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HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 02272007 - D.3 TO: BOARD OF SUPER: a FROM: William Walker, M.D{ By: Randall L. - Director �v C Q u n ly moo: J sr�_cov,_ t DATE: February 27, 2007 SUBJECT: January 15, 2007 Chevron Fire Follow-up Report SPECIFIC REQUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION RECOMMENDATION: Accept report and presentation by the Hazardous Materials Programs and Evans and McDounough on the January 15, 2007 Chevron Fire. FISCAL IMPACT: None BACKGROUND: A fire occurred at the Chevron Richmond Refinery on January 15, 2007. The fire started at 5:18 AM. The communities of Point Richmond and Point Molate were requested to Shelter-in-Place. The situation was determined to be secure enough to issue an "All Clear" at approximately 8:34 AM. Health Services wants to ensure.that the root causes of the fire are learned and that actions are take to prevent such an accident in the future. The attached report discusses the actions that were by the Hazardous Materials Programs in determining the impact from the fire. The report also discusses the actions that the Hazardous Materials Programs have taken after the fire including: ie Post Incident Survey done by Evans and McDounough • Monitoring Chevron's Incident Investigation, including the root cause analysis • Responses to questions raised in a public meeting • Chevron's 72-hour and 30-day reports G CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: YES SIGNATURE: /J RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR RECOMMENDATION OF BOAR COMMITTEE APPROVE OTHER SIGNATURE(S): y ACTION OF BOARD ON / �f APPROVE AS RECOMMENDED _/OER VOT OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE UNANIMOUS (ABSENTI�/17t L'� ) AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD AYES: NOES: OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN. ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTESTED ?. i / JOHN CULLEN,CL OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS AN COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR Contact Person: CC: B 6EPUTY Chevron Richmond Refinery January 15, 2007 Incident Board of Supiervisors Follow-up Report February 27, 2007 Incident A diesel-like material was released and ignited at the Chevron Richmond Refinery at approximately 5:18 AM on January 15, 2007. Chevron personnel originally reported the incident as a Community Warning System (CWS) Level 2 incident. A CWS Level 2 incident is where sensitive populations may have an adverse reaction to the release and where messages are sent to the media letting them know of the situation. At approximately 5:34 AM, Chevron upgraded the incident to a CWS Level 3 incident. A CWS Level 3 incident is expected to impact the surrounding community. At this level, sirens are used, notifications to the media are made, the National Weather Service broadcasts a warning message, emergency response personnel are paged and notified over the CWS computer terminal-I and the Telephone Emergency Notification System is used to call the community downxYind of the incident. Chevron activated the CWS Level 3 incident by starting a programmed sequence from one of their CWS terminals. (The Office of the Sheriff has reported on the CWS to the Board at an earlier date and this will not be included in this report). Health Services Hazardous Materials Responders were in the community by 5:41 AM assessing the community impact. In total,four Hazardous Materials Responders were assessing the impact to the community and one went to the Incident Command Center. The "All Clear" was called at approximately 8:39 AM. The incident timeline is included in Attachment 1. Three samples were taken during the fire to determine the possible impact on the community. Based on the sampling that was done in the surrounding community, little or no impact from the smoke was. detected. The results of the sampling are included in Attachment 2. Follow-up to the Incident The County's Hazardous Materials Incident Notification Policy requires a facility that has a CWS Level 2 or 3 to submit a 72-hour and 30-day follow-up reports on the incident. Chevron has completed both of these reports, which are included as Attachment 3 and 4. The Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO) requires facilities to perform a root cause analysis as part of their incident investigation. Accidental Release Prevention Program Engineers work with the facility to ensure that an approved root cause analysis method and a team that is familiar with the method land process is in place to do the analysis. The facility then updates the Accidental Release Prevention Program Engineers on their preliminary findings, including initiating c uses and any root causes that are found during the investigation. Chevron is covered by the City of Richmond's ISO, which.is administered by Health Services. The Root Cause Analysis Report is not complete at the. time of this report. Health Services has a contract with Evans and McDounough to do follow-up telephone surveys after an incident where the community is requested to shelter-in-place. A telephone survey was done after this incident and a summary of the survey results are included in Attachment 5 Community Meeting Supervisor John Gioia setup a public meeting to hear the community concerns about the incident and to hear of the possible health concerns from the incident. This meeting was held on January 24 at the Washington Elementary School in Point Richmond. The media reported that approximately 175 .people attended the meeting. Supervisor Gioia welcomed the people to the meeting, Michael Kent facilitated the meeting and the following people gave short presentations: • Randy Sawyer Health Services Hazardous Materials Programs, Hazardous Materials response • Wendel Brunner, M. D. Health Services Public Health, Potential Health Impact • Lieutenant Jeff Hebel Sheriff's Office Emergency Service Division, Community Warning System use • Mark Ayers Chevron Fire, Chevron's response • Jack Broadbent Bay Area Air Quality Management.District, Air District's response The public had an opportunity to ask questions and give their comments on the fire. Approximately forty people spoke and the questions and comments were noted. The questions and comments with a response from the appropriate organization are included in Attachment 6. What is Next? Health Services Hazardous Materials Programs personnel will continue to monitor and work with Chevron until the incident investigation, including the root causes analysis is complete. At this time, it looks as if the investigation will be complete sometime in March. The Root Cause Analysis Report will be posted on Health Services website www.cehealth.org, as was all of the attachments included in this report. This spring the Accidental Release Prevention Engineers will be holding ISO meetings in Richmond for Chevron and General Chemical's ISO preliminary audit findings. The meeting will give an opportunity for the community to learn, ask questions, and comment on what Chevron and General Chemical are doing to prevent accidents and what Health Services found during their audit. �,L� $�� A�� p'Cx���T 1 Timeline for the January 15, 2007 Chevron Level 3 Incident 5:18 Fire Starts 5:23 Chevron activates the Comm nity Warning System with a Public Health Advisory 5:33 Chervon activates Community Warning System and four sirens N 5:40 CCHS Hazardous Materials (Haz Mat) talks to KCBS 5:41 CCHS Haz Mat staff begins assessing community impact 5:45 CCHS calls Bay City News 5:45 CCHS calls Natl. Weather S rvices; NWS asks for e-mail 6:00 CCHS emails SIP MessagetoNWS 6:09 CWS Duty Officer notifies TENS Dialogic contractor to activate 2988 phone numbers 6:10 KCBS activates Emergency Alert System sending information to other media outlets 6:11 NWS broadcasts SIP 6:34 Dialogic starts phone calls 6:49 CCHS puts up first of ninewebsite postings (cchealth.org) with SIP info 6:56 CCHS resounds siren 7:29 CCHS resounds siren 7:59 CCHS resounds siren 8:05 Chevron isolates source of fire 8:39 CCHS Health Officer and Incident Commander issue All Clear 8:39 CCHS posts "All Clear" on website 8:41 CWS sends All Clear I 8:47 TENS contractor Dialogi begins All Clear phone calls ATTACH MENT 2 Analysis of Air Samples Taken During January 15, 2007 Chevron Incident by Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Response Team Chemical Dutra Materials Marine& I-580 Toll Booth Wester Drive Tewksberry (ppm) Plaza (ppm)** (ppm Iso-Butane 0.0103 0.0052 0.0746 N-Butane 0.0169 0.005.9 0.1854 Iso-Pentane 0.0144 0.0032 0.0704 N-Pentane 0.0208 0.0206 0.0617 2-Methylpentane 0.004 0.0028 0.0191 3-Methylpentane 0.002 0.001 0.0122 Hexane 0.0053 0.0014 0.0205 Benzene 0.0019 0.0021 0.0156 Toluene 0.0146 0.0051 0.0165 Xylenes 0.0105 0.0049 0.015 Ethylbenze 0.0037 .0002 0.0054 *ppm—parts per million— 1 ppm= 1 molecule for every 1,000,000 molecules ** This sample was influenced by the automobile traffic traveling on 1-580 going through the toll booths and is the reason that it was higher then the other two samples Dutra Materials is north of I-580 and west of Chevron just off Western Drive. The sample taken at this location was at 7:02 am. The intersection of Marine and Tewksbury is located in North Richmond. The sample was taken at 7:12 am. The final sample was taken at the 1-580 westbound tollbooths at 7:20 am. All of the chemical concentrations that were measured on January 15 during the fire were well below any concentration where there is a recognized level of concern. Benzene is the chemical of greatest concern i Benzene levels have dropped throughout the US over the last decade, but concentrations of about 1 part per million are common in metropolitan areas. Included with the sampling data are descriptions of the hazards of the above chemicals developed by the EPA for the ConocoPhillips fenceline monitors in Rodeo.. Butane The problem with butane isn't so much that it's toxic, but that it's explosive at high concentrations. The primary risk of exposure to butane is narcosis, which occurs at high exposure levels. Exposure to 10,000 ppm butane for 10 minutes causes drowsiness, but there are no reports of systemic toxicity or irritation at this level (Gerarde 1963a, as cited in American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists [ACGIH] 1986/Ex. 1-3, p. 10). In the Bay Area is usually not detected above 1 part per million. Pentane Pentane has similar health effects to butane and hexane. Hexane Hexane is another component of gasoline that acts as a respiratory tract irritant at low concentrations and a narcotic anesthetic at higher concentration. Safe exposures are below a threshold between 50 ppm (ACGIH) and 500 ppm (OSHA). Benzene Benzene is a problem because it is known human carcinogenic. Benzene is common in most gasoline used in the United States, and there could be a quart of Benzene in your gas tank right now. Because of this, Benzene is present in the air in most areas in the United States. It is regulated at sources by EPA as one of the 161 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) and it is one of 33 Urban Air Toxics that are priorities for EPA. In most cities, it is one of the top three carcinogens in the air. Levels have dropped .throughout the US over the last decade, but concentrations of about 1 part per million are common in metropolitan areas. Benzene is one of the worst of the hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) that USEPA regulates in terms of its health effects. There are no standards set by EPA for this chemical; it is regulated by emission permits at major sources. Toluene Toluene is a common organic solvent that is similar in toxicity to benzene. It is regulated- at sources by EPA as one of the 161 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). At high concentrations it causes a narcotic anesthesia starting around 200 ppm in air, while levels above 10,000 ppm can be fatal. Safe levels are below 100 ppm. Long-term exposures are less dangerous than benzene in that toluene is not now suspected to be carcinogenic in humans. The acute toxicity of toluene in animals is however, greater than that of benzene: Patty (1963b, as cited in ACGIH 1986/Ex. 1-3, p. 578) reports that the lethal doses of toluene and benzene in mice are 10,000 and 14,000 ppm, respectively. The oral LD(50) for toluene in rats is 7.53 ml/kg (Smyth, Carpenter, Weil et al. 1969/Ex. 1-442). Exposure of rats to 2500 or 5000 ppm. of toluene caused a temporary decrease in white cell count but no evidence of damage to the blood- forming organs or the liver. Fairhall (1957d, as cited in ACGIH 1986/Ex. 1-3, p. 578) stated that severe toluene. exposure can cause a marked drop in the red blood cell count and partial destruction of the blood-forming elements of the bone marrow;.but other researchers report that numerous animal studies indicate that toluene is not a bone marrow toxin (Gerarde 1960c, as cited in ACGIH 1986/Ex. 1-3, p. 578). A study by Greenberg, Mayers, Heinmann, and Moskowitz (1942/Ex. 1-325) reported that painters exposed to toluene levels of 100 to 1100 ppm exhibited enlarged livers, a moderate decrease in red blood cell counts, enlarged red blood cells, and absolute lymphocytosis, but no leukopenia. Wilson (1943/Ex. 1-403) observed 1,000 workers exposed to toluene at levels ranging from 50 ppm to 1500 ppm for periods of one to three weeks. One hundred of these workers developed symptoms severe enough to require hospitalization. Levels of 500 ppm are considered immediately dangerous. Xylenes (O, M, P) There are three different forms of xylene (ortho, meta, para) that have similar toxicities. Xylene is a common liquid organic solvent, and is a natural component in gasoline. It is regulated at sources by EPA as one of the 161 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Safe long-term levels are 100ppm, although even short-term exposures above 1000 ppm are considered dangerous. Xylenes cause a wide variety of health effects from neurological (dizziness, drowsiness, nausea or headache) to eye, nose and throat irritation, to skin irritation. Studies of workers exposed to xylene revealed headache, fatigue, lassitude, irritability, and gastrointestinal disturbances as the most common. symptoms (Gerarde 1960d%Ex. 1-738a). At unspecified exposure levels, .Browning (1965b/Ex. 1-1016) also noted gastrointestinal disturbances, in addition to kidney, heart, liver, and neurological damage; blood dyscrasias, some of which resulted in death, were also reported in these workers. A study by Nelson, Enge, Ross et al. (1943/Ex. 1-66), in which human volunteers were exposed to 200 ppm xylene, found eye, nose, and throat irritation in the subjects at this level of exposure .Levels of 900 ppm Tare considered immediately dangerous. Ethyl Benzene Ethyl benzene is of low acute toxicity in general, but at high levels it can produce the same narcotic-like symptoms of benzene and toluene. It is regulated at sources by EPA as one of the 161 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Long-term safe levels have been set at 100 ppm, while levels above 800 ppm are dangerous even in the short-term. The chemical causes respiratory system irritation (eyes, nose, lungs) and a swelling of the lungs that at high levels can be life threatening. Ethyl benzene is also flammable above 1,000 ppm, but health effects are more important. OSHA concludes that workers exposed to concentrations of ethyl benzene above the 100-ppm level, even briefly, are at significant risk of experiencing irritation; the Agency considers this to be a material impairment of health. Accordingly, the Agency is establishing a short- term limit of 125 ppm for a 15-minute period to supplement the existing 100-ppm time-weighted-average limit for ethyl benzene. INTENTIONALLY BLANK ATTACHMENT 3 Tera Lirnrragn Chevron Products C;ompnny ,, Manager. Health,Emmntam irmnci Richmond Refin&y Chevron and Safety- '441 C:he%Ton Way, Richmond CA 448()1 Tei 5'10 247-14010 Fax 510-742-53>?. bink;"ri;chevrori.��m Ja17Ua1y l8. 2007 Randall L. Sawyer Hazardous Materials Program Director Contra Costa Health Services Department. 4333 Pacheco Boulevard Martinez, CA Q45'5'-2'1!9 Dear .Mr. Sawyer, In accordance with the December 14,2004 Contra Costa Health Services(CCIiS)Department Hazardous Materials Incident Notif'icdtion Policy, Chevron is providing a 72 hour written report for the Community Wamin-.System Level 3 event which occurred at the Chevron I�.iciiiiioiid Re:finery tat? January 150' 2007. The purpose of the attached report is to confirm/modify the inforn7ation pro.,vided it)the initial notification provided on January ]5"'2007. If you have additional questions or concerns, please feel free to contact Matt Brennan of my si ff at(510)242-186,2 or myself Te izarraga Attachment.: Richmond 72 Hour Rep vt. Cc: BAAQiMD—Brad Ki.no A ChevronTexaco Company ATTACHMENT B 72 HOUR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES For CCHS Use Only: Received By: Date Received: Incident Number: Copied To: Event Classification Level: ATTENTION: Randall L. Sawyer Hazardous Materials Program Director Contra Costa Health Services Department 4333 Pacheco Boulevard Martinez,CA 94553 INCIDENT DATE: January 15,2007 INCIDENT TIME: 05:18 hrs FACILITY: Chevron Richmond Refinery PERSON TO CONTACT FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Matt Brennan Phone Number: (510)242-1862 I. SUMMARY OF EVENT On January 15,2007 at approximately 05:18 hrs a fire occurred.at the Chevron Refinery#4 Crude Unit. Based on current information, it is believed that the primary source of the fire was near P-1 165A (C-1160 Vacuum Column Bottoms pump). Operators were in the process of shutting down the plant in preparation for scheduled maintenance and inspections. #4 Crude Unit is listed as a Cal/ARP Program Level 1 Process 11. AGENCIES NOTIFIED, INCLUDING TIME OF NOTIFICATION Primary:Community Warning System(CWS): a. Level 2 at 05:22 hrs b. Level 3,TENS and sirens activated by Chevron at 05:30 hrs. c. All-clear at 08:40 hrs.—.via notification system. Secondary: Subsequent notifications via telephone to the agencies above and others III. AGENCIES RESPONDING, INCLUDING CONTACT NAMES AND PHONE NUMBERS: The list below does not include all representatives from all agencies: Cal/OSHA Inspector Mr.Tom Johnston (925) 348-3163 RPD Chief Mr.Chris Magnus (510) 323-3306 RFD Chief Mr. Michael Banks (510) 307-0831 CCHS HazMat P m. Asst. Director Mr. Steve Morioka (925) 646-2286 ECFD Chief Mr. Maples (510)215-5540 BAAQMD En r. Mr. Bill Hammell (510) 749-4605 ATTACHMENT B 72 HOUR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES IV. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTION: o Chevron Fire notified at approx. 05:20 o Plant Operators activated water spray on fire. o Chevron Fire personnel on-scene at approx. 05:22 o Responding organizations included-Chevron Fire,Chevron Fire Brigade, Richmond Fire Department and El Cerrito Fire Department. Petro-Chemical mutual aid was provided by Valero, Shell, Tesoro and Dow. o A total of five(5) alarms were dispatched in response to this event and the Community Warning System was activated at Levels 2 and 3. V. IDENTITY OF MATERIAL RELEASED AND ESTIMATED OR KNOWN QUANTITIES: An unknown amount of hydrocarbonts was combusted, resulting in a release of sulfur dioxide. Analysis results to-date from Sections VIII (b)and(c)provides no evidence of adverse air quality impacts associated with the fire. VI. METEROLOGICAL CONDITIONS AT TIME OF EVENT: Wind Speed 8 MPH Wind Direction 750 (E-W) Precipitation None Temperature F 430 VII. DESCRIPTION OF INJURIES: One employee was treated for minor bums. Treatment was provided by Chevron Fire Department and an outside hospital,the employee was released to return to work on the same day.Another employee received on- site treatment for a minor skin irritation and returned to work on the same day as well. I I ATTACHMENT B 72 HOUR FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES VIII. COMMUNITY IMPACT: a) To-date,eleven (11)calls have been identified for follow-up b) Sampling data and community monitoring results: Four(4)Chevron employees were deployed outside of the refinery to take air monitoring samples at various locations downwind of the fire. Monitoring continued through January 1.6 at 06:20 hrs. All 31 direct-reading samples showed non-detectable Hydrogen Sulfide(H2S), Sulfur Dioxide(SO2), and benzene concentrations(< 1 ppm,<0.1 ppm, and<0.1 ppm, respectively). Additionally approximately 40 gas bag samples were collected in various downwind locations in Richmond and Point Richmond. Samples have been and sent to Air Toxics Ltd. laboratory for sulfur compounds and VOCs testing.The test results are expected within the next several days. c) Fence line monitoring: Continuous monitoring data is gathered around the clock from instrumentation located at Chevron's Office Hill, High Hill and Gertrude Street monitoring stations. A data point is given, close to or prior to the incident as a reference. The following maximum readings were recorded between the times the fire started and the time all-clear was called by CCHS.None of the maximum readings exceeded OSHA's Permissible Exposure Limits PELs). High Hill Office Hill Gertrude Street H2S 4.33 ppb @ 05:18 2.18 ppb@ 05:18 1.0] ppb @ 05:18 H2S 56.03 ppb @ 06:39 3.49 ppb @ 07:30 1.63 ppb P,07:37 S02 Non-detectable-<] ppb Station does not monitor Non-detectable- <1 ppb Note:The Cal/OSHA PEL for SO2 is 2,000 ppb(2 ppm) averaged over an 8-hour period. The Cal/OSHA PEL for HSS is 10,000 ppb(10 ppin) averaged over an 8-hour period. IX. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION RESULTS: A formal TapRooT© investigation to determine the cause of the incident has been initiated.The team is composed of Subject Matter Experts(SMEs) as well as operations personnel, management personnel and a Union representative. Other SMEs will be brought into the investigation on an as needed basis. X. SUMMARIZE INVESTIGATION RESULTS BELOW OR ATTACH COPY OF REPORT: An investigation has been initiated and is anticipated to be completed within 30 days. However, technical analysis may further extend the completion timeline of this investigation. X1. SUMMARIZE PREVENTABLE MEASURES TO BETAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE INCLUDING MILESTONE AND COMPLETION DATES FOR IMPLEMENTATION The impacted portion of the plant is not operational. Preventative measures and corrective actions will be based upon the investigation,report mentioned in Section X, above. 1 1 Tv, �I��ALL 1 ATTACHMENT 4 I , INTENTIONALLY BLANK ATTACHMENT C 30 DAY FOLLOW-UP NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES Page 3 of 4 VIII. COMMUNITY IMPACT: a) On the day of the incident, Chevron received eleven (11) calls from the public. b) Sampling data and community monitoring results: All air samples taken during the incident indicate there was no evidence of adverse air quality, and hence, we would not expect adverse health impacts to have resulted from the incident. All sulfur and VOC compound analytical results were below: (1) Reportable release thresholds, (2)Cal/OSHA's Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs)',and (3) California OEHHA/ARB chronic inhalation Reference Exposure Levels (RELs)Z.Therefore, emissions from the incident were well under both worker and community health exposure limits. Four(4)Chevron employees were immediately deployed outside of the refinery to manually take air monitoring samples at various locations downwind of the fire using direct-reading instrumentation.The manual monitoring continued throughout the incident. All 31 direct-reading samples showed non- detectable concentrations of Hydrogen Sulfide(H2S), <0.I ppm. Sulfur Dioxide(S02), < 0.1 ppm,and benzene<0.1 ppm.. In addition to the direct reading instrument monitoring, Chevron personnel used Tedlar bags to gather a total of 11 air samples downwind of the refinery on the day of the fire. These samples were analyzed for sulfur and VOC compounds,the results are summarized below: Testing for sulfur was performed using ASTMD-5504 method testing for 20 sulfur compounds. Only one compound,Carbonyl Sulfide was found above the detection limit. The lab indicated interference from the Tedlar bags may contribute, in whole or in part,to the positive results of Carbonyl Sulfide. Testing for Volatile Organic Compounds(VOCs) was performed using EPA method TO-14A GC/MS Full Scan for 62 VOC compounds. Only five (5) compounds were detected above the detectable limits. NOTES: ' OSHA sets enforceable.permissible exposure limits (PELs)to protect workers against the health effects of exposure to hazardous substances. PELs are regulatory limits on the amount or concentration of a substance in the air. 2 The California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEH7-IA) Chronic Reference Exposure Limits (RELs)set airborne levels that would pose no significant health risk to individuals exposed continuously to that level. These limits are set to protect people living in communities surrounding such releases. ■ In a closed-ended question, three quarters (73%)of those who were aware of the incident as it was occurring said they heard the sirens, and 82% of those who were aware of the incident reported getting the TENS call. Television and radio are also sources for incident information. I ■ Of those who were aware of the incident while it was happening, over half(57%) either turned on the television or already had it on, and 41%either turned on the radio or already had it on. One out of five (20%) neither watched the television nor turned on the radio for information about the incident. ■ Most of those with the television or radio on saw or heard emergency alerts— 87% of those with the television on, and 7i% of those with the radio on. ■ Eighty-three percent(83%) of those who saw television alerts or heard radio reports thought.the instructions given were clear and consistent. Not all respondents followed i very protocol during the incident. ■ Four out of five respondents(78%)reported staying indoors for the duration of the incident, and another 10% stayed indoors for a portion of the incident. o Half(50%) of those who did not stay indoors had an obligation to meet, either work(37%) or something else(13%). ■ Most people(91%) closed and locked their doors and windows during the incident, but just 18%of those sealed the cracks with tape or damp towels. ■ Of the 46%that own pets and l were aware of the incident as it was happening, most (85%) had their pets inside already when the incident started, and over half of the remainder (55%) brought their pets inside during the incident. ■ A quarter (26%) of those whol were aware of the incident as it was happening did not turn off their heaters, air conditioners, or fans to the outdoors, while 46% did turn them off. The remaining 28% did not have anything to switch off, or they were off when the incident started. o Of those who switched off their appliances that draw air from the outside, one quarter (27%) closed o� covered all outside vents, and another 37%reported that they had.no vents to the outside or that they were already closed or covered. Another 37%did not close or cover all vents to the outside. ■ Of the 64% of those who have la fireplace and were aware of the incident while it was happening, 7% had a fire burro, g at the start of the incident, and 46% closed their damper during the incident. The "all-clear" is being heard. ■ In an unprompted, open-ended question, 48% of those who were aware of the incident as it was happening said they got an automated all-clear phone call or message. o In the closed-ended question, 71% said they got the all-clear call or message. ■ Another 42% saw or heard about the all-clear on television or radio. I - 2 - I ATTACHMENT 6 �Y B�� �� Cannot measure long-term impacts on a short-term basis. System does not adequately address what happens. Need to focus on more than Chevron. Focus on whole community. Page 10 of 11 Since Air District's flare control has been adopted, Chevron is the only facility whose flaring episodes have gone up. Chevron is poisoning this co Imunity you must go. Community — it is time to take)a stand against Chevron. 9 Need more $ in healthcare to come for the community. We all take risks, we must realize accidents do happen, so let's work together, do this the way it's supposed to be. Keep it positive. Chevron is trying to expand facility's production with use of denser crude oil. Fire burned for 9 hours. Wind shifts, everyone should notify in their own languages. Chevron —we're not going to allow it. Never got a phone call Heard Chevron representative on KCBS saying there was no danger to community 1 hour before we were told to Shelter-in-place conflicting message. Send out comments and questions to those signed-up Why did Chevron send only their fire chief? [Chevron employees were asked to raised their hands and there were over 20 in attendance] Warning system would not have been necessary. had there not been an accident. At 5:20 a.m. — 5:30 a.m. th� e day of fire. Chevron spokesperson was on the news and said there was o impact to community. This is when Shelter-in- place was going on. This is contradictory. A lot of comments are on the warning system. Should focus on the fact that there was an incident. Homeless have no protectjon from fire and no cars to drive away. What need do people have for city offii ials if they have to fend for themselves. Accidents do happen. Now is a good time to come together to develop solutions. It is good that Chevron is here and willing to listen. Let's all work together to get something positive done. Page 9 of 11 Nature of industry = pollution whether Dr. Brunner can measure air quality or not there is still pollution. There is going to be spill/accidents, lets make Chevron contribute funds to pay-for the services we need. Potholes/homeless etc. Saying there is no impact.is not accurate. A lot more needs to be done to fix the system, possibly relocation. At 5:40 1 heard sirens and went outside and it stunk. Chevron should be fined and money given to community because it has to many accidents. Chevron is interfering with my personal time, calling at 5:30 a.m. you're violating the communities' personal time. I worked at Rodeo refinery and was made to be a fire fighter and I didn't want to do it. Media was reporting in front of Chevron that there was a shelter-in-place, that is a conflicting message, and it is not safe. Need to consider other languages in the area. Washington Elementary practices SIP all the time. Children and teachers at this school know what to do when CWS is activated. Can alert parents from school. However, this event was before school. Can there be people at key intersections to inform parents dropping off kids? Chevron Fire did a great job. Worked at Chevron 42 years and recognize that they have good safety practices. Ladies if you are in your kitchen 24 hrs/day how many accidents would you have? When I recently moved to this area, I was not given information on CWS or sirens. Realtors and landlords should inform new homeowners/renters about CWS. If we're required to Shelter-in-place, Chevron should give us grants to fix cracks and windows so it is save to stay inside. We should have freedom to breath. Provide us all with air purifiers. Been working for 7 years with community. Chevron needs to be more accountable. Need to think of way to transition from fossil fuels. Page 8 of 11 1/24/2007 Community Meeting Regarding Chevron 1/15/2007 incident Comments: Chevron needs to get advice from the community. They should have a CAP. Need to increase penalty on industry No better safety pattern at refinery in my 30 years experience in refineries for employees and community. We need to figure out a system that works for our community. System was created in 1998 for the community. Now more cell phones, more languages, and different community. Need quick accurate information Fix the broken system Chevron supports non-profits provide great resource to our community. I heard sirens and knew it was not a test day and could see smoke moving towards Marina. Everyone in Pt. Richmond should know if an alarm sound there is a fire. If the smoke smells go inside. Chevron puts great efforts into safety. They are doing a great job and are a great economic resource to community. Must learn to function on our own. Get free CERT trainings. Heard sirens at 5:15 Channel 5 had news at 5:30. Start a system where neighbors are responsible for calling others in the community; Tony Semenza of CAER can lead this. We didn't hear sirens, didn't receive call, and drive 8 blocks away. We cannot put our health at risk while Chevron makes millions. Use common sense, whenyou hear alarm know there's a fire at Chevron. If you smell smoke, go inside and shut the door. We need better warning system and we have great people working on it. Page 7 of 11, 27. How can the sample show just background levels and not cumulative when we can -see the smoke? We all saw the smoke rising into the air and the emissions from the fire were in the smoke plume. We also saw the smoke plume rise over the Richmond community and go out over Marin County and the bay. Because the emissions from the fire were in the smoke plume and not close to the ground, the air quality at ground level close to the refinery was slightly over what is considered as normal. 28.Will Chevron be fined? The Air District inspection staff is investigating the circumstances surrounding the Chevron fire. It is too soon to provide the details pertaining to the settlement of a violation notice. Page 6 of 11 22.Why doesn't Chevron hire local contractors? 100s of contractors from all over do work during shutdown etc. Chevron is committed to operating the Refinery safely,- reliably and i1ncident free. Due to the nature of our industry, we rely on contractors to provide specialized expertise and perform work. We select the most qualified contractors based on safety and work performance. To help local residents meet the rigorous skill and safety qualifications required to work for a refinery or a contractor; Chevron funds a. Regional Occupational Program at Richmond's Kennedy High School that each year provides job training for about 70 students. 23.How does Chevron compare to other plants worldwide? Safety and reliability is a core value for the Chevron Richmond Refinery. The. -Refinery has an' active and robust process safety management program. As one measure of safety performance, based on total recordable incidents at the Refinery, 2006 was our safest year on record. The latest Bureau of Labor Statistics Report shows Chevron's Richmond Refinery 2005 total recordable incident rate was almost one-half the rate of other petroleum refineries in the U.S. (All U.S.= 0.7, Richmond Refinery=0.4). Historically, using the same measure, the Richmond Refinery safety performance is better than other industries such as transportation and warehousing, education and health services, construction and others. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor 2006) 24.Chevron's employees work 112 hours/day, 14 days straight. Is this safe to be working with dangerous material? At Chevron, the health and safety of our workforce and the community is a core value and a top priority. Chevron's employment policy includes that no employee may :work more than 7 consecutive days. 25.Why did Chevron send only their fire chief? Refinery Fire Chief Mark Ayers represented the Refinery and discussed the immediate response to the incident, and other Refinery managers in attendance, included Tery Lizarraga, manager of Health, Environment & Safety and Dean O'Hair, manager of External Relations. Also attending and available if needed to provide information were refinery subject-matter experts and other employees. BAAQMD 26.We need more accurate air quality data? The air quality information obtained by the BAAQMD is very accurate. The air quality data collected during the fire was obtained using the I most accurate equipment and testing devices available. The BAAQMD has air quality monitors surrounding the Chevron refinery. The BAAQMD also has the ability to collect air samples at other locations by using a mobile air monitoring van. Page 5 of 1 I actions with an objective of preventing a recurrence. Protecting the health and safety of our employees and community is a core value and a top priority for Chevron. We want all employees to return home safely at the end of their work day and we are committed to striving to reduce all incidents to zero. 17.How does these affect children with asthma? How will Chevron help the children? To date, analysis conducted of the air sampled throughout the community during the incident indicates there was no evidence of adverse air quality, and hence, we would not expect adverse health impacts to have resulted from the incident. That's a result consistent among community sampling and monitoring done by the Contra Costa Department of Health Services, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) and Chevron. 18.What is Chevrons accountability to the community and the city of Richmond? For more than 100 years, the Richmond Refinery has maintained a commitment to operating safely and reliably in a community where Refinery employees live and work. The Refinery's commitment to safe and reliable operations includes actions to comply with the City of Richmond's Industrial Safety Ordinance and the health-based air and water quality standards established by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District and the Regional Water Quality Control Board. 19.Why are there no contact names for Chevron? Just phone and address. Chevron Richmond Refinery External Affairs is available to assist the community with questions. Dean O'Hair, manager of External Affairs and his staff will make sure your question is answered. Please contact the External Affairs office at 510 242 4507. Additionally, someone is available to investigate odors and respond to community questions on a 24 hr basis, please call 510 242 2127 for assistance. 20.What unit broke down, what happened? The incident occurred in the Refinery's crude unit. An investigation into the cause of the incident is underway. The Refinery is fully cooperating with Cal-OSHA, EPA, BAAQMD and Contra Costa County Health Services working on behalf of the City of Richmond. As the investigation continues we will work with the regulatory agencies to share information. For current updates please visit the Contra Costa County Health Services website: http://www.cchealth.org/. 21.What caused the accident? Did Chevron have proper permits? An investigation into the cause of the incident is underway and we will work with the regulatory agencies to share information. As part of the investigation we will determine the root cause and take appropriate actions to prevent a recurrence. For current updates please visit the Contra Costa County Health Services website: http://www.cchealth.org/. Chevron has processes in place to obtain the proper permits for work at the Refinery. Page 4 of 11 during aShelter-In-Place. The Community Warning System with the sirens, telephone and media notifications are the best system we currently have for notifying the public of a potential hazardous materials release either at a fixed facility or transportation accident. Richmond Fire 12.What would have happened if another fire broke out? 1/3 of Richmond fire fighters were at Chevron. Four companies from Richmond''Fire responded to the Chevron incident on January 15. There are automatic aid agreements already in place that will be called upon by dispatch to respond effectively (e.g. EI Cerrito Fire Department (3 stations), Contra Costa County Fire Department (2 stations) and mutual aid request from additional Fire Department in the area (e.g. Pinole, Rodeo-Hercules, Albany, etc.) to respond to other fire emergencies in the area. Sheriffs Office 13.Why can't Chevron call TENS contractor and start call process? Was there adequate work staff? The Community Warning System (CWS) includes a variety of alerting tools, of which the Telephone Emergency Notification System (TENS) is only one. Other tools include sirens, links to radio and TV stations, weather radios, Internet alerts and the County's cable TV channel. Chevron has a single notification procedure that triggers all those systems under the authority of the Health Services Department. "Adding a separate activation procedure for TENS would distract Chevron staff from managing a facility emergency and increase the risk of errors or,inconsistencies, without actually addressing the problems with the current TENS. 14.Why can't we connect sirens to phone calls? The current TENS vendor does not offer that level of technical integration. However, that capability is a requirement for the replacement system for which the contracting process is already underway. 15'.We need to figure out a_ system that works for our community. System was created in 1998 for the community. Now more cell phones, more languages, and different community. No warning system will ever be perfect, but the Office of the Sheriff is constantly examining ways to improve warning service. A key element of this program is an update of the CWS warning system based on the international! Common Alerting Protocol `technical standard. This new capability will make it easier and less expensive to add new alerting tools as they become available, and to measure and compare the effectiveness of existing methods. Chevron 16.Who is responsible? If Chevron has best safety in place then why the accident? Chevron is responsible for the safe and reliable operation of our facility, investigating the cause of the incident and implementing corrective Page 3 of 11 be reduced. What about other chemicals? This is affective with all chemicals. 5. What are the effects of driving through an area where an accident has occurred? What if you were stuck in an area? If you are approaching a vapor cloud, it would be best to avoid driving into it. However, if you are in the vapor cloud, make sure that all the windows are shut and the vents in the car are all closed and drive on through as quickly as possible (within the allowable speed and traffic). 6. How does these affect children with asthma? Smoke from any type of fire may exasperate a preexisting breathing condition, such as asthma. Based on the wind direction and the air monitoring that was done during the incident, no long-term health impact is expected, including to children with asthma. 7. What makes you say all clear? How do you define an all clear? The release that is impacting the community has stopped, the situation is under control and there is no reasonable possibility that the situation will flare back up, and the effects of the release is no longer impacting the community then the Health Office working with the Incident Commander will issue the "All Clear". 8. We were lucky, but what about the community where the smoke blew? The smoke dissipated before it reached Marin County, which is approximately three miles away from the refinery, which means that the concentration of hazardous materials was diluted to where the health impact was negligible. 9. Is it a conflict of interest to have Chevron alert community? The refinery personnel are the first ones to know that there is a problem that could have a health impact on the community. Because of this, they can activate the Community Warning System by pushing a button. When Chevron alerts the community, they are acting as an agent of Health Services. If Chevron had to first notify Health Services that there is a problem, the alert and the notifications would be slowed down. Health Services can activate the Community Warning System for any of the refineries and many of the chemical plants in the County. This includes upgrading the level of warning if Health Services determines that this is appropriate. 10.What would happen if there was a Casino at Pt. Molate? The likelihood of affecting more people will be much higher if there were people in the direction of the plume. Richmond OES 11 . Can there be people at key intersections to inform parents dropping off kids that there is a Shelter-in-place? A Shelter-In-Place means that everyone goes indoors; placing "people at key intersections" would mean breaking the Shelter-In-Place and placing individuals at potential risk outside. Richmond Police and Fire Personnel are not equipped with apparatus to stay outdoors Page 2 of 11 i I Questions and Comments froml the January 24, 2007 Public Meeting-on the January 15, 2007 Chevron Fire Health Services 1. When does a person evacuate as apposed to Shelter-in-place? Evacuation has long been used to move the public away from danger. Its goal in hazardous materials emergencies is to avoid or minimize exposure to dangerous chemicals. When evacuation can be completed ,before dangerous levels of hazardous materials move into the community, it is the public protective action of choice. This will avoid exposure to the hazardous material completely. It may also be preferable when the leak is large, unpredictable and difficult to control, or when there is a high risk of explosion or flash over. However, evacuations can take a very long time to complete,. particularly in areas with high population density. 2. Why are only the people where wind .is blowing notified? Everyone should know! Why isn't everyone notified? .The Community Warning System informs the community members surrounding the refinery by the . use of sirens, activating the Emergency Alert System, contacts with the media, and people with Weather Radios receive the message to shelter-in-place. The Telephone Emergency Notification System is used to notify.people down wind of the incident and specific information on how to shelter-in-place. The Telephone Emergency Notification System is not as fast as the other tools of the Community Warning System and takes time to call each individual' landline phone in the area of designation. So the people down wind are in the direct line of the hazards created by the incident and need to take protective action. 3. Why do we have to seal up the a house? Won't the toxins get in the house and we were sealing ourselves in? Studies of sheltering effectiveness calculated that, for a typical dwelling and a plume lasting 10 minutes, the dose indoors would be about one-tenth of the outside dose. For other types of dwellings and releases, the indoor dose could be as little as one percent of that received outdoors. For our purposes, dose can be simply considered a measurement of how much (concentration) and for how long a person is exposed to a toxic.material. If a person is exposed to a higher concentration for a longer period of time, the dose received will be higher..And the higher the. dose of toxic material received, the more likely a person will become sick as a result of the exposure. If the dose of an accidentally released toxic material can be held to a low level, unhealthy effects of exposure can be minimized or avoided. 4. Why does towel or tape keep out bad air? The towel and tape reduce the openings where air and other chemicals may enter a building. By putting a towel over an opening or taping close an opening the chemicals entering will Page 1 of 11 Timeline January 15, 2007 5:18 Fire Starts 5:23 Chevron activates the Community Warning System with a Public Health advisory. 5:33 Chevron activates the Community Warning System and four sirens 5:40 CCHS talks to KCBS 5:41 HazMat staff begins assessing community impact 5:45 CCHS calls Bay City News 5:45 CCHS calls NWS; NWS asks for e-mail 6:00 CCHS emails SIP Message to NWS 6:09 CWS Duty Officer notifies TENS Dialogic contractor 6:10 KCBS activities Emergency Alert System 6:11 NWS broadcasts SIP 6:34 Dialogic starts phone calls 6:49 CCHS puts up first of nine website postings (cchealth.org) with SIP info 6:56 CCHS resounds siren 7:29 CCHS resounds siren 7:59 CCHS resounds siren 8:05 Chevron 'isolates source of fire 8.39 CCHS Health Officer and Incident Commander issue All Clear 8:39 CCHS posts "All Clear" on website 8:41 CWS sends All Clear 8:47 TENS contractor Dialogic begins All Clear phone calls 6:49 CCHS puts up first of nine+ website postings (cchealth.org) with SIP info Page 11 of 11 P. INTENTIONALLY BLANK CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMISSION .; ,,•, SrA`col]N February 27, 2007 MEMO To: Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors From: Sabiha Gokcen,Chairperson,Hazardous Materials Commission Re: Proposed Changes to the Community Warning System For the last five years,the Hazardous Materials Commission has conducted detailed reviews of the use of the Community Warning System after major chemical accidents or releases. The purpose of these reviews has been to identify policies or practices that are not working satisfactorily, and to make recommendations for improvement or modification. The Commission conducted such a review of the use of the Community Warning System after the January 15, 2007 fire at the Richmond Chevron Oil Refinery. The Commission noted three areas of concern as a result of their review. . 1) The Telephone Emergency Notification System message was not sent in a timely manner. 2) Cell and Internet phone systems are not called by the Telephone Emergency Notification System. 3) The resounding of the sirens did not occur in a timely manner. At our February 22,2007 meeting Art Botterell, Community Warning System manager, made a presentation about changes being proposed for the system to address these concerns. The Commission voted unanimously to support the proposed changes as described to them. Specifically,the Commission supports: . 1) A shift in the use of the Telephone Emergency Notification System such that when a Shelter-in—Place advisory is made, the phone notification messages be sent immediately to all homes and businesses within a specified distance surrounding the chemical release or fire,to be followed-up later by messages to homes at a greater distance in the down-wind area. 2) Efforts to investigate and employ,if feasible, systems that can send Telephone Emergency Notification System messages to cell and Internet phone systems. 3) Changes to the Community Warning System that will enable automation of periodic resounding of the sirens during a Shelter-in-Place advisory. 4) Efforts to educate the public about the use of the Telephone Emergency Notification System as an integrated component of the Community Warning System. Members:Sabilxa Gokcen-Chair, Scott Anderson,Henn)Clark,Sharon Fuller,Frank Gordon, Don Grant,Dave Hudson,Steven Linsley,Jim Payne,Jimmy Rodgers,Mike Shiniansky,George Smith 50 Douglas Drive, Suite 310A,Martinez CA 94553 Phone (925)957-5417. Fax (925)370-5098