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Home My WebLink AboutMINUTES - 03051991 - 2.5 •Y 2 . 5- THE . 5- THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA Adopted this Order on March 5, 1991 by the following vote: AYES: Supervisors Fanden, Schroder, McPeak, Torlakson, Powers NOES: None ABSENT: None ABSTAIN: None ------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------- SUBJECT: Report on the Recent Escape from the Martinez Detention Facility In response to the request of the Board on February 12, 1991, Sheriff Richard K. Rainey appeared before the Board this day and presented-- his report dated March 4, 1991 on escapes at the Martinez Detention Facility. A copy of the report is attached and included as a part of this document. The Board ACCEPTED the report of the Sheriff-Coroner and the recommendations contained therein. I hereby certify that this is a true and correct copy of an action taken and entered on the minutes of the Board of Supervisors on the date shown. ATTESTED.. jL l2 y/ PHIL BATCHELOR,Ciork of the Board cc• County Administrator of Supervisors and County Administrator BY �. `7X� - ✓ ,Deputy SHERIFF—CORONER'S DEPARTMENT Contra Costa County Administration Division 646-2402 Date: March 4, 1991 5199, To: Phil Batchelor, County Administrator BOAfl SUpe,,V � From: Richard K. Rainey, Sheriff-Coroner C OCF S Subject: ESCAPE REPORT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND In 1981, the Contra Costa Sheriff's Department opened the Martinez Detention Facility. The facility was described as a "new generation, direct supervision jail.11 The combined architectural design and inmate management approach provided the most cost effective method of incarceration while preserving inmate rights and granting privileges. A benefit resulting from the design concept included open-air exercise courtyards adjacent to each housing unit providing recreation alternatives to the inmates. The unscreened courtyards were retrofitted with screening when it was determined that it was possible to scale the walls. Five male housing units received metal mesh screening to prevent escapes. Three other modules were not covered due to roof inaccessibility. F-Module courtyard was not screened due to budget constraints relative to Proposition 13 and the fact that female inmates posing less of a threat to escape were housed on that module. F-MODULE BACKGROUND Only female inmates were to be housed on F-Module in the original design. Due to funding issues at the time of construction and the fact that women did not pose a significant escape risk, no courtyard screening was installed. As a result of inmate population growth and increased demands for medical services, F-Module became an all male medical module in November, 1990. In conjunction with creating a medical module, a remodeling plan was developed. This plan included the installation of wire mesh screening above both courtyards utilized by F-Module inmates. This construction project began in November, 1990, and was substantially completed in January, 1991. The original architectural plans specified a one-piece section of screening material for each of the courtyards. This material was no longer manufactured or available. A substitute material was approved which required the use of 8- foot wide rolled mesh screening. This material created an overlap or seam problem which was addressed by utilizing "u-bolts" to clamp the screening to support cables. P. Batchelor March 4, 1991 Page 2 Due to physical limitations, a field decision was made to replace certain "u-bolts" with fasteners described as "hog rings" and "wire ties." These items were used in areas where the overlapping of wire screening did not occur directly over the support cables. The construction manager/project inspector believed that these adjustments were reasonable due to the described conditions, and provided a sufficient structural barrier. The contractor met all the directives and require- ments of the contract related to the courtyard screening portion of the project. On the evening of February 4, 1991, four inmates escaped from F-Module. This was accomplished by defeating the door lock to the large courtyard which provided access to an area which was intended to be closed to inmates. An inmate then scaled the courtyard wall and tied ropes made from sheets to .the screen which covered the courtyard. Our investigation indicated that a screw- driver was used to pry apart several fasteners which were meant to secure overlapping sections of screening material. After defeating the screening in this manner, the four inmates were then able to crawl between the layers of screening one by one and escape from the facility. This was accomplished during darkness and heavy rain. The escape was discovered by the module deputies at the next scheduled inmate count at 10:00 p.m. The Martinez Detention Facility currently houses more than 850 inmates in a facility designed for 386. These crowded conditions result in a dramatic increase in the level of noise and tension in the building and a significant increase in the staff workload. This environment leads to stress which expresses itself in the staff making mental mistakes. Additionally, the increased demands on staff divert them from security responsibilities. INITIAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS As a result of the escape on February 4, 1991, additional training of deputies and sergeants has occurred emphasizing security measures. Corrective counseling and disciplinary measures were implemented. A procedure was developed which requires supervisors to test custody staff on their know-ledge of security issues on a weekly basis. Facility security continues to be the priority of all our custody staff. The courtyard screening has now been retrofitted with additional "u-bolts" and carriage bolts with square washers at intervals of 18 inches or less along any existing seams or overlapping of screening material. These additional anchor points eliminate any reliance on "hog rings" or "wire ties" and now provide maximum security comparable to screening on other courtyards in the facility. Dead-bolt locks have been ordered for all courtyard doors. This will eliminate the ability to tamper with the locking device to allow the lock to be defeated. These locks will be installed upon delivery. It is absolutely imperative to the future security of the Martinez Detention Facility that the following recommendations are implemented immediately. The recommendations require the assistance of the General Services Department to provide cost analysis, design plans, and available vendors to complete the projects expeditiously. P. Batchelor March 4, 1991 Page 3 RECOMMENDATIONS 1) A perimeter alarm system, similar to the West County Detention Facility, should be installed on each of the screened courtyards. This system would be monitored in the Central Control Room and would signal staff of any effort to defeat or tamper with the courtyard screens. This would prevent future escape attempts by inmates from the courtyard areas and alert the custody staff of any attempt to aid an escape from the facility roof. 2) A barrier or perimeter wire commonly referred to as "ribbon wire" should be installed below the courtyard screening to deny access. Products similar to this are currently in use at the Marsh Creek Detention Facility and the West County Detention Facility. 3) There are locations on several of the courtyards which allow an inmate to scale the courtyard wall and contact the security screening. Metal plates would be placed at strategic points which would prohibit future access. 4) The West County Detention Facility should be opened as soon as possible to relieve the crowded conditions in the Martinez Detention Facility. SUMMARY The contractor complied with the architectural plans. It is quite evident that the security screening was breached. In addition, the custody staff failed to locate the courtyard door which had been tampered with and allowed inmate access to the courtyard. Several steps have been taken, or are under consideration, to improve the security at the Martinez Detention Facility. Every effort will be undertaken to eliminate the possibility of future escapes and breaches of security. RKR/jmw