was,for example, 100 times higher than the U.S. Census data, the results of the
analyses would not change measurably, since the ground transport(i.e.,transport
outside of the port of entry)incident free risk(which is insensitive to population
changes in the immediate vicinity of the port)dominates the port accident risk(which
is sensitive to population).
2. Unloading Storin>'& ading Spent Fuel Casks-The following questions arise out of a
concern over the adequacy of existing unloading facilities prior to the installation of additional
unloading cranes later in the decade and the seismic sensitivity of the site.
a. Q: How will accidents be avoided?
A: The procedure for unloading a spent fuel container would be the same as for any other
ISO(International Standards Organization)container,with additional inspections by
State and Federal authorities, as appropriate. In the case of shipments through the
Concord Naval Weapons Station,we would gain the benefit of the experience and
procedures they have developed for safely handling explosive cargos. Although the
Weapons Station's capabilities will be improved when the modernization program is
complete, the current 112 ton floating crane and go ton truck crane would have more
than enough capacity to handle the spent fuel shipping casks(average weight of about
20 tons).
Upon removal from the ship,a container with a spent fuel cask inside would be placed
directly on a railroad flatcar or a truck trailer and tied down. The container with a
spent fuel cask inside would then be moved expeditiously out of the port(typically
within 2to 4 hours). There would be no long term storage,or opening, or reloading
of the casks at the Naval Weapons Station. If the departure of the truck or train were
delayed(due to bad weather,for example)theta the spent fuel container would remain
on the vehicle until it could leave.The proper security measures would be employed to
ensure the safety of the spew fuel. The probability of an earthquake of a magnitude
sufficient to disrupt the shipping activities while the spent fuel is in port is extremely
low. Even if such an earthquake were to ocau,it would not be expected to damage
the shipping casks. Rather,it would be an accident initiator,leading up to the type of
accident conditions that are analyzed in the EIS. For additional information on this
subject, see Volume 1, Section 2.6.3.2.2 of the Final EIS.
In the period of more than 30 years in which this same type of spent fuel has been
accepted into the United States in the past,there have been no accidents in which any
radioactive cargo was released from a spent fuel cask.
b. Q: What security will be,provided?
A The Concord Naval Weapons Station has a security force to prevent any interference
with operations on the Naval Weapons Station. This security force would provide
protection while a shipment was at the Concord Naval Weapons Station. The security
at the Naval Weapons Station,and that provided during the remainder of an overland
shipment within the United States,would comply with the requirements of Nuclear
Regulatory Commission(NRC)regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations at
10 CFR 71. These requirements include provision for armed guards while shipments
are in highly populated areas or in port. Shippers often hire off-duty State or local
police to perform this function Tramsportation Plans can provide for additional
security,beyond that required by the NRC regulation,if conditions so warrant. See
Volume 1, Section 2.8 for additional information on this subject.
c. Q: How will radiation exposure be kept below critical levels?
A: The radiation shielding built into the spent fiul shipping casks, and the regulatory
requirements governing the allowable loading of the spent fuel stopping casks,would
keep the radiation exposures very low. The applicable regulations limit the radiation
doses from spent fuel shipping casks to 10 millirem per hour beyond 6 feet from the
transport vehicle and to 2 millirem per hour to occupants of the transport vehicle.
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However,the radiation levels experienced in practice are usually much lower than the
regulatory limits. For example,the radiation levels measured by Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and State of North Carolina during the most recent shipments of foreign
research reactor spent fuel detected no radiation above natural background radiation at
3 feet from the package bolding the shipping cask. The radiation levels at the surface
of the shipping casks ranged from 0 on the front and back to 0.17 millirem on the top
and sides of two of the casks. F9r the n wst limiting shipment(i.e.,a shipment
containing the most radioactive spent fuel with resulting cask radiation levels at the
regulatory.Emit),the eff a of the shipment on the natural background radiation field
about 300 feet from the shipping casks would not be detectable.
In addition,the mitigation measures discussed in the EIS would require tracking the
involvement of individual workers in the spent fuel shipments to ensure that the same
workers are not involved in enough shipmemts to&Uow their individual exposures to
exceed the regulatory limit of 100 millirem per year.
d. Q: Why has DOE's position changed from either military or commercial port to one that
seems to be only military and a non-combative base?
A: DOE's position,as documented in the Final EIS,is that any of the ten ports analyzed
as potential ports of entry in the EIS would be acceptable. However, numerous
comments received from the public during the review of the draft EIS urged DOE to
use only military ports. Although DOE considers this additional measure to be over
and above that which is necessary to ensure safe transport, we do agree that certain
military ports, such as the Concord Naval Weapons Station and the Charleston Naval
Weapons Station would provide additional security for the shipments and would
provide a buffer(Le.,distance)between*#area where the spent fuel casks would be
unloaded from the ships and areas accessible to the general public. In discussing the
potential for use of military ports with the Navy during preparation of the Final FIS,
DOE and the Navy jointly determined that it would be inadvisable to use either bases
or maintenance facilities for combatant ships(i.e., ships designed to carry and use
weapons in battle)to avoid possible interference with the Navy's national defense
mission.
e. Q: How is the mission of the Concord Naval Weapons Station different than a combative
base's mission?
A: The mission of the Concord Naval Weapons Station is to receive, snore, outload, and.
tranship explosive ordnance for use in Pacific Ocean areas,by the United States
Department of Defense. This mission includes routine handling of hazardous bulk
items of the size and weight of the proposed spent fuel shipments.
5
The mission of a combatant base or maintenance facility is to serve warships. Neither
the facilities nor the ships they service routinely handle bulk items similar to the
proposed spent.fuel shipments. Furthermore,the combatant bases,'often located in
major metropolitan areas,must provide for the rapid and unpredictable deployment of
their ships. As a result,the mission of a combatant base is much more time sensitive
than that of a Naval Weapons Station.
3. Overiand Shipment:
r
a. Q: Will DOE guarantee that all shipments to Idaho from the Concord Naval Weapons
Station be by rail as a further safety protection matter?
A: We have listened and take seriou:ly the strong preference for shipment by rail
expressed at the Much 4 meeting in Concord. As a part of preparing the
Transportation Plan,DOE would-consult with thz State and selected jurisdictions
along the land transportati3n route to detamine whether there is additional preference
for either track or rail. DOE would be prepared to abide by any consensus that might
arise.
b. Q: Has DOE evaluated specific friction characteristics such as traffic volumes and flows,
pavement conditions,intersections, signals and number of lanes along the land
transportation route?
A: In the analyses of the risks associated with the proposed shipments,DOE used State
truck accident statistics,rather than local statistics. However,the remits of the
analyses of potential accident conditions are so low that the statistical risk of an
accident(possibly associated with undesirable local road conditions)could increase by
a factor of about 100 without measurably increasing the level of risk associated with
an accident above that of incident free conditions.
The EIS does not contain local traffic, street and pavement analyses. These factors
would be addressed during development of the Transportation Plan, including highway
mode and route to the Interstate system if the decWotn is made to ship the spent fuel
by truck.
4. Comparison with OtherP Ports:
a. Q: Would DOE provide more specific comparison ofthe attributes for selecting the
Concord Naval Weapons Station?
A: The 269 page Appendix D in the Final F-nn+amnental Impact Statement on a
Proposed Nuclear We4vns Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent NuckAv Fuel contains a lengthy discussion of each of the ports that met
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the"appropriate experience"criteria, and a discussion of the process used to select
among them. If you could provide a more specific definition of the type of information
that you at seeking, other than that already provided'in Appendix D,we would be
pleased to respond
5. Finances for Training.Pbl-he_Safet. & Ememucy Reponse:
a. Q: What kind of training will be given?
A: DOE wig,as pati of developing the transportation plan for these shipments,work with
the State and local emergency r+esponsc/public safety officials to identify and then
provide any training that would be needed. This could include basic awareness
training for first responders, specific operations level training for hazardous materials
teams and specialized courses, including a course on rail response.
b. Q: What level of financial support would be provided?
A: The level of any required financial support would be determined during discussions
with State and local authorities during preparation of the Transportation.Plan. In
general,we would provide the inctemet W resources,either in kind or financial, that
would be necessary to enable emergency response personnel to respond to an incident
involving the proposed shipments of spent,fuel.
C. Q: There are tamently in place local government emergency response plans;has DOE
reviewers there local plans? If so,how would they have to be changed in order to
accommodate the DOFs proposed program?
A: DOE normally reviews local emergency response plans as part of the preparation of
the Transportation Plan for programs such as the proposed shipment of spent fuel.
Since there has been no decision at this point that any spent fuel will be accepted,we
have not yet reached the point at which these emergency response plans would he
reviewed. The team of emergency response personnel(Federal, State,Tribal and
local),which would be formed as part of the transportation planning process,would
develop an emergency response section of the Transportation Pian. This section of the
plan would delineate roles and responsibilities which would be consistent with the
emergency response system of each State and Taal government along the
transportation corridor for these shipments. The local officials would determine how
their plans would need to be changed,if at all,based on our planning activities.
d-, Q: Given the topography and geography of this area,how will DOE assist in the handling
of simultaneous emergencies such as might occur because of an earthquake or an
explosion ata local industrial compltx?
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A: DOE's Radiological Assistance Program teams would be available to the incident
commander in the event of a radiological accident, as discussed in Section 2.7 of the
EIS. These teams are trained to deal with radiological,emergencies and will assist in
recovery efforts when requested. In addition,any carrier would be required to have a
recovery plan and will provide for the recovery and continued shipment of any
radioactive mate W.
6. Demous�trations at the Concor Navat W_MDona Station:
a. Q: Will DOE commit to bearing the costs of public safety and emergency response
.personnel? Over what time period?
A: As indicated above,DUE would be willing to enter into an appropriate agreement to
reimburse local agencies for incremental costs incuned in responding to large
demonstrations,including costs for public safety and emergency response,that are
directly attributable to large demonstrations seising out of the shipment of;pent fuel
from foreign research reactors. Such an agement could cover a reasonable period of
time during which members of the public are expressing concern about the shipments
that would be received through the Concord Naval Weapons Station. The specifics of
this reimbursement would be addressed and defined in the agreement discussed in the
response to question a. above under`Bax is to Our Communities".
RECEIVED
D D.
CITY OF CONCO'RD CIT COUNCIL
1950 Parkside Drive, MS/01 LM Rosas, Mayor
Concord,California 94519-2578 MR 21 1%6 Bill NlcManigal,Vice Mayor
R
(510) 798-0636 Ile]:it N4.Allen
D OF SUPERVISOR` mel A. Past ick
COSTA Wim k A. Peterson
!MNM- ca
OFFICE OF THE NIAVOR1xiinct,KeihL Citv Clerk
Telephone: (510) uOrWorl9calt T I lionlas Wending. City h casul cr
EdN\;1rd R. latlics,0111N, Manager
March 20, 1996
President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington,D.C. 20500
Dear President Clinton:
It was a pleasure meeting you and Vice President Gore at Ygnacio Valley High School on Saturday,March 9.
On behalf of the Concord City Council, I want to thank you for your important visit to our area.Your support of
NetDay '96 was greatly appreciated by the community. I trust you enjoyed your stay in Concord and the San
Francisco Bay Area.
We now request your support to stop a proposal by the Department of Energy and the Department of State to
ship spent nuclear fuel rods through Concord. By a unanimous vote of the Concord City Council,this letter is
being sent to you to enlist your support to prevent shipment of nuclear fuel rods through our community.
The Department of Energy and the Department of State are proposing that the Port of Concord,located at the
Concord Naval Weapons Station,be used as the one west coast port of entry for spent nuclear fuel rods arriving
from foreign countries. Fuel rods would be off-loaded at the Port of Concord and placed in trains or trucks for
shipment to a temporary federal storage facility in Idaho.
We are concerned about the adverse impacts the shipment of fuel rods could have on the San Francisco Bay
Area and Contra Costa County in particular. We believe the Final Environmental Impact Statement is inadequate,
and we oppose the use of the Port of Concord for the transport of foreign spent nuclear fuel rods. We urge you to
reject the proposal by the Department of Energy and Department of State to ship these fuel rods through the Bay
Area.
The San Francisco Bay Area has a population of 6,000,000 people. Ships carrying potentially dangerous fuel
rods would go through the Golden Gate to Concord, passing close to both major population centers as well as
numerous small communities.
We are very concerned about impacts to land use,the transportation system,economic vitality,public health
and safety. Our major concerns are discussed below.
I ECONOMIC AND FISCAL IMPACTS
• The recent closure of military bases has had a significant and detrimental impact on the California
economy. The shipment of spent nuclear fuel through our region will not help to promote regional
economic prosperity. In fact the presence of spent nuclear fuel shipments in our region will give us a
competitive disadvantage in our attempts to encourage economic growth.
President Clinton
March 20, 1996
Page 2
• The proposal could result in significant direct costs to local governments. Local emergency service
resources—police, fire, ambulance, hospital—will be required to be activated in case of an accident.
Mutual aid agreements could require the mobilization of emergency service providers from throughout
the region. We fear the federal government will not refund local jurisdictions for their costs. We fear this
program will result in yet another unfunded federal mandate and reduce local control of local finances.
II TRANSPORTATION ROUTES
• Nuclear fuel rods could be transported through large and small cities on their long route from Concord to
Idaho. People in these communities would be subject to potential nuclear hazards. Local emergency
service providers are not trained or equipped to deal with nuclear accidents.
III SECURITY CONCERNS
• Past demonstrations at the Concord Naval Weapons Station have attracted up to 7,000 people a day and
have been highlighted in the national media.Demonstrations at the Naval Weapons Station,investigations
of potential terrorist groups, and security for convoys, in all probability will require police assistance.
Police assistance could be needed from communities throughout the region. We are very concerned about
potential police costs.
• The Departments of Energy and State did not fully discuss the attractiveness of spent nuclear fuel rods to
anti-government groups. It has come to our attention that fuel rods could be added to conventional bombs
to create a radioactive bomb scene. In light of the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City,this
potential use of nuclear fuel rods is very disturbing.
IV ACCIDENT POTENTIAL
• The Departments of Energy and State did not assess potential hazards of shipping spent nuclear fuel rods
through the Bay Area,one of the largest metropolitan regions in the country. There are hazards in San
Francisco Bay along the route from the Golden Gate to Concord. The EIS does not consider hazards to
6,000,000 Bay Area residents,most of whom live near coastlines along the proposed route. The EIS does
not analyze impacts on the regional transportation network and the regional economy if a fuel rod ship
accident damages any of the five bridges between the Golden Gate and Concord. The EIS does not assess
the potential for accidents due to natural conditions such as heavy fog,the length of the trip within the Bay
from the Golden Gate to Concord, narrow channels, and possible conflicts with commercial and
recreational boats.
• In the case of an accident,DOE has stated that local emergency services agencies would be expected to
handle the situation. Local police departments,fire departments,hospitals,ambulance companies,and
other emergency service providers do not have the capacity to deal with radiation accidents.
• Local governments would require a significant subsidy from the DOE to revise emergency service plans,
train local personnel,and buy equipment. Designated employees may require salary incentives to work
in radioactive situations.
• The EIS does not analyze what local agencies should do if an accident situation resulted in health hazards,
contaminated the water supply of the Contra Costa Water District or the East Bay Municipal Utilities
District,closed major roads,contaminated San Francisco Bay,caused panic,or resulted in other unforseen
catastrophes.
• The EIS risk assessment does not include natural hazards particular to this area such as earthquakes. The
EIS does not consider potential hazards caused by the built environment. Contra Costa County already
has a large number of potentially dangerous industries such as chemical plants and oil refineries. After
Csx-�-dtA� w( D •�
President Clinton
March 20, 1996
Page 3
adding the Concord Naval Weapons Station to this list,it only can be concluded that Contra Costa County
has more than its fair share of hazardous uses. We do not want to add nuclear fuel rod shipments to this
list.
• Five or more shiploads of nuclear fuel are scheduled to arrive at the Port of Concord. The specific number
of ships depends on the cargo capacity available per ship. These shipments would be transferred to trains
and trucks in Concord. Special convoys of trucks and/or special trains only carrying fuel rods would travel
to Idaho. The magnitude of this undertaking is significant and has not been taken into consideration by
the Department of Energy.
As you can see,we are very concerned about potentially significant regional and local impacts of the proposed
federal program to ship spent fuel rods through the Bay Area. There are viable and less dangerous alternatives for
shipping rods;alternative routes which do not go through one of the largest metropolitan areas of the country. We
hope you will reject the proposal to use the Port of Concord for this program.
The Concord City Council and the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors have received considerable
public input regarding this proposal to ship nuclear fuel rods through Concord. A hearing held in Concord last May
by the Department of Energy attracted 240 people,almost all of whom were against this proposal. Approximately
50 people representing concerned groups and individuals addressed the Concord City Council last June regarding
this issue. A public information meeting was held in Concord on a stormy evening earlier this month with
representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Energy, the Contra Costa County Board of
Supervisors,and the Concord City Council. There were 35 speakers in opposition to the proposal. Enclosed are
some examples of letters we have received in opposition to the shipment of fuel rods through Concord. We have
received no correspondence in favor of the proposal.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours
Lou Rosas
Mayor
A08266-4.LR6
Attachments:
Letter dated March 18, 1996 from City of San Jose Letter dated March 5, 1996 from City of Pittsburg
Letter dated March 14, 1996 from City of Belvedere Letter dated March 4, 1996 from City of Sunnyvale
Letter dated February 29, 1996 and Resolution dated Letter dated February 12, 1996 from City of Walnut Creek
February 27, 1996 from City of Brentwood
cc:
Governor Pete Wilson Concord City Council City of Martinez
Senator Barbara Boxer Edward R.James,Concord City Manager City of Pittsburg
Senator Dianne Feinstein Rick Doyle,Concord City Attorney Town of San Anselmo
Representative Bill Baker Contra Costa Times City of San Jose
Representative George Miller Concord Transcript City of San Pablo
State Senator Daniel Boatwright City of Belmont City of Santa Rosa
Assemblyman Robert Campbell City of Belvedere City of Sunnyvale
Assemblyman Richard Rainey City of Brentwood City of Walnut Creek
Jeff Smith,Chair of Contra Costa County City of Clayton
Board of Supervisors Town of Fairfax
w4 JQ� CITY OF SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA
# +k RM NaRTld FIRST STREET
p ig SAN JOSE.CA 95"0=1792
(40B)277-4237
— PAX c40101=77-313S8
SUSAN HAMIABR
MAYOR
March 18, 1996
Mayor Lou Rosas
City of Concord
1950 Parkside Drive
Concord,CA 94519
Dear Mayor Rosas:
Thank you for bringing to my attention the United States Department of
Energy (DOE) proposal to ship spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries to
the Bay ,Area. This proposal raises serious concerns regarding human health
and safety in the San Francisco Bay Area.
The Bay Area is a precious economic resource to the nation and deserves the
support and protection of the Federal government It is essential that the
DQE Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project adequately
assesses the potential hazards of shipping spent nuclear fuel rods through one
of the largest metropolitan-regions in the country:
Although there are many safeguards in place for the transport of this
material, there is always some risk associated with moving hazardous
materials. It would be more prudent to explore alternative routes where
there would be less exposure to a large population and an extremely fragile
environment. I join you in opposing the current DOE proposal.
Please keep me informed as to the status of your efforts.
Sincerel ,
Susan Hammer
Mayor
CC. City Council
Regina Williams
i
i
CCity of Belvedere * 1996 * Incorporated 1896
�IFO1Z
450 San Rafael Avenue Councarnernbers
Belvedere, California 94920-2336 MayorLani Valentine
Telephone: 415/435-3838 Fax: 415/435-0430 Vice Mayor Steger Johnson
Email: cofb@aol.com Justin Faggioli, Ken Johnson, &.Ann Otter
March 14, 1996
The Honorable Lou Rosas
Mayor
City of Concord
1950 Parkside Drive, MS/01
Concord, CA 94519-2578
Re: Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel Rods through San Francisco Bay
Dear Mayor Rosas:
Thank you for your letter of February 23 alerting us to the proposal by the U.S. Department of
Energy to transport spent nuclear fuel rods through San Francisco Bay to the Concord Naval
Weapons Stations for land conveyance to an Idaho disposal site.
The Belvedere City Council took action at its March 4 meeting to express its grave concern about
this proposal. We urge the Department of Energy to re-evaluate its routing plans and bypass any
transit of nuclear waste through the San Francisco Bay area.
Our concerns arise from the following:
1) Potential for accident
Idaho as a final destination is a long way from the entrance to the San Francisco Bay, and
at any point along the way, contamination problems could occur, both in the Bay or on
the land. Logically, it would appear advantageous for the Department of Energy to
pursue direct transport of the nuclear material from its origin to its destination-- why not
by air? Certainly this would minimize the exposure for accidental spill and
contamination en route.
2) High population densi_ area
If nuclear materials are to move along any US domestic corridors, surely they should
avoid those corridors of high population density such as the Bay Area, one of the largest
metropolitan regions in the country. These materials should, under aQ conditions be
present in the San Francisco Bay Estuary which supports a fragile marine ecosystem that
The Honorable Lou Rosas
March 14, 1996
page 2
we are desperately attempting to restore to health. Any accident or spill could cause
irrevocable environmental damage, as well as threaten human life.
3) Response by local emergency agencies
The Bay Area is documented earthquake country, and our emergency crews are focused
on appropriate response to such natural events. A radioactive disaster is another matter
altogether. . . how could local jurisdictions bear the costs of this kind of emergency? The
very possibility of such an occurrence should mandate alternate access routes to Idaho.
Please bypass the San Francisco Bay Area.
4) Economic Issues
Even the spectre of any shipment of spent nuclear waste through our region will diminish
regional economic confidence. With recent military base closures, this area is working
hard to create a climate of economic health. Surely the Department of Energy cannot
believe this proposal contributes to our well-being and prosperity.
Kindly forward these comments to those in Washington with whom you are dealing on this issue.
Please advise us of the outcome or if there is anything additional we can provide to help forward
the cause.
Sincerely,
Lani Valentine
Mayor
LV:sb
RECEIVE
OF 'M'i
City of Martinez MAR - 8
525 Henrietta Street, Martinez, CA 94553-2394 nS
Wig
1876
March 5, 1996
Contra. Costa County
Board of Supwv.sors
651 Pine Street - Rm. 108B
Martinez, CA 94553
Attn: Clerk of the Board
Dear Board Members:
The City of Martinez originally took a position opposing the transportation of the
Spent Fuel Rods to Concord and through Martinez to its final destination in Idaho.
Please review the enclosed letter to the Department of Energy that reiterates my
concerns even after the completion of the final EIS.
Sincerely,
Julian M. Frazer
Vice Mayor
i
JF:elm
Enclosure
CITY COUNCIL CITY MANAGER
Michael M. Menesini,Mayor Harriett Bun Timothy J. Farley Julian M.Frazer Barbara J.Woodburn James Jakel
® Printed on Recycled Paper
Community Contra Harvey f n
o
Development �.J Director of Coommummu nity Development
Costa
Department
County Administration Building County
651 Pine Street E-�c
4th Floor, North Wing
Martinez, California 945530095 T ,
Phone: (510) 335-1229 ; = March 22, 1996
Charles Head, Program Manager
Office of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management (EM-67)
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
Dear Mr. Head:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Final Environmental Impact Report on
the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. In June, 1995, we commented on the Draft EIS on this
project, finding that it was inadequate because of its lack of specificity in identifying local
impacts and mitigation measures and its too-general alternatives analysis comparing the
use of alternative West Coast ports. Subsequently, the project has been better defined
and scaled-down, but the Concord Naval Weapons Station in Contra Costa County has
been selected as the single West Coast Port-of-Entry in the preferred alternative. We
believe that the new project definition would have simplified the preparation of a more
concise local impacts analysis and "finalist" ports comparison (e.g., the work could have
been done as part of a comprehensive analysis of the preferred alternative).
Unfortunately, our concerns still haven't been addressed in any detail in the Final EIS and
we continue to believe that the environmental review is inadequate.
The local environmental concerns which we find to be inadequately covered in the Final
EIS may be summarized as:
1. Inadequate coverage of the Golden Gate to Concord Naval Weapons Station water
transportation corridor.
In most respects, the Final EIS appears to treat the last segment of the water
shipping route to the Concord Naval Weapons Station as a continuation of the open
ocean shipping lane rather than as a congested and confined bay-estuary channel.
The increased opportunities for accidents due to the narrow and shallow channel,
proximity to other vessels, bridge abutments and other navigational installations,
piers and docks, and adjoining land uses such as refineries, don't seem to be
specifically.addressed. The substantial population living along the waterway
doesn't seem to be acknowledged (except as a methodological consideration in the
technical appendix modeling shipboard accidents).
Charles Head, Program Manager
U.S. Department of Energy
March 22, 1996
Page 2
2. Inadequate coverage of loading and storage at the Concord Naval Weapons
Station.
The program for unloading, storing, and reloading spent fuel casks is not described
in a cohesive manner which enables a reader to understand where operations will
occur, how accidents will be avoided, what security will be provided, and why
radiation exposure will be kept below critical levels. Particular concerns on these
activities include the adequacy of existing unloading facilities prior to the installation
of additional unloading cranes later in the decade and the seismic sensitivity of the
site.
3. Inadequate coverage of the Concord Naval Weapons Station to Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory land transportation corridor.
The Final EIS indicates that the spent nuclear fuel casks, which number about eight
casks per shipment, could be trans-shipped to the INEL by either truck or rail.
Specific transportation facilities are not identified in the EIS, but are to be worked
out with local authorities at an appropriate time (a subsequent DOE pass-out, not
part of the EIS, did depict both rail and truck transportation route segments.)
Although the EIS provided computer-generated figures for adjoining populations,
and associated radiation risk estimates, the land transportation corridors are not
evaluated for specific friction characteristics such as traffic volumes and flows,
pavement conditions, intersections, signals and numbers of lanes. All of these
affect the potentials for accidents, travel times, and durations of exposure to
radiation.
4. Inadequate local cumulative risk analysis
Although the Final EIS discusses cumulative risk in relation to DOE's importation
program options, it does not evaluate the local effects that would result from the
addition of the nuclear fuel casks to the ambient risks already present in the
environment by existing nuclear materials (military and civilian) chemicals, and
petroleum processing. A local cumulative risk analysis was requested in our
previous comments on the Draft EIS. Our concerns on this matter are:
• Even if the intake, transfer, and trans-shipment of spent nuclear fuel at the
Concord Naval Weapons Station might not (barring accident) create
significant health risks, the increment of risk added to the ambient health risk
could result in a significant cumulative impact.
• Similarly, the release of additional radiation resulting from an accident, such
as a shipboard collision or fire, loading or unloading accident, or road or rail
accident could produce significant cumulative risk levels.
Charles Head, Program Manager
U.S. Department of Energy
March 22, 1996
Page 3
5. Absence of a "finalist" West Coast Ports-of-Entry comparative impact analysis
The Final EIS compares the impacts of using the Concord Naval Weapons Station
as the West' Coast Port-of-Entry with numerous other ports, but in very general
terms. It does not, as noted above, provide a more specific comparison of the
attributes of using the CNWS with other "finalist' ports such as overland travel
distance and size of the local population. Consequently, the Final EIS does not
provide a compelling rationale for selecting the CSWS vis-a-vis other candidate
facilities.
6. Lack of an adequate local mitigation program
The Final EIS does not specify a detailed local program to mitigate the potential
impacts of the proposed project. The Final EIS indicates that many mitigation
measures would not be identified until after a decision is made on the project.
Example of our concerns include the extent of the escorting program when loads
are being transported, security during transfer, presence of federal emergency
personnel while waste is being taken through the Bay Area, training of local
emergency personnel, responsibilities for incident management, and reimbursement
for local costs.
Please contact me at (510) 335-1229 if you would like to discuss these comments.
Yours Sincerely,
�..�C..�
Ct.
1..._
Charles A. Zahn
Assistant Director
CAZ:rw
RCZS:head.ltr
C.c.: Supervisor Jim Rogers
Supervisor Jeff Smith
Supervisor Gayle Bishop
Supervisor Mark DeSaulnier
Supervisor Tom Torlakson
Phil Batchelor, County Administrator
Victor Westman, County Counsel
William Walker, M.D., Director of Health Services
Val Alexeeff, Director, Growth Management Economic and Development Agency
Gary Brown, Director, Office of Emergency Services
c ,
e Citv of Martinez
roI _ 525 Henrietta Street, Martinez, CA 94553-2394 (510) 372-3505
FAX: (510) 372-0257
a�1876'
March 4, 1996
Thomas Grumley, Asst. Secretary for
Environmental Management
Office of Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20585-0001
Dear Mr. Grumley:
SUBJECT: Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear
Fuel
On June 6, 1995, the Martinez City Council sent comment letters on the Draft EIS On the
Return of Spent Nuclear Fuel. The issues raised in our previous letters have not_been
adequately addressed in the final EIS.
Specifically, the response to the issue regarding provision of emergency services in the
case of a local accident or disaster. The Final EIS indicates that DOE would provide
technical assistance to local agencies who might be involved in responding to an
emergency incident. This does not address financial assistance if the local agencies do
not have the resources. or staff to respond to an incident. The EIS provides for a
Transportation Plan, Appendix H, to be developed. This plan should be completed for
each site prior and included in the Final EIS.
Secondly, the Final EIS does not adequately address economic impacts on the local
community and surrounding communities. The proposed use of the Concord Naval
Weapons site may have a negative impact on the economy of Martinez and may lower
CITY COUNCIL CITY MANAGER
htichae i M. plenesini.Mayor Harriett Burt Tlmoth%*J. Farle)' Julian M. Frazer E3arbar r J. Woodhurn James Jakel
I7nut•ri qr1 H•c-ylctl('ttx;
Thomas Grumley, DOE
March 4, 1996
Page 2
property values in the area. The EIS responds to this issue by stating that the risks would
be less than the risks associated with the handling of other hazardous cargos. This should
be backed up with a site specific evaluation reviewing current use of the site and potential
economic impacts based on the communities involved.
Sincerely,
Julian M, Frazer
Vice Mayor
cc: Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors
Councilmembers - City of Concord
Councilmembers - City of Martinez
CITY OF SUNNYVALE
' The Heart of Silicon Valley
456 WEST OLIVE AVENUE SUNNYVALE. CALIFORNIA 94086 (408) 730-7470
March 4, 1996
Robin N. Parker
Alayor
Mr. Charles Head
Landon Curt Noll Program Manager
14ce Mayor Office of Spent Fuel Management
Department of Energy
Stan J. K3%vczyn:ki 1000 Independence Av. SW
Councilwembcr Washington, DC 20585
Jin, Roberts Dear Mr. Head:
Council embc:
I am writing in regard to the proposal by the United States Department of
Nlanuel t/alcrio
Crnmcilmcmber Energy to ship spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries to the Bay Area.
As you know, shipments would travel through the Golden Gate to the
Pat vorreiter Concord Naval Weapons Station where they would be transferred to truck
COUnellmember or train convoys for transport to a storage area in Idaho.
Jack Walker The City of Sunnyvale has serious concerns with the adequacy of fhe final
CouncHniember environmental impact statement regarding this matter. We are concerned
about the potential impacts of spent nuclear fuel on life and properly and
the natural environment as well as municipal costs associated with the
program.
The Bay Area is one of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States.
As a result, human environmental exposures to the shipment of spent
nuclear fuel are immense. Unless and until it can be shown that there is
no risk to human health or the natural environment, the City of Sunnyvale
would maintain a position of opposition to this DOE proposal.
Sincerely,
1 ;J;
Robin N. Parker
Mayor
:cai
cc: Lou Rosas. Mavor. Citv of Concord
CITY OF
BR
February 29, 1996
Mr. Lou Rosas, Mayor
City of Concord
1950 Parkside Drive
Concord, CA 94519-2578
Dear Mayor Rosas.-
The
osas:The City of Brentwood would like to go on record in opposition to the proposal by the
United States Department of Energy to ship spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries to
the Bay Area. At the City Council meeting of February 27, 1996 the attached Resolution
No. 96-27 was approved unanimously by the City Council to oppose this proposal.
Please let us know if.there is anything else we can do to oppose this proposal.
Sincerely yours,
Donna Rogers
Deputy City Clerk
Attachment
Resolution No. 96-27
cc: City Council
Jay Corey, City Manager
City Hall - 708 Third Street, Brentwood, California 94513
Administration Offices (510)634-6900 • Planning - (510)634-6905
Public Works - (510)634-6920 Building - (510)634-6906 Fax - (510)634-693-
Police Department - 500 Chestnut Street, Brentwood,CA 94513 • (510)634-6911 • Fax - (51.=i 634-6919
RESOLUTION NO. 96-27
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BRENTWOOD
OPPOSING THE PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED STATES.DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY TO SHIP SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES
TO THE BAY AREA.
WHEREAS, the United States Department of Energy proposes to ship spent
nuclear fuel from foreign countries to the Bay Area; and
WHEREAS, the shipments would travel under the Golden Gate Bridge, across San
Pablo Bay, pass.through the Carquinez Straits and be delivered to the Concord Naval
Weapons Station for transfer to ground transportation; and
WHEREAS,-spent nuclear fuel rods are extremely hazardous and the proposed
shipments raise concerns regarding human health, hazard to shipping, and possible
terrorist activities; and
WHEREAS, the City of Concord and Contra Costa County are seeking a unified
Bay Area response in opposition to the Department of Energy proposal.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the City Council of the City of
Brentwood opposes the Department of Energy proposal to ship spent nuclear fuel through
the Golden Gate to Concord.
PASSED by the City Council of the City of Brentwood, at its regular meeting of
February 27, 1996, by the following vote:
AYES: Councilmembers Guise, Morrill, Kidd, and Nfayor Hill
Councilmember Sherman abstained
NOES- None
ABSENT: None
APPROVED:
WILLIAM HILL, MAYOR
ATTEST:
Ax�v 4;.'�
DONNA J. ROG S,D-EPTV CITY CLERK
unlit
February 12, 1996
Lou Rosas, Mayor
City of Concord
1950 Parkside Drive
Concord, CA 94519-2578
RE: DOE Proposal to Ship Spent Nuclear Fuel to Concord
Dear Mayor Rosas:
On behalf of the Walnut Creek City Council, I wish to express our strongest
opposition to the Department of Energy's proposal to ship spent nuclear fuel to the
Concord Naval Weapons Station.
We share the very real and serious concerns of the City of Concord and our other
neighboring communities over the potential health and safety issues this proposal
raises.
Thank you for coordinating a meeting with DOE officials to discuss this matter
further. I look forward to learning more details about this meeting.
Sincerely,
GWEN REGAJLIA
Mayor
P.O. Box 8039 4- 1666 North Main Street 4- Walnut Creek, California 94596 <;, (5 10) 943-5800
yz y
City of pfushfurg
Civic Center • P.O. Box 1518 • Pittsburg, California 94565
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR
March 5, 1996
Charles Head, Program Manager
Office of Spenf Nuclear Fuel Management (EM-67)
U.S. Department of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington D.C. 20585
SUBJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON A PROPOSED
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY CONCERNING
FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Dear Mr. Head:
Having received and reviewed the subject document, the City of Pittsburg remains very
concerned about, and unconditionally opposed to the selection of the Concord Naval
Weapons Station (CNWS) as a port of entry for foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel.
We understand the foreign policy implications of the project, and generally applaud efforts to
reduce the amount of nuclear material available for potential illicit use and/or environmental
contamination. However, we do not understand the Department of Energy's decision to
transport this deadly cargo through one of the most heavily populated regions on the West
Coast.
On June 20, 1995, then-Mayor Taylor Davis transmitted a resolution to the DOE formally
registering the City of Pittsburg's opposition to the potential designation of the CNWS as a
port of entry for the spent nuclear fuel shipments. This resolution was adopted after a careful
review of the Draft EIS for the project, which also resulted in the transmission of a comment
letter posing questions and expressing concerns about the adequacy of the document.
The DOE's efforts to respond to these comments, as well as the issues and concerns raised
by hundreds of other commentors throughout the nation, is very much appreciated. The
magnitude of this response might be evidenced by the fact the Final EIS is nearly 5-inches
thicker (and a whopping 11 pounds 4 ounces heavier) than the Draft EIS. Unfortunately,
while the Final EIS. is long on words, it remains very short on answers.
California Healthy Cities Project ®�
National Center for Public Productivity Exemplary Award - 1993
City of New Horizons
Mr. Charles Head
March 5, 1995
Page Two
Answers which were forthcoming in the Final EIS failed to provide reassurances that the
benefits of utilizing the CNWS as a port of entry outweigh the potential consequences of
shipping this dangerous material through a major population center.
One of the most troubling omissions in the Final EIS is any discussion of the consequences
of a worst-case scenario involving a ruptured or exploded fuel cask. DOE's position seems to
be that this just will not happen. However, no statement has been made that such an
occurrence is impossible. Given that it is possible for the spent nuclear fuel to be released
from the transportation casks under certain circumstances, either intentionally or accidentally,
we are deeply troubled that the DOE has based its environmental analysis, including its
environmental justice analysis, on the premise that the likelihood of such an occurrence is
impossible.
Although such an incident may be unlikely, we believe that our concerns related to a "worst-
case-scenario" incident are understandable. Such concerns are further exacerbated when
claims by project opponents that the shipments will contain more nuclear material than most
atomic bombs, and that spent nuclear fuel "is one of the most dangerous materials on earth"
remain undisputed by the DOE.
We are also troubled by what we consider to be the failure of the Final EIS Jo address even
the most fundamental impacts associated with the project. By way of example, these issues
include but are not limited to traffic and transportation system impacts that will be created by
trucking fuel casks weighing over 25 tons on regional roadways and bridges.
During our review of the Final EIS, we were amazed to read that
DOE has not yet selected ports, routes, or transport modes for the foreign
research reactor spent nuclear fuel. If CNWS is selected, then DOE would
choose the best route to I-680 in accordance with Department of
Transportation regulations.
This obviously begs the question, if the DOE does not know which local transportation
routes will be used, how can the project's potential environmental impacts on those
transportation routes be evaluated? While such a lack of specificity may be acceptable under
NEPA, such an omission during the environmental review prgcess in California would
prohibit the approval of ggy project at the local level.
Similarly, we were surprised to read that.once the fuel casks are loaded onto trucks, "The
trucks would not be restricted to driving only during off-peak hours." Are we expected to
believe that trucks carrying payloads in excess of 25-tons will not negatively impact traffic
on the Bay Area's already overcrowded highways and bridges during peak commute periods?
Mr. Charles Head
March 5, 1996
Page Three
This concern is compounded by the fact that project's potential transportation impacts have
not been re-visited in light of the recent analysis by the California Department of
Transportation documenting the need retrofit Bay Area bridges. Given that the Benicia-
Martinez Bridge on Interstate-680 is in dire need of seismic retrofitting (estimated at $63
million to $75 million), it seems unlikely that the bridge is safe for transporting such a
deadly cargo. Furthermore, once the retrofitting begins, trucking the spent nuclear fuel over
the bridge during peak commute hours will create transportation impacts not considered in
the Final EIS.
Although just a sampling of Pittsburg's ongoing concerns, we believe the examples provided
above are sufficient to demonstrate inadequacy of the project's Final EIS, and the
inappropriateness of selecting the CNWS as a port of entry for spent nuclear fuel. We are
very appreciative of DOE's continued efforts to communicate with local officials and citizens
as demonstrated at the public meeting held in Concord earlier this week. It is in this spirit of
communication that we hope the DOE will listen to our objections and reconsider the
decision to utilize the CNWS for this important, but potentially dangerous project.
Thank you very much for your consideration. If you have any questions, or care to discuss
these matters in more detail, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Jose h E. Canciamilla
Mayor
cc: City Council
Michael R. WocKJs, Interim City Manager
President Bill Clinton
Senator Barbara Boxer
Senator Diane Feinstein
Representative Bill Baker
Representative George Miller
Hazel R. O'Leary, Secretary of Energy
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State
State Senator Daniel Boatwright
Assemblyman Robert Campbell
Assemblyman Richard Rainey
Mr. Charles Head
March 5, 1995
Page Four
Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors
Concord City Council
Antioch City Council
Clayton City Council
Martinez City Council
Walnut Creek City Council
Pleasanton City Council
Berkeley City Council
San Francisco Mayor and Board of Supervisors
Contra Costa Water District
Association of Bay Area Governments
Contra Costa Times
Pittsburg Post-Dispatch
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