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HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 12011998 - D10 TCI: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Contra FROM: PHIL BATCHELOR, COUNTY ADMINISTRATORS '� Costa Count DATE: November 23, 1_998 ^ Sr,, tiiix SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL. SAFETY ORDINANCE SPECIFIC REOUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from the County Planning Commission on the Industrial Safety Ordinance, including Resolution 131998. 2. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from the Hazardous Materials Commission on the Industrial Safety Ordinance. 3. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs in the Health Services Department on the Industrial Safety Program. 4. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from the National Institute for Chemical Studies on the Industrial Safety Ordinance. 5. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from REW Consultants, Inc. on the Industrial Safety Ordinance. 5. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of the report from the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs in the Health Services Department on a Safe Work Practices Protocol. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: YES SIGNATURE: ? s � RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR _RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMMITTEE APPROVE OTHER SIGNATURES: ACTION OF BOARD ON D@Ci'Ilk�78T � 1998 APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED XX OTHER XX SEE TUE ATTACHED ADDENDUM FOR FURTHER BOARD ACTION and BOARD ORDER D. IO B. VOTE OF SUPERVISORS 1 HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE -�-- ) AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN AYES:I T , TV K V NOES: I IT & T AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE BOARD ABSENT: ABSTAIN: OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN, ATTESTED December 1 1998 Contact: PHIL BATCHELOR,CLERK OF THE.BOARD OF Cc: SUPERVISORS AN COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR By DEPUTY 7. ACKNOWLEDGE receipt of a cover memo from the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs for the Health Services Department, forwarding a Oft version of the Industrial Safety Ordinance incorporating amendments requested by the County Planning Commission, Hazardous Materials Commission, Health Services Department and consultants and which have been agreed to by many of the stakeholders, including industry and labor. 8. RECEIVE an introductory oral report from the County Administrator. 9. RECEIVE an introductory oral report from the Community Development Director. 10. RECEIVE an introductory oral report from Ms. Leslie Stewart, Chair of the Hazardous Materials Commission. 11. RECEIVE an oral report from Lew Pascalli, Director of Hazardous Materials Programs. 12. RECEIVE an oral summary of the report from the National Institute for Chemical Studies, presented by Mark A. Scott, President. 13. RECEIVE an oral summary of the report from REW Consultants, Inc., presented by Ms. Jo Haegert, Hazardous Materials Division of the Health Services Department. 14. OPEN the public hearing on the recommendations of the Contra Costa County Planning Commission on Land Use Permits for Development Projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials. 15. RECEIVE all public testimony on the Industrial Safety Ordinance and on the recommendations of the County Planning Commission. 16. CLOSE the hearing on the recommendations of the Contra Costa County Planning Commission on Land Use Permits for Development Projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials. 17. DETERMINE that the adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance is exempt from CEQA as a CLASS 8 Categorical Exemption (Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the Environment). 18. INTRODUCE the version of the Industrial Safety Ordinance,WAIVE reading and FIX December 8, 1998 for adoption of the ordinance. 19. REFER"toaopriate staff the remaining items outlined in the cover memo to thecopy of the ordinance that were not incorporated into the ordinance for further study and follow-up. BACKGRQUND: Introduction: On August 11, 1998, the Board of Supervisors received and referred to the County Planning Commission and Hazardous Materials Commission the draft Industrial -2- Safety Ordinance which had been proposed to the Board by Supervisors DeSaulnier and Canciamilla. The Board also directed the County Administrator to seek funding from industries in order to retain independent consulting expertise to evaluate and report to the Board on the proposed ordinance and directed that Board members be advised of the name of the selected consultant. The Board directed that the consultant evaluate the draft Industrial Safety Ordinance for its efficient and effective ability to improve industrial and community health,to consider any relevant previous ordinances submitted to the Board, analyze the cost effectiveness and enforceability of the ordinance and report back to the Board after obtaining public input. The Board also directed that public meetings be held in various areas of the County in order to receive public input. The Board also directed the Health Services Director to convene the appropriate stakeholders to provide recommendations regarding the development of a safe work practices protocol in order to assure the highest possible level of worker safety. We believe that the attached reports respond to each of those directions from the Board. Tab#1 in the binder which has been provided to each Board member contains the recommendations of the County Planning Commission and Community Development Director. Tab#2 contains the recommendations from the Hazardous Materials Commission. Tab #3 contains recommendations from the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs on behalf of the Health Services Director. Tab#4 contains the report from the National Institute for ChemicalStudies, one of the outside consultants who was retained by the County. Tab #5 contains the report from REW Consultants, Inc., the other consultant who was retained by the County. Tab #6 contains a report from the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs, on behalf of the Health Services Director, reporting on the referral regarding a Safe Work Practices Protocol. Tab#7 contains a 4"version;version of the Industrial Safety Ordinance and includes amendments which incorporates all of the recommendations for changes in the language of the ordinance which have been made by the County Planning Commission, Hazardous Materials Commission, both consultants,and the Director of Hazardous Materials Programs in the Health Services Department. Some additional recommendations were made by the Hazardous Materials Commission, the Health Services Department and the two consultants which did not directly relate to the language in the draft ordinance. All of those recommendations should be referred to appropriate staff for further study. This � � ���version of the Industrial Safety Ordinance has been reviewed with and concurred in by the industry and labor stakeholders. They and others will provide their own testimony on the extent to which this version is acceptable to all of the varied interests which have been a part of this process. If the0 z � version of the ordinance is acceptable to the Board, once all testimony has been received and the hearing has been closed, it would be -3- appropriate for the Board to introduce the . rersion of the ordinance, waive � reading, and fix December 8, 1998 for adoption of the ordinance. The County Planning Commission has made the following five recommendations, following which the Commission recommends that the Board adopt the Industrial Safety Ordinance: 1. Modify Section 84-83.602 to make the ordinance applicable in any non- agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise the Summary and Section 450-8.018 to clarify that the Health Services department may require changes to both the Safety Plan and Safety Program. 3. Expand the definition of"Major Chemical Accident or Release"to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines, regardless of the chemical released. 4. Globally revise the Ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention(CaIARP)program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.018 review,audit,and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e., Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a;major chemical accident or release), to make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issues raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal to the stationary source or persons who commented. The Hazardous Materials Commission made a number of recommendations for language changes to the ordinance. These include the following: 1. The ordinance should be revised throughout to reference the CalARP program regulations, as distinct from the federal regulations. The primary implication of this change is that external events, including seismic events, will have to be included in the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)when there is a potential to reach a public receptor at the endpoint defined in the CalARP program regulations. 2. Enforcement provisions of the ordinance should be adequate to attain compliance. The Commission recommends that the Board and County Counsel review enforcement tools for the draft ordinance, particularly for Chapter 450-8, Risk Management. 3. Section 454-8.004: PURPOSE AND GOALS. (a)(5)providimg for publie review of the Safety Plari, providing;for public input into the-Sgfely Plan and public review of the inspection and audit results:.W. (a)(9) reventinand reducingthe number, fre u ngend seven of accidental releases in the County. 4. Section 450-8.406: AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous' materials and assure protection of the environment. -4- 5. Section 450-8.014(a) and Section 450-8.016(b)(ii): The term Accidental Release," referring to releases to air, is used only in Section 450-8.016(b)(ii). The term major chemical accident or release" is also used in that Section, and encompasses releases to all media. The use of both terms invites confusion. The definition of "Accidental Release" in Section 450-8.014(x) and subsequent use of the term should be deleted. 6. Section 450-8.014(g): "Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that results in the release of a Regulated Substance including but not limited to the air, water or soil and meets one or more of the following criteria....[continue as in the proposed draft]. ♦ The definition should be expanded to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community Warning System guidelines, regardless of the chemical released. This change provides CCHS the authority to conduct a root cause analysis based on the effects of the incident, rather than solely on the chemical released. 7. Section 450-8.016 Human factors:stationary sources shall develop a written human factors program that follows the guidance document develoled or adopted the Cie art ent. The program shall be evelct ed within one year fallowing the issuance of the Counly guidance document or the effective date of the ordinance. whichever is later. The human factors program shall address: [—and continue as in proposed draft]. 8. Section 450-8.016(b)(11): To carry out Recommendation 5 (to delete any reference to "Accidental Release") this Section should be amended as follows: Section 450-8.016(b)(ii) the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for Aecidental Releases of Regulated Substances any release that could reasonably have had the potential to become a Major Chemical Accident or Release; 9. Section 450-8.018: This section should be revised to clarify the activities which will be conducted, and make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations. ♦ The appeals process should be limited to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented. In addition, the ordinance should otherwise assure the public's right to appeal the County's decision regarding a Safety Plan. ♦ The Commission recommends that issues raised during the public meeting may be the basis of an appeal, and is concerned that the legal definition of"public meeting"(as distinct from"public hearing")may not allow for that. The Board should direct County Counsel to include this issue in his review of the ordinance. 10. In Section 460-8.018: Review, Audit, and Inspection: (a) the ordinance should provide that the public meetings be held during rather than after the public comment period. In line with the Commission's recommendation ("—and limit the appeals process to -5- issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented"), issues raised during those meetings should be among those that could be the basis of an appeal, with whatever procedures (such as recording the meetings) that may be required to secure that right of appeal. To address the issue of meeting time, the Commission recommends the following action by the Board of Supervisors if the Board adopts the proposed ordinance: ♦ That the Board direct Health Services to take into account the community's time needs when scheduling the public meetings. 11. Section 450-8.018: Review, Audit, and Inspection: (b) The Department within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release, at the diseretion of the Departiomemt, conduct a safety inspection to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016. ...[continue as in the proposed draft] 12. SUMMARY and Section 450-8.018: The Summary and Section 450-8.018 should be revised to clarify that CCHS may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program. This will alleviate any concerns that CCHS can require modifications only to the written Safety Plan, as distinct from the implemented program. 13. Section 4501-8.022: Community Outreach. By recommendation of a Commission member, the Commission was asked to consider replacing the language of this section,which provides funding for the Hazardous Materials Ombudsman, with language to establish a Health Services Public Outreach and Information Program for the Safety Plans and their public review. The Program would include a community-based non- profit organization as a contractor. The Commission supported ensuring funding for the Ombudsman. To address the provision of technical assistance,the Commission recommends the following actions by the Board of Supervisors if the Beard adopts the proposed ordinance: ♦ That the Board direct Health Services to solicit questions and concerns from the public prior to the public meeting so that staff can better act as a technical resource for the public, and; That the Board set aside $50,000 from the General Fund for a one- year technical assistance grant pilot project to assist in the review of Safety Plans. The National Institute for Chemical Studies made a number of recommendations for language changes, but with those changes, recommends that the Board of Supervisors adopt the proposed ordinance. Their proposed amendments include the following: 1. Section 450-8.014 (a), the definition of "Accidental release" should be amended to include emission of a Regulated Substance into water and soil as well as ambient air. 2. Section 454-8.016 should be amended to clarify that the Safety Plan to be submitted under this section includes the Human Factors program, requirements and authorities for conducting Root Cause analyses, implementation schedule requirements for action items developed from the Process Hazards Analysis, and the Accident History. 3. The County legal staff should review the provision in Section 450-8.016(c)to determine whether the County may legally exclude all or part of a Root Cause analysis from disclosure in a legal proceeding. 4. Section 450-8.016(d)should be amended to clarify that the Stationary Source must address all the action items in implementing the Process Hazards Analysis. 5. Section 454-8.018(a) should be amended to expand the time for public review of a proposed Safety Plan from 30 days to at least 45 days. The section should also be modified by adding language to allow flexibility in timing for the public meeting and to specify that the public meeting be held in the affected community. 6. Section 450-8.016(4) should be amended to clarify that 41laction items identified by Process Hazards Analyses must be addressed'. 7. Section 450-8.018(b) should be amended to allow the Health Services Department discretion in conducting safety inspections fallowing Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. The Health Services Department should write implementing policies to indicate under which circumstances the Department will and will not conduct such inspections. MICS recommends that the Health Services Department be given discretion and that"shall" be changed to "may" and the phrase "at the discretion of the Department" be deleted. 8. Section 450-8.418(b) should also be amended to require that Safety Plans and Programs be audited by Health Services Department staff or consultants for compliance at least once every three years. 9. Section 450-8.018(d) should be amended to clarify that required modifications to a Safety Plan apply not just to the document but to all programs contained within the plan. 10. Section 454-8.018(f)should be amended to make Safety Plans valid forthree years from the date of final action. This should not be discretionary and the phrase "at the discretion of the Department" should be deleted. 11. Section 450-8.022 should be amended to delete the reference to"complaint prevention" as one of the jobs of the Community Ombudsman. 12. The Health Services Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient qualified staff to handle the expected workload increase resulting from adding processes to the existing RMP requirements, including new processes within facilities covered by CaIARP;conducting root -7- cause analyses of major accidents and releases; and reviewing and evaluating Human Factors programs. Similarly,the Community Development Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient staff in the event it is determined that the proposed risk management program will require review under CBQA. 13. The County legal staff should review existing enforcement authorities to clarify which tools are available to the County to enforce the proposed ordinance. Section 450-8.028 should be amended to more clearly identify these enforcement options. 14. The Board, after consultation with County Counsel, should consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance classifying certain serious violations, such as false filing of information, as misdemeanors. 15. Section 84-53.502 should be amended by deleting the proposed language and re-inserting the current language from Ordinance 96-50 stating that the land use provisions will apply in all non-agricultural zoning districts. 16. The Board should direct staff to eliminate cross-references to other ordinances to the extent possible without significantly lengthening the proposed ordinance. This would help make the proposed ordinance a more complete document and minimize the need to consult other references in order to fully understand the new requirements. 17. The Board should consider including a provision that would require the ordinance to be reviewed triennially, after three years of full implementation. This would enable the Board to review the performance of County agencies and the regulated industries under the new requirements, evaluate the effectiveness of the ordinance, and determine whether any changes are needed to improve public safety. REW Consultants, Inc. made the following recommendations: 1. that the Health Services Department develop a criteria document outlining the requirements for a written human factors program. 2. Section 450-8.018(d) be amended by deleting "the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source"and replacing it with"the Stationary Source shall resolve and document closure on actions identified by the process hazards analysis as fellows..." in order to clarify that the Stationary Source does not have the right to select which safety action items are to be completed. 3. It is suggested that training not be included in the proposed'ordinance but rather be developed separately because of its complexity. The Health Services Department has made a number of proposed revisions to the ordinance in response to the recommendations of the County Planning Commission,the Hazardous Materials Commission and the consultants,which are reflected in a � ,a version of the ordinance attached to their memorandum at Tab#3. -8- . 10 rr ; 'i Contra Caste TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FROMI DENNIS M. BARRY, AICD County COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR • ' s DATE: November 3, 1998 SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE, COUNTY FILE #ZT1-98. SPECIFIC REQUEST(S) OR RECOMMENDATIONS) & BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION RECOMMENDATI 1. DETERMINE that the adaption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance is exempt from CEQA as a CLASS 8 Categorical Exemption (Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the Environment) . 2 . OPEN the public hearing, receive testimony on the proposed ordinance. 3. CONSIDER the recommendations of the County Planning commission contained in Planning Commission Resolution #13-1998 (attached ars Exhibit 1) . 4. CLOSE the Public Hearing. 5. DIRECT staff to incorporate any desired modifications and determine a date for staff to return with the ordinance for possible introduction. FISCAL IMPACT The cost of administering the requirements of the ordinance will be born by applicant fees. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT. . X YES SIGNATURE Vk RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR RECOMMENDATION OF BOARDCOMM TTEE APPROVE OTHER OL SIGNATURES) ACTION OF BOARD ON __--December 1 . 1998 APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED XX_ OTHER IX_ SEE THE ATTACHED ADDENDUM FOR FURTHER BOARD ACTION VOTE OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS' A =gy"Mmetys ("BENT TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF AN AYES: 11I-, IV f V NOES*. 1 T ACTION TAKEN AND ENTERED Obi THE ABSENTt ABSTAIN. MINUTES OF THF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN. Contatct:D®3111iS M. Barry, AICD 335129{! Origt Community Development Department ATTESTED December 1 . 1998 cc: CAO PHIL BATCHELOR, CLERK OF County Counsel THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Health Services-Hazard Materials Div. AND COUNTY AD ISTRATOR BY , DEPUTY Page Two BAS F,OUNDJRF :N FOR RECOMMDATIONS On August 1.1., 1998, the Board of Supervisors ' referred the Industrial Safety Ordinance to the County Planning commission and the Hazardous Materials Commission. Additional background information is included in the staff report to the Planning Commission dated September 8, 1998 (attached as Exhibit 2) . On September 22, 1998 having fully considered the proposal, the staff analysis, the proposed CEQA exemption (see pp. S-7, S-8 of the staff report) , and all testimony received, the Planning Commission recommended that the Board of Supervisors adapt the Industrial Safety Ordinance with the following modifications: 1. Modify Section 84-63.602 and make the ordinance applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise Summary and Section 450-8.018 to clarify that Contra Costa Health Services Department may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program in order to find a plan in compliance with ordinance requirements. 3. Expand the definition of "Major Chemical Accident or Release„ to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines regardless of the chemical released. 4. Globally revise the Ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP) program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.01.8 review, audit, and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e. , Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a major chemical accident or release) , to make the process consistent with. the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issues raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal to the stationary source or persons who commented. Staff has reviewed the ordinance for conformity with the County General Plan and suggests that the Board of Supervisors find the proposed ordinance consistent with the plan, particularly with reference to the Hazardous Materials uses Section of the Safety Element (pages 10-54 through 10-63 of the County Genual Plan) and Hazardous Waste Management Section of the Public Facilities and Services Element (pages 7-58 through 7-68) . ADDENDUM TO ITEM D.10 December 1, 1998 Agenda On November 3, 1998,the Beard of Supervisors continued to this date, consideration of the report from the County Administrator and others relative to the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance including: • Recommendations from the County Planning Commission; • Recommendations from the Hazardous Materials Commission;' • Recommendations from the Health Services Director; • Recommendations from the National Institute for Chemical Studies (outside Consultant); • Recommendations from Ray E. Witter(outside consultant); • Recommendations from the Director,Hazardous Materials Programs, Health Services Department, on a Safe Work Practices Protocol; and Continued to this date, the hearing on the recommendations of the Contra Costa County Planning Commission on Land Use Permits for Development Projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials (County pile 4ZT 1-98), a referral from the Board of Supervisors to consider an Ordinance which would repeal Chapter 84-63 and add a new Chapter 84-63 which requires land use permits for certain projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials. The proposed Ordinance sets forth criteria for requiring land use permits for industrial projects, excluding maintenance projects, and adds a new Chapter 450-8 to the County Code. This new chapter will require submittal and public review of a Safety Plan and Program, an expanded list of regulated substances, and increased inspection and audit requirements of regulated industries; and Continued to this date, consideration of introduction of the Ordinance. Phil Batchelor, County Administrator introduced staff s recommendations on Board Order D.10 (A). Dennis Barry, Community Development Director(CDD)introduced staffs recommendations on Board Order D.10(B). Leslie Stewart, Chair, Hazardous Materials Commission,presented the Commission's recommendations to the Board (See Hazardous Materials Commission's Report, identified as Tab 2). The Director of the Health Services Department's Hazardous Materials Program,Lewis Pascalli, Jr., presented two reports. (See Hazardous Materials Programs Report dated November 19, 1998, identified as Tab 3) and(See Health Services Department, Hazardous Materials Programs, dated November 20, 1998, identified as Tab 6). Mr. Pascalli also presented the Hazardous Materials Program's report (see Hazardous Materials Programs,Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, known as the "Consolidated Redline dated November 23, 1998", identified as Tab 7). Bill Alton, Accidental Release Prevention Specialist, County's Hazardous Materials Program,was also present to answer the Board's questions. Consultant Mark Scott,President,National Institute for Chemical Studies, 2.300 MacCorkle Avenue, S.E.,Charleston,West Virginia,was also present. (see National Institute for Chemical Studies, Contract No. 23-222-1, identified as Tab 4). The Board discussed the issues. Jo Haegert,Accidental Release Prevention:Specialist, Hazardous Materials Program,presented the report by Ray Witter,of REW'Consultants. (See Report To Contra Costa County, California,Board of Supervisors Ordinance Review Project, prepared by Ray E. Witter,REW Consultants,Inc.,St.Louis,MO, identified as Tab S). Dennis Barry explained a technical modification in the redlined version. 1 Victor Westman, County Counsel, suggested language modifications to the proposed Ordinance. (Memorandum, mated December 1,J998, to the Board of Supervisors from Victor I Westman, County Counsel). The Board continued to discuss the issues. The public hearing was opened and the following people commented on the matter. Larry Blevins, Plumbers and Steamfitters,Local 342, 5537 Louisiana Drive, Concord; Bob Mannaberg,Mt. Diablo Peace Center, 3 Rapo Court, Pleasant Hill; David Nesmith, Sierra Club; Debbi Landsloff, Sierra Club Bay Chapter, 6016 Orchard,Richmond; Jim Jakel, Contra Costa Council, 877 Ygnacio Valley Road,4202, Walnut Creek; John Dalrymple,Labor Council, 525 Green Street,Martinez; Sabiha Gokcen,2047 Olympic Drive,Martinez; Paul Borenstein, Tosco, 711 Huntington Place,Martinez; Jim Payne, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers,P.O. Box 349,Martinez; Mike Dalley, Sierra Club,SF Bay Chapter, 729 Everett Street,El Cerrito; Steve Sullivan,P.O. Box 507, Benicia; Pirate; Krishnan Padmanabhan,2266 Foxhill Drive,Martinez; Michael Hernandez,#UA 342,935 Detroit Avenue,Concord; Ralph Sattler, C.S.E., 1204 Ulfinian Way,Martinez; Jahn Sakamoto,Eichleay Engineers,3096 Bernard.Avenue, San Ramon; Wally Shoults,CCC Hazardous Materials Commission,2977 Grant Street, Concord; Kasha Kessler, Shoreline Environmental Alliance,P.O. Box 225, Crockett; Andrew Posner, 523 Camelback Place,Pleasant Hill; George Vogt,4801 Keller Ridge Drive,Clayton; Greg Feere, Contra Costa Building Trades Commission,935 Alhambra Avenue, Martinez; Ron Banducci,Martinez Refining Co., 5251 Blackhawk Drive,Danville; Denny Larson,Communities for a Better Environment, 500 Howard St.,San Francisco; Arts Betts,Crockett; James Madwell,DVC Student; Donald Anderson, 1280 San Pablo Avenue,Rodeo, Steve Ambhar; Maurice Turrieta,6519 Manhattan Court,Martinez. The following people did not appear. However the Chair read their comments into the record: Donald Brown, Communities for a Better Environment, 1801 Sonoma Blvd., #117,Vallejo; Joe Burke, 600 Center#202,Martinez; Cheryl Johnson, 3217 Fraser Road,Antioch; Jim Brumleve, 1512 North Gate Road, Walnut Creek; Dave La Erickson, 847 Sage Drive,Martinez; Dianne Davis, 1008 Palisade Court,Martinez; John Gliatto, 1003 Haven Street,Martinez; Art Bertz, 1035 6`f' Street, Crockett; Bob Fuhnnann, .3500.Dover Street,Napa; Charles Lemmon, 627 Ulfinian Way, Martinez; Oskar K-Heintz, Tosco, 3495 Tanager Circle, Concord; Joe Jacoby, 1138 Mattos Drive, Vallejo; Rick Ernst,Northern California Mechanical Contractors Association; 1350 Hayes Street,#B-1,Benicia; Brad Fisk, 2536 Cartier Court, Fairfield; Gary J. Peterson, 18 Glenview Drive, Martinez; Lincoln Sinclair,2010 Lancaster#1,Richmond; Katherine Whelzer, 455 Del Sur Street,Vallejo; Glenn Dean, 80 Tabor Avenue,Fairfield; 2 Jim Haney, 2164 Ackerman Drive,Pittsburg; Steve Dornan, 825 Granite Court, Vacaville; Robert Bustos, 3780 Gladstone Drive,Pittsburg; David Wall, 2011 Rapallo Way, Bay Point; David Freeman, 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Mark Dement,41 Katie Court,Pleasant Hill; Chuck Leonard,2154 Ackerman Drive, Pittsburg; Randy Houston,Local 342 Steamfitters, 151 Arcadia Drive,Vacaville; Dana Anderson, Tosco, 2520 Morello Heights,Martinez; E. H. Bruner, Bay Area Instrument and Electrical, Inc.,175 Industrial Way, Benicia; Michael Fairbanks, Bragg Crane, 457 Parr Blvd., Richmond; Mark J. Sally, Tosco, 849 Oxford Way, Benicia; Heather Quisenberry, 1087 Alamo Court, Pittsburg; Dave Grant,Tosco, 150 Solano Way, Martinez; Brent Babow, Timec Company, California Contractors Alliance, 155 Corporate Place, Vallejo; Joe Boykin, 815 Azores Circle, Bay Point; Warren Tumagg, 530 Brownstone Road, Oakley; Scott Fink, 1442 Unedd, Fairfield; Matt Costello, 114—4th Street, Apt#147, Santa Rosa; Dick Hazeltine, 1061 Orchard Avenue,Napa; Sam Galiote, 4404 Montreal, Antioch; Floyd Coffman, 500 J Street, Apt 113,Martinez; Murphy Callahan, 747 Alhambra Road, El Sobrante; Randy Magana, 1905 Bailey Road, Concord; Pete Kinsel, 1615 Noia Avenue, Antioch; Linda Stephens, 4851 Udell Road, Vacaville; Timothy Moore, 1155 Hollowbrook Court,Brentwood; Nelson Harmon, 4 Plateau Court, Hercules; Waldimar Kindt, 940 Bonnie Lane, Oakley; Woodrow Clifton,P.O. Box 1952,Benicia, Robbie Nash, 53 Los Cerritos Drive, Vallejo; Rod Burke, 1515 Grandview Avenue, Martinez; Steve Apperson, 445'Youngsdale Drive, Vacaville; Stanley Lazuka, 3001 N. Texas Street#73,Fairfield; Steward Martin, 3001 N. Texas Street,Fairfield; Felipe Velasco, P.O. Box 1385,Pittsburg; Anthony Cuellar, 5301 Elm Lane#6, Antioch; Bill Strock Sr., 2301 Sycamore Drive#2,Antioch; Michael Egger, 111 Castro Street,Pt. Richmond; John Victor, 3501 Gallagher, Antioch; Eric McGuire, 851 La Cruz Lane, Vacaville; Patrick McDuff'ie, 524 Herald Street, Crockett; Thomas Herrington, 5855 Slug Gulch, Somerset; Martin Rosales, 300 Calmace Drive, Dixon; Melvin Kibbes, 1220 West 9th Street, Antioch; Steven Crier, Route R2 Box 2575,Bell Forks, South Dakota; Jessy Van Slochtelen, 855 Allview Avenue,El Sobrante; Alan Pastega, 1201 Santa Fe,Martinez; Michael S. Redd, 2972 Palo Verde Way,Antioch; Reita Stone, 742 Edwards Street, Crockett; Marc Lopez, 315 Scarlet Oak Court, Pleasant Hill; Ken Camp,P.O. Box 1764,Bethel Island; Larry Henderson, 10655 Highway 70, Marysville; Mark Brandt, 3025 Olympia Circle, Pittsburg; Robert Bennett, P.O. Box 429, Martinez; Chuck Hawley, 2373 Esmond Avenue, Richmond; James R. Partain, 3545 D. Northwood Drive, Concord; Winston Llewellyn, 2330 Lancaster Drive, Apt 1,Richmond; Dennis Aubuchon, 103 Newell Lane, Vallejo; Charles Ray, 2348 Ackerman Drive, Pittsburg; 3 Levie Huogins, 468 19'x`Street,Antioch; David Driggars, 615 Aleta Place,Pleasant Hill; Celia O. Palomino, 2164 Ackerman Drive,Pittsburg; Antonio L. Cerna, 1027 Prairie Drive, Suisun; Bob Jordan Jr.,25 Adelaide Drive,Martinez; Raghard Wills, 8844 Windsor Road,Windsor; James Revell, 1373 El Dorado Drive, Concord; Christopher Wacht, 851 W. Walker Landing Road, Walnut Grove;' Richard Elliott, 2945 McClure Street,#305, Oakland; Monica Palomino, 1295 Jensen Drive, Pittsburg; Jenee Donner, 3713 Mt. Diablo Blvd. #4,Lafayette; David Bean,2164 Ackerman Drive,Pittsburg; Todd Lopez, 7410 Gallant Circle,Citrus Heights; Gary Field, 266 Regency Circle,Vacaville; Michael Hernandez,2841 Ryan Road, Concord.; Carl Connell, 1380 San Pablo,Rodeo; John Rosembaum, 830 Georgia Street,Apt B,Vallejo; Terry Partain, 142 Randolph Road,Pittsburg; Tim Partain, 2309 Clinton Court, Antioch; Rocky Pompa, 1851 Hoffman Lane,Byron; Allen Frerichs,2632 Stoneridge Drive, Modesto; Harry Russell, 1037 Lengel Circle, Vallejo; Dan Nunes,244 Kendall Avenue,Crockett; Jose Sanchez,2544 Hinkley Avenue,Richmond; Tony Buchel, 5730 Pepperridge Way, Concord; Dave Chambers, 3424 Morningside Drive,Richmond; Louis Jordan, 150 Gordon Way,Martinez; Greg Willingham, 340 Riverdale Court, Vacaville; Rene Feliciano,4291 Diehl Way,Pittsburg; Jim Bullock, 2441 Mt. View, Concord; Edward Lewis,2959 Devon Way, San Pablo; Jose Palomino, 3512 Tabora Drive,Antioch; Howard Adams, 720 Kendall Avenue,Crockett; Bert Mayg,2006 Dalis Drive, Concord; Myron Taylor,4 East Lake Place,Antioch; Rick Phillips, 2676 Elmhurst Cr.,Fairfield; Stan Harris, 2945 McClure Street,Oakland; Michael Cronin,2117 B Manzanita Way,Antioch; J.W. Raybourne, 265 Brixton Court,American Canyon; Clay Sutterfield, 607 B York Street, Vallejo; Kerry Morris, 217 Carolyn Drive, American Canyon; Larry Estes, 5295 Laurel, Concord; Kirti Shah, 110 Rock Oak Court, Walnut Creek; Glen Garfein,2469 Warren Lane,Walnut Creek; Paul Kerr,Bay Area Instrument and Electric; 175 Industrial Way,Benicia; Wayne Perryman, 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Dave Carellini, 82 Gilrix Drive,Martinez; Mike Pirnat, 160 Walnut Meadows Court,Oakley; Luis A. Calderon, 1706 Domaine Way, Oakley; Dwayne Simonds, 2212 Tyler Court, Antioch; Don Simonds, 3312 Canby Road, Antioch; Fred Fields, 2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg; Stan Fletcher, 22 Cutting Court, Richmond; John Smyrl, 978 Center Avenue, Martinez; James Medvill; James Douros, 35488 Cabrill Drive, Fremont; Obray Van Buren, 200 Gregory Lane, Ste 114 A, Pleasant Hill; Steve Ombenhowser, 200 Gregory Lane, Ste 114 A, Pleasant Hill; Patricia Seek, 2775 Broadmoor Avenue, Concord; Blair Gast, 4530 Alhambra Way, Martinez; M.Bruley, 4291 Satinwood Drive, Concord; Gerald,C. Lindborg, 2038 Elinora Drive,Pleasant Hill; 4 Dale Peterson, 3428 Bluejay Drive, Antioch; KellyAuschitz, 1308 Roman Way, Martinez; Jerry Balmer, 6 Catalpa Court,Napa; Troy Garland, 1286 Raton Court, El Sobrante; Ken Faria, 611 Berellesa Martinez; Larry Edmond, 1101 Jacobsen Street,Antioch; Richard Capps, 81 Inlet Drive,Bay Point; Daniel Palomino, 2164 Ackerman Drive, Pittsburg; Andre A. Miller, 595 Kister Creek, El Sobrante; Brian Worth, 3485 Walnut Avenue, Concord; Charles Coon Sr., 3016 Chrisse Court, Antioch; Dale Robbins, 2727 Alhambra Avenue, Martinez; Craig Rose, 925 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Matt Caesar, 925 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Greg Partain, 152 Camino Del Sol, Martinez; Roberto Arellano, 925 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Ernie Kaler, 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Doug Brown,24 Tareyton Court, San Raman; Yusuf Baxamusa, 3049 Santa Maria Court,Concord; Tom Baca, 213 Midway Drive, Martinez; Darwon Gardner, 1072 Eastridge Drive,Napa; Harlow Newton,2235 Greenwich, San Pablo; Ernie Carrington,2463 Richmond Parkway,Richmond; Erick Lehfeldt, 3322 Bluejay, Antioch; Ray Starkey, 3142 Brent Court, Castro Valley; Carol Mauchin, 1084 Meadowbrook Drive, Fairfield; Saxx Serape,2201 San Jose Drive,#101, Antioch; Don Larson, 7 South Lake Court, Antioch; Ken Darke, 2156 Owens Court, Pinole; Sidney Clutts, 1151 San Pablo Avenue, #D, Pinole; Robert Corona, 115 Laining Court,Vallejo; Edward Quesada, 157 Dimaggio Avenue, Pittsburg; Peter Eberle,4774 Esquivel Road, Vacaville; Broderick Nickelberry, 333 Alabama Street,Vallejo; Carol Mauchin, 1084 Meadowlark Drive,Fairfield; Erin Lewis, 11 Carquinez Strait Drive#1, Martinez; Ken Wills, P.O. Box 225, Knightsen; Lawrence Forige, 992 Jewett Avenue, Pittsburg; Todd McGuire, 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Alfredo Ortegia Jr., 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Ken Brown, 8820 Chapparal Drive,Fairfield; Terry Swan,40 Bruce Court, Pleasant Hili; Eric Vorheis, 935 Detroit Avenue, Concord; Vin Fonderelo, 3913 Chatworth Street,Pittsburg; Dave Herwat, 989 Springwood Court, Rodeo; Will Cliff`, 3466 Willow Pass Road, Concord; Robert Garrison, 1251 Pear Drive, Concord; Wayne LeMoine, P.O. Box 6110,Vacaville; Ron Peterson, 5073 Comanche Way, Antioch; Brian McComb, 2343 Acacia Drive, Concord; Erik Smith, 4124 Sandra Circle,Pittsburg; Don Jackson, 1739 Kheem, Richmond; Mike Campbell, 2783 Estates Avenue,Pinole; Eric Jensene, 154 Margie Drive,Pleasant Hill; Jerry Stern, 235 Azores Court, Bay Point. Supervisor Rogers requested the Deputy Clerk call Fred Millar, Ph.D. on the speakerphone. Dr. Millar is a Policy and Environmental Analyst, 5049 S. 7th Road No. 201, Arlington., Virginia. (During Public Comment,Denny Larson, of Communities,for a Better Environment gave the Board a copy of Dr.Millar's report and resume . Dr. Millar's phone conversation was amplified over the public speaker system. 5 Following discussion by the Board, Supervisor Canciamilla moved to close the public hearing. Supervisor DeSaulnier seconded the motion. The vete was as follows: AYES: Supervisors Uilkema, Gerber,DeSaulnier, Canciamilla and Rogers NOES: None ABSENT: None ABSTAIN: None Following further discussion by the Board, Supervisor DeSaulnier moved: "The Berard direct staff to come back for first reading on December 8th with an Ordinance that is the Ordinance in front of us with the following changes: First around penalties that we add, in Section 450-8.428, we add at the end of that, as an infraction or criminal misdemeanor; we also add under community outreach, sort of the spirit of what Hazardous Materials was suggesting that at least in the first go around that we commit$50,400 to the Community Outreach process but that go through the County Ombudsperson's Department, and that we also incorporate both Dennis Barry's and, Victor Westman's suggested language changes and that we also direct, at the outset of the hearing in terms of liability problem issue, so that paragraph would be added; that we also direct staff to come back next week as a way to enact a process to go after safe work protocols and then lastly I would like some help with the feasibility issue, so that the motion is with those changes and. I would still';like a suggestion from Division on the feasibility issue and then it would come back for first reading on December 8t with second reading on December 15t"." Supervisor Uilkema clarified specific language and seconded the motion. Following further discussion by the Board, Supervisor Uilkema withdrew her second of the motion. Supervisor Rogers then seconded the motion. Supervisor Gerber suggested additional modifications to Supervisor DeSaulnier's motion, and he declined to accept the amendments. Supervisor Gerber advised the Board she would not be supporting the motion. Supervisor Canciamilla asked that the motion be restated. Supervisor DeSaulnier restated his motion: "So the direction is to have staff come back next week to introduce this first reading of the Ordinance in Tab 7, the first one is the infraction, add infraction and criminal misdemeanor on, under penalties, which is page 19, 4th paragraph, so we add as an infraction or criminal misdemeanor. Number two is the language that was suggested from Mr. Barry and Mr. Westman for inclusion 6 hours ago. Number three was the changes on the grammatical change on major chemical accident or release in Page 5. The addition; of language to commit $54,000 under public outreach, to be handled through the Division with a recommendation to the Board as to what that public outreach will be that will include some kindof interaction with community based organizations. Also that we would insert and ask staff to do that, and next week the language that Mr. Payne has given us today around an annual review and with any suggestions or modifications the Divisions might want to make to that suggestion. That next week we also come back separate from the ordinance with a commitment to work through the safe work protocols, which I believe is Tab 6. And then lastly, is the feasibility language,which I will not defer to staff for suggestion." 6 Mr. Pascalli advised that staff had concluded they would be able to administer this Ordinance with the words"feasible"taken out on Page 5, Section(g), Line 3; and on Page 4, Section(c) (definition); take out the word"infeasible"on Page 14 No. 4 (regarding the schedule on implementing recommendations from the PHA.) Following further Board discussion. Supervisor Rogers withdrew his second. Supervisor Canciamilla seconded the motion, and the vote was as follows: AYES: Supervisors Uilkema,DeSaulnier and Canciamilla NOES: Supervisors Gerber and Rogers ABSENT: None ABSTAIN: None 7 REI V ED DEC - 1 1 Annual Review and Evaluation. BQARD OF SUPF.RVIaO" (a) The Department shall annually: CO[+ A COSTA€r%3 (1) review its activities to implement this Chapter,and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of this Chapter in achieving its purpose and goals pursuant to Section 450-8.004. (b) An annual review and evaluation report shall be prepared based upon the previous fiscal year's activities and shall contain a brief description of how the Department is meeting the requirements of this Chapter as follows: (1) Effectiveness of the Department's program to ensure stationary source compliance. (2) Effectiveness of the procedures for records management. (3) Audits and inspections of Stationary Sources to ensure compliance with this Chapter. (4) Root Cause Analysis and/or Incident Investigations. (5) The Department's process for public participation. (6) Effectiveness of the Public information Bank, including status of electronic accessibility. (7) Other required program elements necessary to implement and manage this Chapter. (8) Comments from interested parties regarding the effectiveness of the local program that raise public safety issues. (9) The impact of the Chapter in improving industrial safety. (c) The review and evaluation report shall be submitted to the .Board of Supervisors on or before September 30 of each year and shall contain: (1) The executive summary for each stationary source that has submitted a Safety Plan pursuant to Section 450-8.016, (2) The annual accident report for each Stationary Source required pursuant to Section 450-8.016(E)(2); (3) A listing of all stationary sources covered by the Chapter and which facilities: (i) Have submitted a Safety Plan,including the status, (ii) Have utilized inherently safer systems, (iii) Have been required to perform Root Cause.Analyses, including the status, (iv) Have been audited, inspected or had Root Cause Analyses and/or Incident Investigations conducted by the Department, (2) A list of new or modified stationary sources since the last review and evaluation, including registration information for each of these facilities. (3) Updated registration information. (4) Legal enforcement actions initiated by the Department identifying each stationary source and Code section alleged to have been violated. This shall include administrative,civil,and criminal actions. (5) Total penalties assessed as a result of enforcement. (6) Total fees, service charges, and other assessments collected specifically for the support of this Chapter. (7) Total personnel years utilized by the jurisdiction to directly implement, administer or operate this program. (d) A copy of the annual audit required pursuant to the CalARP regulations shall be submitted to the Board of Supervisors. WKS1MWITH:D.10 CAP - IT Coww mw A"t ENENT OFPmLt3'T`IoN -INDuS f'WAL ToXiNs An envb orrmamjuW eduawfon wVan&Wivn sm*vMg the conmmu nritiaa aft'Potni,Ptttsb rindwh P.O.Box 1128 P itbbur&CA 94565-2021 (925)439-=7 Your axthwpwdc*wfivIar , mer a t ferawa in your conumunity November 22, 1998 TO:, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (faxed to 925-335-19131 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY RE: INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE First,we would hies to compliment the Dowd of Supervisors for holding the seven public meetiaaSs throughout out the county to disouss the various ordhiances being considered. It bui It confuience and understanding and opened dialogue atnong the various oonstituaU in tabor, Indtastry,couWy,and community. The panel discussions were especially a active.We hope to look forwarded to this kind of open communication In the future_ Second,before making your decision on Tuesday,lar tuber I sit,we would Ilk*to make some amendmea ft to the finance you we consldwing. These ainendmants are suggested in the spirit of complementing the present ordinance,which has many good points in its favor. How+a&w, thom aro same areas which could use some surer thenln&as follows. 1.a►. COMMUNITY OUTREACH: In addition to assuring the salary and continuances of the, county Ombudsman,Community Outreach should include the O budanan working with the various cc uuhy-Wa�d envirounwntal groups across the county to achieve both outreach and community input. I. b. TECEWCAL ASSISTANCE: Granting technical assistance manias will give community groups*cc*"to experts jjust as Industries and agencies have woe€rs to their experts]in the review of safty plans and other technical documents. This can level the playing field and;build trust betwe m oommunity and industry. Otherwise,industry will think the community dens not understand dues to lack of expertise and the community will think that industry iso ignoring them and cannot be busted. 2. CLIC COMMENT PERIOD: This comment period should be no less than 45 days. 3. PENALTIES: The penalty should be a Criminal Misdemeanor. CAP-IT (92,5)439-2227 '1 Contra TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS =1 Y Costa FROM: DENNIS M. BARRY, AICD, County" COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR DATE: November 3, 1998 SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE, COUNTY FILE #3T1-48. SPECIFIC REQUEST(8) OR RECOMMENDATXON(S) is BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION RECOMMENDATIONS r 1. DETERMINE that the adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordina'ce is exempt from CEQA as a CLASS 8 Categorical Exemption (Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the Environment) . 2. OPEN the public hearing, receive testimony on the proposed ordinance. -, 3. CONSIDER the recommendations of the County Planning Commission contained in Planning Commission Resolution 113-1998 (attached as Exhibit 1) . 4. CLOSE the Public Hearing. 5. DIRECT staff to incorporate any desired modifications and determine a date for staff to return with the ordinance for possible introduction. FISCAL TTMPACT The cost of administering the requirements of the ordinance will be born by applicant fees. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: X_ YES SIGNATURE 0(` _____ RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR � RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMM TTEE .,_._, APPROVE OTHER SIGNATURE(S) : ACTION OF BOARD ON APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED OTHER VOTE OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS 18 A UNANIMOUS (ABSENT TRUE AND CORRECT COPX OF AN AYES! NOESZ ACTION TAKEN AND ENTERED ON THE ABSENT: ABSTAIN: MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF Contact:Donnis M. Barry, AICD 335-1290 SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE BROWN. Orig: Community Development Department ATTESTED cc: CAO PHIL BATCHELOR, CLERK OF County Counsel THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Health Services-Hazard Materials Div. AND COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR BY , DEPUTY Page Two BACKGROUNDIREASQNS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS On August 11, 1998, the Board of Supervisors referred the Industrial Safety ordinance to the County Planning Commission and the Hazardous Materials commission. Additional background information is included in the staff report to the Planning Commission dated September 8, 1998 (attached as Exhibit 2) . On September 22, 1998 having fully considered the proposal, the staff analysis, the proposed CEQA exemption (see pp. S-7 S-8 of the staff report) , and all testimony received, the planning Commission recommended that the Board of Supervisors adopt the Industrial Safety ordinance with the following modifications: 1. Modify Section 84-63.602 and make the ordinance applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise Summary and Section 450-8.018 to clarify that Contra Costa Health Services Department may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program in order to find a plan in compliance with ordinance requirements. 3. Expand the definition of "Major Chemical Accident or Release" to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines regardless of the chemical released. 4. Globally revise the ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP) program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.018 review, audit, and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e. Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a major chemical accident or release) , to make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issues raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal to the stationary source or persons who commented. Staff has reviewed the ordinance for conformity with the County General Plan and suggests that the Board of Supervisors find the proposed ordinance consistent with the plan, particularly with reference to the Hazardous Materials Uses Section of the Safety Element (pages 10-54 through 10-63 of the County General Plan) and Hazardous Waste Management Section of the Public Facilities and Services Element (pages 7-58 through 7-68) . RESOLUTION NO, 13-1998 RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, INCORPORATING' FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO LAND USE PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PRO46TECTO INVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, County File' #ZT 1-98» WHEREAS, on August 11, 1998 the Board of Supervisors referred to the County Planning Commission and Hazardous Materials Commission the Draft Industrial Safety Ordinance for report and recommendation; and WHEREAS,in the Board of Supervisors referral, two chapters are proposed. Chapter 4501-8 requires oil refineries' and chemical plants to file a Safety Plan with the Health Services Department within one year after adoption of the ordinance with specific criteria, guidelines and review. Chapter 84-63 would repeal and replace the provisions of ordinance 96-50, including changes in the requirements for a land use permit on developmentprojects and delete such requirements for major maintenance projects. This ordinance would apply throughout the unincorporated area of Contra Costa County; and WHEREAS, after notice was lawfully given, a public hearing was scheduled before the County Planning Commission on Tuesday, September 8, 1998 and subsequently continued to September 22, 1998, whereat all persons interested might appear and be heard, and WHEREAS, on Tuesday, September 22, 1998, the County Planning Commission having fully reviewed, considered and evaluated all the materials provided by staff, including the Class 8 Exemption from CEQA, along with the testimony and evidence submitted in this matter,and; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the County Planning Commission recommends to the Board of Supervisors of the County of Contra Costa, State of California, that the Board of Supervisors ADOPT the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance with the following changes: 1. Modify Section 84-63.602 to make the ordinance applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise Summary and Section 450 -8.018 to clarify that Contra Costa County Health Services Department may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program. 3 . Expand the definition of "Major Chemical Accident or Release" to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines, regardless of the chemical released. PANS TWO RESOLUTION NO. 13-1998 4. Globally revise the ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.018 review, audit, and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e. , Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a major chemical accident or release) , to make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issues raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal. to the stationary source or persons who commented. BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the direction to prepare this resolution was given by the County Planning Commission at its meeting of September 22, 1998 by the following vote: AYES: Commissioners - Clark, Pavl,inec, Gaddis, Kimber, Terrel, Wong, Hanecak NOES: Commissioners - None ABSENT. Commissioners - None ABSTAIN: Commissioners - None BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Secretary of the County Planning Commission shall respectively sign and attest the certified copy of this resolution and deliver the same to the Board of Supervisors all in accordance with the Planning Laws of the State of California. JOHN HANECAK, CHAIR County Planning', Commission, County of Contra Costa, State of California ATTEST: _y DENNIS M. BARRY, 'Secreta y of the Planning Comm' cion, County of Contra Costa, State of California DMA j df bo3:ztl-98.res EXHIBIT"2" .Agenda Item #4 Community Development Contra Costa County COUNT'PLkNNING COMMISSION IQESD.AY, SEPTEMBER 8. 1998 - 7:00 P. 1. INUQD=IM This is a referral from the Board of Supervisors of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The proposal would substantially readopt Chapter 84-63, originally added by Ordinance 96-20 and repealed by ordinance 96-50 (The so-called. "Good Neighbor Ordinance") and repeals Chapter 84-63, added by ordinance 96-50, and containing criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous wastes or hazardous materials. In addition, the ordinance would add Chapter 450-8 to the County Code, containing measure to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental release of hazardous substances, including requirement of a safety plan and program for regulated industry, public participation in the review of that plan and program, an expanded list of regulated substances beyond those required of the Risk Management Plan, hoot Cause analysis of all major chemical accidents or releases, inspection and audit requirements and a public outreach and information program. The proposed ordinance would apply in the unincorporated area of Contra Costa County. II. BACKGROUND In December, 1996, the Board of Supervisors adopted ordinance 96-50, which substantially modified the County requirements for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous wastes and hazardous materials. The ordinance required land use permits for major maintenance projects, as defined, and modified the system for project scoring for new development projects and substantial modifications to facilities in order to expand the number of projects subject to land use permit,requirements. a'oNIso.sr S - 2 Since the adoption of the ordinance, the County has been involved in litigation brought by industrial and business interests attempting to overturn the adoption of the ordinance. In addition, Supervisors DeSaulnier and Canciamilla have been attempting to bring the various interests involved in the issue together to reach agreement on an alternative means of providing industrial safety, without the requirement of land use permits. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance is the result of these efforts. There are two parts to the proposal; a new Chapter 450-8 and a new Chapter 84-63. These sections are discussed separately below. Chapter 450-8 This section would require that within one year after 'adoption of the ordinance, a stationary source as defined (including ail refineries and chemical plants subject to federal risk management program requirements) must file with the Health Service Department a Safety Plan which includes an expanded list of covered processes beyond those subject to the federal requirements (See section 450-8016(a)), a Human Factors program (8016(b)), the conduct of a Root Cause analysis for any major chemical accident or release (which the Health Services Department may elect to conduct itself) (8016(c)), a Process Hazards analysis and implementation of action items resulting therefrom (8016(d), and an accident history from June 1, 1992 through the date of the Safety Plan Submittal (8016(e)). Following the submittal of the Safety Plan, the Department will make the portions which are not protected trade secrets available for public review for 30 days and will thereafter conduct a public meeting to solicit comments on the plan. Within 30 days after a major chemical accident or release the department will inspect and audit the facility to determine compliance with the safety plan provisions, and shall do so at least every three years., ab1TSO.sr S - 3 Based upon the review of the Safety Plan, or in response to the inspection/audit provisions, the department may requiremodifications or additions to the Safety Plan in order to bring it into compliance with the ordinance. Such determinations shall be subject to the administrative appeal provisions of the County Code at Chapter 14- . (Under article 4503-8.018(e), an appellant is either the stationary source or a person who submitted public comment on the safety plan.) The Safety flan will be valid for a period of three to five years, at the discretion of the Health Services Department. In addition, the ordinance provides for Community Outreach (454-8.022). This section requires the employment of an ombudsperson for the investigation of complaints, environmental health concerns or questions about hazardous materials programs for people who live or work in Contra Costa County. The ordinance also requires the creation of a Public Information Bank to provide ready public access to information relevant to the purposes on the ordinance, but at a minimum including business inventories and emergency response plans, Risk Management Plans, Safety Plans and department incident reports, to the extent such information is not protected trade secrets. Ar alb Health Services Department Hazardous Materials Division staff have advised the Community Development Department that the proposed addition of Chapter 4503-8 to the County Code, along with the changes in Chapter 84-63 would provide a higher level of worker and public protection than the current land use permit provisions of ordinance 96-50 (The so-called "Good Neighbor Ordinance"). HSD staff is proposing some modifications to proposed Chapter 450-8 in order to clarify and strengthen certain of its provisions. Those proposals will be provided under separate ab\zso.sr S - 4 cover, and: HSD Staff will be present at the Planning Commission hearing on this matter to address any questions which may arise. The addition of this chapter to the code will significantly expand the areas for which industrial uses must provide information, audits and inspections, and physical and human factor changes to increase the safety of the covered processes involving the use of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes over and above the requirements of the Federal Risk Management Program. In referring the proposal to the Planning Commission, the Board is asking for recommendations on both the zoning ordinance changes contained in Chapter 84-63 and the addition of Chapter 450-8. Therefore, staff suggests that the Commission in making its recommendations comment both on the specific provisions of the proposal and on the proposed shift from reliance on the land use permit process to the dual approach including both land use permits for a narrower range of projects, and the requirement of safety plans, audits and inspections, expanded covered processes beyond RMP and Human factors and Root Cause analyses. Chapter 84 6 The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance would repeal Ordinance 96-50, and adopt a new Chapter 84-63 Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Materials. The effects of the changes are basically as follows: I. The ordinance would apply only in the Heavy Industrial, Light Industrial, Controlled Manufacturing districts and in the Planned Unit Development District, where the underlying General Plan Land Use designation is for industrial use. db\ISo.sr S - 5 2. Major maintenance projects would no longer be subject to the requirement of land use permits or, alternately, Public Safety Agreements, 3. The scoring system for determining that a project involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials requires a land use permit would be revised to increase by twenty points the aggregate score at which permits would be required. This change would return the level to that in effect prior to the adoption of ordinance 96-50, as adopted by ordinance 96-20. (i.e., a score of 80 or higher would require a land use permit). It should be noted that unlike ordinance 96-20, the proposal would require a land use permit for projects which stores twice the quantity specified as the threshold planning quantity of hazard category A materials on the Extremely Hazardous Materials list, or 2,0001 pounds, whichever is less, and for projects which add new process units handling category A or B materials, unless credit is available for reductions or projects to be closed in the same facility. In addition, any vessel that has a fill to capacity level of 40,000 tons or more would require a land use permit, unless credit is available for reductions or projects to be closed in the same facility. (Definitions of "Process Unit,' "Intermediate Product" and "Final Product" are added in connection with the foregoing provisions). 4. Unlike ordinance 96-50, but consistent with Ordinance 96-20, the proposal does not include in the scoring the "R" factor, which adds up to five points to the aggregate score on the basis of the incident record of the facility. For ease of reference for comparison purposes, copies of Ordinance 96-20 and Ordinance 96-50 are being included in the Commissioners' packets for the September 8, 1998 meeting. dbUSo.sr S - 6 Analysis Ordinance 96-50 ("Goad Neighbor") contains substantial exemptions for these facilities which have a good safety record. It is conceivable that some facilities could undergo numerous major maintenance projects without being subjected to the land use permitting requirements of Ordinance 96-50. The adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance would "level the playing field" in this respect, since all facilities would be subject to its provisions, without exception. Large new development projects would generally still require land use permits, particularly since any new process unit handling category A or B materials will require a 'land use permit, unless a credit is granted for reduction or an offsetting project is closed in the same facility. (Section 84-63.1002(c)). Staff of the Health Services and Community Development Departments do not support the proposed limitation of the applicability of Chapter 84-63 to the districts listed in section 84-63.602. There is a possibility that projects in other non-residential districts could handle hazardous materials or hazardous wastes, and thus, there is a possibility that a project which should be subject to the use permit requirement would not be. Staff favors the provisions in ordinance 96-50, which made the provisions applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. Otherwise, the proposed ordinance is essentially the same as Ordinance 96-20, with the exceptions noted above increasing permit requirements where new process units are proposed. CE(C!Qmpliance Staff'has determined that the adoption of the proposed ordinance qualifies as a Class 8 Categorical Exemption from CEQA: "CLASS 8 Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the. Environment Class 8 Consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies, as authorized by State (law) or local ordinance, to assure the as\IsO.sr S - 7 maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the environment where the regulatory process involves procedures for protection of the environment. Construction activities and relaxation of standards allowing environmental degradation are not included in this exemption" (CEQA Guidelines Section 15308). The adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance is an action taken by the County as a regulatory agency which is authorized by State Law and local ordinance. The requirement of land use permits and the requirement and review of Safety Plans and procedures for responding to accidental releases of hazardous materials, inspections, audits and other provisions of the ordinance are all procedures to protect the public health and safety and the environment. These procedures are intended to avoid and reduce the potential for hazardous materials to be released into the air, water and ground, where they could have a significant and adverse effect on these resources and to people, both on and off site. No construction will result from the adoption of the ordinance, and no relaxation of standards ;will result in environmental degradation. Although the point score for requiring land use permits is increased, HSL) staff have advised that the addition of the provisions of Chapter 4501-8 will result in a higher level of protection for the onsite employees and the public generally than that available presently through the land use permit provisions of Ordinance 96-50. III. COM f NDA—TIONS Direct Staff to prepare a resolution recommending that the Board of Supervisors adopt the Industrial Safety Ordinance, with the modifications proposed by staff. DMB, db\ISO.sr 8/28/98 db\ISo.sr CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMISSION November 19, 1998 1 Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors 651 Pine Street Martinez,CA 94553 Dear Supervisors: Thane.you for referring the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to the Hazardous Materials Commission for our review. As you are aware,the Commission.has devoted many hours to the drafting and review of industrial safety ordinances over the last several years. We authored an earlier ordinance,Ordinance 96-20,which is incorporated with some amendments into the current proposal. We concur with those amendments,which address gaps that came to light during the hearings on Ordinance 96-50. The Commission has reviewed the full proposal extensively during nine committee and full Commission meetings, and heard staff reports and public comments. Several Commissioners attended the Board meetings on the proposal,as well as the public meetings convened by the Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson, and reported back to the Commission on concerns heard there. Our recommendations follow. 1. The ordinance should be revised throughout to reference the CalARP program regulations, as distinct from the federal regulations. The primary implication of this change is that external events,including seismic events, will have to be included in the Process Hazards Analysis(PHA)when there is a potential to reach a public receptor at the endpoint defined in the CalARP program regulations. 2. Enforcement provisions of the ordinance should be adequate to attain compliance. The Commission recommends that the Board and County Counsel review enforcement tools for the draft ordinance,particularly for Chapter 450-8,Risk Management. 3. Section 450-8.004: PURPOSE AND GOALS. (a)(S)pto o iding for pubhe review of the Sftfety Nwt, =vides fo too the S&&ty Planr v' w th au ult viennti n b _ sev_ °t of accidgMaj Memo- in lsunty. Members: Leslie Stewart,Chair Pare Aguilar Maria Alegria Scott Anderson Henry Clark Paulette Lagana Marl Leeds .Steven Linsley Jim Payne Michael Polkabla ,Timmy Rodgers Mike Shimansky Stuart Shoults Gayle B. tlilkema Executive Assistant: Elinor Blake 20 Allen Street,Martinez, CA 94553 (923) 370?5022 Fax(925)370-5098 Board of Supervisors Page 2 Proposed Industrial.Safety Ordinance November 19, 1998 4. Section 4$0-8.006: AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police powerfor the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials mid aas=pr IWAign of the environ ent 5. Section 450-8.014(a) and Section 450-8.016(b)(ii): The term"Accidental Release," referring to releases to air,is used only in Section 450-8.016(b)(ii). The term"major chemical accident or release"is also used in that Section, and encompasses releases to all media. The use of both terms invites confusion. The definition of"Accidental Release" in Section 450-8.014(x)and subsequent use of the term should be deleted. 6. Section. 450-8.014(g): `Major Chemical Accident or Release' means an incident that results in the release of a Regulated Substance including but not limited lathe air,water olr sail and meets one or more of the following criteria:...[continue as in the proposed draft). ♦ The definition'should be expanded to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident'according to the Community Warning System guidelines,regardless of the chemical released. This change provides CCHS the authority to conduct a root-cause analysis based on the effects of the incident,rather than solely on the chemical released. 7. Section 450.8.016 Human factors: stationary sources shall develop a written human factors program that fQJLQw&9& WAia= v r Do t, The Mg=shalt be d v�within one year following the lata. Tbt-hu=ft=a=gram shalt d;mss: [...ani continue as in proposed draft]. 8. Section 450-8.016(b)(ii): To carry out Recommendation 5 (to delete any reference to "Accidental Release")this Section should be amended as follows: Section 450-8.016(b)(ii)the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for y release that could reasonably have had:the potential to become a Major Chemical Accident or Release; 9. Section 450-8.018: This section should be revised to clarify the activities which will be conducted, and make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations. ♦The appeals process should be limited to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented. In addition,the ordinance should otherwise assure the public's right to appeal the County's decision regarding a Safety flan.. The Commission recommends that issues raised during the public meeting may be the Board of Supervisors Page 3 Proposed industrial Safety Ordinance ?November 19, 1998 basis of an appeal,and is concerned that the legal definition of "public meeting„(as distinct from."public hearing„)may not allow for that. The Board should direct County Counsel to include this issue in his review of the ordinance. 10. In Section 450-8.0018 Review,Audit, and Inspection: (a)the ordinance should provide that the public meetings be held during rather than after the public comment period. In line with the Commission's recommendation C ...and limit the appeals process to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented"), issues raised during those meetings should be among those that could be the basis of an appeal, with whatever procedures(such as recording the meetings)that may be required to secure that right of appeal. To address the issue of meeting time,the Commission recommends the following action by the Board of Supervisors if the Beard adapts the proposed ordinance: That the Board direct Health Services to take into account the community's time needs when scheduling the public meetings. 11. Section 450-8.018 Review,Audit,and Inspection: (b)The Department sht4l may within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release, at the digeretion of the Departmeft conduct a safety inspection to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016. ...[continue as in the proposed draft] 12. SUMMARY and Section 450-8.018: The Summary and Section 450.8.018 should be revised to clarify that CCHS may require changes to bath the Safety Plan and the program. This will alleviate any concerns that CCHS can require modifications only to the written Safety Plan, as distinct from the implemented program. 13. Section 450-8.022 Community Outreach. By recommendation of a Commission member,the Commission was asked to consider replacing the language of this section,which provides funding for the Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson, with language to establish a Health Services Public Outreach and Information Program for the Safety Plansand their public review. The Program would include a community-based non-profit organization as a contractor. The Commission supported ensuring funding for the Ombudsperson. To address the prevision of technical assistance, the Commission recommends the fallowing actions by the Board of Supervisors if the Board adopts the proposed ordinance: .hoard of Supervisors Page 4 Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance November 19, 1998 ♦ That the Board direct Health Services to solicit questions and concerns from the public prior to the public meeting so that staff can better act as a technical resources for the public, and; ♦That the Board set aside$50,000 from the General Fund for a one-year technical assistance grant pilot project to assist in the review of Safety Plans. Contra Costa County is known nationally as a leader in forging local environmental health and safety policies and programs. We hope these comments are helpful to you in your deliberations on this important issue. Sincerely, Leslie Stewart Chair cc; William B. Walker,M.D. Hazardous Materials Commission M CSE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 9:40 AM OEM Wmi E communities f or a Better EnvIr 0 n m a n t November 23, 1998 Contra Costa mrd of Supervisors 651 Pine Street Martinez, CA 94553 RE: independent Analysis on the Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Dear Supervisors: On behalf of our over 3,000 members who live in Contra Costa County, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) would like to submit an independent analysis of the the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance for your review. This review was commissioned by CBE and the Baric Chapter of the Sierra Club to ensure that the Board received the most complete analysis of this critical health and safety issue. Please find enclosed a copy of this analysis by Fred Millar, Ph.d.,of Arlington,'VA, as well as his resume. As you will note Dr. Millar has worked: for labor, government and public interest groups bath nationally and internationally. His experience should compliment the ether consultant reviews you have commissioned by in ustry groups. We look forward to working with you on improving the proposed Ind astrial Safety Ordinance so that communities will be protected and empowered. Our detailed recommendations will be mailed to you individually when the new draft of the ordinance is available for the public to review. Sincerely, Lenny Larson (via fax) N. Cal. Director CBE d8 � d • 9 dgward , # 5rh1 , S . F . . CA 94105 415 - 243 - 9573 • * Msii : chohucketCiao - erg __ __ CBS./NORAN 415-243-8373 11/223/98 9.41 AM 1/4 FRED MIL LAIC Ph.l 449S. 7th ROAD No. 201 ARLINGTON VA =04 TEL 703-99&0996 a- fi: fin1ftr*erob com Experienced public interest and environmental advocate,policy analyst and educator,bared in Washington,D.C., with skills,technical expertise and:national, local and international contact,in a wide range of issues and strategies. Recognized international expert and lobbyist in nuclear waste transportation and chemical accident prevention,consultant to the major U.S. chemical and oil worker unions,networked with industry, government, and citizen groups.' Recent accolmplish nts include: o Developed and focused national and grassroots action strategies on chemical hazard assessment,emergency planning, accident prevention, and public access to information. Researched problems and educated citizens, workers and public officials in shores of petrochemical communities on disaster risk issues and on existing risk documents such as worst- case accident scenarios. Results: many risk reduction activities by companies and governments. o Conceived,initiated and lobbied successfully for new legislation enacting a major new federal regulatory program on prevention ofchemical accidents. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19917 impact an estimated 60-100,000 U.S.chemical and oil facilities and provide an estimated $3 billion of worker safety training and new risk documents for workers, goverment officials and the public. o Coordinated lobbying,organizational and membership development and fundraising for the Nuclear Waste Citizens Coalition, a national network of nonprofit groups focused on the 1996- '98 nuclear waste legislative proposals in Congress. 1"5-97 D.C. Coordinator, Nuclear Waste Citizens Coition,Washington, D.C. Coordinated the work of a coalition of national and regional groups,,.from booth commercial nuclear power plant communities and Nuclear weapons site communities,focused on issues of centralized interim storage of irradiated fuel and cif a proposed reversal of the U.S.Ilan since 1977 on commercial spent fuel reprocessing. Researched and wrote issue papers,talking paints for lobbying, weekly reports too membership. 1994-98 Consultant, nuclear waste and the cal accident prevention policies Clients included Gil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,grating Engineers International Union,Friends ofthe Earth/England and Wales, National Environmental Law Center,Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Indiana Stator Emergency Response Commission.,Women's Action for New Directions,Labor Ministry of Brazil.' CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 RD11/23/98 (D 9:41 AM 2/4 19V-94 Director of the Toxics Project*Friends of the Earth,Washington,D.C. Raspvnsible for resnrch,policy development lobbying and organizing in chemical accident prevention,risk assessment, air toxics emissions, right-to-know issues,hazardous materials transportation and multinational corporate accountability. Utilized the political opportunities es presented by the 1984 Bhopal (India)toxic gas disaster to mobilize and focus citizen and government action in the U.S.and abroad on chemical accident prevention, pollution prevention, and community Right-To-Know. Initiated and coordinated 1.the environmental community's response to the 1986 Right-To-Know lave,the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act. Built a network of activists.,workers, ftte and local officials and media contacts in chemical communities and provided technical and strategy assistance. Founded and initially steered the Working Group on Community Right-To-Know,comprised of national and local environmental groups and labor unions. Meeting regularly io Washington,D.C.to share information and plans,the Working Girroxr<p staff also sues several hundred activists with a monthly newsletter. * Researched and raised concerns locally,nationally and internationally on ftw key disaster- risk chemicals: chlorine,ammonia,and hydrogen Fluoride. One result: the twelve Leas Angeles- area cities enacted local regulations promoting risk reductions in five major flicilifies by 1998. As a policy expert, addressed international conferences on chemical accident prevention. Served ars advisor to the U.S.goverment delegations and addressed conferences with industry and government participants in London,Manchester, Stockholm,Berlin,Boston, Milan,Goa and Ahmedabad{India),and Tokyo. * As a national enviromarital point person,pressured the oil and chemical industry to make good on their promises ofnew openness to the public. Built bridges nationally and internationally between the industry and engineering communities,activist grouM labor unions and public(officials. Addressed scores of state and local meetings,including many in communities of calor. Initiated strategy of national "corporate-specific networks" for tracking the performance of petrochemical companies- Coordinated the environmental and labor coalition that in 1991-94 lobbied OSHA and EPA on their regulations to implement the Glean.Air Act Amendments of 1990. 'Wrote and delivered testimony for Congressional hearings and wrote technical comments on proposed regulations. CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 ( 9.41 AM 3/4 As an OSHA grant-funded consultant to the three major U.S. petrochemical labor unions, trained groups of workers in several cities on chemical accident risks and accident prevention. Lobbied Congress for two major unions for new training funds. Initiated a bi-lateral Right-To-Know strategy between Friends of the Earth/U.S. and NOO groups abroad to ask multinational petrochemical companies for their toxics emissions information which they must make public in the U.S. but not elsewhere. Projects completed in England and Germany,begun in India and Mexico. * International advocacy. gave invited presentations on chemical accident prevention and community fight-t"wow policy and legislation to government and industry officials, universities and citizens groups in Canada, Lithuania,Latvia, Bulgaria,Nicaragua, Mexico, India, Vietnam,'1"hai#and, Germany, and.Australia. 1979- Director of the Nuclear and Hazardous Materials Transportation.Project at the Environrnental Policy Institute, Washington, D.0 Spearheaded the environmental community's efforts,educated the public mid lobbied the government and corporations on issues of nuclear waste and hazardous materials storage and transportation. o Initiated and implemented major strategy approaches for toxics activists:and national and local legislators and periodically implementod national media campaigns. o Created and nurtured a network of local environmental groups and state and local officials who successfully lobbied Congress: --to make public the routes of civilian nuclear waste shipments, and -- to preserve;existing authority for state and local regulations on nuclear and hazardous materials transportation. Worked with Capitol Hill,several regulatory agencies,national trade associations,national media,environmental NGOs,labor unions, petrochemical industry, investor groups,and funders. Testified before several house:and Senate committees. Worked with international agencies,media,international and national NGOs,and consultants,and traveled widely and addressed international symposia on nuclear and to)res issues. L _ _ r CBE/NORAN V 415-243-8373 1 1/23/98 (D 9:41 AM 4/4 Communicated technical and strategy information continually and widely by a variety of means. media work,newsletters,public speaking in several types of fora,comments on rulemakings,mailings to networks of interested parties. Wrote,and disseminated model tribal, state and local laws to regulate nuclear and hazardous materials transportation. Aided the development of tribal and .Mate stakeholder groups to Participate actively in nuclear waste policy issues. 1978-79 Research consultant for the Ohio Public Interest Campaign. Worked tinder federal grant,researched and wrote final evaluation of a four-year project on plant closings in Ohio. 1972-78 Assistant Professor of Socfology,George Mason University, Fairfax,Virginia. Taught political sociology, social problems, sociology of war and peace, social theory. PUBLICATIONS * Researched, wrote and edited "The Community Plume", a foundation-funded publication that Friends of the Earth sent to 4100 Local Emergency Planning Committees in the U.S., 1988-91. * 'Winning the Right-To-Know", in The Environmental Forum, December, 1992 * Op-Ed piece,New York Times Business Section, "Braking the Slide in Chemical Safety", May 1986 * "Regulations on the Routing of Irradiated Fuel," a chapter in 'Me Urban Transport of Irradiated Fuel(Macmillan .Press, 1984) * "Hazardous Materials Transportation", a series of three articles for International Fire Chief magazine, 1981. EDUCATION S.A. in Philosophy from Notre Dame University(1966) M.A.and Ph.D.in Sociology from Case Western Reserve University(1975). __ _ • CBE✓NORAN 415-243-8373 ma11/23/98 ( ) 9:41 AM 1116 R ort to the Beard of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d'.,Policy Aitalyst REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CONTRA COSTA. COUNTY EFFORTS TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL RELEASES A REPORT TO THE CON'T'RA COSTA C OUN"1 Y BOARD OFSUPERVISORS RVISSORS Fred Millar, Ph.D. * November 19, 1995 Executive Summary: We outline herein the current system of federal and state regulation to prevent accidental releases,pointing out strengths and weaknesses. lased on this analysis, we suggest amendments to improve the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in Contra Crista County (CCCo), which would apply to the unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County. Our recommendations include neve and improved provisions for the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: *A broad authority for local regulation for tisk reduction,similar to U.S.EPA's under the: Clean Air Act. *Clarify County Health Department and County Supervisors' authority and discretion to ensure safe operations and accident prevention improvements at facilities.. *More scope for meaningful public participation in regulatory proceedings •A grogram to facilitate meaningful public understanding and participation through technical assistance grants. #More adequate definitions of some terms; adequacy, audit, accidental release,major accidental release,enviro nntental receptor,and public receptor. *An annual report on progress on rneasureable risk reduction. *A local`General Duty' clause to ensure overall safe operations at facilities,similar to the federal Clean Air Act. *Prompt release of some facility documents to inform the local discussion on risk reduction.: including Worst Case Scenarios, Process Hazard. *Analyses of Year 2000 safety assessmermts and exercise of Year 2000 contingency plans #A more comprehensive scope of information provided for the public in a Public Information Bank and a timetable to accomplish this. I. Introduction; Any now local chemical safety ordinance in Contra Costa County(CCCo)will be Layered on top of the existing Federal and State laws which deal with chemical accident prevention, and h new local tarn is likely in part to share their strengths and weaknesses, and will have a chance in part to remedy the latter andflor to exacerbate thein. So we mint first consider the way's in which the Federal and State laws axe inadequate,as well as the ways in which a local ordinance can improve upon them.. II. Local Regulation: CCCo has had historically one of the€ctrongeatt.AA i ple entations of California s RMPP, administered by the Health Services Department(HSDX This is no doubt in part a response to a4 series of significant accidental releases. From 1989 through 1997, some 62 major releases left 4 workers dead and 141 injured. Fully 31,050 members of the public have been injured, hospitalized or sickened.� ' [Source: "Rising Risks to Refinery Com murd ice,by CSE,stordine Environmental Alliance,and the CenWel Labor Ccanil of Contra Cosec County,.fume 19971 {PAGE I CBE/NORAN 415.243-8373 In11/23/98 (D9.'41 AM [ 2/16 Re rt to the mrd of Supervisors Fred Millar,,Ph.d,Pulit Anal t 1. CCCo provided a sung basic public participation process in its MPP. The county staff was rightly proud of it as"the most extensive in the country" <see their 5112195 "Comments to EPA".The county progrant included using the public library for documents, solicitation of public comments,and the scheduling of public meetings. CCCo HSD staff recommended(5112/95)that U-S. EPS include a similar' strong public participation process in the federal RMS'<but EPA declined. Although the County s program was commendable, meaningful public participation must include more than making documents available, and also include providing a real opportunity to modify facility plans to improve safety and an appeal to trap elected officials. 2. CCCo has also, to its credit, been somewhat Leen can promoting facility use of Inherent Safety(IS). CCCo staff s 5112195"Comments to U.S. EPA", for example, gave examples where CCCo facilities have switched to safer chemicals. And HSD staff recommended that U.S. EPA.. in its RMP regulations adopt an "IS checklist"for ensuring a consistent and focusedalaproach by facilities and.administeringagencies,('but not what t ey described as the more costly Technology Options Analysis requirement that national environmentalists and labor unions had recommended in vain that EPA include in the RMP regulations). See also Appendix C-1 in the June 1998 CCCo"OdARP Guidance"which provides a list of sources on IS practices that facilities might utilize. But without some kirad of systematic HSD annual report based on goalss and measures of risk reduction, the public has only a vague idea of how effective the loczl regulatory program has been in encouraging more use of IS practices. 3 The C.osinty reportapoly interpreted the,R11 P prngwmm to he ew- wntially ce►tca rolueable WIM11 it catfac to lcq uttiius,safety imprvvullteuts at the facilities. Instead,the County relied on its ability to"jawbone", i.e., to convince companies to make improvements voluntarily. Although tibia Aiel msult in a numbs r o f sat*y inkprr ven-ir wts, ctrtalu f'&&Hit.it a resisted and accidents throughout the county increased. Without clear enforceability provisions, a new ordinance would suffer from the sari flaw. 4. The recent,and in most aspects excellent, "Contra Costa.County CalARP Program Guidance Document",dune 1998, also demonstrates how the local program can carry along flaws stemming from the base layers of federal and state regulation., Just one example. the lack of a firm;federal reggulatory floor regarding public access to all of the new risk inf6mution(which the federal CAA Section 112(r)lav explicitly calls for)can lead to a similar problem on the lead level,even when there seems to be an awareness by the local regulators that providing public access to more information might be appropriate and useful; " CCCH SD believe that an informed public is a key contributor to chemical emergency prevention, preparedness and response and the best way to inform the public is to provide an RMP that will help there focus on information directly or immediately useful to local level prevention, preparedness, and response. You [covered facilities]are not required to provide the public with access to Cather documentation developed under {PAGE } I -....-....I.....I.. -,.,.,....,."..,.....,..,..'..'....,....'........,.,. X...............- ............... CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 Q0 11/23/98 9:41 AM 3/16 Port W the Board Of Su rads Fred Millar,,Ph.d,PoliAna!nt this rule. if the public requests access to the other documentation, you must decide whether and how to provide iL We suggest that you work with the public to find a way to meet reasonable community needs.' (p. 9-36) We suggest that it is the County Board s(and IISD a)job to determine how and how much of such information to provide for"an informed public". The CCCo CaIARP Guidance Document nukes explicit that although the Wesal RN4P to be submitted to U.S.EPA shall be in electronic farm,the RMP for COCo s CalARP program will be submitted as a paper copy(p. 1-4). A major failing in current law at all levels is that it provides aInv,.*t no,way for the public not public officials to employ Measurable 90418 in risk reduction not measures of progress in achieving those goals. A new local ordinance should require a package of some beginning facility and public sector efforts to set risk reduction goals and efforts to use rough measures of risk reduction. Some of the latter could include: a. Worst Case Scenario blast zones, radiation zones,and downwind cloud distances: accident"footprints'already required in law,and which provide rough but useful measures of risk to surrounding neighborhoods. b. "Near Zone"calculations. The same gas dispersion models used to produce downwind distances can also produce cloud speed calculations and infiltration estimates., how fast clouds could arrive at and infiltrate various downwittd receptors such as residences, hospitals, or schools. Whencombined with estimates of how many minutes it might take to begin and carry out any kind of public protection activities such as evacuation and shelter-in-place",such cloud speed calculations allow the identification of some calculable "Rear zone*(a term rust used in the Oeveland Local Emergency FUnning Committee) to identify the neighborhoods nearest chemical facilities where neither evacuation nor sheltering in place can be effective in the plant s own Worst CAse Scenario. c. The facilities own catastrophic insurance documents,although premiums are largely market-driven, might provide some rough measure of risk reduction. d. Mom complex but important measures of risk reduction,especially those which can get at the reduced probability of accidents through better management systems, etc.,can be seen interspersed in the various technical documents which include discussions of'planned changes to improve safety",or lists of the "action items"to prevent accidents that are included in P44Aa and recommendations from incident investigations,etc. For these to be meaningfully assessed, the public sector chemical engineers should do a professional assessment in an annual summary report by facility. An annual aurnmary rwort on occident A4 raduction by HST)would ovide an annual scorecard,albeit with only rough measures. As with the PAGE CBE/N©RAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 0 9:41 AM [°l 4/16 Re rt to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.,Pol!g Analyst annual federal Tonics Release Inventory,such an annual scorecard could be a powerful incentive for pushing risks downward. .III. Conclusions and. Recommendations for amending the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to promote a more effective program of accident prevention. A. Analysis and critique of the proposed "Industrial Safety" ordinance (ISO): Given the inadequacies of federal law,state law and current local ordinances,and continued local accidental releases, a new local ordinance a is needed to strengthen chemical accident prevention efforts. Neither federal oar state law preempts more stringent local.laws. The proposed.Industrial Safety Ordinance(ISO) provides a very useful framework and a substantial stride forward in improving local regulation on accident prevention. TSC)provides a useful extension of local regulatory oversight to some of the most dangerous facilities,but it also needs to be supplemented by some additional provisions. It is not explicit in ISO, although it seems implicit,that it is intended to be the county s program for implementing CaIARP and that the CalARI'fee structure will fund the program. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance(TSC)),as a modification of existing law, seems essentially designed : 1. To allow most major facility maintenance projects to proceed without a land-use permit as is currently required. 2_ To impose some specific additional local safety requirements on the most dangerous facilities(called 'Stationary Sources"and defined as only those with Program Level 3 units and in the tail or Chemical Xtanufacharing sectors), including requirements on some processes in those Stationary Source:facilities which processes are not covered by current federal and Cal ARP laws. On its face, the proposed ISO does not attempt to remedy some of the key flaws in the federal `€t2(r)program,and it would not substantially affect the County s implementation of CaIARP except in a narrow range of Stationary Sources. For example, ISO would not provide overall more meaningful public participation, hearings,the ability of elected officials to require safety improvements, or the right of citizens to appeal to board of supervisors as an integral part and within the general framework of the CalARP processes. The new Safety Plan regia is to be applied to a narrower universe of facilities than CalARP presumably covers,and some local facilities which pose substantial risks and which could benefit from increased public oversight may fall through the cracks. A key recommendation here,therefore, is that ISO should seek to remedy some of the serious base-line deficiencies in the federal and state program as they apply in CCCo, as well as specifying key additional {PAGE } .................................................................... ...................................... CBE/NORAN 41 S-243-8373 ma 11/23/98 9:41 AM D5/16 l�ext,to the Board of Supervisors Fred MiHar,Phd., Fohcy Axial t features for adequate local oversight needs. Some of the main features of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: A. Under ISO, a Stationary Source must submit a Safety Plan with 12 "safety elemeam"and comply with new requirements: i. Human Factors ii. Root Cause analysis iii. Process Hazard Analyses if not already covered in Federal Program Level 3 iv. Accident History< must cover since 1992, so longer than the federally-required 5 year accident history. B. In all PHAs submitted to the local AA, Stationary Sources must: i. Conoider uou of Inhoront%afar 9yotuaw(199)undor oorao conditions. ISS must also be considered in the design and review of new facilities and proce&9es. ii. Complete action items within a specified time frame. C. HSD will review the Safety Plan, allow public comment, and schedule a public meting. D. After an accident, HSD shall inspect and audit the facility, and may require modification of the Safety Plan. E. ISO makes an assertion of attorney-client privilege(which should already be available in current law). F. An Ombudspersou position is created for public outreach, specifically for"complaint prevention". (Since this program is already available,it should be clarified whether its inclusion here is meant to limit its scope to aspects of this ordinance only.) G. A Public Information Bank shall include "ready access"to "Public documents". There is no specification as to how soon this facility shall be available. Specific Amendments that are needed (by Section) in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: CHATTER 450-8 RISK MANAGEMENT 430-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS This section should specify'Prevent and reduce the number, frequency, and severity of accidental releases in the County;" And"Provide a local General Duty clause" And 'Provide for a broad authority for the HSD in prevention of accidental releases." PAGE CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 0 9:41 ,AM 6/16 EE- t to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Md., Policy Analyst t And "Provide for increased public access to,and input into the review of,risk manaegen3ent plans and ether accident prevention documents under federal,state and focal regulations, and provide for public review cif the inspection and audit resultsg" .And "Ensure a permanent reale for a well-informed public,with access to documents and to technical assistance grants from the Health Service Department, in:review of technical documents, participation in comment periods and hearings." And "Provide for early release of risk documents necessary for an informed public discussion of accident prevention." And"Address potential public safety rids of accidental raters from covered facilities arising from failures of computer programs or chips due to Year 2000 failures." 450-8.008 ADMINSTRATION. Substitute for"The County Health.Officer is charged": "The Department is charged". 450-8,012 INSPECTION, Add in this section: "Inspection shall not be merely for purposes of determining completeness of documentation ,but also for determining the adequacy of the source's equipment and risk management programs to prevent accidental mleases and to reduce the severity of thea tltt occur." 430-8.014 DEFINITIONS. "Accidental Release" -- should include releases into"ambient air, waiter, or sail.". "Adequacy of safety programs'shall mean the ability of these measures to prevent and reduce the probability and consequences of accidental releases of regulated substances which have the potential to cause significant harm to workers,the public or the envirouxr3 r t.. This judgr nt shall be made by HST?staff using a combination of industry cosies, accepted standards. "Adequacy of safety programs"shall mean the ability of theses measures to prevent and reduce the probability.and consequences of accidental releases of regulated substances which have the potential to caws significant harm to workers,the public or the envtrorarient. This judgment shall be made by HSD staff using a combination of industry codes, accepted standard industry practices, and inherent safety options. ".Audit"includes "a review of the relevant docurmnta iost,and process safety information,inspection of the physical facilities, an interviews with aft levels of plant personnel [Comnwnt: this mut of {PAGE } .. CBE/KORAN 41 S-243-8373 In11/23/98 (D 9:41 Aho 7/16 !!port to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d,Policy Analpt the definition is taken verbatim from CCCo CalARP Guidance Document, June 1998, p. 7-22.1 in order to identify safety issues that need to be addressed to prevent and reduce the consequences of accidental releases." (g)"M*r chemical accident or release' : Amend(2)to read: "results in admission of one or more persons to a hospital." And include as(6) "any release in which the Health Officer or stationary source determines that there was an imminent and substantial threat to safety, public health, Property, or the environment_" "Environmental Receptor"shall include, in addition to categories covered in the Federal and CatARP(Section 2750.6)definitions,actual environmental media such as ambient air, land and water resources including groundwater, wetlands, ocean and rivers. "Public receptor" should be defined as in 40 CFR Part 68.3. "Review by the Department"of facility plans, programs and processes shall include review of facility compliance in terms of completeness of documents and adequacy of onsite programs. Add as new Section 450-8,015 GENERAL DUTY AND AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL RELEASES. (a) General duty. "The owners or operators of facilities covered under the CaIARP program or this rule have a General Duty to prevent accidental releases of hazardous substances." (Chis wvould provide a new local General Duty Clause(the facility has a general duty to prevent accidental releases,even in the absence of specific regulations on the cause of the accident): as already exists in the federal OSHA and the federal CAA Section 112(r)law, and which allows the regulating agency to enforce(usually after accidents or inspections),cite and issue fines. This enforcement action is usually followed by settlements in which the facility agrees to nuke safety changes not strictly required by,or even explicitly covered in,current regulations. Enforcement of the federal CAA General Duty Clause is currently reserved by U.S. EPA.< i.e., not delegated to states or locals <as if U.S. EPA had any significant resources to enforce it.) (b) Authority to Regulate. [a broad, explicit mandate for HSD to regulate in any way necessary to prevent chemical accidents,similar to the CAA s broad grant of authority to U.S. EPA in Section 112(r ){7){A):] "In order to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances,the Health Officer is authorized to promulgate releaseprevention, detection,and correction requirements which may include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting,training, vapor recovery, secondary containment,and other design,equipment, work practice and other operational requirements.. The Health Officer may require compliance as expeditiously as possible". 4.50-5.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. Within(b)Human Factors Program, add as new(5). "Within one year {PAGE, } ............................................... ................................... CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 am 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 8/16 Re rt to the Board of Sufn"isors Fred Millar,Phd-,Policy Analyst the Madonmy 'Source shall illipleflient trailling for its ellipkiyom ill the human fitc(ors,program and ensure that their contractors comply with it." Add as new(f) Pre Startup Safety Review: "For all projects that constitute a-change-in risk project7' or a"development project" as defamed in the CCCo Code, a scheduled shutdown maintenance turnaround project,or that trigger both institution of the management of change procedures and change in operations procedures: (1) The stationary source shall perform a pre-project safety review which demonstrates that,with respect to the project,the source has complied with all"rnanagement of change"provisions incorporated in the source s RMP pursuant to 40 CFR Section 68.75 or its counterpart in CAIARP; the RMF'process safety information(40 CFR 68.65)has been amended and updated;and the project otherwise complies with all applicable requirements of federal and state JUMP laws and regulations and the,approved RMP. (2) This safety review shall be submitted to the Officer for examination prior to project eomnlenoenwnt,and the Officer shall review and approve the safety review upon determining that the project will be undertaken in compliance with all applicable regulations of state and federal RMP laws and this Ordinance. Add as new: (g) Facility release of Worst Case Scenario maps and related documentation. Within 90 days of the effective date of this ordinance, each Stationary Sources shaft provide to the Health Officer and make available to the public : (1) accident scenarios as calculated for the federal RMP, with the addition of related documentation and maps. Such documentation shall include the Source s calculations of arrival times of WCS toxic clouds at various public receptors nearby,the typical infiltration times for buildings within the danger zones,the time needed for effective evacuation and other public protection measures, as well as eventual maximum cloud(or radiation or blast zone)distances. [Comment The idea is to get at the determination of the possible "near zones'(as done by Cleveland LEPQ,where neither evacuation nor sheltering in place could work. The federal law intended the facility RMP information,including the WC8,to be available as an underpinning of future community legislative discussions,] (2) Process Hazard Analyses with summaries by process of serious accident risk problems identified, *action items*recommended by the PHA teams, and subsequent facility resolution/implementation of these action items. (3) By 90 days after the effective date of this ordinance, the Stationary Source shall provide the first of semi-monthly periodic facility reports,on safety-related Year 2000 problems and on facility progress in remediating where necessary facility systems that are (PAGE ........................................ Cl3EIN ltAh! 415-243-83711/23/98 x:41 AM �9/16 R to the Board of Superyisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.,Pali Ana!rt safety-critical and vulnerable to Year 2000 failures. (4) By March 1, 1999,the Stationary Source somal submit a facility Year 2000 contingency plan tuldng into account the possible loss of outside utilities such as water, power and wastewater treatment, and outlining plans for potential fail-safe shutdown and safe startup, and by June 1, 1999 shall Lest that plan in coordination with the HSI] and the Fire Department. 450-8.018 REVIEW, AUDrr AND JINSPECTION. Clarify the authority of tate HSD,the Officier and the Beard of Supervisors to add safety improvements to the facility's plan and the mechanism by which it would be enforced if the facility is unwilling. Public comments on the Safety Plan should be taken for a period of 45 days. Hearings shall be held in communities where the facility is located on evenings and weekends. A firm schedule should be provided for the HSD s review of the initial Safety Plans . HSD should conduct a compliance audit every year (not 3 to S years). HSD shall conduct interim safety inspections, to protect public and worker health and safety, until the Safety Plana are due one year after the effective date of this chapter. Aced: "In addition to the RMP progress and compliance audits, tate Officer shall conduct a public safety and health inspection at every stationary source approximately every three years(or intone frequently if so required by tate California health and Safety Code article 2(Sections 25531 et sect.)of chapter 6.95, as amended from time to time)to assess compliance with the provisions of the RMP and to determine that necessary measures are being taken to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances and to reduce the severity of those releases that may occur." Add. Interim Inspections. Prior to approval of a stationary sources RMP by the County,the Officer shall conduct up to two on-site inspections to review implementation of those action items previously selected by the source s process hazard analysis team for implementation from prior process hazards analyses or hazard and operability studies. Based on the results of that inspection,the Officer may require the facility to implement those action items prior to approval of the RMP. "HSD a review of source's safety programs shall include a determination that, in regard to all critical safety systemic,a source s actions in: - "addressing the fundings" of facility s PHAs(p.39) "addressing"incident investigation recommendations(p. 36) making an "appropriate response" to Compliance Audits(p.45) {PAGE } _.. ...... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ........ . ....... ............... ....._... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ..............._... _._ ......... ..._..... ......... ......... CBE/NC?RAN 415-243-8373 RD11/23/98 9:41 AMf ["� 14/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred h illar,Ph.d.,Poli Analyst result in facility safety equipment and programs which arc adequate to prevent accidental releases," HSD may require changes in both the Safety Plan and:the safety programs and equipment of the Source. Adel: "In the Department s review of facilities covered under CalARP, there shall he a 45-day comment period and a public hearing shall be scheduled after the Department completes its dmf'/ evaluation review of the facility's RMP but before it completes its final review, recommendations and approval of the RMP." In section(c )eliminate the words: "with respect to the equipment involved in the incident" [The inspection should consider management system and safety programs, as well as equipment] 45".022 COMMUNITY OUTREACH [Comment: the goal of retia ngful public participation includes the right to have technical assistance in order to understand and assess the sometimes-complex documentation submitted by Stationary Sources. The standard of achievement here: are typical workers, residents and citizens able to act in protecting public health and safety?] Substitute: "In order to encourage meaningful public review of Source documents and government reviews,the HSD shall develop a Public Outreach and Information Program,including the utilization of one or more non-profit community-based organizations as a public outreach contractor. The Program shall make affected members of the community aware of the opportunities for public review of Safety Plans and other related documents and shall provide members of the public with technical assistance in such review. A non-profit-community-based organization may contract for expert and technical assistance. The Public Outreach and Information Program shall be approved by the Beard of Supervisors. Commencing on January 1, 1999,the HSD shall annually place in its proposed budget a request for the sum of at least$50,000 for the Program:. HSD shall establish procedures to review the activities of any public outreach contractor and to monitor the program." Add: "HSD shall transmit Offsite Consequence Analysis information and maps for all covered facilities to the CCCo Zoning Commission and to the School Board,for potential use in land-use planning and specifically in siting decisions for schools, hospitals and other sensitive facilities, as well as for new siting or majorexpansion of potentially hazardous facilities close to such public receptors." 4513-8.024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BALK. A starting date for this facility should be specified. The Public InffamuWon Bank should include facility documents generated under the federal RMP and'C:alARP,except for the most voluminous. These held as a public repository at the Public Information Bank shall (PAGE } .... ..... ..... CBE/NORAN 41 S-243-8373 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 11/16 Fv!pp#to the Beard of Su isosrs Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy Anal st include, at a minimum: Unda the federal l~MR Safbty Information PFIAs Offsite Consequence Analyses documentation(ef. CaIARP Section 2750.R): i.e.,not just the maps but the assumptions and calculations Compliance Audits Incident Investigation reports Under 'AIA RP: Evaluation review documents and Inspection records AA completeness reviews AA evaluation reviews AA inspection documents<for compliance with all levels of reqs: federal,state and local AA annual performance self-audits 45C1-f3.028 PENALTIES. Should be re-titted "ENFORCEMENT ANIS PENALTIES" Add: "and shall be punishable as a criminal misdemeanor." IV. Background: The Federal and State Lags that any County Ordinance will build on; their strengths and weaknesses. A. The federal level: In the 1990 Federal Clean Air Act(CAA) Amendments,Sections 112(r)on "Prevention of Accidental Releases"and Section 304 on"Chemical Process Safety Management" were explicitly designed by Congers to "deputize"the chemical workfozce(under OSHA regulations)and the public and state/local agencies(under EPA regulations), with significant amounts of new risk information< 13 new risk documents tonal for workers, and a similar number for the public. The aim is to promote a vigorous public debate among workers(anal their union representatives), the public(and their goveraranental representatives), and the facilities posing the risks,and thereby to establish a new forms and a higher level of public oversight and pressure on facilities for accident.risk reduction and accident Prevention. The new CAA provision making worst case scenarios public, for example, is designed to inform the public debate as to what is at stake, as well as to allow stakeholders in a rough way to prioritize community risks and to measure progress in reducing there. The law intends to create a swell-informed set of stakeholders who are presumably able to use the information for optimal community risk reduction; the law also provides for a data set that can be used nationally as well as locally for comparison of facility risks and risk reduction efforts. Thus the federal law, while not specifying the farm of local commun4 debate and action to reduce risks,explicitly encouraged that and fueled it with a. powerful set of new information available to the workers and the public. Congress neither discussed nor placed any economic limitations on the use of the new risk data. In the CAA,Congress enacted a►safety law which provided a minimal federal floor of safety information and {PAGE } __ CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 9:41 QM r) 12/16 Re to the Board of Su isors Fred Millan,Ph.d,Poli An t practices and which explicitly would not preempt more stringent state and local laws and regulations. Congress provided a potentially powerful but sketchy framework for federal enforcement and future regulatory develo nt,without specifically funding the enforcement part and without er specifying the direction of future regulations. Congress left any balancing of economic and safety factors to the workings of democratic debate at local and states levels. Although a promising and usefully detailed law,CAA 112(r)has been significantly weakened by U.S. EPA s(much-delayed) 1996 promulgation cif the mandated federal Risk Management Plan(RMP)regulations(40 CFR Part ). The most significant weaknesses in the existing California state(€"atARP)and proposed local laws stem from the federal regulations having set far too low a federal floor,in particular for public access to infnrma.tion and for public involvement. It is useful to describe these weaknesses in order to appreciate in which ways local laws might remedy them. (This discussion well focus mainly on the Risk Management Plan program(FPS."s regulatirsm3),but will alp take into account the simultaneous impacts of the federal Process Safety Management programa(OSHA,'s). A brief outtine of the inadequacies of the 1996 federal RMP regulations, many of which were:carried forward into the subsequent CaIARP regulations, includes the following, a. EPA's regulatory re-definition of Congress s terra"Risk Management Plan"<as a summary only of the voluminous documentation required under the;Act. EPA.calls the remaining substantive material the "Risk Management program*which must be implemented by the facility. EPA's re-de,fin tion is probably illegal,and almost certainly well be subject to legal challenge in mid-1999. This summary"RMP"created by EPA is a barely adequate set of information for electronic submission to the new federal database, but wholly inadequate for underpinning the;vigorous and well-informed rale Congress envisioned for the public and workers. b. The main impact of the EPA."creative re-definition'"of Risk Management Plan is severely limited availability of documents to the public.only the summary "RMP". Important underlying documents are to be left on site, for state and focal agency use only and if needed, c. Vagueness regarding standards for judging adequacy: e.g., of safety-related equipment, Process Hazard Analyses, audits,inspections, etc. d. Vagueness regarding adequacy of facility responses to such analyses as audits and incident investigations,and to recommendations from various analyses. e. No Technology Options Analysis. f. Into substantial provisions for public participation or oversight. {PAGE } _ _ CBE/NORAN 416-243-8373 11/23/38 9:41 Ate 13/16 Re rt to the Board. of Supe7isors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Poli Ana!)2t g, No provisions for public officials participation/oversight. h. No tie-in to the normal protections of the overarching National Environmental Policy Act: since no federal approvals are involved to trigger NEPA,only federal enforcement. i. No technical assistance for the workforce or the public in order to facilitate their oversight rales. j. Lack of a federal regulatory floor for the Congressionally-mandated EPA system for periodic "audit" of RMPs. Under the 1996 federal RMP regulations it is not clear if implementing agencies must do a certain number of inspections or only paperwork reviews. k. No right to file a"citizen snit" tinder 112(r). in other pains of the CAA,citizens have this right in case enforcement by government falters. 1. No substantial role specified for workers, beyond the mandated worker participation in the creation of facility THAs(under 1992 federal OSHA.regs). The PHA documents must be matte available to workers on the site. m. An inadequate definition of"environmental receptor"as only referring to designated wildlife areas, parks, etc., versus actual environmental resources such as the ocean,. rivers,and groundwater. (See the similar formulation in Section 2750.6 of CalARP), B. The state level. Vince at least the early 1984 s Californians have progressively increased public sector oversight of what has too often been shown as an accident-prone state petrochemical industry. The California state accident prevention law, with its implementing regulations called CalARP, includes the federal RMI'program,and takes delegation of the federal RMP program. CalARP adds some useful provisions of its own: lower Threshold Planning quantities(TP(?s)for some chemicals and a larger list of covered chemicals,for two examples. CalARP has superseded the earlier statewide Risk Management and Prevention Program(RMPP)which operated for some years,but CalARP has retained its basic structure of implementation by local Administering Agencies(AAs). RMPP had been implemented unevenly, to varying degrees by various local AAs, fence in part the need for new public sector oversight by the state and by responsible localities. (As an aside, of course California has consistently paid more attention than other states to seismic possibilities as one external factor that could trigger accidental releases.. Out of the auras in which many AA&failed to perform was the provision of public participation in the RMPP process and in oversight of the facilities. The new CalARP tracks closely the federal.RMF'programs,and shares its key flaws, but it usefully adds more public sector review of facility RMPs and a fee system to fund the public sector regulatory program. € PACE } ................... ........................................... . CMMORAN, 415-?43-8373 %a 1 i/23/98 (D9:41 AM 14/16 Re ort to the Board of Sixperyisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.X Poh�cy Analyst U.S. EPA.s responsibility to "audit" the RMN will be delegated,through CalARP regulations,to Califumia s implementing agencies. This arrangement promises to be much more suitable than leaving such a key responsibility, as would otherwise occur, with U.S. EPA s regional office,and with no targeted federal resources to fund implementation or enforcement. Some features of CalARP that are most relevant here: [Regular page numbers here are from the"Proposed Regulations" dated 4/21/98,( a quick review of the later versions,dated 5/10/98, and 3/3{98 suggests they are not significantly different. We were advised by state and CCCo officials to ignore the"Emergency Regulations" promulgated 7/7198. Hyphenated page numbers are from "CCCo CalARP Guidance Document",June 1998] The AA can bump up a facility which under the federal RMP would classify as(less risky)Program.level 1 or 2 to(more risky)Program Level 3, and consequently require a full RMP at the local level(p.7). "P.MP"is defined narrowly,as having the 7 Component Elements outlined in Article 3. So it is similar to the federal deflmition of "RMP",as summary data only,plus a registration. This is the "RMP"to be mAde available to the public under both federal and CalARP regulations. • Most of the information in CalARP s"RMP" summary document(see p. 15)consists of sum n aries of policies and programs, Categories of[card data that it will include: ----substances handled ----chemical-specific prevention steps(perhaps only examples) ---- five-year accident history "planned changes to improve safety"(sec,=o Guidance, p. 9-43 for the county s recommendations(only)on what to include here) CalARP requires all facilities(p.7-26)to"consult" with(see p, 9-37 for definition of"consult", taken from CALOSHA) employees regarding PHAs and ether elements of the facility s Press Safety Management program,and to inform employees about the findings and recommendations from incident investigations. • The AA must coordinate with the facility (Section 2735.5(ai))to determine how much and what:hind of detail in "documentation" is required for an RMF to be considered adequate, f1t is not clear if this also refers to what information must be maintained on-site.] • In calculating the Worst Case Scenarios,the facility may take credit for the facility s measures for passive mitigation(e.g., dikes), but not for administrative controls(as to the federal RMP regulations). (p. 27) [The latter means the facility promises to implement management measures, e.g., not to fill a storage tank beyond 113 of its.capacity.] {PAGE } ... CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 9:41 AM ( 15/°16 to the Bmrd of 5u isors Fred Millar,Ph.d,Poli Anal t * Trade secrecy is according to currant state law. We present here a brief outline of the main stages and amici problems of the new CalARP process(pp, 14-15) (the care of which the proposed industrial Safety Ordinance doers rot substantially modify, but adds onto in some aspectO [Page numbers here are from the pm►posed CalARP regulations,dated 4121198.] In the next section of this report we will recommend some legislative changes to remedy the defects of bath the federal and the CaIA.R.P programs. 1. The AA conducts a completeness review of the facility s RMP under Cal ARP. (The facility also submits a copy of its federal RXIP to the AA.) 2. Formal public review of the lX4P consists of a 45-day public comment period. No provision for public hearing. 3. The AA dc's an evaluation review of the MP (within 24 months for Program 3 facility). [CoJAI2P does not limit AA activity to Program 3 facilities only] No provision for public comment or bearing. 4. The AA shall do inspections for regulatory development and for eaforc meat of the federal CAA (p.66). "Inspection" is not defined, nor is the frequency of inspection& No public access is provided for inspection records. (p. 68) 5. The AA shall inspect all sources every 3 years for compliance with all provisions of the CaIARP regulations. "Inspection" is not defined. No public access is provided for inspection records. 6. The AA shall periodically "audit"facility RMN for adequacy and for compliance[ with.Article 3 only.](p.,66) [Apparently not with other doc carne ntationl �mmx Public access to the audit process documents is provided-(p.67) "Audit",an absolutely key enforcerrient operation,is not defined, so it is not clear whether"audit" involves an inspection. 7. On site documentation: The facility operator(P:30)maintains COCA documentation(27501 8) oti-.xrte, with no provision tor-puto#ic access. Also the operator maintains safety information on-trite(p.31). Otherdocuments(pp, 14,38 and 68)to be maintained on-site include, equipment documentation PIA.s t rssvr*1i�nnn A tv,44P .... CBE/NORAN7ff 415-243-8373 M911/23/98 0 10:34 AM 1#1 Re ort to the Board of Supervisors fired Millar,Ph.d-,-Policy Analyst Incident Investigations S. Public access is to the RMP only(p. 13), not to onsite documents (p.30). But workers seem to have access to all documents produced under CalARP (p..46) 9. A persistent problem is CalARP s vagueness regarding the adequacy of the required facility actions to: "address findings" of facility s PHAs(p 39) "address"incident investigation recommendations(p.36) make an "appropriate response"to Compliance Audits(p.45) 10. The State Office of Emergency Services(OES)can oversee the adequacy of local AA program(p. 71). The AA does annual self-audits of its Performance. The State OES can take control if any local AA progr'ttrrm proves inadequate,either administratively or in reducing risk under CalARP. Office of the County Counsel Contra Costa County 651 Pine Street, 9th Floor Phone:(925)335-1800 Martinez, CA 94853 Fax: (925)646-1078 Date: December 1, 1998 ' + To: Board of Supervisors +► ; o� c OFsuP�tN�S From: Victor J. Westman, County Counse o rA cosra co. Re: TAB 7 --Consolidated Redline Draft Ordinance On Industrial Safety On November 26, 1998, after reading the draft ordinance contained in TAB 7 of the binder provided to you for your December,1 meeting and assuming that you will have first reading of the draft ordinance on December 11 and fix December 81 for adoption of it, we suggest at least the one revision and one addition to the draft ordinance indicated below. For this reason, we would ask that you buy a 3{4 vote waive the restrictions of Ordinance Code section 25-2.206 and allow your consideration of the below stated recommendations since County offices were closed on November 27, 1998 and it was not possible to provide these comments to you at that time. Our two suggestions follow: 1. In subsection (b) of section 450-8.014 (page 4) revise the definition of "Department" to read: (b) "Department" means the Contra Costa County Health Services Director and any Director authorized deputies. 2. Add new Section 450-8.030 to read: 450-8.030 Notwithstanding any other provision of this code and for the purposes of this chapter wherever it provides that the Department shall act, such direction in all instances shall be deemed and is directory, discretionary and permissive and not mandatory. (Ord. 98--, §2.) - VJW:df cc: Phil Batchelor, County Administrator H ADFOTi1MEM081VJW\TAB7.WPD ...:... w> ]PEES ` GENERAL LIABE LM PROVISIONS §820.2 Tale i Div. 3.6 can for f. Superintendent of streets of a city was liable i9. Evldenee Ii for In action against officers of irrigation district and the tri a sewer, notwithstanding offi- for damages for death of plainWh' minor is -.S tialButler v. Ashworth (1894) 102 daughter alleged to have been caused by dan- t, 12.9 Pad Cal 3P. 922. . gerout condition of structure areas canal, evi- 17. utilities dente was insufficlent to prove notice by oM- owned by Action city for fire Wherein it cis of the dangerous condition as required by Of employe" le acting in StatLI919, p. 7.56, as basis of recovery. os- was ell that em �t cleat their em doted water valve borne v. Imperial, hT. Dist (App. 1935)8 Gal. u i an left it closed without n ing either city ApP.2d 622,47 P.2d 798. ( Lend fire department or 01aintiff to that water was Evidence. 1n action for damages against di- not available at to extinguish fines in rectors of irrigation district for alleged negh- ioar their vicinity of p o premises was barred by grace and misconduct in frsCwling,refusing. and re years. $goovv immunity. Heie&and Moran v. neglecting to supply � �' - !)54 Cil. C of Modesto (1966) 49 CaLRptr. 377, 64 ter, sustained finding that damage accruing to C&L2d 229,411 P.2d 105, pla�in#ffs rice crop was not caused by any will- ssot int% fu1 violation of duty by odd directors or through ow - 18, son super any negligence or miscoddiset on their part "tacicliag Prison supervisory Personnei' P Nissen v.Coult(App. 3 Dist 1929)96 Cal.App. achell v involvement was not alleged could not be held 611.274 P.603. Opp.374, nsibk for act of their subordinates under orr>3a law. Milton v. Nelson, CJ-9 20. Damages,generally ko male (CaL)1975.527 F.?d 1158. Award of$12,000 compensatory damages to Allegations that medical center was plaintiff who proved that,without any to t+apsatted�to perf ," blood test for function, �build- ":, a� tion associated with a legitimate police syndrome(AIDS)after police officer severely beat him while holding callit, officer was ly exposed to AIDS virus,but him is a helpless position on the ground, was t that canter tasted blood for hepatitis supported by evidence. Scruggs v. Haynes instead of AIDS and discarded remaining un (App_ 1 Dist 1967) 60 Cal.Rptr. 355, 252 cal. erf reP used blood sample,were sufficient to form is App«2d 256. bsrildirsgs, for action in absence of some immu- est submit nity apple to county medical center's em- sastian of 21, Punitive damages ployees. "Smith v.County of Kern(App.5 Dist ; abandon 1993)25 Cal-Rptr.2d 716,20 CALAgp.4th 1826, County offidals were liable to same extent as a8+am of r7eview denied. private individuals for their alleged intentional Bed efliaet Under Public Dfffcers Liability Act(repealed), mon of emotional distress. so that allega- +'of allegations of complaint and proof in addition m employees complafnt relating to punt- 14(1954). to those requh-ed to state cause of section against tive damages should not have beenn stricken. declared city under Public Liability Act were reqWvd as i9R 86 232 v.Superior Court cameo)(App.4 Dist itlon, and against city dxxuncilmen and officers. Barsooni �• at�truct{on 878. v. City of (A p. 4.and, 1940) 38 Cal. Award of $5,000 punitive dssr3nages against tee boads, App.2d 413 P 743. defendant policeman would not be set aside as -*ban" Plairc8ff suing public officers for alleged nest- improper whine Plaintiff proved that, without ,ems were Bence was required to bring complaint withinany Justification associated with a legitimate rsonal us- tats.1919, p. 756. § 1 liability on po ce function, the officer severely beat him I event of officers. Shannon v. Fl er(App. 1931) while holding lin in a helpless position on the ' in schod 116 CaLApp. 258, 2 P.2d 835, hearing denied ground. Scruggs v.Haynes(App. 1 Dist 1967) 1 be liable 116 Ga1.App. 258, 3 P.2d 1020. 60 Cal.Rptr. 355, 252 Cal.App.2d 256. 820.2. Discetiona acts Exceer couldpt as citherwi provided by statute, a public employee 's>not liable for t°vasonable an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act,or onussioll Was.the s in high- result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or n6t'such s iS Cal.48, discretion be sbuused. ttsad tom- (Added by Stats.1963, c. 1681, p. 3269, g 1.) �t Legislative Comttee Gsmraents--Senate s) 165 Cal. This section restates thepre-existing California law. Lipman v. Brisbane 1 Elem. School Dist.,,55 Gal.2d 224, 11 Cal.Rptr.97,359 P.2d 465(1961), Hardy 245 .... MEmo101398A.DGC CONTRA COSTA, HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FROM: LEW PASCAILLI SUBJECT: STAFF REPORT ON PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE DATE: 11119148 CC: This staff report addresses the direction given to the Contra Costa Health Services (CCI-b) Hazardous Materials Division Ombudsperson and the CCHS Hazardous Materials Division during the August 11, 1998 Board of Supervisors meeting. CCHS HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DIVISION ONMUUSPERSON The CCHS Hazardous Materials Division Ombudsperson was directed to publicize and organize public hearings in the impacted communities and to provide the Board with an implementation plan for the hearings. The ombudsperson organized and conducted seven community meetings to allow the public the opportunity to ask questions, give their opinion,and share their concerns. Five of the community workshops consisted of a presentation by a CCHS representative followed by public comments. The Clyde and.Pittsburg community workshops consisted of a presentation from CCI-B; presentations from labor, industry,and environmental group representatives, and public comments. Video and/or audio tapes from these meetings were forwarded to the independent consultants (i.e., Mark Scott and Jan Taylor of the National Institute of Chemical Studies and Ray Vlitter of REW Consulting) for consideration during their evaluations of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The dates and locations of the community meetings were as follows: • October 7, 1998-Rodeo Senior Citizens Center • October 14, 1998-Martinez City Council Chambers • October 15, 1998-Crockett Community Center • October 21, 1998-Clyde Community Center • October 22, 1998-Pittsburg City Council Chambers • October 28, 1998--Pinole City Council Chambers • October 29, 1998-Hercules City Council Chambers 1 L MEn10101398A.narc There were a total of approximately 300 attendees at the seven conunurrity workshops. Common concerns raised during the community workshops were addressed in the Question and Answer document included in Appendix A.This document was distributed at the community workshops. C,CHS HA'zAmoUs MATERIALS DIV1sioN The CCI-1S Hazardous Materials Division was directed to evaluate the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in the areas of public health, safety, and the environment. The Hazardous Materials Division was also directed to report to the beard at the same time as the County Planning and Hazardous Materials Commissions submit their reports. C -IS evaluated the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance for its ability to prevent and mitigate accidental releases during all phases of operation(e.g., startup,emergency shutdown). Public health, safety, and the environment will benefit from prevention and mitigation of accidental releases. CCHS also evaluated the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance for its ability to require land use petits for development projects that could significantly and adversely affect public health,, safety, and the environment. Finally, C -iS developed modifications to clarify and further strengthen the proposed ordinance. Prevention and Mitigation of Accidental Releases Programs,policies,and procedures developed and implemented to satisfy the following requirements of the proposed ordinance have the potential to reduce the probability and severity of accidental releases and to improve mitigation of accidental releases: t Risk Management Program Requirements - The stationary source must extend the following requirements to all processes during all phases of operations: Process Safety Information - Information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substance, the technology of the process (e.g., process chemistry, an evaluation of the consequences of deviations), and the equipment in the process (e.g., relief system design, safety systems) must be maintained accurate and current. This information must also be made available to employees. Operating Procedures- Written operating procedures must be developed and implemented for each operating phase including but not limited to, emergency shutdown, normal shutdown,and startup following a turnaround. These procedures must provide clear instruction for safely conducting the activities and must address operating limns, safety and health considerations, and safety systems and their functions. The stationary source must also develop safe work practices such as lockoutltagout, confined space entry, and line or equipment opening. These operating procedures must be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practices. Whey must be annually certified as current and aerate. Employee Participation - Employees must be consulted with on the conduct and development of the process hazard analysis (PHA) and on the development of all other elements of the risk management program. Employees must also be provided with access to PHA's and all other information required to be developed as part of the risk management program regulations. 2 MEM0101398A.AOC Training - The stationary source must provide initial and refresher training to employees involve(f in operating a process. The training will emphasize specific safety and .health hazards,emergency operations including shutdown,startup,and safe work practices. Mechanical Integrity 4 The mechanical integrity program requires stationary sources to develop procedures to meet the requirements of four basic categories. First,the stationary source must develop a program for quality assurance in the construction of new plants and equipment (e.g., proper installation of equipment, ensuring that design specifications are met). Second, the stationary source must develop written procedures for maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment.Third,the stationary source must develop a training program for employees involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment. Fourth, the stationary source must develop an inspection and testing program that follows recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (e.g., standards developed by the American Petroleum institute(APT}or the Chemical Manufacturers Association(CMA)). Management of Change - The stationary source must develop and implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures. The procedures shall assure considei ration of items including,but not limited to the impact of change on safety and health,and the technical basis for the proposed change. Pre-Startup Review - The stationary source must conduct pre-startup reviews for new sources and modified sources when the modification is significant enough to, require a change in the process safety information. The pre-startup review shall make specified confirmations including, but not limited to completion of training of each employee involved in operating a process. Compliance Audits - The stationary source must certify that they;have evaluated compliance with the provisions of the risk management program regulations every three years. A report of the compliance audit must be developed and the two most recent audits retained. Incident Investigation--The stationary source shall investigate each incident that resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. A report must be developed,including but not limited to,the date of the incident a description of the incident,and the factors that contributed to the incident. Hot-Work Permits - The stationary source must implement applicable fire prevention and protection requirements and issue hot work permits for hot work operations: Contractors - The stationary source must inform the contractors of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. The stationary source must ensure, through periodic evaluation of performance, that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to perform his or her job safely. The stationary source must also ensure that each, contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices. Emergency Response Program - The stationary source must develop an emergency response program that will depend upon whether the source intends on responding to incidents or depending upon local response agencies. Regardless of whether the source will respond or not,they must develop procedures for notify i%and interfacing;with public and local emergency response agencies. They must also ensure that they, and the public response agencies,have the adequate resources to respond to incidents. 3 mEmo1O1338n.0OC CCHS personnel are responsible for conducting audit and inspections of the program, policies,and procedures developed and unplernented to satisfy the preceding requirements; CCAS is also responsible for developing, and malung publicly available, a written audit report including required modifications or additions to these programs. • Root Cause - The stationary source must conduct a root-cause analysis of all'>"major chemical accident or releases" as defined in the ordinance. A root-cause analysis is an in-depth incident investigation to identify the rudimentary cause(s) and contributing factors in an incident. CCHS may elect to perform an independent root-cause analysis within 34 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release. The stationary source's cooperation in the C HS root-cause analysis is required and defined in the proposed ordinance. • Human Factors Program -The stationary source must develop, and train their employees on, a written human factors program. The program will focus on the interaction or interface between employees and the process and attempt to identify and minimize those factors that can cause human error(e.g., poorly organized control boards, excessive overtime). Human factors will be included in process hazard analyses and incident investigations. • Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items - The stationary source must conduct a process hazard analysis (PHA) on all processes using an appropriate methodology. FHA's can be very detailed studies identifying the consequences caused by equipment failure,.human error,etc. The PHA team also formulates recommendations to prevent, detect, or mitigate the cause or consequences. The existing federal and state regulation only requires that the stationary source assure that recommendations be resolved in a timely manner. The proposed ordinance defines "timely mariner" to mean within one year unless a process shutdown in required. if a process shutdown is required, the recommendation shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround. • Public Information-The stationary source must develop a Safety Plan that will be available for public review and comment for 30 days. CCHS shall schedule a public meeting on the Safety Plan following the 30-day comment period OOHS must formulate "final determinations" summarizing required modifications or additions following the public review of the Safety flan and CHS's review of the Safety Plan.The"final determinations" are public documents that can be appealed to the Board of Supervisors by any person who has submitted public comment on the Safety Plan. CU-IS will also develop and make publicly available written audit reports and written incident reports. The proposed ordinance also provides for electronic availability of documents such as business plan inventories, emergency response plans, Risk Management Plans,Safety Plans,and Department incident reports. Land Use Permit Requirements Additionally,the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance includes a land use permit section intended to ensnare that land use permits be obtained for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health,safety,and the environment. The proposed ordinance requires sources to obtain land use permits for development projects if the project is not otherwise exempt and if any of the four conditions provided below is satisfied. Development projects satisfying at least one of these conditions should represent most, if not all, of the development projects that could significantly and adversely affect public health,safety,and the environment. * Development project scoring 80 points or above(out of a possible 175 points)using the hazard score formuLL NOTE: The proposed ordinance applies the hazard score and hazard score 4 MEMo101398A.noc formula developed by the Hazardous Materials Commission for inclusion in ordinance number 96-20. Refer to Question 4 of Append A for additional information regarding the hazard score selection:process used by the Hazardous Materials Commission. • For hazard category A materials,the development project stores twice the quantity specked in the Threshold Planning Quantity (IT-IQ) on the Extremely Hazardous I Substances List (Appendix A of 40 CFR Chpt. I, Subchapter J Pant 355)or 2000 pounds, whichever is less. Hazard category A materials are the most hazardous and include explosives, poisons, radio- active materials,spontaneously combustible material,materials that are dangerous when wet,the most :hazardous oxidizers, and infectious substances. This new provision of the ordinance is more protective of worker and public health because it requires a land use permit for storing relatively small quantities of Category A materials regardless of hazard score. Projects storing less than twice the TPQ or 2000 pounds would be subject to hazard scoring per 84-63.1004 of the proposed ordinance. Projects handling less than TPQ or 500 pounds, whichever is less would be exempt per 84-63.604(c)(3)of the proposed ordinance. • For hazard category A or B materials, the development project will result in a new process unit(s) unless:,the process unit complies with Section 84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6 - Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing process unit do not constitute a new process unit. Hazard category B materials are materials such as certain corrosives and flammable liquids,gases, and solids.NOTE:One of the reasons cited for decreasing the hazard score required for obtaining land use permits for development projects from, 80 to 60 (in ordinance number 96-50)was that the 80 point threshold would not.have captured the Chevron Richmond Refinery Cleaner Fuels Project had it been in the unincorporated area of the county. This new provision of the ordinance would capture any new process, unless it complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.1004,handling a hazard category;A or B material regardless of hazard score,and would have captured the Chevron Cleaner Fuels Project. • For hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with Section 84-63.1004(d) 1 though 6--Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. The main effect of this provision will be to require obtaining land use permits for large storage vessels handling flarrunable liquids and flammable gases,unless the new vessel complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.I004. NOTE; Vessels storing less than 40,000 toes would be subject to hazard score per Section 84- 63.1004 of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance R.ecornmended Modifications to the Proposed Ordinance CC HS reconmmends the fallowing modifications to the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to clarify and further strengthen the requirements. Appendix B includes a redlined copy of the ordinance with the following modifications incorporated • The summary should be revised to state that CCS TS can require changes in the Safety Plan and the Safety Program, We also suggest that"more stringent inspection and audit requirements" be replaced with"authorization of the County to expand audits and inspections to all units within the Stationary Source". 5 MEmoI01398A.D0C • Section 450-8.002(b) should be revised to replace "stationary source" with "facilities subject to the federal regulation". Stationary source is defined in this ordinance differently than in the federal Risk Management Program rule or the CaIARP program regulations. • Section 450-8.002(c) should be revised to reflect that the California Health and Safety Code adopted the federal Risk Management Program with certain state-specific amendments. Specifically, it should be revised to "...to implement the federal EPA's Risk Management Program rule with certain state-specific amendments.". • Section 450-8.010 should be revised to limit the exemptions of this ordinance. - There should be no exemptions for stationary sources or CCS (at their discretion) to perform root cause analyses following an incident that meets the definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release. There should also be no exemptions for Accident history reporting. Specifically, (b) should be revised to "...provisions of this chapter except Sections 450-8,016(c)and(e),and 8.018(f) and W. - The current proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance exempts storage tanks unless they contain chemicals included.in the CalARP program. Storage tanks storing regulated substances, as defined in the proposed ordinance, should be included. Additionally, storage tanks containing combustible liquids should also be included. Specifically,(b)(1) should be revised to"storage tanks containing a non-regulated substance,except for storage tanks that contain a material that meets the combustible liquid definition of 49 CFR 173.120(b)". - The current proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance exempts all drum storage regardless of chemical and volume. This is inconsistent with the existing CkA.RP program regulations. Specifically(b)(2)should be revised to"drum storage of a non-regulated substance,less than 10,000 pounds of a Hazard Category B Material m a single location, and for a Hazard Category A material in a single location, less than the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials list (Appendix A to 40 CFR Chapter I,Subchapter J,Part 355, as amended from time to tame) or 500 pounds,whichever is less". - Subsection (b)(3) should be revised to be consistent with the CLARP program regulations that also exempt laboratories from threshold quantity determination if certain conditions are met. Specifically, (b)(3) should be revised to "activities in process plant laboratories or laboratories that are under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3(ee) of 40 CFR. This exemption does not apply to specialty chemical production; manufacture, processing, or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations; and activities conducted outside the laboratory" - A Subsection (b)(5) should be added to exempt hazardous waste storage already covered by existing regulations and legislation. Specifically, (b)(5) should read "any waste tanks, container or other devices subject to the federal and state hazardous waste laws Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (ACRA), 40 CFR Chapter 1, Subchapter I, commencing with Part 260, and the California Hazardous Waste Control Law, California Health and Safety Code,commencing with Section 25100,and California Code of Regulations,Title 22, Division 4.5,Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous Waste." • Section 450-8.014 should be revised. 6 ... . MEM0101398A.DOC - "Accidental Release" should be removed. Accidental Release is used in the human factors program to require that human factors be considered in incident investigations of "near bits". "the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for Accidental Releases of Regulated substances that could reasonably have had the potential to become a Major Chemical Accident or Release" This sentence must then be re-written as %or for an incident that could: reasonably have resulted in a Major Chemical Accident or Release". Incident is a less restrictive term than release and includes excursions such as high temperature or high:pressure. - The definition of"Major Chemical Accident or Release" should be expanded to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community Warning System guidelines regardless of the chemical released. "T'hs provides CCH'S:the authority to conduct a root-cause analysis or incident investigation based on the effects of the incident not based solely on the chemical released. - The definition of "Major Chemical:Accident or Release" should specifically state that the Level 2 or Level 3 Incident determination is made by the Department. - The definition of"Major Chemical Accident or Release" should be revised to ensure that the onsite property damage is initially estimated by the stationary source but the offsite property damage will be initially estimated by appropriate agencies and compiled by the Department. The term "property damage" will also be expanded to explicitly include clean.-up and restoration activities. Specifically, (g)(3) should be revised to "causes on and/or off-site property damage(including clean-up and restoration activities)initially estimated at$500,000 or more. tan-site estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off-site estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the Department.". - Add a definition of Safety Program. "the documentation,development,implementation, and integration of management sus by the Stationary Source to comply with the safety requirements set forth Section 450-8.016". + Section 450-8.016(a) should be revised to ensure that the Stationary Source complies with the safety requirements listed as"RMP Eements". • A subsection 450-8.016(b) should be inserted and include previsions for facilities that become stationary sources after the effective date of the ordinance. The provisions should be consistent with the Ck\RP Program regulations. Specifically, subsection (b)(1) should include "A f 1147 that becomes a Stationary Source after the effective date of this ordinance shall submit a_Safety Plan to the Department within three years of becoming a Stationary Source that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection (c) below. in addition, the Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections (c)through(g) of this section and include a description of the manner of compliance in the Safety Plan. (b)(2)A new covered process at an existing Stationary Source shall comply with Sections(c)through(g)prior to initial startup." • Section 450-8.016(a)RMP Elements- should be revised to state that the Safety Plan shall follow Chapters 6 and 7(dated July 1, 1998) and Chapter 9 (dated November 2, 1998) of the guidance document. The titles for the RMP elements should also be revised to reflect the actual titles in 7 MEMO1O1398A.DOC the CalARP program regulations (i.e., Pre Start-Up Reviews, Compliance Audits, Contractors, and Emergency Response Program) • Section 450-8.016(a)RMP Elements- should be revised.to "Incident Investigation. The written summary of an incident investigation required by Section 2755.7 of the Ck regulations shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting from the investigation are specific only to the process or equipment involved in the incident, or are applicable to other processes or equipment at the stationary source. 'The incident investigation shall be made available to the Department upon request." • Section 450-8.016(b) Human Factors Program - should be revised to require CCHS to develop or adapt guidelines specifying the requirements of the Human Factors program. Guidelines are necessary to ensure that the requirement for a Human Factors program is applied consistently to all stationary sources. Also,the term"that could reasonably have had:the potential to become" should be replaced with"that could reasonably have resulted.in". • Section 450-8.016(b)(ir Human Factors Program should be revised to replace "Accidental Releases of Regulated Substances" with"an incident". Process excursions (e.g., a high pressure excursion in a reactor) may occur which do not result in a release but which do merit an investigation.. • Section 450-8.016(c)Root Cause Analysis-should be revised: - Rename the subsection Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. - Include provisions for C CAIS to be updated on the progress of the Stationary Source's root cause analysis following a Major Chemical Accident or Release or a release of a regulated substance. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "Stationary Sources shall periodically update the Department on facts related to the release or incident, and the status of a Root Cause analysis conducted pursuant to this section, at meetings scheduled by the Department and the Stationary Source. To the maximum extent feasible,:the Department and StationarySource shall coordinate these meetings with other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source". - Include provisions for CCHS to review the final documentation for root causes analyses, including recommendations to be implemented to mitigate against the release reoccuring. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "Ihe Stationary Source shall allow the Department to review the final Root Clause analysis report,including recommendations to be implemented to mitigate against the release or incident reoccuring". - Include provisions for the stationary source to submit a written summary of the root cause analysis to the department, within 30 clays of completion of the root cause analysis. The written summary shall include a schedule for completion of the recommendations. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "Within 30 days of completing a Root Cause analysis performed pursuant to this section, the Stationary Source shall submit a written summary of the Root Cause analysis to the Department that includes the recommendations to be implemented and a schedule for completion of the recommendations". Include "root causes analysis or an incident investigation" throughout the Department's requirements. This allows CCHS flexibility in conducting an appropriate analysis for the incident. 8 MEMOt4I39$A.DOC • Section 450-8.06(d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items -Process Hazards Analysis should be replaced with Process Hazard Analysis throughout the ordinance. • Section 450-8.016(d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items - should be expanded to explicitly include the acceptable PHA methods (e.g.,What-If, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)). Also,expand the ordinance to specifically include the requirements of Title 8 Section 5189(e)(5) rather than reference the CalARP program regulation. • Section.450-8.016(d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items - should be revised to require the stationary source to conduct seismic analyses on processes containing chemicals included in the CaIARP program regulations which have the potential for a worst-case release to reach a public receptor at the endpoints specified in the CLI RP program regulations. • Section. 450-8.016(e) Accident History - should.be revised to require annual submission of an update of the accident history. Specifically, the section should be revised to "The stationary source shall annually submit an accident history report to the Department. The first annual report shall be due two years after the effective date of this ordinance,and subsequent reports shall be due on the anniversaries of the effective date of the ordinance." • Section 450-8.018 Review, Audit, and Inspection - should be revised to include the following clarifications and revisions: - Revise subsection.(a)to explicitly identify the procedure and timeline for initial review of the Safety Plan for completeness prior to the comment period. Specifically,revise (a)to include "The Deparunent shall provide the Stationary Source with a written notice of deficiencies. The Stationary Source shall have 60 calendar days from receipt of the notification of deficiencies to make any corrections. The Stationary Source may request, in writing, a one time 30 calendar day extension to correct deficiencies. By the end of the 60 calendar days or any extension period, the stationary source shall resubmit the revised Safety Plan: to the Department. After the Department determines that the Safety Plan is completed, the Department shall issue a public notice per the Department's Public Participation Policy and..." - Revise subsection (a)to extend the public comment period from 34 days to 45 days, to be consistent with the existing CalARP program requirements. - Revise subsection (a) to allow flexibility in whether the public meeting will be held at the beginning or end of the comment period. Community members may revise or develop comments following the public meting;therefore,it is important for the comment period to be open for some period following a public meeting. - Move subsection(d)to subsection(b)and revise it to include"Based upon the Department's review of an public comment on the Safety flan or,following a safety inspection required by subsection (f), an incident inspection required by subsection (g), or an initial audit required by subsection (ej,...". Also revise subsection. (d) to reflect that the Preliminary Determination is a compilation of determinations that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or'Safety Program are required. Include language, taken from the Sections 2 `75.2(e)(�, (g), and (i) of the CalARP program regulations outlining the procedures and timelines for Preliminary and Final Determinations. 9 MEM0101398a.Doc - Revue subsection (b) to include a second public comment periodd to be conducted on the preliminary determination which will include additions or modifications to the Safety Plan and the Safety Program - Move subsection (e) to (c) and revise the appeals process so that appear to the Board of Supervisors within 30 days of the Department's final determination are limited to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who raised them. This may also require that a public hearing rather than a public meeting be held to ensure that all comments are documented. - Ensure that the Department shall be required to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 every 3 years as opposed to every 3-5 years as stated in the 8/11/98 version of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. - Include criteria, from Section 2775.2(6) of the CaIAR.P program regulations for audit prioritization (e.g., Accident history of the Stationary Source, Quantity of Regulated Substances present at the Stationary Source) • County Counsel will be specifically asked to review sections 450-8.012 and 450-8.018 of the proposed ordinance and add language, as necessary, to ensure that within 30 days following a Major Chemical Accident or Release it is at the discretion of the Department when (within.the 30 days)the safety inspection or incident safety inspection will commence. 10 MEmo14 398n.DOC APPENDDC A _ _ naEmoI01298.aoc DRAFT 10129198 CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOUS MATE=RIALS PROGRAMS DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE? Below are answers for common issues raised during the community meetings. 1. How can the public participate in ensuring safety under the currentordinance, and under the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? Both the existing 96-50 ordinance and the land use permit section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance are covered by CEQA. The risk management section of the proposed Industrial''Safety Ordinance may also be covert# by CEQA. (The Community Development Department (CDD) Director :$_ is currently reviewing information submitted by CCTIS.) There are numerous opportunities for public'participation and appeals through the CEQA process, including but not limited to the following; - Initial determination of CEQA applicability is subject to appeal by members of the public - Proposed negative declarations or mitigated negative declarations'shall be provided for a public review period of not less than 20 days - Members of the public can challenge the findings of the CEQA review to an appellant division within 10 days of the decision", - Draft Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs) shall be provided: for a public review period of 30 to 60 slays - The County holds a public hearing on EIRs (not a state requirement) - The findings from negative declarations, mitigated negative declarations,and EIRs including the adaption or rejection of mitigation measures is subject to public review - The mitigation monitoring and reporting program for a mitigated negative declaration or EIR is presented during a public hearing The risk management section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance also includes the following opportunities for pubic participation and appeals regardless of whether CEQA applies or not: MEM0101298.00C DfwT 10129/98 - A 30-day public review and comment period on the Safety Plan - A public meeting shall be held by the Department following the 30-day public comment period - Persons who commented on the Safety Plan can appeal the "final determination" of the Safety Plan to the Board of Supervisors within 30 days of issuance of the"final determination". .Additional information is provided in Attachment A. 2. The proposed ordinance has some provisions about accidental chemical releases. Are releases to the air,water,and soil all covered by these provisions? Yes. The root cause analysis performed by the Stationary Source and by CCHS, inclusion in the Accident History, and a safety inspection to review and audit compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 are ah'triggered by la Major Chemical Accident or Release. The definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release is shown below and is independent upon release medium (i.e., not restricted to air,water,or soil). Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that results in;the release of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the fallowing criteria. (1) results in one or more fatalities; (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or more persons; (3) causes property damage(on and/or off-site)initially estimated by the Stationary Source at$500,000 or more, (4) meets the definition of a Level 3 or Level 2Incident in the Community Warning System incident level classification system defined in the 9/27/97 county guideline for the Community Warning System;,or (5) flammable vapor clouds of more than 5000 pounds. Additionally, the proposed ordinance extends the federal Risk Management Program prevention program elements and the emergency response program to all process units not otherwise covered under the federal program. The federal Risk Management program was developed in response to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The majority of chemicals covered by this regulation (and the California regulation which adopted the federal regulation with certain state-specific'amendments) were chosen'because of their tonicity and volatility, or flammability characteristics. 'These chemicals have the greatest potential to quickly get off-site and impact environmental and public receptors. However, process units do exist that use chemicals with relatively high toxicity and low mEmolO1298.DOC DRAFT 10/29/98 volatility characteristics. These chemicals are not going to form vapor clouds but they may be hazardous if released to mediums other than air (e.g., water). The proposed ordinance would extend the prevention program elements (e.g., mechanical integrity, training, management of charge) and the emergency response program to those process units to prevent releases from occurring and to quickly mitigate releases that do occur. 3. Under the proposed ordinance, who performs the assessment of$500,000 property damage for the determination of a"Major chemical Accident or Release"? Section 4504.014(g) of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance includes a definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release(which is provided in Question 2). Currently, the stationary source develops the initial estimate. CCHS will review the potential consequences of the assessment and recommend arevision to the proposed ordinance as appropriate. Also, the definition states property damage, but may need to specifically state that property dan age includes clean- up and restoration activities. A 4. Bath the current and proposed ordinance rate certain proposed industrial projects with a"Hazard Scare". If a certain score is reached,the facility is required to obtain a land use permit before it can proceed. The current ordinance ells for a permit application at a scare of 60 out of 180. The proposed ordinance calls for a permit at a scare of 80 out of 175. Does this ensure that, under the proposes ordinance, facilities with significant projects will be required to obtain land use permits? The hazardous Materials Commission set the Lazard Score required to obtain a Land-Use Permit at 80(out of maximum score of 175) following years of review and documented evaluation. This review included scoring;numerous projects, real and fictitious,to identify those projects that merit the review associated with obtaining a Land-Ilse Permit. The hazard score of 80 represents=consideration of a number of factors including,but not limited to: • Requiring land use permits for projects that could significantly impact public safety • Focusing resources on projects with the greatest potential to impact public safety • Avoiding overburdening small businesses • Providing incentive for facilities to perform risk reduction projects' such as substituting higher hazard category materials with lower hazard category materials and moving equipment and vessels'>away from the fence line MEM01012 8moc DRAFT 10/29/98 .Projects scoring between 70 and 79 are subject to a determination of non- coverage ander 84-63.806 of the proposed industrial Safety Ordinance. Determinations of non-coverage are appealable to the Board of Supervisors. More importantly, the proposed ordinance does not simply raise the hazard score back to the original score of 80. It raisesthe score to WAND includes certain development projects that require a Land-Use Permit REGARDLESS of hazard score. These development projects are described in Attachment B. 5. What safety training for workers is required under the 96-50 ordinance, the Safe Communities Ordinance, and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? The existing 96-50 ordinance does not specifically include any training requirements. The initial sturdy conducted as part of the>C,'E+QA process for "major maintenance projecti" may indirectly review training but there are no specific requirements for operator, maintenance personnel, or contractor training. The intent of section 450.8.016 of the Safe Communities Ordinance is to extend the risk management program elements, including prevention program elements and emergency response,to all covered processes. NOTE: the ordinance actually states that the risk management plan,which is very different than:the program, be extended to covered processes. Covered processes is defined as "a process that has a regulated substance present in more than a threshold quantity or a state threshold ,quantity or a process where the,distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst case release assessment'is egatto or more than the distance to any public receptor. If there is no threshold quantity or state threshold quantity for a regulated substance,''the threshold quantity shall'be deemed to be 1000 pounds." Therefore, the intent is for the prevention program elements including' but not limited to training, mechanical integrity, and contractors (included in Attachment C) which address training requirements for operators,maintenance personnel, and contractors respectively to be extended to covered processes. Additionally, section 450-8.016(m)(1), (m)(2), and (m)(3) of the Safe Communities Ordinance requires that journey level workers have completed apprenticeship training, apprentices employed are in an approved. California apprenticeship program, and journey level employees have completed specified upgrade training within the last year. The proposed Industrial Safety ordinance extends the federal Risk'Management Program prevention program elements and emergency response program to all units >in the stationary source. 'There are 11 prevention program elements, including training, mechanical integrity, and contractors that specifically mEW01298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 address training requirements for operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors respectively. Additional information regarding the requirements of the training, mechanical integrity, and contractors elements is provided in Attachment C. 6. 'What safety improvements have local industry carried out that were required by Contra Costa Health Services under current hazardous materials law? Hundreds of improvements have been required and implemented. See Attachment D for a memo entitled "(quantifying the Effectiveness of the Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMP Y1. The County Risk Management and Prevention Program (DMPP) was established in 1989 to help prevent accidental releases of acutely hazardous materials (AHMs). The ARMs ander the RMP? include 360 chemicals. In January 1998, RMPP legislation and regulations were replaced whi, the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program. regulations. Facilities ,are required to implement their RMPP until they are asked to submit a risk,management plan (RMP) under the CaIARP program. Sources with federally covered processes are required to submit R.1V.1P's in July of 1999. Information similar to that included in the attached memo will be maintained by CCHS for submittal to the Office of Emergency Services (OES). Sections 2780.5 and 2780.6 of the CalARP program regulations specify an annual performance audit submission and administering agency performance evaluation respectively. 7. 'What are the enforcement penalties for the current 96-50 ordinance,the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance,the Safe Communities ordinance, and the ordinance introduced by Supervisor Uilkema? Violations of county ordinances are infractions unless otherwise specified in the ordinance as misdemeanors. Infractions are punishable by the following fines: - First violation in one year: a fine up to $100/day - Second violation of the same ordinance in one year: a fine up to 8200/day - Third and subsequent violations of the same ordinance in one year: up to $500/day This applies to the current 96-50 ordinance, the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, and the ordinance introduced by Supervisor Uilkema. The Safe Communities Ordinance specifies violation of the ordinance as a misdemeanor. Misdemeanors are punishable by up to 6 months in county jail,by fine not exceeding$1000.00,or by both. MEM0101298.Doc DRAFT 90129/98 8. What is the difference between the Safe Communities Ordinance and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in regards to community outreach? The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance requires that the CCHS Hazardous Materials Programs ombudsperson act as the single point of contact for Contra Costa County residents regarding environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about the Hazardous Materials Programs. The Safe Communities Ordinance requires CCHS to develop a Public Outreach and Information program, including the utilization of one or more nob-profit community based organizations as a public outreach contractor.>CCHS would annually place in its proposed budget a request for approval, appropriation,and allocation of the sum. $50,000 for the Program. 9. Will members of the public require technical assistance to review and comment on the Risk Management Pians and Safety Plans submitted to satisfy the requirements of the CalA P program regulations and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance respectively? No. The primary purpose of both the Risk Management Pian(RIVE`) and Safety Plan, is to communicate information (e.g, the hazards, prevention, and emergency response) to the public. Therefore, the document must be written to be understandable by members of the community, with little if any technical assistance required. The preamble to the federal Accidental Release Prevention Requirements (i.e., 40 CFR Part 58, Risk Management Program regulations) suggests that less than five pages of text will be required to convey the necessary information in the RMP submitted to the federal environmental Protection Agency (EPA). See Attachment E for the applicable sections of the preamble to the federal regulation. Section 2735.5 of the CalA.RP program regulation requires the stationary source to closely coordinate with CCHS to,implement the requirements of the CaIARP' program and to determine the appropriate levelof documentation required for the RMP. The Community Awareness Emergency Response (C.AER) Group, Inc. formed subcommittees (Le., steering, guidelines, technical, communication) with representatives from County staff, industry, 4abor, and environmental/community groups to determine an appropriate level of detail for the RMP's submitted in Centra Costa County. A guidance document was developed and distributed for comments twice (ie., initial draft and final draft). It (Contra Costa County CaURP Program Guidance Document) was finalized July 1, 1998 and is available to stationary sources and members of the public through the CCHS Hazardous Materials Programs. The level of documentation deemed appropriate by the subcommittees is substantially greater than that suggested in the preamble to the federal Risk Management Program regulations. MEM0101298.00c DRAFT 10/29198 However, the RMP must still be understandable to members of the community, with little if any technical assistance required. The Communications Committee has the following activities planned to inform and educate the public and owners and operators of stationary sources: a video discussing the risk management program is being produced; a brochure on the risk management program is being developed a workshop with JBF Associates is being held on 'November 30 to assist stationary sources on communicating their RMP (members of the public are welcome), templates are being developed to assist stationary sources develop brochures and fact sheets to discuss their sources and the chemicals they use, a web page is being developed to address the riskmanagement program and a second workshop regarding risk communication is planned for the spring>(members of the public are welcome). If you would'like more information, contact Randy Sawyer at CCHS Hazardous Materials Program(325)646-2286. 10. Which facilities will be covered: by the risk management section of the Safe Communities Ordinance and which facilities will be covered by the risk.management section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? The fallowing information is based on information provided earlier this year to CCHS by affected facilities. The estimate is subject to change after worst ease release scenarios are conducted (i.e., some of the program 3 covered processes nay be eligible for program l status due to worst case release scenario modeling). • The Safe Communities Ordinance applies to industrial facilities (undefined in the ordinance) in unincorporated dreams with program 3 covered processes under the federal Disk Management Program regulations: This includes Air Products -- Shell, Air Products — Tosco, Criterion Catalysts, General Chemical.Bay Point,'GWF Power Systems,Polypure Incorporated, Martinez Refining Company, Randal-Bolsi Water Treatment Plant, Rodeo 'Sanitary District, Tosco Avon, and Tosco Rodeo. There are three additional facilities which could be covered, but which may make process/chemical changes that would exclude them from the program. "These facilities include: E.I.DuPont, Crockett Cogeneration, Delta Diablo Sanitary District. • The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance applies to facilities in unincorporated areas with program 3 covered processes under the federal Risk Management Program and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). This includes Air Products — Shell, Air Products — Tosca, Criterion Catalysts, ;General Chemical Bay Point, Polypure Incorporated, Martin" Refining Company, Tosco Avon,and Tosco Rodeo. .. MEM0101298.00c DRAFT 10129/98 NOTE: The preceding discussion applies to the riskmanagement sections of these ordinances only (Le., applicability is not the same for the land use permit sections of either ordinance) Cather questions were asked during the workshop regarding enforcement and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Those questions have been referred to the appropriate county departments (i.e., County Counsel and the Community Development Department). Answers to these questions and concerns will be provided as they become available. If you:have additional questions or comments please contact County Ombudsperson, Michael Kent at(925) 313-6587` MEM0101298.DGC DRAFT 10/29/98 ATTACHMENT A CEQA is triggered by the act of granting a land use permit in the "Lancs-Use Permit for Development Projects"sections of all ordinances discussed in the workshop. The Community Development Department (CDD) Director is currently reviewing criteria supplied by Contra CostaHealth Service (e.g., CalARP guidance document, audit protocols)to determine whether acceptance of the Safety Plan by Centra Costa Health Services (CCHS) in the "Risk. Management" section of the proposed ordinance triggers CEQA. If CEQA sloes apply to acceptance of the Safety Plan (in the proposed ordinance) by CCHS and a negative declaration is proposed, members'of the public have 20 days to review the Department's determination (e.g., Negative Declaration) and submit comments. NOTE: This assumes that none of the statutory or categorical exemptions are applicable. The decision making body must consider the public comments before issuing their decision. Any member of the public can,challenge the findings of the CEQA review to an appellant division(e.g., the Board of Supervisors)within 10 days of the decision. This challenge can be either based on the content of the findings or on the process used by the permitting/accepting body to snake the decision. However, the appellant must demonstrate that there is substantial evidence that the impact would' be significant for the permitting body to require mitigation measures. The permitting body can also require a measure as a Condition of Approval without it being a mitigation of a significant impact, although there does have to be a connection between the measure and the project. The Department cannot, through the CEQA process, require mitigations of impacts unless they are deemed significant and supported by evidence. Members of the public may file a lawsuit against the final decision made by the Board of Supervisors regarding the appeal. Whether CEQA applies to the proposed ordinance or not, the public will be able to comment on the Safety Plan during the 30-day review and comment period. These comments will be considered by the Department during the development of the"final determination" which includes determinations that additions or modifications to the Safety plan are required. The stationary source or any person who commented on the Safety Plan during the 30-day period, can appeal the Department's decision to the Board of Supervisors. Members of the public may file a lawsuit against the final decision made by the Board of Supervisors regarding the appeal. NOTE: CCHS recommends that the proposed ordinance be revised to limit appeals to issues raised during the comment period,not to individuals who raised them. The existing 96-50 ordinance requires land-use permits for maintenance projects costing at least one million dollars and requiring that the unit be taken out of service for more than two weeks'. A majority of projects meeting these criteria will be; f Section 84=63.604 (d), (e), (g),and(h)of the existing 96-50 ordinance allows exemptions for obtaining land-use permits for major maintenance projects. For example, Section 84-63.604A(d)`exernpts a major maintenance project covered by a Public Safety Agreement entered into by the County and the facility MEM0101298.noe DRAFT 10/29/98 turnaround projects for the refineries. The County Community Development Department (CDD) mush determine whetherthe land-use permit is subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CDD; may determine that the maintenance project is "categorically exempt", thereby not triggering CEQA2. If they determine that CEQA is triggered,then CDD must conduct an initial study. The initial study conducted under CEQA will include an assessment of the effects that the "major maintenance project" will have on air quality, water quality, noise, risk of upset, and transportation among other topics. This assessment determines whether there is substantial evidence that the proposed project would present significant environmental impacts and to identify measures to mitigate any significant impacts. If there are no significant impacts, CDD will issue a_`negative declaration". If mitigation of significant impacts is required and agreed to by the,applicant, CDD will issue a "mitigated negative declaration". Members of the public have 20 days to review the determination:and submit comments. If the significant impacts can not be mitigated or if certain types of significant impacts are identified, CDD will require that an Environmental impact 'Report (EIR) be prepared. Mitigation measures resulting from these determinations are typically included in a /mitigation monitoring plan approved by the County Planning Commission, and included in the permit's Conditions of Approval. The existing 96-50 ordinance does not apply to maintenance projects casting;less than 1 million dollars or requiring that the unit be taken out of service for less than two within Five years prig to the time the major maintenance project application is submitted to the department. Section 84-63.604(g)of the existing 96-50 ordinance allows an exemption for major maintenance projects at facilities covered by a Risk Management Plan. Extending the Risk Management Program elements to all units and defining regulated substance to include Hazard Category A and B materials satisfies many if not all of the requirements for this exemption. 2 CEQA Guidelines, Section 15300.2 restricts the use of the categorical exemptions under certain circumstances,one of which is the possibility of a significant impact:"A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances," The Department has used this statement.to determine that the two Tosco major maintenance projects(Avon and Rodeo)did not qualify for the categorical exemption presented in the CEQA Guidelines Section 15302(c). This section categorically exempts"replacement or reconstruction of existing utility systems and/or facilities involving negligible or no expansion capacity. 3 To conduct "Risk of Upset" for the Tosco land use permit, CCHS required that the stationary source review startup and'shutdown procedures for accuracy and review safeguards to ensure that they are adequate protection against human error. CCHS representatives reviewed the safe work practices at the source. mEmo101298.00c C7w €10129198 weeks (e.g., a maintenance project costing $750,000 or requiring less than two week downtime would not be covered). The existing 96-50 ordinance does not apply to any other phases of operation (e.g., emergency shutdowns, normal operations). The "major maintenance project" portion of the existing 96-50 ordinance does not apple to any units in the stationary source other than those being shutdown for major maintenance. . mwo101298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 ATTACHMENT B Regardless of Hazard Score,the following types of development projects will require the stationary source to obtain a land use permit in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. • For hazard category A materials, the development project stores twice the quantity specified in the Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ) on the Extremely Hazardous Substances List (Appendix A of 40 CFR. Chpt. I, Subchapter J Part 355)or 2000 pounds,whichever is less. hazard category A materials are the most hazardous and include explosives, poisons, radia-active materials, spontaneously combustible material, materials that are dangerous when wet, the most hazardous oxidizers, and infectious substances. This new provision of the ordinance is more protective of worker and public health because it requires a land use permit for storing relatively small quantities of Category A materials regardless of hazard scare. Projects storing less than twice the TPQ or 2000 pounds would be subject to hazard scoring per 84-63.1004 of the proposed ordinance. Projects handling less than TPC or 500 pounds, whichever is less would be exempt per 84- 63.604(c)(3)of the proposed ordinance. • For hazard category A or B materials,the development project will result in a new process unit(s) unless the process unit complies with Section 84--63.1004 ( ) I through 6 — Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing process unit do not constitute a new process unit. Hazard category B materials are materials such as flammable liquids, gases and solids, One of the reasons cited for decreasing the hazard scores required for obtaining a land use permits for new development projects from 80 to 60 was that the 80 point threshold would not have capttued the Chevron Richmond Refinery?Cleaner Fuels Project had it been in the unincorporated area of the county. This new provision of the ordinance would capture any new process, unless it complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84.63.1004, handling'a hazard category A or B material regardless of hazard score,and would have captured the Chevron'Cleaner Fuels Project. • For hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with Section 84- 63.1004( ) l through 6—Credit for reductions or projects to be closed.. The main effect of this provision will be to require obtaining land use permits for large storage vessels handling flammable liquids and'flammable gases, unless the new vessel complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.1004. MEM0101298:0oc DDA"10/29/98 ATTACHMENT C The federal Risk Management Program was adapted by California with certain state- specific amendments. This attachment includes the regulatory;requirements for 3 of the I l prevention program elements extended to all process units not otherwise covered by the federal regulation: training,mechanical integrity,and contractors. These prevention program elements address operator training,maintenance personnel training, and contractors training respectively. Section 2760.4 Training. (a)Initial training. (1) Each employee presently involved in operating a process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in Section 27601.3. The training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and'health hazards, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employet,'s., job tasks. (2) In lieu of initial training for these employees already involved in operating a process on June 21, 1999 an owner or operator may certify in writing that the employee has the required knowledge, shills, and abilities to safely carry out the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (b) Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the process. The owner or operator, in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process, shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. (c) Training documentation. The owner or operator shall ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section. The owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the'identity of the employee,the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training Section 27601.5 Mechanical Integrity. (a)Application. Sections(b)through(f)of this section apply to the following process equipment: (1)Pressure vessels and storage tanks, (2)Piping systems(including;piping components such as valves); (3)Relief and vent systems and devices, Proposed CalAi2P Regulations 5/01/98 Page42 (4)Emergency shutdown systems, (5) Contrails(including;monitoring devices and sensors,alarms,and interlocks); and, (6)Pumps. (b) Written procedures. The owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. mr=m o101298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 (c) Training for process maintenance activities. The owner or operator shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (d)Inspection and testing. (1)Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. (2) Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (3) The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineeringpractices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. (4) The owner or operator shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment. The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test,the name of the person who performed the inspection or test,the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on, which the inspection or test was performed, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the >results of the inspection or test. (e)Equipment deficiencies. The owner or operator shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in Section 2760.1) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation. (f)Quality assurance. (1) In the construction of new plants and equipment, the owner or operator shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used. (2)Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions. (3) The owner or operator shall assure that maintenance materials,spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used:.. Section 2760.12 Contractors. (a)Application.This section applies to contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a covered process. It does not apply to contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety, such as janitorial work,food and drink services, laundry, delivery or other supply services. (b)Owner or operator responsibilities. (1)The owner or operator,when selecting a contractor, shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator's safety performance and programs. (2)The owner or operator shall inform the contract owner or operator of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work]and the process. ................... XXXXX MEM0101298,DOC DRAFT 10129/98 (3) The owner or operator shall explain to the contract owner or operator the applicable provisions of Article 7. (4) The owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with Section 2760.3(d), to control the entrance, presence, and exit of the contract owner or operator and contract employees in covered process areas. (5) The owner or operator shall periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations as specified in section(c). (c)Contract owner or operator responsibilities. (1) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to safely perform his or her job. (2) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to: his or her job and the process, and the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan (3)The contract owner or operator shall document that each contractemployee has received and understood the training required by this section. The contract owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the contract.employee, the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (4) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices required by Section 2760.3(d). (5) The contract owner or operator shall advise the owner or operator of any unique hazards presented by the contract owner or operator's work, or of any hazards found by the contract owner or operator's work. .................... MEM0101298.DoC DRAFT 90/29198 ATTACHMENT D ._. THE QUANTWYING T'M EFFECTIVENESS OF Introduction THE' MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAIK The County Risk Management and Prevention program Wp)was prevent accidental releases of acutely hazardous materials(AHMs). The A established.in 1989 to help included 360 chemicals. The Program ( ) IBMs under the PMpp Management and Prevention Plan to Health of he that dle ABMs p'p to submit a .Risk to perform the following: ,the facility is required • A Hazard and Operability Study(Hazi.7p) • An off-site Consequence Analysis(OSCA) • A seismic analysis • Implement management practices to prevent accidental releases of AHMs • Manage he risk at the facility • Implement the mitigations from the'HazOp and seismic analysis A facility's Ri jPP is described in the Risk Management and Prevention Pia*t, which is document that is available for public review. There were 120 facilities public Management and Prevention Program. covered by flee Risk How effective is t€le RMPP, since there are still accidental releases of AHMs? Following is a Of some indicators that demonstrate t€le effectiveness of the program within Contra Cast Cou list nt},; • Dramatic reduction in the valuate of AHMs handled in the County • Implementation of a vast number of processsafety improvements by AHM-handling facilities g • Implementation of many new and upgraded management and process safety progratxts as a direct result of the program. Reduction in AHMs Handled Between 1990 and 1994 there was a 60 million pound decrease (179 to 118 millionounds) to the amount of AHMs handled in Contra Costa County, which is a 33% decrease. Some exam les are p listed below, are some of thy:decreases in the AHMs handled in Contra Costa County: p AHM LARGEST QUANTI'T'YNT QUANTITY PERCENT AmDECREASE lbs. monia 12,800,707 (lbs.) Chlorine 4,43'2,658 65 H drofluoric Acid 7650,897 5,159,269 400,400 33%0 H dro en Fluoride 80,082 80% H dro en Sulfide 1,650'0()0 1,450,000 2 b25,542 223,075 1 % tJleutrz 64% Sulfur Dioxide 16,4?4,762 16,408,602 2,651,027 749,3(11 Since 1994 there has been an additional decrease of 600,000 pounds of hydrogen fluori -and at least 2,000,0001 pounds of oieum handled in the county. de Dandled I _ . The decreased inventories of AHMs are an inherently safer way to handle these materials. many cases, there is not only decreases in the A M inventories, but alternative saferchem' In are replacing the AHMs in many processes. icais hnprovements Madeas a Result of the RMPP' Hundreds of changes were made as a result of the RMpP. They include Changes in the management systems, mechanical changes to the processes, and upgrades to prevent Potential damage from an earthquake. Included with this paper are three pages of es les of changes made by the different facilities. The three pages of examples that follow aexamples g seventy-three pages list of changes made by six facilities {four oil re excerpted f refineries and two chemical Companies). Management and .Process Safety Programs As a result of the Risk .Management and Prevention Program and Cal/OSHA's Process Management requirements, ''.fere have been numerous new management systems. fes Safety meLited to Prevent and respond to accidental releases. Some of the new management systems that were implemented by many facilities as a result of the RMPP are listed below; • Process Hazards Analysis + Process Safety Information(updating Piping and Instrument Diagrams, etc.) • Management of Change programs + Training programs On January 1, 1997 the RMPP was replaced by the California Accidental Release Prevent' Program which incorporates the federal on EPA Risk Management Program. The CalARP Program incorporated the best parts of the RMPP with the EPA's Risk}Management Program. For more information please contact an Accidental Release.Prevention Specialist at(925) 546-2286. .. u lu en A, tU O C4 o o t ` a O ri) c y ass , H "' 5 a 40. 'du 4I 79 Cc c . rn O chi 0 0 O > CJ] C7 u' 0 <13 O cri C-d u td 0 c- vi ✓ � 4> ctl C7 vii ✓ rte-, Uy t7 p tLy , cup a� y, m a� ,«3 � o, u o crl o o cu ami ° j ca c> C3 Cl) v ,u o 0 M cav V1 0 Q `✓fit...�-r. v vs • � nZIbo 4> yj 'tJ 0,10 ,: O co 4 N 0 0 � d Cj o "0 0 t At a3 � t r E a1 P: �, m •+ p ¢> rn �s. 0 V, tin + .> 'i3 ��-.. �j > r �o x „>, __ _ _ v m 0 u ' r o ) cn r a� eri r, r1 fiC! C) fl; v `' rpt " o o z `s .a Z co r >' 4 0 a) Al) c, cri cu 9s c 4-4 b11 cc cd v ` ami ro Wc� y .v aU o y o v Coo r3 ci -e_) v ct3 cn ` , .� as •� �` � v 75 4-4.M W o cot cnQ co as .v o CL) a Crj 03 . 4 ` + ' 3 '�� 41 ro � W r� o H � • 6.1 ` 0+j' N 0 4- f.,y �- ° cai i su V 03 > i4.)� C> v c s Fe (44 • *' w -a a� c{K O �. ai btJ s. " Cd 0 b SCS` cd +ll cO QJ '3 f Z' c1 4-r vt cn rn ' + 0 0Q> p w 0 f4 U in-i 00 t ` a4 0 d Z r _ GQ co •-�LII•! ` . a .�`to � ., . W ry { •,mow }QctxoY2 CO 4- tLt 'yam", rn 4t r _ v5 ezf rl td 0 t Ys-+ ` iia o+ ��Go 0 2s' q� 4-< N. crj 0 C� 0 VI v3 fit` O '3 tz 0 Q' �', zn a fit.. crj 6? �. GJ NX + mEmol49298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 ATTACHMENT E Section III. G of the preamble to the federal Accidental Release Prevention Requirements. Risk Management Programs,40 CFR Part 68, states the following: "EPA. agrees that an informed public is a key element of a sound chemical emergency prevention,;preparedness, and response. However, EPA.:also believes that it is essential for the public to focus on the information essential at the local level for prevention, preparedness, and response and has decided to maintain its proposed requirement that the RMS' provide certain information about the risk management programs at a source. EPA motes that its previous use of the word summary was not intended to imply that the source prepares a "full" RMI' document from which a source extracts summary information that is shared with the public. Rather, the source is obligated to develop certain information about the hazards, prevention, and emergency response programs from the array of documentation at the source to prepare an RMP. EPA believes it would be unpractical to require sources to share all documentation used for the safe operation of the processes at a source. Not only is much of this information likely to be confidential, but significant technical expertise and time are necessary to extract, understand, and to make meaningful judgements about the adequacy of the information. The RMP will consist of an executive summary and required data elements addressing all elements of the riskmanagement program as described below. Detailed supporting documentation will be maintained on site available to the implementing agency for review." Additionally, page 31713 subsection IV of the federal preamble stags the fallowing. "...The summary shall include brief description of the following items: the source's prevention and emergence response approach, the stationary source and regulated substances; worst-case release scenario(s) and alternative release scenarios), including any administrative controls applied to limit the release quantity; the general prevention program and chemical-specific prevention steps, the five-year accident history; the emergency response program- and 'planned changes to improve safety. EPA anticipates that none of these items should require more than a half page of text." __ _ _ mEmOI41398a.DOC APPENDa B CCHS REDLINE DRAFT ORDINANCE NO.98» INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the official text of the enacted or amended provisionsof the County Ordinance Code): SECTION 1. SUMMARY. This Ordinance acids Chapter 450-8 to the County Ordinance Code. Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations which supplement the requirements of California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (commencing with section 25531) of Chapter 6.95 concerning hazardous materials management by enacting measures to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental releases of regulated substances that have the potential to cause significant harm.to the public health and increase participation by industry and the public to improve accident prevention. These measures include submission of a Safety Plan to the County, stringent requirements for the contents of a Safety Plan and SgfgV public review of the Safety Plan,authorization for the County to require changes in the Safety Plan or SafetyProgram. an expansion of the list of regulated substances beyond those covered by RMP, and rvqwirvmentsauthorization of the County to expand audits and inspgpl ons to all units within the Stationary Source. Root Cause is required for all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. A public outreach and information program is established. This ordinance substantially readapts Chapter 84-63,originally added by Ordinance No 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance No. 96-50, and repeals Chapter 8463, added by Ordinance leo. 96-50 Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as added by this ordinance, set forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material which encourage business and other entities, in planning such projects, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Article 84-62.14 is readopted in its entirety. SECTION 11. Chapter 450-8 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read: CHAPTER 450.8' RISK MANAGEMENT 450-8.002 BACKGROUND and FINDINGS. The Board of Supervisors on Contra Costa County finds as follows; (a) Recent incidents in Contra Costa County at industrial chemical, petrochemical, and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews, inspections, and audits that supplement existing federal'and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public health and safety from accidental releases. 11/19/98 Page 1 __ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (b) Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(4)) required the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate the "Risk Management Program" intended to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur. Allfacilities subject to the federal reactionmust prepare a Risk Management Plan based on a Risk Management Program 'established at the Sesite, that includes a hazard assessment of the facility and accidental release prevention program,and an emergency response program(44f1 CFR.§68.12). The gwafeo-facili must submit the federal RMP to the EPA by June 21, 1999 (44.0 CFR § 68.10). The federal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (c) The California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et-seq.) of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1, 1997 to implement the federal EPA"s Risk Management Program rule with certain state-smiric amendments. The State"s RMP is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention(CaIARPjProram. (d) The County recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safety, and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and response at the local level. Preventing accidental releases of regulated substances is the shared responsibility of industry, government, and the public. The first' steps toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and assessing the risks. Once information about chemical hazards in the community is openly shared, industry, government, and the community can work together towards reducing the risk to public Health and safety. (e) The success of a Safety Program is dependent upon the cooperation of industrial chemical and oil refining facilities within Contra Costa County. The pudic must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented, including changes or actions required by the Department or the'Stationary Source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS. (a) The purpose of this ordinance is to impose regulations which improve'industrial safety by the following: (1) requiring the conduct of process hazards analysis for Covered Processes handling hazardous materials not covered by RMP; (2) requiring the review of action' items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the Stationary Source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3) requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of Stationary Sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and analysis for the determination of the Root Cause for certain incidents; (4) providing review,inspection,auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and regulations, (5) providing for public review of the Safety Plan, (6) facilitating cooperation between industry, the County, and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at Stationary Sources, 11119198 Page 2 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (7) expanding the application of certain provisions of the We a4-RMP to processes not covered by the F -RMP;and (8) requiring the development of a written human factors program. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.006 AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials. (Ord. 98-•__•_, § 2.) 450-5.008ADMINISTRATION. The Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord. 98'-_, § 2.) 4:50-8.010 APPLICABILITY. (a) This ordinance shall apply to StationarySources; (b) The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except Sections 454- 8 016(e}>'and(g) and Sections 8.018(f)and W: (1) storage tanks -containing a;non-re"u ted substance.excent> for storage tanks that contain a material that meets the cornbu ble li' uid d fi "tion of 49CFR 173.,120{b) "eh seAs4es the P"siem of the Q'140=41 URRM 91441A >a (2) drum storage of a gon-regulated substance,•>less than 1€ ounds of a Hazard Category l3 material lr�cated such shat drums couldreasonably be' ex ected to;be involved in a sin le release• and for a Hazard Cate ,A material located such that the drums could [Mona_bly be ex ted to be involve in a sin le release less tW the uanti cified as the eshold�Plg=g Qgpfily on the Extreme) H ardour Materials list A radix 'A to 40 CFR C a ter 1 Subcha ter J Part 355 as gWended from ti to tune or 544 ounds whit ever' is less. (3) activities in_process plant laboratories or laboratories that are under the su ervision of a technical) uaiified'individual as de lned in Sectio 720.3 ee of 40 CER. This exemption does nQt gpply to s ci chemical production rnanufac e rocessi or use of substance in pilot plant sc e o rati n and activities conducted outside the labatalom. (4) utilities, except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit. S gny wste tanks cont ` ers or other devices sub get t the federal an' state h ardour waste laws Resource C reservation and RecoVe Act R R 40 CFR: Cha er I Su.1Nhgpter I ,co entire with Pa rt 260 and::thg California Razadous Waste Control Law California He th and SaLe1y, Code cg=gpgm& with 21/19198 Page 3 i CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Section 25100 and California Code of Regulations,, Title 22 d'vision 4.5 EnvirpMent Health Standards for the Man ement of H dour e.' (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.012 INSPECTION. The Department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter and to supporting documentation retained by the Source for the purpose of determining compliance with this; chapter. (Ord. 98-_, § 2•) 450-8,014 DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this chapter the definitions set forth in this section shall apply. Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to there in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40CFR § 68.3) and in California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95, unless the context indicates otherwise. Aelfeas@Z v err (ab) "Covered Process"means any process mat a Stationary Source (bis) "Department"means the Contra Costa County Health Services Department. (,,cd) "Feasible" means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,taking into account economic, and technological factors. (de) "Industry Codes and Standards"means the edition of the cedes and standards in effect at the''time of original design or construction for the design, construction, alteration, maintenance or repair of process units, industrial equipment, or otherindustrial facilities, structures or buildings published'by the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)or the American National Standards Institute(ANSI). (- e "Inherently Safer Systems" means Inherently Safer Design Strategies as discussed in the 1996 Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication "Inherently Safer' Chemical Processes" and means Feasible alternative equipment,processes,materials, lay- outs, and procedures meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a >Major Chemical Accident or Release by modifying a process rather than adding external`layers of protection. Examples including,but not limited to,substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure, lower flammability, or lower toxicity, isolation of hazardous processes, and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. 11/19198 Page 4 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Mfg) "Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that the partm nt determines meets the definition of a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident in the Community Warning System incident level classification s st defined in the 9/2.7-/97 county nuidelin, for the Community Warning System or results''in the release of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) results in one or more fatalities; (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or macre persons, (3) causes on and/or off-site property damage including clean-u and restoration activities) initially , estimated t $500j000 or more. On-site estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off-site estimates shall be performed by WDropriate agencies' and cgWiled by the 1`3epartment3, -(4) meets Ohio- ddeoffiiaitiea 89 a bevel� of be-i-04 2 ifisidefit in 4ho Gofftmuffity VAwaing (4)-t4) flammable vapor clouds of more than 5000 pounds. (gh) "Regulated Substance" means (1) any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California)Health and Safety Code section 25532 (g), as amended from time to time, or (2) a substance which is listed in Hazard Categories A or B in section 84- 63.1016. Mixtures containing less than 1% of a Regulated Substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. ) "RMP" means the Risk Management Plan required to be submitted and Risk Management Program required to be implemented pursuant to the requirements of the California Health and Safety Code article 2(Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95.' (j) "Root Cause means prime reasons, such as failures of some management systems, ' that allow faulty design, inadequate training, or improper changes, which lead to an unsafe act or condition, and result in an incident. If root causes were removed, the particular incident would not have occurred. &) "Safety Plan" means the Safety Plan which is required to be submitted to the Department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.4116 of the chapter. (k)"Safety Prograam" means the documentation develoaMeul imialementation and integration of management :systems by the Stationary Source to ggM ly with the safety requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016 (1) `Stationary Source" or "Source" means a facility which includes processes was defined in 44 CFR 68.1 that are subject to federal Risk Management Program Level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code (NAICS) is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) or 325 '(Chemical Manufacturing). (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 11/19/98 ,age 5 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 450-8.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.Oa The Stationary Source shall submit a Safety Plan to the Department within one year of the effective date of this ordinance that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection (ac) below. In addition, the Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections *) through (eg) of this section and include a description of the manner of compliance in the Safety Plan. A facilily that becomes a Station Source affter the effective date of this ordinance shall sub 't a Safe Plan to the<De ent withinthree YeLxs of becomin g Stationm Source'!at that complies with theravisia s of tWis section and that includes the of elements listed in subs_ ection c _'below. In addi 'o the Station ource shall com 1 with the mfkly re uirements et>forth in subsection thrau hof this section and include a descri tion of the manner of ggmPliance in the Safety Ply, Anew cove ed rocess at an existing 5t AtioRMSource shall g2Mp1y with Sections c throb Pon r to initial startut� (K) RMP Elements. -= ems-Covered Processes F49 -shall be subject to the RMP program >elements and emerggm response pro,�,r n, listed below. The Safety Plan shall include a description of the manner in which the RMF` elements listed below shall be applied to the Covered..Process. These IMP elements shall be implemented in conformance'with RMP and the Safety Plan shall follow Chapters 6 and 7' dated July 1 1998 and Chapter 9 dated November 2, 1998 of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department Risk Management Plan guidance document,June 1998. Process Safety Information Operating Procedures Employee Participation Training-for each:employee in such Covered Process Mechanical'Integrity-including the use of Industry Codes and Standards Management of Change Pre Start-UpSafety Reviews Co liance Audits Incident Investigation: The written sHMMM of an inti ent investigation __required' by Section 2755.7 of the CaIARI'regulations hall indicate nk er the cause of the' incid' nt and/or recommendatio resultin from the investi ation e s cific onl to the proc 's or a ui ment inv v d in the incident or are gp hca e to other rocesses or egjipMent at the 2qtiogM source. The incident ilnvestigphon>.re art shall be mane available to the De2art ent upon request. ♦ Hot'Work ♦ Contractors Safety Pr-egmm + Emergency Response Pro ram 11/19/98 Page 6 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (fid) Human Faetors Program. (1) Stationary Sources shall develop a written human factors program that follows the guidance doc et> dev to or adopted b`' the ent. The program shall be developed within one year following the issuance of the County guidance document or the pfT ctive date of the ordinance, whichever is>later. The Human Factors Program.shall- address%: (i) the inclusion of human factors in the Process Hazards Analysis process; (ti) the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for an;incident that could' reasonably have resulted in a Major Chemical Accident or Release, (iii) the training of employees in the human Factors program; (iv) operating procedures, and (v) the requirement to conduct Management of Change prior to staffing,changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations or emergency response. Employees and their Representatives shall be given the opportunity to participate in such Management of Changes. (2) Employees'and their Representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3) The program shall include, but not be limited to, issues such as staffing, shiftwork and overtime. (4) A description of the human factors program (4)(1) through ("3) ph2ve shall be included in the Safety Plan prepared by the Stationary Source. (eve) Root Cause Analysis and Incident IuveMglLtion. Stationary Sources shall conduct a Root Cause' analysis for each Major Chemical Accident or Release which occurs after the effective date of this chapter. Station Sources shall a 'odicall u ate the De art 1 on facts related to a release or incident and> the status of a Root Cause ana sis conducted ursuartt to this section at tiLna scheduled'by the Tae r4nM d the Station source. To the aximun extent feasible, the Department ds do Source shall coordjnate> these rneetin 's with other envies with `u `sdiction over th atio source. 'The SIgign Source shall allow the Dg artznent to revi,w the final Root Cause anal si Nport. includiLig recommendations to; be izm lemented to mitigate against the release or incident re-occurrin . 'Within 30 das of com lett a Root Cause ana sis erformed ursuant to this' e io lh- Station source shall submit awritten sMMMM of#1e Root Cause anal si to the l)e ent that includes the recommendations to be im lemented and a schedule for<corn letion cif the' recommendations. The methodology of the Root Cause analysis shall be one of the recommended'methodologies from the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall'be reviewed by the Department to determine substantial equivalency. The Department may elect to do its oven independent Root Cause analysis or incident�ivestigad p y for a Major Chemical Accident or Release. If the Department'elects to conduct a Root';Cause analysis or incLdent investi n—the Stationary Source shall cooperate with the Department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of 11119/98 Page 7 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Department and Stationary Source personnel and without placing undue burdens on the operation of the Stationary Source: (i) allow the Department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms, physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment, (ii) provide the Department with pertinent documentation, (iii) and allow the Department to conduct independent interviews of 'Stationary Source employees, subject to all rights of the Stationary Source and employees to be representedby legal counsel and/or management and union representatives>during such 'interviews. If u' i the course of the Department's Root Cause analysis or incident investigation access is required to areas of the Stationary Source which in the judgement of the Stationary Source require personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the Department shall provide it's personnel with such equipment and training. To the maximum extent feasible the Department shall coordinate any Root Cause analysis or incident investigation it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source to minimize the adverse impacts on the Stationary Source and/or its employees. No part of the conclusions, findings or recommendations of the Root Causeanalysis or incident investigation conducted by the Department or Stationary Source, relating to any Major Chemical Accident or Release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or Suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. (df) Process Hazards Analysis/Action Items. Process hazards analyses will be conducted for each of the Covered Processes not included in the federal program level 3 RMP according to one of the following methods: What-If ♦ Checklist What-If/Checklist ♦ Hazard and Operability Study{HAZUP) +► Failure Made and Effects Analysis (FMEA) r .Fault Tree Analysis, or An'a ro' riate a uivalent methodolo9v a roved by the Dgl2artment prior to conducting the process hazard gnalysis 2QThe process hazards analyses shall be conducted within l year of the effective date of this'Chapter and no later than the submittal elate of the Safety Plan. Previously I completed process hazards analyses that comply with Section 5>189 of Title '8 of CCR or CalARP are acceptable for the purposes of this Chapter. (Process hazards analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least every 5`,years after c_=omr)letien of the initial PHA- Updated and revalidated PI-iA(s) completed to comply with Section 5189 of Title 8 of CCR or CaIARP are acceptable for meeting the update and revalidation requirement t III9l9$ Page 8 .:::: .... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT ffl All PBAs shall be perfbMedby a team with Lx2grtise in mg-imp-ring and rocess esti ns and the team 'shall include at least n em to has ex fence and knowl e s ifxc to the roc s>belm evaluat Also one m ber of the team must be knowledgeable in the s iflc Ply meth dolo be` used. a (5)External events including seismic events shall bg considered for prosses eontainin a smbstwce rle ineo in the California Code a# BLegulations, Title 19 Chapter 4.51. ctio&.2770 5 if the distance to the nearest receptor for.,a worst case release>scen o_ s cified. by the California Code of Re ations Title 19 Cha ter 4.51 Section 2750.3 is be and the dis ce to a toxic or fl le Mdpoint as,d fined in California C e of Re ulations Dal >19 Choter 4.51 Section 2750.2Ca1. (6)For all covered processes,the Stationary Source shall consider the use of Inherently Safer Systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazardig analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities. „For all Covered Processes, the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazarda analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source as follows: all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed' within one year after submittal of the Safety Plan-, all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be<completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaroundof the applicable process``subsequent to one year after submittal of the Safety Plan unless the Stationary Source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Department that such a schedule is infeasible. For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall'retain, documentation of closure, and any associated justifications, of actions identified by the process hazards analysis. (eg) Accident History. >(D The Stationary>Source shall include in the S&1y Plan an accident'history of all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases from. June 1, 1952, through the date of Safety Plan submittal to the Department. For each Major Chemical Accident or Release the Stationary Source shall report the following information,to the extent known: date,time and approximate duration of the release; chemicals released, estimated quantity released in pounds; type of release event and it's source; weather conditions at the time of the release; on-site impacts, known off-site impacts; initiating event and contributing factors; Root Cause(s); 11/19198 Page'9 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT whether off-site responders were notified;and operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. 2 The, Statio Sours s all annuallA ajLbmit an accident history reporto the Depgtmeat. The_first annual Wort sW be due two years after ft ef. etive dme,o this ordinance and subse gent re arts shall be :due on gLe anniversarie of the effective date of the ordinance. 450-8,018 REVIEt AUDIT,AND INSPECTION. (a)> Upon submittal.of a Safety Plan by the Stationary Source, the Department shall review the Plan to determine if all the elements re aired by Sec 'on 450-8fl16 are included and com late: 1bg De ant h 1 ravide the S `o Source a wdtten,Notice of Deficienci & 'l'he Sigggn-M Source shad have 60 calendar s o recei t of the Notice of Deficiencies tam a m correctio . Thi✓ Statio Sa ce May re tzes in writin a ane time 0 calendar da extension to correct defici e" s. ftthe end of the 60 calm da s ar an ,extension eriad the Staticin sour a shall resub t e revised Safe Plan to the Denartment. a -After the I)e ant determine at the'Safe P is co lets the D arttnent sh '1 'slue a ppblic notice pgr gLe D artment's>.P blic Partici ti. n Pglicy and make portions of the Safety Plan which are not protected trade secret information available for public review. Public comments on the Safety Plan shall be taken by the Department'for a period of 4538 days after the&fet y_Plan is made available to the public. The Department shall schedule a public meeting Wr the Department's Public Participation Policy on the Stationary Source's Safety Plan withmaAef the 4538 clay comment period (dh) LUBased upon the Department's review of and public comment on the Safety Plan or, following a safety inspection or incident inspection done pursimant to Segtions to or g), or, fallowing an audit required by Section (e), the Department may require modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program submitted by the Stationary Source'to bring the Safety Plan or Safety Program--into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or SaLProgram are rewired, and any determination that no modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program are required shall be in writing, (collectively'referred to as the " _relit:mM Determination") shall be mailed to time Stationary Source and shall be made available to the public. The PreliminDeterminations 1 include an e_x_pjanation for ft,basis, of the revisions r fl ti indusia sUndgds. and id ii e such as AIC fCCpS Wdel` es d AaME and API dards to the ext rat that such idelines are licab e and shall include a timetable for their imetnentation. 2 he Statin 'Source shall es orad 'n writin ''to a Preli 'n Determ ion made in accordance with Sectio . The resp—onsg resp—onshall state that the StatigAW Source will irn lernent the revisions contain in the Prelim" 1?etermiri`tiara or shall state at Stationga Source re'ects the revis`ons in whole or-in For e ch rejected revision the Stabiop4a Source shall galain the b` is or re`ectin such revision. Such ex mlMation may include substitute revisions. 11119198 Page 10 CCAS REDLINE DRAFT 3 The writte res cense under Segtion; 2 all be reg ived b the } ent within 90 days of-ft .s e of the PreliminM Pgtermination or>a sheer fimg,jbe De gIlme t specifies in the Pre ' Determination as pecessjo roteet Iublic e' rd the environment. Prior to 1he'written res onse being due andupoa written re ust ftom the Station Sciurge the lie ent ma rovi e "n writin dzuc nal time for the' respon e to be received. 4 After>receivi the res nse from thStatio Stour a re uired in Ntion 3 the D artrnent the L7e attment will issue a ublic notice r the De is Public` Part`ci ation 'Polio mak both the Prelim' Determination and the Statim Sources res onse available for a 45 public review gLd comment pgfigd. The>Department ; will sch le a RMblic meetiLig, vgIthe Department's Public EqALCipigion, Poligy on the Prelimi Determination and the Stationga<Sources res'` nses within the 45-dgy public responseyeriod.' Followin theublic review and commenteriod; uixed ' Section b 4 the De art ent shall issue a'Final Determination of necess revisions tote Sghgy Plan and Safety Pro rare to the Stationar So-urge, The de artme t shall Aeveton a time table for im 'lementinth se revisions in coins t tion with the Stati Source. The'Final I?eterniination ma adopt or modify the substi to revisions rovided in the res se under Section b F` al Determination Iht ada'is a revision re`eeted b th Station` Source shall include an g lanation for the basis for'ada tia the revision. A; Final Dete nation that does not adopt a aubstitute r vi iom provided under Section >b shall include an explanation of the '<basis for finding such subg6 e revision easonable The'De,Vg=nt shall make the l#'nal Determinati n available for u lie review per the nggg ent's Public Participation Pol cv The Department may not impose additional requirements in a Safety Plan or 5 f, ely Program which would cause a violation of or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal° agency y s 11119/98 page 1 I CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Op Within 30 da s of the De artment's Final Determination made ursuant to Section &Q on the SqfW Plan and S#Lely Program, the StatiopM Source an(kor an son rna appeal the Final Determination to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14.4''by a' verified wri en notice of a eal filed wi the Clerk of the Board of-Swervi ors and 2gyment of the a licable>a al fee. Thea eal must be limited o issues raised in comments submitted during the public comment aeriod The notice shallstate the grounds for an such a eaL In acting on the avveal.the Board shaft have the same authori over the Safety Plan and Sade Program as the De artnent. The deci i n of the Board of Supervisors shall be final with respect to the Safety Plan and Safety'Pro ream {�{d) The Safety Plan shall be valid'for a period of three to five years at the discretion of the Department from the date of final action and shall b reviewed and updated by the S ILtioUM Source eve three to five yem at the discretion of the-De ament pursuant to the reguirements of this ordinance. Ary revisions to the 'Safety Plan as a result of the review and utidate shall be submitted to the Department and shall be subject to the provisions of this Section: (e) The Department 'shall review and audit the Statippary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section'450-8.016 at least,:once every three years Audits will be nnontized according to the following criteria: (1) Accident history of the Stationary Source (2) Accident history of other Stationary Sources in the same in4ustr� (3) Quantity of Regulated Substances present at the Stationary Some, (4) Location ,of the Stationary Source and its proxirni, the public and environmental receptors, (5) The presence of specific re gpulated substances (6) The hazards identified in the Safety Plan. The Stationary Source shall allow the Department to conduct these audits The Department, at its option, may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting said.audit. � } Within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release the 'Department may' commence a safe ins ection to review and audit the Station Source's com fiance with the provisions of Section 454-8.016. The Stationary Source shall allow the Department to conduct these insrrections. The Departmen at its option may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting said inspection. Within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release, the Deyartment''Ma commence an incident insnpetion with respect to the process involved in the incident Pursuant'to the>:orovisions of Section 450-8.016(e) *4 on the Sa4ty Plan way appeal the fi"64 11119/98 Page 12 .. .. CCHS REDLINE``DRAFT' appeal,a"eVA 41444-4- t-L.,-q Qffk eg the good egg 'd pwi4fiest ef" wlieable appeal fee. t-he —qqm---A author-45, e*er- the Safety Plan as the papfif#00fit. 4410 dogisio a Of the Reffd of 8t1Pet:N46eF9 shwl be 4R84 M4*feweat te the safety Plan. W Rod up" shop be (lh) Nothing in this section shall preclude, limit, or interfere in any way with the authority of the County to exercise its enforcement,,; investigatory, and information gathering authorities ander any other provision of law nor shall anything in the'Chapter effect or diminish the rights of the Stationary Source to claim legal privileges such as attorney client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the Department. (Ord. 98-_, §'2.) 450-8.020 TRADE SECRET. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section' 25538, as amended from time to time,or as otherwise protected or required by law. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450»8.022 COMMUNITY OUTREACH. The Department shall by December 31, 1998, employ an ombudsperson for Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in Contra Costa.County regarding environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the Department. The ombudsperson's role will be one of "complaint' prevention" as well as investigating concerns`and complaints, facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs,procedures, or issues: (Ord. 98-__, § 2.) 450-8.024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BANK. The Department shall collect and provide ready access, including the use of electronic accessibility as reasonably available, to public documents which are relevant to the goals of this chapter, including' at a minimum, business plan inventories and emergency response plans, Risk Management'Plans, Safety Plans, and Department incident reports. This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 11/19/98 Page 13 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 450-8.026 FEES. The Department may, upon a majority, vote of the Board of Supervisors, adopt a schedule of fees to be collected from each Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter. Any review, inspection, audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those casts reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter, including costs of staff and/or consultant time or public hearings and administrative' overhead. The fee schedule shall include the cost of the ombudsperson position. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8,028 PENALTIES. Regardless of the availability of ether civil or administrative' remedies and procedures for enforcing this chapter, every act or condition prohibitedor declared' unlawful' by this chapter, and every knowing or willful failure or omission to act'as required herein, is a violation of this code and shall be punishable and or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-6'of the County Ordinance Cade specifically'including but not limited to Article 14-6.4 thereof(public'nuisance). (Ord. 98-_3 § 2•) SECTION Ili. ORDINANCE NO. 9 -50. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No.96-50 is hereby repealed. SECTION IV. ORDINANCE NO. 96-20. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by>Ordinance 96-50,'is modified and added to the County Ordinance Code. CHAPTER 84-63 LAND USE PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIAI, Article 84-63.2 General Ordinance No. 98- (Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Waste or hazardous Material) The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Code). 11/19/98 Page 14' ........ ......... ......... ......... ...._.... ...... ............... ......... . ................................. ......... ......... ......... _...... . ................. . ......... ............... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT SECTION L SUAIMAR.Y. The County Ordinance Code requires land use permits for the specified>development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous'material in the L-Ilight industrial, W-3 controlled heavy industrial, and H-I heavy industrial land use districts. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 86-100, regulates land use permits for development projects' involving hazardous waste or hazardous material. This ordinance repeals Chapter 4-63, and adds a new Chapter 84-63 in its place. Articles 84-63.2, 4-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8,'84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as>.added'by this ordinance, sets forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material, which encourages business and other entities, in planning the project, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of the new Chapter 84-63 continue to require land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. Article 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63,' added by Ordinance No. 90-73, is renumbered and readopted in its entirety as Article 84-63.14. SECTION II. Chapter 84-63 of the County Ordinance Cade, added by Ordinance No. 86-100 and amended by Ordinances Nos. 91-49, 90-92 and 90-73, is repealed in its entirety, and is replaced by new Chapter 84-63,added by Section III of this ordinance. SECTION III. Chapter 84.63 is added to the County,Ordinance Code,to read:' 84-63.202 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to promote the health,;'safety and general welfare of residents and persons in the County by encouraging businesses` and other entities, in planning and developing projects involving hazardous material or hazardous waste, to consider factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community, and by requiring land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health,safety and the environment. (Ords. 98-_§ 5,'96-50 96-20, 90-92, 86- 100.) 84-63.204 Conflict. This chapter is not intended, and should not be deemed, to prevent or preempt compliance with federal or state laws, regulations, rules or orders, or to excuse compliance with any other County ordinance, including other requirements of this code. (Ords. 98'-_§5,96-50, 96-20 86-100.) Article 84-63.4 Definitions 84-63.402 General. As used in this chapter, the words and phrases defined in this article shall have the meanings given unless the context'otherwise requires. (Orris. 98 § 5 96-50, 96-20.) 11/19/98 Page 15 f _ _ __ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 84-63.404 "Baseline Period." "Baseline period" meansthe consecutive twelve month period of time during which activity is measured for purposes of this chapter. The baseline period shall be any twelve consecutive month period within five years of the date of the submittal of the application that is reflective of a normal year of operation. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 4-63.406 "Change-in-risk project." A "change;-in-risk project" means a new use of an existing building,structure,or facility,not involving construction other than:minor alterations, which use will involve a hazardous material or hazardous waste in a higher hazard category and which use will result in a hazard score higher than the hazard score of the previous use. (Ords. 98-_ § 5,96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.408 "Commercial property." "Commercial property" means all properties with a commercial designation in the general plan including but not limitedto the following,:, commercial,regional commercial, airport commercial, office,and business park. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.410 "Development project." (a) A "development project" means a new, permanent building, structure or facility to be constructed that will manage hazardous materials or hazardous waste, or a permanent change-in-risk project. As used in this section, "permanent" when used to describe"a building, structure, or; facility, or the new use of an existing building, structure, or facility (change-in-risk project) means that the building, structure,facility or use is intended to be in operation for more than six' months. (b)A"development project" does not include; (1) Pipelines and related equipment more than 300 feet from commercial or residential property. Related equipment includes, but is not limited r to, items such as valves, fittings, pipe supports, insulation, instrumentation, corrosion protection systems,, heat tracing systems, leak. containment systems, and fire protection'systems. Related' equipment does not include storage tanks, storage vessels, process units or plants, mechanical rotating equipment, (e,g., pumps, compressors, motors, turbines, internal combustion engines, etc.). However, the Zoning 'Administrator may determine,'at the Zoning Administrator's sole discretion, that miner equipment defined above as not related is exempt from the ordinance. (2) Any project consisting only of maintenance, repair, and replacement or minor modification of existing equipment provided the storage design capacity is not increased and the hazard category of hazardous material or hazardous waste handled 'is not increased: (3) Any transportable treatment unit that has obtained,all required,penults and is used solely for site remediation or waste treatment purposes, provided the 'transportable 11119/98 Page 16 .: . .. CCRS REDLINE DRAT treatment unit will be located on for a maximum time limit of one year. The Director of Community Development will have the authority'to grant a one year time extension if the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director that the unit is temporary. Otherwise, a land use permit will be required if the unit will remain on the site beyond the time limit specified above. (4) Any project for which;.permit applications have been deemed complete on or before the effective date of this chapter by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District' or other government agency with jurisdiction over the, project provided the project' application has been deemed complete within one calendar year and has completed'' CEQA'documentation. The proponent of a project described by subsection,(4) of subdivision;(b) of this section' may elect to be subject to the requirements of this chapter in lieu of any requirements in effect prior to the effective date of this chapter. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20,90-92, 86-104.) 84-63.412 "Dispose." "Dispose" means to discharge,deposit,inject, clump,'or place any hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or,be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,' including ground waters. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20,86-100.) 84-63.414 11Fquipment.11 "Equipment" means pipes, pumps, vessels and, other similar types of apparatus. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.416 "Facility." "Facility" means a group of buildings, structures, or units with the same purpose on contiguous parcels (including parcels separated by a right-of-way, as defined in section 1002-2.002 of this Code)under common ownership or control. (Orris. 8-_§ 5,96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.418 "Finished Product" means a material which can be sold to market as a commodity. 84-63.420 "Hazardous material." "Hazardous material" means any material that, because of its quantity,concentration,or physical or chemical characteristics,poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment,and includes any material that is listed in the Code of Federal Regulations,Title 49, Section 172. 101 (Hazardous Materials Table), as amended from time to time. (Orris. 98-_§'5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.422 "Hazardous waste." "Hazardous waste" means any substance which is regulated as a hazardous waste by the California Department of health Services under 22 11/19198 Page 17 CCHs REDLINE DRAFT California Administrative Code, Division 4, Chapter 30, or defined as a hazardous waste under Health& Safety Code section 25117, generallyas follows: (a) "Hazardous waste" means either of the following: (I) A waste, or combination of wastes, which because'of its quantity, concentration, or physical,chemical,or infectious characteristic may either: (A) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,or incapacitating reversible illness. (B) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or environment when improperly treated,stored.,transported,or disposed of,or otherwise managed'. (2) A waste which meets any of the criteria for the identification of a hazardous waste' adapted by the State Department of Toxic Substance Control pursuant to the Health & Safety Code section 25141. (b) "Hazardous waste" includes,but is not limited to, federal Resource Conservation and Recover Act("ftCR:A")hazardous waste,extremely hazardous waste and acutely hazardous waste. (Orris. 98-_ § 5,96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) 84-63.424 "Intermediate Product" means a material which requires further process treatment on-site or off-site to produce a finished product which can be sold as a commodity. 84-63.426 "Manage." "Manage" means to generate, treat, store, transport, use or dispose of hazardous material or hazardous waste. (Orris. 98-®§ 5, 96-50,96-20, 86-100.) 84.63.428 "Process Unit" means a collection of interconnected vessels and equipment' designed to separate, purify, react, combine or otherwise chemically or physically after one or more feed materials, to produce one or more finished or intermediate products and associated wastes, defined by plot or boundary limits. For example, a catalytic cracking unit, a hydrocracking complex, etc. Pieces of'a process unit such as 'pumps, compressors, towers, reactors,vessels, and other such equipment and appurtenances,do not constitute,a process unit. 84-63.430 "Project Description." "Project description" means a written description and explanation of the construction and operation of a development project. A project description shall address all phases of and for the life of the project. The project description shall include the following information as well as any other information deemed necessary by the Community Development Director for the purpose of determining the hazard score: 11/19/98 Page 18 CCHS12Ia ELIDE DRAFT (a) A description of the facility location with respect to major freeways and immediate neighbors, and the size (in square footage or acreage) of the property on which the facility is located. (fir) An area map showing the facility in relationship to the surrounding community; and (c) A description of all significant operations involving hazardous material and/or hazardous waste currently being managed, and/or proposed to be managed,'including a brief general history of the facility. {d} A summary of the baseline data for all five years and a justification for the selection of the representative baseline year of data used in the calculation of the hazard.score. The Community Development Director may wive the requirement of submitting any or all of the information required by paragraphs (a)'through(d),'above. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.432 "Residential property "Residential property" means all properties with a residential designation in the general plan, including but not limited to the following: single family residential,multiple family residential, and mobile homes. (Orris. 98-- § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.434 "Sensitive receptor. The term "sensitive receptor" includes schools,general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, licensed child day care facilities, and similarly less-mobile populations, and detention facilities including jails, youth camps and other locked facilities. These facilities have more than twelve people. For the purposes of this section, "general acute care hospital" has the meaning set' forth in Health and Safety Code section 1250(a), "long term health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1418(a) and "child day care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1596.750. "School" means any school used for the purpose of the education of more than 12 children in kindergarten or any grades i to 12, inclusive. (Orris. 984-§ 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.436 "Store." "Store" means an act to contain;hazardous waste or hazardous material for any period of time in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste or hazardous material. (Orris. 9$'-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 86-100.) 84-63.438 "Transport." "`transport" or "transportation" means: 'an act to move hazardous waste or hazardous material by truck,rail,marine vessel or pipeline. (Orris. 98-- § 5,96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.6 Applicability 11/19/98 Page 19 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 84»63.602 Applicability. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person proposing a development project in the '1J-1 light industrial district, the W»3 controlled heavy industrial district, or the H-1 heavy industrialdistrict shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. In addition, except as otherwise provided'' in this chapter, any person proposing a development project in a P-1 planned unit district on land''designated for industrial' use in the general plan shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20, 86-100.) 84-63,604 Exemptions. The following projects and structures are 'exempt from the provisions of this chapter: (a) Any project built solely to comply with federal., state, regional' or local agency enforcement orders under a compliance time schedule that precludes timely review under this chapter. This section is primarily intended to allow exemptions for compliance with laws, regulations, rules, or administrative or judicial Girders such as nuisance abatement orders or other short-term or immediately necessary actions. This section is not intended to allow automatic'' exemptions for projects being undertaken to comply with changed federal, state, regional or local laws. A 'facility claiming an exemption under this section,,must file a copy of the enforcement order and'proposed project description within thirty(30)days of receipt of the order. (b) if any building, structure, or facility is destroyed or damaged by>disasters such as earthquakes, floods, offsite fires, or an act of gad or the public enemy,the facility may be rebuilt under the following conditions. (1) The rebuilt project is used for the same ''purpose as the destroyed damaged' project, (2) The rebuilt project complies with all environmental regulations in effect at the time of rebuilding, including Best Available Control''Technology';'(SACT) or at least the same level of control that previously existed, whichever 'provides the greater level of protection to the public, (3) The rebuilt project does not have a higher hazard score than the destroyed or damaged project (both rebuilt and destroyed or damaged project to be'scored as if they are new); (4) The hazard category of chemicals used in the rebuilt project is not greater than used by the destroyed or damaged'project; (5) Construction is commenced within one year unless an extension is granted by the Community Development Director, (6) The rebuilt project is at least 300 feet away from the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor and no closer to the nearest residential'property or sensitive receptor than the destroyed or damaged project; and (7) The rebuilt project will .not manage Hazard'Category A materials in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged'project, will not manage hazardous wastes in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project, will not''manage Hazard Category'B materials in quantities greater than 10% more than the amount .managed. by 11/19/98 Page 20 CCAS REDLINE DRAFT the destroyed or damaged project, and will not manage Hurd Category C materials in quantities greater than 10%more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project. (c) A development projectin which both the size, as defined in section 84-63.1012 and the monthly transportation quantity are less than; (1) for Hazard Category C materials-4000'tons (2)for Hazard Category B materials - 5 tons (3) for Hazard Category A materials - the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials List (Appendix A to 40 C.F.R Chapter I. Subchapter J, Part 355, as amended from time to >.time), or 500 pounds,' whichever is less. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) Article 84-63.8 Standards and Procedures 84-63.802 Application for Applicability Determination; Exemption. Any person proposing a development project which may be used to manage hazardous waste or hazardous material shall apply to the Community 'Development Director for review and a determination whether a land use permit may be required under Article 84-63.10 or whether the; project is exempt under section 84-63.604(a) or (b) or 84-63.606. Projects exempt under section 8463.604(c)are not required to submit an application pursuant to this section. If the hazard score of a project is 69 or less and the'project does not increase the amount of hazardous waste or hazardous material managed as compared to the baseline of the last three years, a determination of non-coverage and an application,therefor are not required. The application shall include all information necessary to complete and verify the hazard score of the project, such as chemical identification, distances to nearest receptors, transportation routes, and a summary of the five year baseline data. The application shall be accompanied by all fees established by the Board of Supervisors. (Orris. 98 § 5, 96-50,96-20, 91-49,90-.92, 86.100.) 84-63.804 Application, Review,'Determination. No later than 'ten calendar'days after receipt of an application, or the submittal of additional information, the Community Development Director shall inform the applicant in writing that the application is complete or shall inform the applicant what additional information is required. Within twenty calendar days of the application being deemed complete, the``Community'Development Director shall issue a written determination of non-coverage pursuant to section 84-63.806, an exemption pursuant to section 84-63.604 (a) or (b), or a determination that a land use permit is required pursuant to section 84-63.1002. (Orris. 98'-_ § 5,96-50, 96-20, 90-92.) 11119198 Page 21 CCHS R MLINE DRAFT 84-63.806 Determination,of non-coverage. 'Upon determiningthat a proposed project has a hazard score up to and including 79 or that the project is exempt'pursuant to section 84- 63.604, the Community Development Director shall issue a determination of non-coverage or exemption. A determination of non-coverage for projects with a hazard score between 70 and 79, inclusive, means that the project is not subject to the requirements of article 84-63.10, but is subject to sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. Projects with a hazard score below 69 and projects which are exempt pursuant to sections 84-63.604 are not subject to the requirements of sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.808 Determinations - Public Notice. All determinations of nein-coverage made pursuant to section 84-63.806 shall be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator within ten calendar days of issuance of the determination. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20,91-49,90-92, 96100.) 84-63,810 Determinations - Further Public Notice. For projects with a point assignment between 70 and 79, inclusive, within five working days of issuing a determination of non-coverage, the Community Development_Director shall mail notice on the date of the determination to all organizations and individuals who have previously submitted a written request for such notice. The Community'Development Director shall publish a tour-inch by six inch advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation within ten calendar days of issuing a determination of non-coverage. The notices required'by this section shall state the name of the applicant,briefly describe the project, provide the names and phone numbers of a representative of the Community Development Department and a representative of the applicant who will be available to answer questions about the project, and shall state the>date by which an appeal must be filed. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20,91-49, 90-92.) 84-63.812 Appeals. Any appeal of a determination of non-coverage shall be filed within ten calendar days of the date the determination is listed on the Zoning Administrator's agenda or ten calendar days from the date of publication pursuant to section 84-63.810, whichever provides the longer period of appeal. Appeals from a determination of non-coverage shall' be heard by the Board of Supervisors. Except as expressly provided in this section, appeals from all decisions and determinations made pursuant to this chapter shall be governed by the land use permit;provisions of article 26-2.24 and are subject to the provisions of article 26-2.30. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.10 Land Use Permits-When Required 11119/98 Page 2 _ _ __ CCHSREDLINE DRAFT 84-63.1002 Hazard Score; Permit Required. Unless otherwise >.exempt from the requirements of this chapter, a land use permit shall be 'required for a development project proposed for the management of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste if any of the following apply; (a) the development project obtains a hazard score of 80 or more pursuant to the formula set forth in section 8463.1004 or (b) for hazard category A materials, the development project stores twice the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning (quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials''List (Appendix A of 40 Code of Federal Regulations Chapter 1,;.Subchapter J Part 355), as amended from time to time, or 2000 pounds,whichever is less; or (c) for hazard category A or B materials, the development project will result in a`new process unit(s) unless the process unit complies with Section 84-63.1004 d) 1 through 6 - Credit' for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing,' process unit does not constitute a new process unit,or (d) for hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with Section '84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6 - Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. subject to the provisions of this article. (Orris. 98-_ § 5,96-50, 36-20.) 84-63.1004 Hazard Scare. (a) Formula. The hazard score of a proposed development project shall be determined pursuant to the following formula; I(T+C +P)xHj +D+A; where the following symbols have the following designations: "T" refers to the point assignment for"Transportation Risk"; "rD", refers to the point assignment for"Community Risk- Distance;;from Receptor"; "C" refers to the point'assignment for"Community Risk.-Type of Receptor"; "A" refers to the point;assigriment for"Facility Risk-Size of Project-Total Amount"; "P" refers to the point assignment for "Facility Risk- Size of Project-Percent Change"; and "H" refers to the point assignment for "Hazard Category of Material or Waste. (b) Project Hazard Score. If more than one category of hazardous material or hazardous waste is used, the formula set forth in this section will be used to calculate a separate score for l 1J19l98 Page 23 _ _ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT each material category. The material hazard category which results in the highest hazard scare for the project will be used. (c) Point Assignment. The factors set forth in subdivision (a), above, shall have the followingpoint assignments: TRANSPORTATION RISK(T) POINTS Truck- residential/commercial 10 (>25%increase or new) Truck-residential/commercial 9 (>5 -25 % increase) Truck-Industrial(>25%increase or new) 8 Truck Industrial(>5 - 25%increase) 7 Rail - (>25%increase or new) b Rail- (>5 - 25%increase) 5 Marine Vessel-(>5%increase) 3 Pipeline -(>5%increase) 1 0- 5%increase 0 COMMUNITY RISS Distance'of project from receptor(D): 0-300 deet 30 >300-400 feet 29 >400 - 550 feet 28 >550 700 feet 21 >700-900 feet 26' >900- 1200 feet 25 11/19198 Page 24 _ ._ _ ComREDLINE DRAFT >1200-1500 feet 24 >'1500- 1800'feet 23 >1800 - 2100 feet 22 >2100 -2500'feet 21 >2500 -2800 feet 20 >2800-3240 feet 19' >3200 -3500 feet 18 >3500 - 3800 feet 17 >3800 4000 feet 1 >4000-4200 feet 15 >4200 - 4500 feet 14 >4500 - 4800 feet 13 >4800- 5400 feet 12 >5400 - 5700 feet 11 >5700 - 6000 feet 10; >6000 6500 feet g >6500--7300 feet g >7300 8000 feet 7 >8000-'8600 feet >8600 - 10,000 feet 5 >10,000 - 11,000 feet 4 >1 1,000 - 12,540 feet 3 11119/98 Page 25 CCHSREDLINE DRAFT >12,500- 14,000 feet >14,000 15,840 feet 1 Type of receptor(C); Sensitive Receptor 7 Residential Property 5 Commercial Property 4 FACILITY RISK: SIZE OF PROJECT Total Amount of Change,tons(Conversion to tons; 1 ton=2000 pounds)(A): >40,000 30 >32,000 40,000 29 > 18,000 -32,000 28 >10,000 - 18,000 27'' >6,000 10,000 26 >400 6,000 25 >2,100-4,000 24 >1,200 -2,100 23 >750 1,2013 22, >400 -750 21 >200- 400 20 >150-200 19' 11/19/98 Page 26 f ... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT >90 -150 18 >50 - 90 17 >30 - 50 16 >20 - 30 15 >10 - 20 14 >6 - 10 13 >4 - 6 12 >2 - 4 11 >1 -2 10 >0.8 - 1 9 >0.5 - 0.8 8 >0.35 - 0.5 7 >0.25 - 0.35 6 >0.20 - 0.25 5 >0. 18 - 0.20 4 >0. 14 - 0.18 3 >0. 12 - 0.14 2 >0. 10 - 0. 12 1 no change (0. 10 or less) 0 Percent Change(P) New 6 >200% 5 11/19/98 Page 27 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT >100%- 200% 4 >50% - 100% 3 >10% - 50% 2 >1% - 10% 1 0%-1% 0 HAZARD CATEGORY OF MATERIAL (H) Category A 5 Category 13 3 Category C 1 (d) Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. A development project that would have a hazard score of 80 or more as determined by the formula in this section shall be entitled to a reduction credit for project closures and/or reductions in accordance with the criteria set forth in this subdivision. Reduction credit shall be given if the Community Development Director determines that the applicant will concurrently close another project or reduce its operations and finds that all of the following criteria are met. (1) The project to be closed or reduced is in the same facility in which the development project is proposed. (2) The project to be closed or reduced is currently in operation and has been in operation for at least three years prior to the date of application, during which period the production schedule has been reflective of a normal production schedule; (3) The project to be closed or reduced is the direct result of the proposed development project; (4) The project to be closed or reduced has a higher hazard score than the proposed development project; (5) The hazard category of the material or waste in the development project will be no greater than the hazard category of the material or waste in the project to be closed or reduced;and (6) The development project will be more than 300 feet from the property line of the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor. The hazard score for the project to be closed shall also be determined by the formula set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section and pursuant to the provisions;of this article. An 11/19/98 Page 28 . _... _........ ....._._. _... ._. . .._.. __ ..................................................... ...._.... ........_... .1111 .. ._. ......... _.............._.. .. ........ ....... ........... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT determining the hazard score for the project to be closed or reduced, said project shall be deemed a new project. The hazard score of the development project shall be subtracted from the hazard score of the project to be closed or reduced. The resulting difference will then be subtracted from the hazard score of the development project to obtain a hazard score adjusted i for the closure or reduction. The adjusted hazard score shall be the basis for determining whether a land use permit shall be required under this chapter. A determination by the Community Development Director that a project is not subject to the land use permit requirement of this chapter as a result of credit afforded for a project closure or reduction shall be reported to the Zoning Administrator pursuant to section 84-63.808 and shall be subject to the public notification requirements set forth in section 84-63.810. (e) Closure, reduction required. Projects proposed for closure or reduction for which closure or reduction credit was afforded under this section shall be closed or reduced as proposed within one year of completion of the development project. This subdivision (e) applies only in cases where a land use permit would have been required but for the closure or reduction credit afforded under this section. (lards. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1006 Determination of Transportation Risk. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated based upon planned total quantities of materials in a hazard category, measured in terms of tons per year for each hazard category proposed. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated for each modeof transportation proportionally within a single hazard category. That transportation point assignment shall be compared by hazard category with the total amount of material in the hazard category transported during the baseline period in order to obtain the percent change in section 8463.1004(b), Transportation Risk. For purposes of determining whether truck transportation is through residential/commercial or industrial areas, the shortest legal route from the closest two-lane (or larger) freeway shall be considered. if the route used in the County does not traverse a two-lane (or larger) freeway,the entire route shall be considered. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1008 Determination of Community Risk - Distance to Receptor. "Distance to Receptor" shall be the shortest distance between an exterior wall or other part of the development project and the property line of the residential property, commercial property or the sensitive receptor used to determine the hazard score of a development project. (Orris. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1010 Determination of Community Risk - Type of Receptor. A hazard score shall be developed for each type of receptor (residential property, commercial property and sensitive receptor) within three miles of the development project based upon the distance of the 11/19/98 Page 29 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT parcel of each type of receptor that is closest to the development project. The receptor that produces the highest hazard score shall be used to determine the hazard score of the development project. Receptors more than three miles from a development project shall not be considered. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1012 Determination of Project Risk - Size. The size of a development project shall be measured in terms of tons of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste stored as a result of the development project, based upon the fill-to-the-maximum capacity of the development project, including amounts stored in tanks; reactors; columns; 'process lines; tank cars, tank trucks or rail cars when connected to process equipment; or any other receptacle used for the containment of hazardous materials and/or hazardous wastes. The amount of material in hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project will be used to determine the total amount of change. If more than one category of hazardous material is used, the amounts of materials (A, B, or C) shall be used with the respective'hazard category in the formula in section 84-63.1004. The specific gravity of hazardous materials or hazardous wastes may be required to calculate the number of tons (or pounds) of hazardous materials and/or hazardous waste managed at the development project. The standard of 2000 pounds equaling one (1)ton shall be used. The point assignment for storage of containerized material in buildings, such as labs or warehouses, shall be based upon the maximum anticipated amount of materials for each hazard category as a result of the development project. (Ords. 98 § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1014 Determination of Project Risk- Percent Change. The percent change of a hazard category shall be determined by comparing the amounts of materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project to the total amount of all materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C'handled at the site from the baseline period. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1016 Determination of Hazard Category. (a) Method of Determination. The hazard category of a material or waste shall be determined pursuant to this section. (1) The primary method of determining the material hazard category of a hazardous waste or material shall be by reference to the hinter 1994 version of the U.S. Department of Transportation ("D.O.T.") Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 ("149 CFR"), Section 172. 101, Hazardous Materials Table." From columns (3) and (5), extract the "Hazard Class or Division" and "Packing Group" information, then proceed to 49 CFR 173.2 to determine the "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision (c) of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. If a material is listed in 49 CFR 172. 101 more than once, the rating that results in the highest hazard category shall be used. The hazard category of a mixture is determined according to its common name as defined in Title 49. 11/19/98 Page 30 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (2) Where a hazardous material, waste, or mixture is not referenced in 49 CFR 172. 101, and the hazard category cannot be determined using the primary method, refer to the manufacturer's MSDS for the D.O.T. "Hazard Class or Division," "Packing Group" and "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision (c) of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. (3) Where the preceding methods are not successful, the Contra Costa County Health Services Director or his designee shall be responsible for determininga material's hazard category. (4) Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth above, materials with the word "poison" in column(6)of 49 CFR 172. 101, Methyl chloride, and the metals Antimony, Mercury, Lead, Arsenic, Thallium and Cadmium and their compounds, shall be Hazard Category A materials, and denatured alcohol and methanol shall be Hazard Category B materials for purposes of this chapter. (b) Exclusions. Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth in subdivision (a), above, Hot Coke, Hot Coal Briquettes, and materials not regulated by D.O.T. or which have no D.O.T. Hazard Class or Division are not regulated by this chapter. (c)Hazard Categories. Hazard Category A Materials I. Forbidden Materials As referenced in 49 CFR 173.21 and 173.54. II. Explosives and Blasting Agents Class 1, as defined in 49 CFR 173.50(b)(1)through 173.50(b)(6). III. Reactive Materials A. Air Reactive Materials - Class 4, Division 4.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(b)(1) and (2). B. Water Reactive Materials - Class 4, Division 4.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(c). C. Organic Peroxides - Class 5, Division 5.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.128. IV. Radioactive Materials Class 7 as defined in 49 CFR 173.403(y). V. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group I 11/19/98 Page 31 __ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a) when Packing Group I is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(1). VI. Poisons, D.O.T. A. Poisons, Class 6, Division 6.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.133 (applies to all hazard zones). B. Infectious Substances, Class 6, Division 6.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.134. VII. Poison Gas Class 2, Division 2.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(c). Hazard Category B Materials VIII. Flammable Liquids Class 3 Packing Groups I and II as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(a). IX Flammable Solids Class 4, Division 4.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(a). X. Oxidizers, D.O.T. Packing Group II Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(x) when Packing Group 11 is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(ii). XI. Flammable Gases Class 2, Division 2.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(a). XII. Corrosives,D.O.T. Packing Group I or II Class 8 Packing Groups I or II as defined in 49 CFR 173.136(a)and 173.137(a)and(b). Hazard Catewa C Materials XIII. Non-flammable Compressed Gases Class 2, Division 2.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(b). 11/19/98 Page 32 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT XIV. Combustible Liquids Class 3 Packing Group III as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(b). XV. Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials Class 9 as defined in 49 CFR 173.155. XVI. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group IH Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a) when Packing Group III is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(iii). XVII. Corrosives D.U.T. Packing Group III Class 8 Packing Group III as defined in CFR 49 173.136(a)and 173.137 (c). (Ards. 98-_ §5, 96-50,96-20.) Article 84-63.12 Land Use and Variance Permits 84-63-1202 Granting. An applicant for a land use permit shall submit a project description. Land use permits required under this chapter may be granted in accordance with the provisions of chapters 26-2 and 82-6. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) Article 84-63.14 Offsite Hazardous Waste Facility Compliance With County Hazardous Waste Management Plan 84-63.1402 Authority. This article is enacted pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 25135.4 and 25135.7, concerning the siting of offsite hazardous waste facilities. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73.) 84-63.1404 Definitions. (a) General. Unless otherwise specified in this section or indicated by the context, the terms used in this article have the meanings ascribed to them in Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.5 (§ 25100 et seq.). (b) „County Hazardous Waste Management Plan" means the county hazardous waste management plan adopted by the Board of Supervisors on August 29, 1989 and amended by the Board of Supervisors on January 30, 1990, approved by a majority of the cities within the county which contain a majority of the population of the incorporated area, and approved by the State Department of Health Services on February 28, 1990, as said plan is amended from time to time. 11/19/98 Page 33 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (c) "Hazardous waste facility" means all contiguous land and structures, other appurtenances, and improvements on the land used for the treatment, transfer, storage, resource recovery, disposal, or recycling of hazardous waste. A hazardous waste facility may consist of one or more treatment, transfer, storage, resource recovery, disposal, or recycling hazardous waste management units, or combinations of these units. (d) "Offsite hazardous waste facility" means a hazardous waste facility at which either or both of the following occur: (1) Hazardous waste that is produced offsite is treated, transferred, stored, disposed or recycled. (2) Hazardous waste that is produced onsite is treated,transferred,stored, disposed or recycled and the hazardous waste facility is not owned by, leased to or under the control of the producer of the hazardous waste. Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-20, 96-50, 90-73.) 84-63.1406 County Hazardous Waste Management. All land use permit, variance or other land use entitlement granted for the operation or expansion of an offsite hazardous waste facility shall be consistent with the portions of the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan which identify siting criteria, siting principles or other policies applicable to hazardous waste facilities. Before granting the application,the division of the planning agencyhearing the matter initially or on appeal shall find that the application complies with the applicable siting criteria, siting principles and other policies identified in the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan, and that the proposed offsite hazardous waste facility is consistent with the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73; Health& Safety Code, §§ 25135.4. 25135.7.) 84-63.1408 Exclusion. The requirements of this article do not apply to projects which are exempt projects under section 84-63.604. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73.) SECTION V. SEVERABILITY. This ordinance shall be construed to achieve its purpose and preserve its validity. If any provision or clause of this ordinance or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect either provisions or applications of this ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the ordinance are declared to be severable and are intended to have independent validity. 11/19/98 Page 34 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT SECTION VI. PREEMPTION. Nothing in this ordinance is intended, and nor shall it be deemed, to excuse or prevent compliance with any state or federal law. If any provision of this ordinance, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be preempted by any applicable state or federallaw, the Board of Supervisors declares that its intent(1)that such provision be severable from the remainder of the ordinance, and (2) that the remainder of the ordinance be given effect in accordance with the provisions of Section I of this ordinance. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between this ordinance and applicable federal or state statutes or regulations, the federal or state requirements shall control. SECTION VL EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance becomes effective 30'days after passage, and within 15 days after passage shall be published once with the names of the Supervisors voting for and against it in the CONTRA COSTA TIMES, a newspaper published in this County. PASSED on by the following vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTEST: Phil Batchelor, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and County Administrator By: Deputy Chair [SEAL] hmind6.doc 11/19/98 Page 35 I' i M JAY . . 2300 MacCorkle Avenue, S.E. - Charleston, West Virginia 25304 (304) 346-6264 - (800)282-2796 - FAX(304)345-6349 - E-mail: nicsinfo@aol.com November 18, 1998 Lewis G, Pascalli, Jr, Director, Hazardous Materials Program Contra Costa Health Services 4333 Pacheco Boulevard Martinez, CA 94553 r Dear Mr scalli: Enclosed is the final report to the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors regarding our review of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, in partial fulfillment of Contract No, 23- 222-1 between the county and the National Institute for Chemical Studies. I will be prepared to present this report at the Board meeting December 1, 1998. Thank you for the opportunity to work on this project. Sincerely, Mark A, Scott President ------------- ss RtK�'R K r � Brady PcI3fOn Su'@!fl`#iSkft' REPORT TO THE CONTRA COSTA COUNTY" BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Review of Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Contra Costa County, CA Contract No. 23-222-1 National Institute for Chemical Studies (MICS) 2300 MacCorkle Avenue, SE Charleston, WV 25304 (304)346-6264 nicsinfo@aol.com Mark A. Scott, President Jan R. Taylor, Ph.D., Vice President Principal Investigators November 19, 1998 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) REVIEW OF PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Protecting the public from industrial accidents is an obvious concern in Contra Costa County. Based upon records made available by county staff, there have been a number of significant chemical accidents and releases in the county since at least 1989. The steps being taken by the county to amend and replace Ordinance 96-50 are important for the future protection of county residents and the environment. The National Institute for Chemical Studies (NILS) has undertaken an evaluation of the proposed :Industrial Safety Ordinance before the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors. Additionally, MICS has reviewed existing Ordinance 96-50,the Safe Communities draft ordinance, and a draft ordinance offered by Supervisor Uilkema. Based upon our knowledge and research,no other state or local government jurisdiction has enacted an ordinance with such far-reaching public safety requirements as contained in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance adds several new public safety provisions not contained in the existing Ordinance 96-50. Compliance with these requirements by the regulated community should provide a greater degree of protection to county residents. Addition of a required Safety Plan and Program for all,processes in large refineries and chemical plants in the unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County should enhance public safety and the environment. Land use permit requirements are appropriate for new processes using Hazard Category A or B chemicals and permanent change in risk projects. The land use permit provides additional levels of review for new potential hazards that will be present for longer periods of time. NICE recommends that the Board of Supervisors consider several amendments for improving the proposed ordinance. Several of these recommendations are to modify language to make the meaning of the ordinance more clear; these recommendations are detailed in the body of the report. Other recommendations address public safety and participation: the definition of "accidental release"; increasing the public comment period for review of safety plans; amendment of the roles of the Community Ombudsperson; allowing for increased penalties for serious violations and other general recommendations. NILS recommends that the Board of Supervisors adopt the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance with the suggested amendments. Report to the Contra Costa Hoard of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) REPORT TO THE CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS REVIEW OF PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE National Institute for Chemical Studies November 19, 1998 INTRODUCTION This report is submitted to the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors by the National Institute for Chemical Studies (MICS), in fulfillment of a contract to review and evaluate the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. Scope of contract The scope of this contract as developed by the Board of Supervisors directed MICS to do the following: Review the Industrial Safety Ordinance that was presented to the Board of Supervisors on August 11, 1998; the existing Ordinance 96-50; the Safe Communities Ordinance; and the proposed.Industrial Safety Ordinance of December 2, 1997 (introduced by Supervisor Uilkema) from an agency's perspective. Provide commenton all areas of the ordinance but focus on the following: --the agency's ability to implement and enforce this ordinance --the land use aspects of the ordinance --the overall public safety elements Methodology NICS undertook the following tasks to complete this project: ■ Reviewed the provisions of Ordinance 96-50 and the three proposed ordinances • Met with county officials to review the scope of the project and receive background information(see Appendix A) ■ Met with key stakeholders identified by the county to solicit input on the proposed ordinance and identify critical issues(see Appendix B) 2 Report to the Contra Costa.Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICO ■ Reviewed documents provided by the county and key stakeholders(see Appendix C) ■ Reviewed video and audio tapes of six of the seven public meetings, and reviewed the summary notes prepared by county staff of one meeting where recording equipment was not operable ■ Conducted follow-up telephone calls with county staff and stakeholders as necessary to clarify comments or seek additional information ■ Participated in conference calls on October 14 and.October 21 with county officials to provide progress reports ■ Prepared and submitted final report to Board of Supervisors 3 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) EVALUATION OF ISSUES Both the existing ordinance 96-50 and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, as well as the other two drafted ordinances, are intended to increase public safety by reducing risks from industrial facilities. This purpose guided MICS' review of these ordinances, that is,the provisions of these ordinances were evaluated in terms of public safety, first and foremost. This required the evaluation of both the land use elements and risk management considerations throughout the ordinances. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance was compared with Ordinance 96-50 using the following criteria: 1) Does the proposed ordinance address risks not previously addressed? 2) Does the proposed ordinance provide incentives to reduce risk? 3) Does the proposed ordinance reduce or prevent the creation of new risk? 4) Can the proposed ordinance be implemented and enforced effectively? The other drafted ordinances were also assessed to determine if provisions found in those ordinances could strengthen the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance(ISO). Proposed Chapter 84-53,Land Use Permits for Development Project Involving Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Material. Proposed Chapter 84-63 requires land use permits and substantial public review for development projects that could pose significant risk to the community and the environment. The proposal differs from the existing Chapter 84-63 in ordinance 96-50 in several significant ways. Interviews with key stakeholders and review of the videotapes and audiotapes',from the public workshops around Contra Costa County provided NILS with a clear picture of the issues important to citizens, industry and government in the county. These issues will be addressed in our review of the ordinances. Applicability. In the proposed ordinance, applicability is specifically targeted at industrial districts. In 96-50, all non-agricultural districts are subject to the provisions of the chapter. It is highly likely that any development projects that would otherwise be subject to the land use permitting provisions would occur in industrial districts. However, to assure that no projects "slip through the cracks,"to assure the public that there is no intent to eliminate coverage, and to prevent the creation of potential new risk, MICS recommends that the language in 96-50 be retained. 4 __ Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) Land Use permit Required. The proposed ordinance requires a land use permit for development projects with a hazard score of 80 or greater. This is the threshold score developed by the Hazardous Materials Commission after extensive work with the scoring system. According to individuals who served on the Commission during that time,the threshold value was determined by scoring hundreds of development projects,both real and hypothetical. The scored projects were judged to be of varying degrees of riskiness using the professional judgement of the Commissioners. The score of 80 was then chosen so that the more hazardous development projects would require the land use permit. This score was set at a level where many projects might be redesigned to lower the hazard score below the threshold to avoid the land use permit process. In lowering the score to avoid the land use permit,risk to the community and the environment would concurrently be reduced. NICS reviewed documents from the hazard scoring process. Dozens of the projects were reviewed by NICS staff member,Peter Howell,PE, an experienced chemical engineer with many years in process safety and accident review. Mr. Howell rated these projects and other projects °with which he was familiar using the Hazard Score formula. Subsequent evaluation by NICS concluded that the Hazardous Materials Commission had done a good job in setting a reasonable threshold that would:meet public safety needs. (See Appendix D for an evaluation of the Hazard Scoring methodology) However, in addition to the hazard score threshold for change-in-risk projects(new use of existing structures), the proposed ordinance adds provisions that have significant public safety benefits. The most significant of these is the requirement of a land use permit for any new process that uses hazard category A or B materials(unless the process unit complies with the requirements for receiving credit for reductions or projects to be closed). The land use permit process triggers a CEQA review. This review allows for significant public input into the development process. CEQA review is appropriate for land use permits since process units, once constructed, are typically operated on a long-term basis and should be carefully assessed for the potential to create negative effects on public safety and the environment. Implementation of the land use permit provisions and any subsequent CEQA review by the county may necessitate involvement by Health Services Department staff. Contra Costa County Health Services personnel assured NICS that current staff in the Hazardous Materials Program can implement this portion of the ordinance. Enforcement of the land use permit requirement will depend on the ability of the Community Development Department(CDD) staff to be aware of development activities that may be subject to land use permits. Health Services Department staff may monitor facility activities during safety inspections under proposed chapter 450-8 and report those to the CDD,but more likely, facility activities will be reported to the Departments through the application for various permits. This may mean that some development activities 5 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) might slip through the cracks,but in general, sufficient enforcement ability will be available to the department, and to citizens through the public notice process. Proposed Chapter 450-8,Risk Management Proposed Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations based upon the federal Risk Management Program (RMP)rule and the California Accidental Release Prevention(CalARP)program. This chapter goes beyond the requirements of the federal and state programs in its goal to improve industrial safety. The proposal is a completely new addition to the County Code and did not exist with Ordinance 96-50. Interviews with key stakeholders and review of the videotapes and audiotapes from the public workshops around Contra Costa County again gave NICE a clear 'impression of the issues important to citizens, industry and government in the county. Applicability. The proposed chapter addresses an expanded scope of risks not covered by federal and state programs. All processes at facilities that contain any federal RMP Program 3 process are covered by the requirements of this chapter. This means that every process in chemical,petrochemical and oil industry facilities must undergo a rigorous evaluation for development of a Safety Plan under this ordinance. The Safety Plan must include not only elements from the federal and state RMP,but also a Human Factors Program,',requirements and authorities for conducting Root Cause analyses of Major Chemical Accidents or Releases, implementation schedule requirements for action items developed from Process Hazards Analysis, and an expanded Accident History requirement. The above requirements for the Safety Plan are mentioned in the introductorystatement at Section 450-8.016. Although a full reading of this section clarifies that subsections (a)through (e) are part of the Safety Plan, NICS recommends that the language of this paragraph be modified to more clearly reflect that these requirements are all part of the Safety Plan and are, therefore, subject to review by the Department and the public. The Safety Plan is required to address "accidental releases" and "major chemical accidents or releases." Both terms have significance for the plan: "accidental releases" are included in the Human Factors Program to evaluate releases that have the potential to become major chemical accidents or releases; "major chemical accidents or releases"trigger the requirement for root causes analyses and inspections by the county, and also must be recorded in the accident history. Although the intent of the proposed ordinance is to address releases to the environment, the definition of "accidental release"is written to only apply to air emissions. NILS recommends that the definition of"accidental release"be amended to include releases to water and land as well as to ambient air. Root Cause Analysis. This section provides authority for the Department to conduct root cause analysis investigations. It also gives the Department the rights to enter the facility, examine pertinent documents and interview employees. This authority clarifies the County's right to be 6 __ Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for C;hernical Studies(NILS) involved in accident investigations from the very beginning. The impact of accidents on the county's residents clearly provides a strong reason for county officials to be involved in the investigation. However,it is very important for the Department to coordinate;with investigations conducted by ether agencies with authority over the facility. First,root cause analyses investigations are expensive to conduct, and in order to provide accident reports in a timely manner,maximizing resources by cooperating with other agencies is important. Secondly, coordination with other agencies will reduce adverse impacts on the facility and its employees. Even in the serious business of accident investigation,numerous requests for the same information are unnecessary. Finally, this section provides that the conclusions, findings or recommendations of the Root Cause analysis conducted by the Department or the facility cannot be admitted as evidence or used in any legal action arising from matters mentioned in the report. A similar provision is found in the Clean Air Act provisions for investigations conducted by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation:Board.However, it is unlikely that the County has the authority to implement a similar provision. While we have no detailed knowledge of the California rules of evidence, this provision may establish a standard not supported by state law.MICS recommends that County legal staff evaluate this prevision for its propriety under state law. Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items. The Process Hazard Analysis requirements for all processes at covered facilities lead to action items designed to reduce the hazards identified. In addressing these hazards, facilities must consider Inherently Safer Systems. While this is not a requirement to adopt Inherently Safer Systems,it does require that the consideration of these systems and adoption or rejection decisions be documented. Additionally, all decisions regarding action items from the PHA must also be documented for review by the Department and the public. The chapter provides for a 30-day public comment period on a facility Safety Plan in Section 450-8.018 (Review,Audit and Inspection). Safety Plans can be complex documents and will require significant effort from the general public to review and comment. A 30-day comment period seems short for complex documents. MICS recommends that at least a 45-day comment period be required as presented in the proposed"Safe Communities Ordinance." The proposed ISO also provides for a public meeting at the end of the comment period. Public meetings such as those held on behalf of this proposed ordinance can be very useful for informing the public as well as hearing comments from the public. The HSD should have discretion in the tinning of the public meeting so that,when appropriate,the meeting can have an informational rale as well as a place for public input on proposed Safety Plans. Informational meetings should be heldduring the comment period and not at the end. In addition, whenever possible such public meetings should be held in the communities where the facilities are located. NILS recommends that the language of the proposed ordinance he amended to reflect flexibility in timing for the public meeting and to specify that the public meeting be held',in the affected community. 7 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) Within this section, the language addresses the implementation of action items identified in the PHA. The section includes the fallowing language: "For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selectad for implementation by the Stationary Source . . . "If the section is read in full, it can be assumed that the documentation of decisions will show what the facility plans to do and why the action items were prioritized in a particular manner. However,the above language can also be interpreted to mean that the facility can choose to implement all or none of the action items. MICS recommends that the language be amended to reflect more clearly that all action items must be addressed. Review,Audit,and Inspection.This section of the proposed ordinance gives the county authority and duty to review the facility's Safety Plan, conduct safety inspections after?Major Chemical Accidents and Releases, and to require modifications or additions to Safety Plans to bring the facility's Plan and Safety Program into compliance with the provisions of the ordinance. Stakeholders and participants at the public meetings offered numerous comments with the concern that the department could only require modifications to the paper document and not necessarily to the underlying safety program at the facility.NICS recommends that the language in subsection(d)be clarified to reflect that required modifications not only affect the document but also the Program at covered facilities. In section 450-8.018 (b), the proposed ordinance states that the"Departmenthill, within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release al the discrel"ot n ofIbg Den =mt , conduct a safety inspection . . ." This statement is inconsistent and should be modified.. NICS recommends that the Department be given discretion and that"shall"be changed to "may" and the phrase "at the discretion of the Department"be deleted. While the Department should be encouraged to conduct a safety inspection following accidents, there may be times when the timing is impractical or other agency activities(such as root cause investigations)beep the department from conducting a safety review under this section. The implementing policy of the Department should address this issue. Further,this section states that the Department shall review and audit . . . compliance . . . at least once every three to five years." We understand that the 3-5 year time frame for both audits and updates of the safety plan was intended to allow the Department and covered facilities to time the Safety Plans with the federal RMP and CalARP program requirements. However, it seems likely that the passage and date of effectiveness of a new ordinance will be close enough to the implementation date(6121199)of these requirements that the 3-5 year time frame can be eliminated. We recommend that the Safety Plans be valid for three years, and that the Plans and Program be audited by HSD staff or consultants for compliance at east once every three years. Community Outreach. An ombudsperson for hazardous materials issues has been hired by the County and is paid currently from county funds. Under this program,the funds necessary to support the ombudsman program would be paid from fees authorized in Section 450-8.026. The role of the ombudsperson in this section is clearly defined. However, the statement that his or her role"will be one of complaint prevention"is open to interpretation,much of it unfavorable. 8 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) NICS recommends that this rale be deleted from the description. There is some concern that a single person will be unable to provide the assistance needed by citizens. In the experience of NICS,an ombudsperson with sufficient resources available to him or her can be effective fulfilling the roles contemplated in this section. An ombudsperson can provide direct assistance or refer citizens to resource agencies and organizations for help in ether instances. Implementation and Enforcement The proposed requirements for both risk management and land use permits raise issues regarding the county's ability to implement and enforce the ordinance. Interviews with county officials and key stakeholders and review of the public meeting videotapes identified two primary issues of concern: staffing capability and enforcement authority. Staffing. The proposed risk management requirements have the potential to increase the workload of the implementing agencies and to require additional technical expertise. The Health Services Department may expect increases in the number of safety plans to be reviewed as processes not regulated under CaIARP and the federal RMP are added with this ordinance. New requirements for human factors programs and root cause analyses of major accidents and releases will require specialized expertise. The Community Development Department may also experience significantly increased workloads if it is determined that Safety Plans are subject to CEQA review. Although existing Health Services staff members have significant expertise in chemical and mechanical engineering, additional staff and additional skills may be required. It seems likely that the HSD will need to add staff and/or consultants to fully implement the CalARP program and the federal Risk Management Program.Additional process units added due to the proposed ISO may not add significantly to that workload. However,NICS recommends that both the Health Services Department and the Community Development Department review their staffing capabilities to ensure that there will be sufficient qualified staff to implement the new requirements. Enforcement. In order for the county to assure compliance with the ordinance, sufficient enforcement authority is needed to provide a credible deterrent to noncompliance. Section 450- 8.028 provides that all violations of the ordinance are subject to the enforcement provisions of Chapter 14-6 of the County Ordinance Code. This chapter provides procedures for both civil and criminal enforcement. County enforcement authority is limited by state law. County Counsel staff advised NICS that violations of the proposed ordinance may be considered as either civil offenses(public nuisance)or criminal offenses(infractions), at the discretion of the county. A recently-passed state statute allows the county to impose administrative penalties; County Counsel has drafted an ordinance allowing the imposition of such penalties, which is currently being reviewed and will be presented to the Board of Supervisors in the near future. It is arguable whether existing enforcement authority provides a credible deterrent. Administrative, civil and criminal penalties available under the State Business Plan law have higher limits and would provide greater deterrence. NICS recommends that the County Counsel review existing 9 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) enforcement authorities to clarify what enforcement options are available, and to advise the Board on how they may be most effectively used. Several suggestions were made by key stakeholders and the public to treat all violations of the ordinance as misdemeanors. Strong criminal enforcement action should be kept as an option for the most serious violations, such as false reporting of information. It would be inappropriate to classify all ordinance violations as misdemeanors,however, since many potential violations of this ordinance would not rise to the seriousness of a criminal offense. Further, classifying all violations as misdemeanors could create a significant judicial backlog due to the time necessary to prosecute misdemeanor criminal cases. MICS recommends that the Board, after consultation with County Counsel, consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance specifying certain serious violations as misdemeanors. 10 Report to the Contra Costa Beard of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions 1. Protecting the public from industrial accidents is an obvious concern in Contra Costa County. Based upon our review of available records,there have been a number of significant chemical accidents and releases in the county since at least 1989. The steps being taken by the county to amend and replace Ordinance 96-50 are important for the future protection of county residents and the environment. 2. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance adds several new public safety provisions not contained in the existing Ordinance 96-50. Compliance with these requirements by the regulated community should provide a greater degree of protection to county residents. 3. Based upon our knowledge and research,no other state or local government jurisdiction has enacted an ordinance with such far-reaching public safety requirements as contained in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. In an ongoing study for.EPA by NICS of state and local government accident investigation procedures,we have discovered no jurisdiction that has undertaken root cause analysis of accidents such as is proposed in the Industrial Safety Ordinance. Discussions with knowledgeable industry observers and experience in the major chemical-producing communities,around the country have also revealed no comparable requirements for industrial safety at the local level. 4. The proposed ordinance will apply only in unincorporated areas of the county. As such, there will be areas of the county that will not be subject to the same level of protection provided to unincorporated areas. 5. The quality of safety training provided to workers in industrial facilities will have a significant effect on the safe operation of those facilities. While we acknowledge the importance of such training,it appropriate for the county to address the issue separately from the proposed industrial safety requirements because of the complexity of training issues and the manner in which they are regulated. Recommendations Proposed QLal2ter 450-8. Risk Management 1. Section 450-8,014(a),definition of"Accidental release," should be amended to include emission of a Regulated Substance into water and soil as well as ambient air. 11 Report to the Contra Costa Berard of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) 2. Section 450-8.016 should be amended to clarify that the Safety flan to be submitted under this section includes the Human.Factors program,requirements and authorities for conducting Root Cause analyses, implementation schedule requirements for action items developed from the Process Hazards Analysis, and the Accident History. 3. The county legal staff should review the provision in Section 450-8.016(c)to determine whether the county may legally exclude all or part of a Root Cause analysis from disclosure in a legal proceeding. 4. Section 450-8.016(d) should be amended to clarify that the Stationary Source must address all the action items in implementing the Process Hazards Analysis. 5. Section 450-8.018(a) should be amended to expand the time for public review of a proposed Safety Plan from 30 days to at least 45 days. The section should also be modified by adding language to allow flexibility in timing for the public meeting and to specify that the public meeting be held in the affected community 6. Section 450-8.016(d) should be amended to clarify that all action items identified by Process Hazards Analyses must addressed. 7. Section 450-8.018(b)should be amended to allow the Department discretion is conducting safety inspections following Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. The Department should write implementing policies to indicate under which circumstances the Department will and will not conduct such inspections.N1CS recommends that the Department be given discretion and that"shall"be changed to"may„and the phrase "at the discretion of the Department"be deleted. 8. Section 450-8.018(b)should also be amended to require that Safety Plans and Programs be audited by HSD staff or consultants for compliance at least once every three years. 9. Section 450-8.018(d) should be amended to clarify that required modifications to a Safety Plan apply not just to the document but to all programs contained within the plan. 10. Section 450-8.018(f)should be amended to make Safety Plans valid for three years from the date of final action. This should not be discretionary and the phrase"at the discretion of the Department"should be deleted. 11. Section 450-8.022 should be amended to delete the reference to"complaint prevention" as one of the jobs of the Community Ombudsperson. 12. The Health Services Department should review its staffing capabilitiesto ensure there will be sufficient'qualified staff to handle the expected workload increase resulting from adding processes to the existing RMP requirements, including new processes within 12 Report to the Contra Costa.Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) facilities covered by CaIARP; conducting root cause analyses of major accidents and releases; and reviewing and evaluating Human Factors programs. Similarly, the Community Development Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient staff in the event it is determined that the proposed risk management program will require review under CEQA. 13. The county legal staff should review existing enforcement authorities to clarify which tools are available to the county to enforce the proposed ordinance. Section 450-8.028 should be amended to more clearly identify these enforcement options. 14. The Board, after consultation with County Counsel, should consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance classifying certain serious violations, such as false filing of information, as misdemeanors. P=osed Chanter 84-63, Land Use Permits I. Section 84-63.602 should be amended by deleting the proposed language and re-inserting the current language from Ordinance 96-50 stating that the land use provisions will apply in all nonagricultural zoning districts. Additional Recommendations 1. The Board should direct staff to eliminate cross-references to other ordinances to the extent possible without significantly lengthening the proposed ordinance. This would help make the proposed ordinance a more complete document and minimize the need to consult other references in order to fully understand the new requirements. 2. The Board should consider including a provision that would require the ordinance to be reviewed triennially, after three years of full implementation. This would enable the Board to review the performance of county agencies and the regulated industries under the new requirements, evaluate the effectiveness of the ordinance, and determine whether any changes are needed to improve public safety. 13 __ Report to the Contra Costa.Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) Appendix.A: COUNTY OFFICIALS CONTACTED Phil Batchelor County Administrator Claude Van Marter Assistant County Administrator Dennis Barry Community Development Director Dr.William Walker Health Services Director Michael Kent Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson Lew Pascalli,Jr. Hazardous Materials Program Director Elinor Blake Executive Assistant, Hazardous Materials Commission Jo Daegert Hazardous Materials Program Accidental Release Prevention Program Specialist Bill Alton Hazardous Materials Program Accidental Release Prevention Program Specialist Silvano Marchesi Office of the County Counsel Lillian Fujii Office of the County Counsel 14 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) Appendix B. KEY STAKEHOLDERS CONTACTED Denny Larson Communities for a Better Environment David Nesmith Sierra Club Kathy Adams,Scott Anderson, and Mario DGiovanni Industrial Association of Contra Costa County Laura Brown and Marjorie Leeds Martinez Refining Company Paul Borenstein and Sabiha Gokcen Tosco Refining Company Jim Payne and Steve Sullivan Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union Greg Feere Contra Costa Building and Construction and Trades Council Dennis Spaniol Council of Industry 15 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) Appendix C: DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Background Information County Ordinance 96-50;proposed ordinance from Supervisor Uilkema;proposed.Safe Communities Ordinance; and proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance SB 1889, California Accidental Release Program(9-23-96) .Response to comments submitted on Draft CalARP Program Guidance Document(May, 1998) Contra Costa County CaIARP Final Program Guidance Document(June, 1998) Contra Costa County Hazardous Waste Management Plan (June, 1989) Excerpt from Contra Costa County General Plan, Section 10.9, "Hazardous Materials Uses" (date unknown) CEQA Process Flow Chart and Summary. California Resources Agency web page (April 22, 1998) List of stationary sources covered by the Ca1ARP Program. CCHS interoffice memo from Randall Sawyer(August 11, 1998) Contra Costa County Code Chapter 14-4,Appeals; 14-6, Civil Enforcement; and 14-8, Criminal Enforcement California State Code 25500 et sect., State Business Plan law Application for Certified Unified Program Agency. CCHS (1995) Ordinance Summaries Questions and Answers from.the Hazardous Materials Commission Meeting, September 14, 1998 (document authored by Jo Haegert, CCHS, October 1, 1998) The New Industrial Safety Ordinance -- A White Paper. Sabiha Gokcen,Tosco Refining Company(September 8, 1998); Summary pact Sheet and Side-by- Side Comparison of 96-50, Uilkema proposal, Safe Communities Ordinance, and Industrial Safety Ordinance(date unknown); and Questions and Answers Regarding the New Ordinance(date unknown) 16 i ...............................................................-......11.111.111,11, . ............................................................................................................................... .................................................... .. .................... Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chernical Studies(NICS) Check List for Critical Health and Safety Issues Alternatives to Replace Good Neighbor Law. Citizens for a Better Environment(date unknown) "Do You Have Questions about the Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance?" Q&A from October 8, 1998 public meeting in Rodeo,prepared by CCHS staff Accident History Summary of industrial accidents in Contra Costa County, 1989-1997. Prepared by Citizens for a Better Environment(date unknown) Report on Hazardous Materials Data Incidents,Notifications, and Complaints in Contra Costa County, 1989-1996. Contra Costa Health Services(August 8, 1997) 1997 Selected Facilities Incident List. Contra Costa Health Services (January 15, 1998) Tosco Avon Refinery Maintenance Project Initial Study/Proposed Mitigated Negative Declaration. Contra Costa Community Development (date unknown) Comments submitted by Citizens for a Better Environment regarding the proposed mitigated negative declaration(September 2, 1998) Supplemental staff report to the Contra Costa County Planning Commission (September 8, 1998) Media Coverage "Deal reached on law on oil refinery safety,"Contra Costa Times, date unknown, "Tosco Avon Refinery gets first permit under '96 Safety Law," Contra Costa Times, October 7, 1998 "Community Groups Demand Investigation into Industry Abuse in Refinery Law Battle -- Public Meetings Announced," Citizens for a Better Environment/Sierra Club media release, September 30, 1998 "Refinery,Unions back proposed changes to safety ordinance,"680 Business Journal, October, 1998 17 ................ .......................................................................................................................I........... ........................................................................................................ Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICs) "Public Hearings on Replacing Good Neighbor Ordinance Law Expected to Show Public Mistrust of Supervisors' New Proposal,"Citizens for a Better Environment media advisory, October 14, 1998 "Martinez Hearing on Replacing Good Neighbor Law Reveals Industry Public Relations Scheme to Demonstrate 'Community Support' for Industry Proposal,"Citizens for a Better Environment/Sierra Club media release, October 15, 1998 Comments from Public Meetings Videotapes of public meetings October 7, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 29, 1998 Audiotapes of public meetings October 14 & 15, 1998 Summary notes prepared by county staff of October 28 public meeting Flipchart notes from October 7, 1998 public meeting Letter to Supervisor Uilkema from Howard Adams, August 11, 1998, with attachment: CCCD interoffice memo Final Committee Report of Ad Hoc Committee, May 7, 1996. "Improvements Needed to Make New 'Industrial Safety ' Ordinance Enforceable and Effective for Impacted Communities," Citizens for a Better Environment, date unknown Other Draft recommendations from the Hazardous Materials Commission regarding the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Summary and full text of Passaic County, N.J. Neighborhood Hazard Prevention Law, enacted September 8, 1998. Provided by the New Jersey Work Environmental Council through Citizens for a Better Environment. 18 ............................. ...... Report to the Contra Costa.Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) Appendix D. EVALUATION OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY'S HAZARD SCORING METHODOLOGY Contra Costa County, California uses a point scoring system to evaluate the degree of hazard associated with land use projects. One objective of this regulation is to encourage the use of chemicals, transportation, and siting that results in a project with hazards that are below an established threshold value, and are thus considered to have minimal risks. The incentive to project owners is to eliminate the need to go through the;expensive and time consuming process of obtaining a land use permit for those projects that have a hazard score less than the threshold value. Severalexamples of the application of the scoring methodology to real life examples were provided by the Health Services Department, Hazardous Materials Program. The formula used to calculate the hazard score is straight-forward and should be within the capabilities of most individuals to evaluate. The evaluation of the project information to obtain the data necessary for each of the variables in the formula is also straight forward for most projects. Each of the project scenarios were reviewed, and each option was considered for those projects. For the formula provided, it appears that a hazard score of 80 points is a reasonable threshold value. The Hazard Scores obtained in many cases did a good job of representing the hazards associated with the process. There are however, some areas where the scoring system can be improved: P rcaut-a a Increase The hazard score is in part determined by the increase in the amount of hazardous materials that the new project or change-in-risk project uses or produces, calculated as a percent over the base value. It appears that in some cases,the project owner could stay under the threshold value for numerous incremental expansions that would exceed the threshold value in aggregate. A potential solution to this is to have a baseline based on a certain}fixed date, or the average of the past three years,whichever gives the highest score. Multiple Chemical Many processes will have multiple hazardous raw materials, or multiple products. The examples provided show that the Hazard Score is determined for each individual chemical and the highest score for a single chemical is then selected to represent the score for the project. This methodology could cause some hazardous projects to be considered as having minimal risk when the hazards may actually be significant. In many incidents,multiple sections of the process and/or 19 Report fo the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical studies(NILS) multiple chemicals are involved. This is certainly the case for most fires and would also be the case for many ether types of leaks or releases. Consideration should be given to,in some way,taking into account that several hazardous materials are present. Process Considerations Scenario B-3 provided by the HSD concerns the installation of a new MTBE, process that will use an existing isobutylene stream:, and methanol that will need to be brought into the facility. The Hazard Scare determined for this process was relatively low at 79 because only the hazards associated with the new methanol requirements were considered. Linder the existing ordinance 96-50, the hazards associated with the existing isobutylene were not considered because it was already in the facility. This methodology does not take into consideration that a new processunit needs to be constructed, and that the hazards will, as a result, necessarily increase. A pipeline or a tank containing a chemical is inherently safer than a chemical process that uses or manufactures that same chemical. It is not uncommon for a refinery or chemical plant to build a new processing unit that uses raw materials exclusively from the facility. The methodology shown would not consider the new process to have any significant hazards and no land use permit would be required. Considering the impact of on-site chemicals used as raw materials could eliminate this problem. However, in the proposed ISO, this possibility is also eliminated with the addition of the required land use permit for new projects using Hazard Category A or B chemicals. Distance to Receptor The table for determining the"Distance to Community" factor D, does not tale into consideration:the mobility of the hazardous material. Gases, vapors, and smoke will travel much further than a solid or liquid material. By not distinguishing between the mobility of the hazardous materials,the table penalizes low mobility materials while being lenient to high mobility materials. For certain gases that have very low limits for toxic exposure,releases may have the potential for serious health impacts beyond the 3 miles shown in the Hazard Score tables. Consideration should be given to providing tables that take mobility into consideration or providing adjusted factors for volatile materials. Conclusion No information was provided concerning the rationale behind the proposed Hazard Score formula. The formula contains most of the variables that affect hazards if you assume that the DOT hazard',rating is appropriate for a process facility. The way that the variables are used in the formula however, is not completely logical. For example,the formula indicates that the amount of hazardous material and the distance to the receptor 20 .................................................................................. ............................................................. keport to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies{NILS) are independent of the hazards associated with the materials. That is, 20 tons of methyl isocyanate and 20 tons of dirt contaminated with fuel oil would both have the same value in the hazard score as far as the A and D factors are concerned. Yet the MIC has the potential for killing or seriously injuring tens,or hundreds of thousands of people but the dirt does not. Even though the formula developed scores that were realistic for many of the scenarios, there were others where it did not strongly correlate with the risk in the described project. Consideration should be given to further developing the formula so that it better represents the risks associated with development projects. 21 .......... ..................................... Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) Appendix D: EVALUATION OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY'S HAZARD SCORING METHODOLOGY Contra Costa County,California uses a point scoring system to evaluate the degree of hazard associated with land use projects. One objective of this regulation is to encourage the use of chemicals,transportation, and siting that results in a project with hazards that are below an established threshold value, and are thus considered to have minimal risks. The incentive to project owners is to eliminate the need to go through the expensive and time consuming process of obtaining a land use permit for those projects that have a hazard score legs than the threshold value. Several examples of the application of the scoring methodology to real life examples were provided by the Health Services Department,Hazardous Materials Program. The formula used to calculate the hazard score is straight-forward and should be within the capabilities of most individuals to evaluate. The evaluation of the project information to obtain the data necessary for each of the variables in the formula is also straight forward for most projects. Each of the project scenarios were reviewed, and each option was considered for those projects. For the formula provided, it appears that a hazard score of 80 points is a reasonable threshold value. The Hazard Scores obtained in many cases did a good job of representing the hazards associated with the process. There are however, some areas where the scoring system can be improved: Percentage Increase The hazard score is in part determined by the increase in the amount of hazardous materials that the new project or change-in-risk project uses or produces, calculated as a percent over the base value. It appears that in some cases, the project owner could stay under the threshold value for numerous incremental expansions that would exceed the threshold value in aggregate. A potential solution to this is to have a baseline based on a certain fixed date, or the average of the past three years,whichever gives the highest score. Multiple Chemicals Many processes will have multiple hazardous raw materials, or multiple products. The examples provided show that the Hazard Score is determined for each individual chemical and the highest score for a single chemical is then selected to represent the score for the project. This methodology could cause some hazardous projects to be considered as having minimal risk when the hazards may actually be significant. In many incidents, multiple sections of the process and/or) 99 ............I...............I.................................................................................. ............................................. Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) multiple chemicals are involved. This is certainly the case for most fires and would also be the case for many other types of leaks or rebases. Consideration should be given to, in some way,taking into account that several hazardous materials are 1present. Proms-fon-siderations Scenario B-3 provided by the HSD concerns the installation of a new MTBE process that will use an existing isobutylene stream, and methanol that will need to be brought into the facility. The Hazard Score determined for this process was relatively low at 79 because only the hazards associated with the new methanol requirements were considered. Under the existing ordinance 96-50, the hazards associated with the existing isobutylene were not considered because it was already in the facility. This methodology does not take into consideration that a new process unit needs to be constructed, and that the hazards will, as a result, necessarily increase. A pipeline or a tank containing a chemical is inherently safer than a chemical process that uses or manufactures that same chemical. It is not uncommon for a refinery or chemical plant to build a new processing unit that uses raw materials exclusively from the facility. The methodology shown would not consider the new process to have any significant hazards and no land use permit would be required. Considering the impact of on-site chemicals used as raw materials could eliminate this problem. However, in the proposed ISO, this possibility is also eliminated with the addition of the required land use permit for new projects using Hazard Category A or B chemicals. Distance to Rogel2tor The table for determinin the"Distance e into consideration the mobility of the hazardous material. Gases, vapors, and smoke will travel much further than a solid or liquid material. By not distinguishing between the mobility of the hazardous materials, the table penalizes low mobility materials while being lenient to high mobility materials. For certain gases that have very low limits for toxic exposure, releases may have the potential for serious health impacts beyond the 3 miles shown in the Hazard Score tables. Consideration should be given to providing tables that take mobility into consideration or providing adjusted factors for volatile materials. Conclusion No information was provided concemipZ the rationale behind the pro2osed Hazard Score formula, The formula contains most of the variables that affect hazards if you assume that the DOT hazard rating is appropriate for a process facility. The way that the variables are used in the formula however, is not completely luical. For example, the formula indicates that the amount of hazar_do`us_m_a_te—�-arand the distance to the receptor 20 .......................I........... A a � Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies{NICS} are independent of the hazards associated with the materials. That is, 20 tons of methyl isocyanate and 20 tons of dirt contaminated with fuel oil would both have the same value in the hazard score as far as the A and D factors are concerned. Yet the MIC has the potential for killing or seriously injuring tens,or hundreds of thousands of people but the dirt dues not. Even though the formula developed scores that were realistic for many of the scenarios, there were others where it did not strongly correlate with the risk in the described project. Consideration should be given to ffirther developing the formula so that it better represents the risks associated with development projects. 21 United Siate<, `` Office of Solid Waste EPA 5513-R-98-009 Environmental Protection and Emergency Response November 1998 Agency (5104) www,epa.gov/ceppc,` EA EPA CHEMICA k} RECEIVED ._ DEC �- l ACCIDENT —,0 a' SUP R1tt5Or S STA C .. IIna NVESTIGATI REPORT I Bosco Avon Refinery j ", Martine California f C;heinicat Emergency Preparedrncss and Prevention Office ��Printed on recycled paper Table of Contents The EPA Accident Investigation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board(CSB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Basis of Decision to Investigate the Tosco Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Other Investigating Agencies Involved in the Tosco Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii Executive Summary of the Tosca Accident Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1.0 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . 1 1.1 Facility Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Process Description . . . . . . . 1 1.2.1 Hydrocracking Chemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2.2 Hydrocracker Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.3 Stage 2 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.4 Stage 2 Reactor Monitoring and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.4.1 Thermocouples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.4.2 Control Board Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2.4.3 Data Logger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.2.4.4 Field Panels for Temperature Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.2.4.5 Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.2.5 Operating Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.2.6 Emergency Depressuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 1.2.7 Operating Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.0 Description of the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.1 Events of January 21, 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.1.1 Night Shift(10 pm to 6 am) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.1.2 Day Shift(6 am to 2 pm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1.3 Swing Shift(2 pm to 10 pm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.2 Emergency Response Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3 Consequences of Explosion and Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.3.1 Death and Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.3.2 Equipment Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . 23 2.3.3 Environmental Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.4 Summary . . . . r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.4.1 Ivey Events Preceding the Day of the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.4.2 Key Events the Day of the Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3.0 Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.1 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.1.1 Coordination with Other Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.1.2 Physical Evidence Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.1.3 Information Sources Reviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 30 3.1.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3.2 Testing Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2.1 Ruptured Pipe Testing&Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2.2 Catalyst Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 i ................... ........................... .......... ...... 3.2.3 Thermocouple Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2.4 Data Logger Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.3 Information Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.1 Effluent Pipe Rupture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.2 Reactor Temperature Excursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.3.2.1 Flow and Heat Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Distribution Tray Pluggage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Catalyst Coking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Bed 4 Operating Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Bed 4 Phase Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Bed 4 Distribution Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Levelness of Distribution Trays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3.2.2 Catalyst Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3.3.2.3 Feed Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 13.2.4 Oil and Recycle Gas Flowrate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.2.5 Quench Flow to Bed 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.3.3 Control of Temperature Excursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.3.3.1 Awareness of Emergency Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Confusing Temperature Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Problems with Temperature Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Strip Chart vs. Data Logger Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Audible Temperature Alarms , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Makeup Hydrogen Flow and Recycle Hydrogen Purity . . . . . . 44 Accessibility of Temperature Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Radio Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3.3.3.2 No Emergency Depressuring Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Prior Temperature Excursions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 July 23, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 March 19, 1996 - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 January 19, 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Emergency Depressuring System Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Procedures , - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Safety and Performance Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.3.4 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.3.5 In-Plant Emergency Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.0 Causes of the January 21 Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.1 Cause of the Pipe Rupture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.2 Cause of the Temperature Excursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.3 Failure to Control Temperature Excursion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.4 Root Causes and Contributing Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Conditions to Support and Encourage Employees to Operate Reactors in a Safe Manner Were Inadequate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 Human Factors Were Poorly Considered in the Design and Operation of the Temperature Monitoring System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 ii _�..... .... ............. - Supervisory Was . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Operational mcuuueuo and Maintenance Were Inadequate . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Operator Training and Support WereInadequate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U? Procedures Were Outdated and . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Process Hazard Anxh/�a �Vuu���c�. .��� ' ' ^ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . . . . 69 Barriers Hazardous Work Conditions Were Inadequate . . . . . . . . . . . 70 j0 � . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ` . . . . ^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Management System Policy and Implementation . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . `. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 72 Facility Readiness and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Training and Suppor . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 rrucouurou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Process Hazard Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 APPENDICES ' . ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . . . ' ' ' ' ' ` ' ' ' ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Appendix References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 Appendix History of Major Process Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1 Appendix Stage 2}{vdrocruckcrProcess Flow Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [-1 Appendix lntecbodQuench and Distribution Sketches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 Appendix Stage 2Reactor Thermocouple Points per Instrument Display. . . . . . . . . . . . E-1 Appendix F Average Bed Differential Temperature for Reactor 3 . . . . . . . . F-1 Appendix 6 Agency Personnel Involved boTosco Accident Investigation .. . . . . . . . . . . . [-1 Appendix}{ Participants ooTosco Avon Refinery Root Cause Analysis . .. . . . . . . . . . . . B-1 Appendix Follow-up Actions Undertaken bvTosco uunfJune l997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I'1 Appendix Guosoury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . J-1 List of Tables Table Critical Operating Limits for Stage ZReactors . . . . . . . . . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . — 14 Table Some Reactor 3 Bed 4, Bed 5, Reactor Inlet/Outlet . . . . . . . . . 10 Table Time Line ofKey Events Preceding the Day ofthe Accident . . . . . . . . . _ . . . 27 Table Time Line ofKey Events the Day ofthe Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 List of Figures Figure l Site Location Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ^ . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . ' . . . . . 9 Figure 2 Facility Plot Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Figure Hydrocracker Unit Flow Block Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure Stage 2System-Simplified Flow Diagram . . . . . . . . ' ' . . . . ` . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Figure 5 Stage 2Reuctnc lmooe��Drawing . . . . . . . . . lO Figure Hydrocracker Plot Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Figure Reactor 3 Temperatures (Bed 4Outlet, Bed 5Inlet, Rs . . . . . . . 20 Figure Reactor]Temperatures (Four Bed 5Outlet) . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Figure First and Second Stage Reactors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 � Figure 10 Reactor 3Ifflneut Piping Rupture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . 25 ih .......... ............ .......-............ ................. ............ ............ Figure I I Photograph-Temperature Field Panel Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Figure 12 Photograph-Back Side of Reactor 3 Effluent Piping Rupture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Figure 13 Photograph-Ruptured Effluent Piping after Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Figure C-1 Stage 2 Hydrocracker High Pressure System- Process Flow Diagram . . . C-1 Figure C-2 Stage 2 Simplified Emergency Depressuring System Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2 Figure D-1 Stage 2 Reactor Internals Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1 Figure D-2 Stage 2 Reactor Interbed Quench and Distribution Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-2 iv ...... . ......... .................. ....... The EPA Accident Investigation Program EPA has a responsibility under section 112(r)of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAA) for the prevention and mitigation of accidental chemical releases. One of the fundamental ways to prevent chemical accidents is to understand why accidents occur and to apply the lessons learned to prevent future incidents. Consequently, EPA has a responsibility to investigate and understand why certain chemical accidents have occurred. A key objective of the EPA chemical accident investigation program:is to determine and report to the public the facts, conditions, circumstances, and causes or likely causes of chemical accidents that result, or could have resulted, in a fatality, serious injury, substantial property damage, or serious off-site impacts, including a large scale evacuation of the general public. The ultimate goal of an accident investigation)is to determine the root causes in order to reduce the likelihood of recurrence, minimize the consequences associated with accidental releases, and to make chemical production, processing, handling, and storage safer. This report is a result of an EPA.investigation to describe an accident, determine its root causes and contributing factors, and identify findings and recommendations. Note that under section 112(r)(1) of the CAA, industry has a general duty to design and maintain a safe facility taking such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and to minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do occur. In addition, under section112(r)(7), EPA has promulgated regulations for the preparation of risk management programs and plans for the prevention of accidental chemical releases. However, compliance and enforcement with these provisions are not the focus of this report but will be addressed at EPA's discretion in separate reports or actions. Prior to releasing an accident investigation report, EPA must ensure that the report contains no confidential,business information. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Trade Secrets Act, and Executive Carder 12640 require federal agencies to protect confidential business information from public disclosure. To meet these provisions, EPA has established a clearance process for accident investigation reports in which the companies who have submitted potentially confidential information used in the report are provided a portion of the draft report. The portion provided contains only the factual details related to the investigation(not the findings, the conclusions nor the recommendations). Companies are asked to review this factual portion to confirm that the draft report cdntains no confidential business information. As part of this clearance process, companies often will provide to EPA additional factual information. In preparing the final report, EPA considers and evaluates any such additional factual information for possible inclusion in the final report. Chemical accident investigations by EPA Headquarters are conducted by the Chemical Accident Investigation Team(GAIT) located in the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) at 441 M Street SW, Washington, D.C. 20464, 202-260-8600. More information about CEPPO and the CRIT may be found at the CEPPO Homepage on the Internet at http://www.epa.gov/ceppo. Copies of this report can be obtained from the CEPPO Homepage v or from the National Center for Environmental Publications and Information (NCEPI) at 800- 490-9198. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress created the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). Modeled after the National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB), the CSB was directed by Congress to conduct investigations and report to the public the findings regarding the causes of chemical accidents. Congress authorized funding in November 1997 and the CSB began operations in January 1998. Several investigations by the CSB are underway. More information about CSB may be found at their Homepage on the Internet at http://www,chemsafety.gov or http://www.csb.gov. EPA plans to complete its work and issue public reports on investigations initiated prior to funding of the CSB. Under its existing authorities, EPA will continue to have roles and responsibilities in responding to, and investigating, chemical accidents. The CSB, EPA and other agencies will be coordinating their efforts to determine the causes of accidents and to apply lessons learned to prevent future events. Basis of Decision to Investigate the Tosco Accident On January 21, 1997, an explosion and fire occurred at the Hydrocracker Unit of the Tosco Refinery at Martinez, California, resulting in one death, 46 worker injuries and precautionary sheltering;-in-place for the surrounding community. The accident involved the release and autoignition of a mixture of flammable hydrocarbons and hydrogen under high temperature and pressure. EPA undertook an investigation into the causes and underlying circumstances associated with this accident because of its serious consequences (fatality, injuries and offsite concern), the potential for greater impacts, and the opportunity to learn from this accident how similar accidents could be prevented. Other Investigating Agencies Involved in the Tosco Investigation This investigation was coordinated among investigators working for USEPA Headquarters, USEPA Region 9, California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (CAL OSHA), lis Department of Labor (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Region 9, Contra Costa County Health Services Division (CCCHSD) and the California Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD). CAL OSHA, with assistance of Region 9 Federal OSHA, concurrently conducted an investigation for violations of health and safety orders as well as a process safety management (PSM) audit. The Bureau of Investigation of CA Department of Occupational Safety and Health concurrently conducted a criminal investigation.. CCCHSD concurrently conducted an investigation into the root causes of the accident. BAAQM.D concurrently conducted an investigation into possible violations of air quality control regulations: vi Executive Summary of the Tosco Accident Investigation At approximately 7:41 p.m. on January 21, 1997 at the Tosco Avon Refinery in Martinez, CA, a section of effluent piping ruptured on the Hydrocracker Stage 2 Reactor 3. A mixture of light gases starting with methane through butane; light gasoline; heavy gasoline; gas oil and hydrogen was released from the pipe and instantly ignited upon contact with air, causing an explosion and fire. A Tosco Hydrocracker operator checking a field temperature panel at the base of the reactor was killed;46 Tosco and contractor personnel were injured. Thirteen injured personnel were taken to local hospitals, treated and released. There were no reported injuries to the public. The immediate cause of the hydrocarbon and hydrogen release and subsequent fire was a failure and rupture of a Stage 2 Reactor 3 effluent pipe due to excessively high temperature, likely in excess of 1400°F. This high operating temperature was initiated by a reactor temperature excursion that began in Bed 4 of Reactor 3 and spread through the next catalyst,bed, Bed 5. The excessive heat generated in Bed 5 raised the temperature in the reactor effluent pipe. The excursion was not brought under control because the Stage 2.reactors were not';depressured and shut down as required when the reactor temperatures exceeded the 800°F temperature limit specified in the written operating procedures. The temperature excursion began with a hot spot in Bed 4 Reactor 3. The hot spot was most likely caused by poor flow and heat distribution within the catalyst bed. Investigators could not determine the specific cause of the maldistribution. Operators did not activate an emergency depressuring of the reactors when some internal reactor temperature readings reached 800°F because they were confused about whether a temperature excursion was actually occurring. Their confusion was due to a variety of factors including: fluctuating temperature readings, a discontinuation of makeup hydrogen flow to Stage 2, a misleading recycle hydrogen purity analysis and the absence of additional audible high temperature alarms after the first high temperature occurrence. They were attempting to verify temperatures in the reactor by having an operator obtain temperature readings from the field panels under the reactors. Poor radio communications hampered relaying these readings to the control room. Even after operators in the control room noticed that the Reactor 3 inlet temperature had increased beyond 800°F, they did not depressure but began to take steps to cool the reactor by increasing quench hydrogen flow and reducing heat input from the trim furnace. Investigators identified the following root causes and contributing factors of the accident: • Conditions to Sursport and Encourage Employees to Operate Reactors in'a Safe Manner Were Inadequate. The emergency depressuring system was not used as required to control previous temperature excursions. Management did not take effective corrective action to ensure that these emergency procedures were followed. An operating environment existed that caused operators to take risks while operating and to continue production despite serious hazardous operating conditions. Temperature limits for the reactors were inconsistently stated and operators did not always maintaintemperature vii ............ ............. .................. ...... ...... ............ within these limits. Management did not recognize or address the conflict between acceptable performance goals and risks. Negative consequences from the past instances of use of the depressuring system may have contributed to operators' reluctance to implement depressuring when required. • Human Factors Were Pooriv Considered in the Desian and OI)eration of the Reactor Temperature Monitoring System. Operators were using three different instrumentation systems to obtain temperature data. Not all the temperature data were immediately accessible, which did not allow operators to make critical decisions quickly. Although not planned by design, access to the most critical monitoring points (those reading the highest temperatures) happened to be located underneath the reactors and could not be accessed from the control room. No Management of Change (MOC) process was implemented for the installation of the outside temperature panels. The alarm system on the data logger only allowed one alarm to be received at a time and did not distinguish between emergency alarms and other operating alarms. The temperature control system caused the operators to make many manual adjustments to control temperatures, which made the Hydrocracker reactor more difficult to operate. Hydrogen purity analysis data available to operators lagged seven minutes behind the actual time of the analysis and provided C, misleading information to the operators. • Supervisory Managementwas Inadeguate. Several apparent serious deficiencies were evident. For example, unit process operators failed to follow posted emergency procedures on this as well as previous temperature excursion incidents. Problem incidents were not always properly conununicated to management and inconsistent application of emergency procedures was tolerated by management, No comprehensive operator training, including refresher training, had been implemented to address all hazards associated with Hydrocracker Unit operations. No management of change program was implemented to address mechanical changes or operational changes such as those needed for the change in catalyst. Root cause incident investigations were inadequate in that they did not investigate all temperature excursions. Also they did not identify the root cause of the excursion nor did they determine why operators were reluctant to follow posted emergency'Procedures. • Operational Readiness and Maintenance Were inadequate., The temperature monitor(data logger) in the control room that had most of the reactor temperature readings was unreliable and out of service sometimes. In the past, reactor operation would continue despite the data logger being out of service. Under the he conditions of a temperature point rising more than 50'F above normal, the data logger could not be reset in order to receive additional high temperature alarms. Radio communications needed to relay temperature data from outside panels to the control room were unreliable and did not function during the incident. Operators had to run the unit with leaking quench valves and stop-gap viii measures were used to deal with leaking heat exchanger flanges. The emergency depressuring system was not tested to ensure its reliability when needed. • Operator Training and Support Were Inadequate Training materials were out of date and unit specific training was mostly on the job and not well documented. Unit specific refresher training had not been developed. Operators received inadequate training on temperature instrumentation. They did not understand that zero default values on the data logger potentially meant extremely high temperatures. Operators did not understand that the decrease in makeup hydrogen flow was an indication of an extreme temperature excursion. Training for abnormal operating situations and drills for emergency procedures were not adequate. • Procedures Were Outdated and Incomplete. Procedures were scattered throughout various documents and had not been updated as changes were made to operating equipment and the process. Recommendations from several incidents were not incorporated into procedures. Procedures were not developed for many operations, including obtaining temperature data from outside field panels underneath the reactors. Procedures had conflicting differential temperatures limits for catalyst bed operation. • Process_Hazard Analysis Was Flawed. The process hazard analysis did not address all existing known hazards and operating abnormalities. It did not reflect the actual equipment and instrumentation used in the process. It did not adequately address previous incidents that had potential catastrophic consequences, such as previousreactor temperature excursions. No hazard analysis was performed for the installation and use of the temperature field panels. Investigators from EPA, CAL OSHA and BAAQMD developed recommendations(summarized below) to address the root causes and contributing factors to prevent a recurrence or similar event at Tosco and other facilities. Hydroprocessing facilities should consider each recommendation in the context of their own circumstances, and implement them as appropriate. • Management must ensure that operating decisions are not based primarily on cost and production. Performance goals and operating risks must be effectively communicated to all employees. Facility management must set safe, achievable operating limits and not tolerate deviations from these limits. Risks of deviation from operating limits must be fully understood by operators. Also, management must provide an operating environment conducive for operators to follow emergency shutdown procedures when required. • Process instrumentation and controls should be designed to consider human factors consistent with good industry practice. Hydroprocessing reactor temperature controls should be consolidated with all necessary data available in the control room. Some backup system of temperature indicators should be used so that the reactors can be ix operated safely in case of instrument malfunction. Each alarm system should be designed to allow critical emergency alarms to be distinguished from other operating alarms. • Adequate supervision is needed for operators, especially to address critical or abnormal situations. Supervisors need to ensure that all required procedures are followed. Supervisors should identify and address all operating hazards and conduct thorough investigation of deviations to determine root causes and to take corrective action. Equipment and job performance issues related to operating incidents should be corrected by management. • Facilities should maintain equipment integrity and discontinue operation if integrity is compromised. Hydroprocessing operations especially need to have reliable temperature monitoring systems and emergency shutdown equipment. Equipment should be tested regularly and practice emergency drills should be held on a regular basis. Maintenance and instrumentation support should be available during start up after equipment installation or major maintenance. • Management must ensure that operators receive regular training on the unit process operations and chemistry. For hydrocrackers, this should include training on reaction kinetics and the causes and control of temperature excursions. Operators need to be trained on the limitations of process instruments and how to handle instrument malfunctions. Facilities need to ensure that operators receive regular training on the use of the emergency shutdown systems and the need to activate these systems. • Tosco management must develop written operating procedures for all phases of Hydrocracker operations. The procedures should include operating limits and consequences of deviation from the limits. The procedures should be reviewed regularly and updated to reflect changes in equipment, process chemistry, and operation. As appropriate, the procedures should be updated to include recommendations from process hazard analysis and incident investigations. • Process hazard analyses need to be based on actual equipment and operating conditions that exist at the time of the analysis. The analysis should include the failure of critical operating systems, such as temperature monitors or emergency operating systems. A Management of Change review should be conducted for all changes to equipment or the process, as necessary, and should include a safety hazard review of the change. X 1.0 .Background 1.1 Facility Description The Tosco Avon Refinery is a 2,300 acre facility located in Eastern Contra Costa County near Martinez, California in the San Francisco Bay Area. The Refinery was originally built in 1913 as a Standard Oil of California facility; in 1976 Tosco purchased the Avon Refinery',from Phillips Petroleum. The Refinery processes 140,000 barrels per day of crude oil, producing gasoline,jet fuel, and diesel fuel. Other products generated are coke, sulfur, ammonia, and sulfuric acid. Crude oil is delivered to the Refinery either through pipeline or through two marine terminals, primarily from production fields in Alaska and California. Figure 1 is a site map showing the Refinery and the immediate surrounding area. Light industrial areas, residential areas and Suisun Bay are located approximately one mile from the Refinery. Figure 2 is a facility plot plan showing the location of the Hydrocracker Unit within the Refinery. This investigation report describes the conditions and circumstances surrounding the January 21, 1997 accident, the events leading up to the explosion, existing process safety management practices, the causes of the accident and contributing factors, and recommendations. The accident occurred in the Stage 2 Reactor area of the Hydrocracker Unit and thus, description of processes and events are focused on this area of the Refinery. For readers not familiar with technical terms associated with refineries or chemical processes, some of these terms are explained in a glossary in Appendix J. 1.2 Process Description This section describes the chemistry, process operations, control system, and operating parameters in the Stage 2 of the Hydrocracker Unit. A history of major process changes to Stage 2 of the Hydrocracker Unit are summarized in Appendix B. 1.2.1 Hydrocracking Chemistry Hydrocracking involves catalytic cracking of hydrocarbon oil in the presence of excess hydrogen at high temperature and pressure. The process breaks larger molecules into smaller ones while reacting them with hydrogen to create more of the molecules used in commercial fuels, such as gasoline and diesel. Sulfur and nitrogen compounds must first be removed from the oil to prevent fouling of the hydrocracking catalyst and to meet final product specifications. This is done by reacting the sulfur and nitrogen compounds with hydrogen to form hydrogen sulfide and ammonia, which are then extracted from the process stream. The general mechanism in hydrocracking includes breaking carbon-carbon single bonds (cracking) followed by hydrogenation (addition of hydrogen to a carbon-carbon double bond). 1 Typical Cracking Reaction C„H, + heat � CjHIO + C6H,4 hydrocarbon oil pentene(olefin) hexane Hydrogenation Reaction CsH,o + H; _' CsH,z + beat pentene pentane Cracking forms olefins (compounds with double-bonded carbons), which could join together to form normal paraffins (compounds with single-banded carbons). However, hydrogenation rapidly fills out all the double bonds, often forming isoparaffins, preventing reversion to less desirable molecules, such as straight chain paraffins which have a lower octane rating. The cracking reaction is endothermic (requires heat) and the hydrogenation reaction is exothermic (produces heat). Heat liberated during hydrogenation is greater than heat consumed during cracking so the overall process is exothermic. The primary variables involved in hydrocracking are reactor temperature and pressure, feed rate, hydrogen consumption, catalyst condition, nitrogen and sulfur content of the oil feed, and hydrogen sulfide content of the gases. Besides serving as a reactant, excess hydrogen is added in order to suppress coke formation on the catalyst and to act as a coolant to keep the temperature rise under control. The higher the temperature, the faster the hydrocracking reaction rate. At normal reactor pressure and flowrate conditions, a 20°F increase in temperature almost doubles the reaction rate. The heat generated from the hydrocracking reaction causes the reactor temperature to increase and accelerates the reaction rate. To control the reaction rate, each reactor has several catalyst beds between which cool hydrogen is injected as quench gas for temperature control. The activity of the catalyst generally declines over time due to an accumulation of coke and other deposits, until the catalyst requires regeneration. Degeneration is accomplished by shutting the unit down and burning off`the carbon deposits, or by removing the catalyst and replacing it with regenerated or new catalyst. 2 Base map source:USGS 1:100,000 Heafdsbu%CA quadrangle(1972)(reduce¢) .. StllSE1?2 Bay .. stir n P15Cf" f 1 1 L k I , d,�� x r ' sig wl�>vTMa c�'Is,/`g � - �,� t'y� '� ✓'"' "" ki+iax u i 3 u1€''a�' �rur •s,,. �1 a'.....,)' L y .S 'Rt .�r`�"`fj [� ,.' W, CW d d 'LStri � .. ,,H y •',►4 �• e:-��,�, f1.r¢I r �i�kr Z: � 4''�R'7 Y Iva sY i jti.. ,.^"t s+R"ar 4y y'.p� tx • � :�E��w> YJ.. .. a � . m t • #P OX.4 MILES Z � 3 7O M#A71N;EZ , `* ,",'* 1afr Mix �'4�+��@ . x drat 4S ', .✓<A V !:. rry�1 " i"s°.'t• " � +�;!':. +Y"iw" ;�. , t 't ql l a*+w p f' •(f�♦ �J--. r trAl�,� t �o- t�pL{,.q � +kZ1' .�{ t� -_. ,dc.,,,,:+ �,.tr,,,,�'��'f*"a,��/ y?a .•+^,�tt Ski. �'.Y'.._..- ���1�. 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Uncon Main office MONSANTO ROAD _. 0150TRPAx%g(copy){St23) i2/t(s/97 Figure 2 Facility Plot Plan Tosco Avon Refinery, Martinez, California 4 1.2.2 Hydrocracker Operations The Hydrocracker Unit includes four sections, a Hydrogen Plant, Stage I Unit, Stage 2 Unit, and Gas Plant. The Hydrogen Plant produces hydrogen for use in the Hydrocracker Unit and other process units. Stage I hydrotreats the refinery gas oils in Reactors A, B and C'to remove sulfur, nitrogen compounds, and other impurities, to prevent fouling of the Stage 2 catalyst. Cracking and hydrogenation occur in the Stage 2 Reactors 1, 2 and 3. The Gas Plant fractionates the hydrocracked product from Stage 2 into propane, butane, light and heavy hydrocrackates, and diesel. Figure 3 is a simplified flow block diagram of the Hydrocracker Unit showing how process streams between the four sections are connected. 1.2.3 Stage 2 Operations Stage 2 is described in detail here because it was the process in which the accident occurred. The hydrocracking technology used in Stage 2 was licensed as a Unicracker by Union Oil of California in 1986. The original Hydrocracker was started up in 1963 under a license from Chevron Research Corporation and was known as an Isocracker, a term which was still used in many of Tosco's documents. The hydrocracking reaction occurs in the high pressure system of Stage 2 which operates in the range of 1350 to 1735 pounds per square inch gauge (prig). Figure 4 is a simplified process flow diagram of the Stage 2 Hydrocracker High Pressure System, Appendix C contains a more detailed process flow diagram of the Stage 2 High Pressure System. A charge pump provides fresh feed from Stage I equally to the three Stage 2 Reactors 1, 2, and 3. Preheated hydrogen is added to the liquid fresh feed after the Stage 2 charge pump. The temperature of this two-phase stream is then raised from about 350°F to over 550°F by heat exchange with the reactor effluent in the Stage 2 feed/effluent exchangers. This provides most of the heat for Stage 2. Additional hydrogen is preheated in Trim Furnaces 1, 2 and 3 and combined with the feed stream from the feed/effluent exchangers, to obtain a desired inlet temperature, ranging from 600-650°F. The heated mixture of oil and hydrogen enters the top of each reactor where it is hydrocracked to produce a mixture of desirable, lighter hydrocarbon components. These range from as light as methane to as heavy as naphtha (up to 10-12 carbons). Within each reactor, the oil/hydrogen feed passes sequentially through five beds of catalyst. The catalyst used by Tosco is a zeolitic (molecular sieve) catalyst. Each bed is designed to achieve about 60% reaction conversion. Cool recycled hydrogen gas is added as quench between the catalyst beds in the reactors, limiting the temperature rise created by the exothermic reaction. The quench hydrogen is injected above Beds 2, 3, 4-and 5 and distributed uniformly through a perforated pipe distributor known as a quench ring. The hydrocarbons and hydrogen are 5 �C x� 1 3 { iI I I ! 04 g I e Im i7L SEL � L = N y Y Y { i i b ..................................... . .. ................................................................... ............... ................ ........................................ .................................... 400 psig Recycle Hydrogen Hydrogen supply Makeup Stag* 2 Hydrogen Compressor I of 2 Trim a Stage 2 (Furnace Reactor 1 of 3 1 of 3 L Stage 2 Recycle Compre53*r Stripper Gas to Hydrogen IIE Stage I Stripper Quench AL Stage tage 2 Hydrogen Love Hydrogen Pressure Recycle Oil From Separator Stage Stripper To Stange 2 Stabilizer U High Pressure Separator FeedlEffluent lk� Stage 2 Exchangers Charge tail Pump Figure 4 Stage 2 System -Simplified Flow Diagram 7 _ ............................................. _ ........ ......... ......... .................... .............. . . ........................................................ collected on quench trays above Bed 2, 3, 4 and 5 and mixed in a quench box in the center of each tray. The mixture is passed over and through distribution trays in order to mix and evenly distribute flow to the next catalyst bed below. Beds 2, 3 and 5 have two distribution trays above them while Bed 4 has only one. See Appendix D for sketches of the reactor interbed distribution system. The reactor effluent stream is cooled in the feed/effluent exchangers by exchanging heat with the incoming feed stream. The cooled effluent stream from each reactor is combined and cooled further in heat exchangers before entering the High Pressure Separator(HPS). In the HPS, hydrogen and oil are separated. Hydrogen and light hydrocarbon gases are recycled back to the Stage 2 recycle compressor (called the IIR compressor). Makeup hydrogen is added to the recycle gas downstream of the compressor to maintain pressure in the recycle gas system. The recycle gas is used as quench hydrogen or heated and combined with oil feed to the reactors. The hydrogen partial pressure of the recycle gas is kept at a minimum of 1100 pounds per square inch absolute (psia) to minimize petroleum coke buildup on the catalyst and subsequent catalyst deactivation. The purity of the recycle gas can be raised by bleeding off a portion of the recycle gas in order to purge light hydrocarbon gases. The liquid phase (oil) from the HPS is pressured down to the Low Pressure Separator(LPS), to flash the remaining light gases overhead to the Stage 1 stripper. The stream from the bottom of the LPS is heated in the stabilizer preheater and fed to the Gas Plant System. The Gas Plant fractionates the product from Stage 2 into propane,butane, light and heavy hydrocrackates, and diesel. 1.2.4 Stage 2 Reactor Monitoring and Control Stage 2 Reactors were monitored and controlled from the control room using board mounted instruments and a personal computer(PC)-based data logger display. Temperature display panels located underneath the reactors were also used to monitor temperatures; however this data could not be accessed from the control room. The internal reactor temperatures were electronically monitored by 96 thermocouples which were connected to the various temperature display instruments. 1.2.4.1 Thermocouples Thermocouples used by Tosco were type "J", iron-constantan, sheathed thermocouples, designed to be flexible to allow routing to various locations in the reactor catalyst beds. In January 1996 an array of 96 thermocouples were installed inside each reactor to indicate the inlet, middle and outlet temperature of each catalyst bed (except Bed 1 inlet). They were also used to determine the axial temperature gradient (temperature difference between points above and below each other in catalyst bed) and the radial temperature gradient (difference in temperature among points at the same level in the catalyst bed). Twelve thermocouples were located in Bed 1, twenty-four 8 were located in each Bed 2 through 4, and twelve were located in Bed 5. Figure 5 shows the location of the internal Stage 2 reactor thermocouples. Additional thermocouples(not shown) monitor the feed, reactor inlet, reactor outlet and reactor skirt temperatures (three skin temperatures per reactor). Fifty-six of the thermocouple outputs were sent to a field instrument panel at the base of the reactor and the rest (40) were routed to the control room. The control room thermocouple signals were routed to board mounted instruments and a PC-based data logger(see next section). Appendix E shows, for each bed, how many inlet, middle and outlet temperatures were monitored by each type of instrument. 1.2.4.2 Control.Board Instruments The control board instruments displayed the Stage 2 flowrates and temperatures in digital, LED light bar, and strip chart format. Figure C-1 in Appendix C shows the instrument controllers used for process streams in Stage 2 High Pressure System. The oil feed rate to the reactor, and hydrogen flow to the trim furnace were regulated by flow controllers. The hydrogen flow to the feed/effluent heat exchangers was flow controlled so that a sufficient hydrogen to oil ratio was maintained. Recycle gas pressure was pressure controlled by hydrogen added from the makeup compressors. Reactor inlet temperature was input to a controller to regulate the trim furnace temperature which was then input to a controller that regulated the fuel gas pressure to the trim furnace. Alternatively, the trim furnace could also be operated at a specified fuel gas pressure. The center inlet temperature from each of the four lower beds was input to a controller which changed the flow of quench hydrogen to each bed to maintain a set temperature'. Other temperatures were displayed in the control room but were not automatically regulated by instrument controllers. These were Bed 1 through 4 outlet temperatures, the reactor outlet temperature', and the differential between reactor inlet and outlet temperature. Strip charts recorded the temperature of the center thermocouple in the inlet of Beds 2 through 5 and the center thermocouple in the outlet of Beds 1 through 4. These same two bed points were also monitored by the data logger. 1.2.4.3' Data Logger The data logger monitor displayed temperatures and locations of 40 of the 96 internal reactor thermocouples. Signals from the remaining 56 thermocouples were displayed at'a local panel at the base of the reactor (see next section). Operators accessed the various display screens using a small, customized keyboard and on-screen menus. The data logger also displayed averaged values of catalyst bed temperatures. if the operators saw an erroneous reading on a temperature 'This same point was displayed on strip chart for Bed 5,but was referred to as Bed 5 outlet even though it was the reactor outlet temperature. Bed 5 outlet temperatures were shown on the data logger and field panel. 9 Re`e�ence riguse 2 Fsometrie Taermoeoupfe Arrangement—Stale 2 Reactors,Secaad Stole}{ydracrotkv,Tosco 1 ------------------- 1 V ' 1 i I i 1 1 pzF )ars• 6E� i I i r N q6 I i I I I r w 0150TRPAXX,t(copy)(St23) 01129,198 Figure 5 Stage Z Reactors Thermocouple Arrangement - Isometric Drawing 10 ............._... _ _ ..... ........ _........... _....._.. ....._._. ......... ._....... ..................................... ......... ...._.... . ............ point, that point could be accessed and designated as "bad" from the keyboard. This designation excluded the "bad" point from bed-average temperature calculation. The data logger displayed temperatures from five points at the outlet of the fit catalyst bed, five points at both the inlet and outlet of the next three catalyst beds, and one point at the inlet and four paints at the outlet of the fifth bed. It also displayed three skin(external wall) temperatures per reactor and the inlet and outlet temperatures of each reactor. The thermocouples were connected to a field multiplexer that sent a digital signal over a single pair of wires to the data logger. The signal coaling into the data logger from a field multiplexer ranged from 0°F to 1400°F. If a thermocouple failed or indicated a temperature that was above range, the multiplexer would send a 0 signal to the data logger. The data logger displayedupdated temperatures at 15 to 40 second intervals. The data logger was also programmed to retain a record of temperature indications, known as the data logger historian. Data from the historian was available to the accident investigators but did not duplicate exactly what operators saw on the data logger the night of the accident because the historian records only some of the information displayed. Every hour, the historian recorded the current value of all points. Between these periodic readings, the historian recorded and time stamped temperature readings only if they changed more than a predeterminedamount (deadband). For all the points, the deadband was 0.5%, or 7°F for the 0 to 1400°F range. The historian created a data file every eight hours. If the historian had not recorded a temperature for a time interval (because it had not changed significantly from the previous value), the historian used the value from the last previous recorded value. The data files were stored on the computer hard drive for one month. The data logger could print from the historian file a value for each temperature at requested time intervals. 1.2.4.4 Field Panels for Temperature Monitoring Field panels were installed under the reactors during the 1996 January-February turnaround,in order to provide additional temperature readings in the catalyst beds. Figure 6 is a plot plan of the Hydrocracker operation that shows the location of the panel under Reactor 3 relative to the control room. Seven points from each thermocouple array were displayed on the panels: Individual temperatures could'be displayed by the operators at the panel using multipoint rotary switches;one switch to select the bed desired and five other switches for selecting the point within each bed. The field panel could display temperatures between -10°F and 1200°F. If the temperature was outside this range, the display would show all dashes {----). 1.2.4.5 Alarms Each input point to the data logger had a high and low temperature alarm. High temperature alarms for the catalyst bed points were set at 780°F. It isnot known what alarm points were set for the reactor inlet and outlets. The reactor skin temperature low alarm was 300°F, while the 11 ................. ...................... .............................................................. ...................................... ......................... Location of field panel "E,SMEET Reactors 00 r-r------ 0 VAM e�% 0 R 2 3 0 0 2 STAEMUZER REDOUXR 0 0 A L.BJL 0 ODO SUCKALLEY EM 0 0= 00 1131 00 0 0 C3 OOM MM m 0 cm� M 0 Cm 0 0 0 000 C3 C3 A C====O cm 00 0 0 0 4ORTWX Room NORTH LA 0000 []o 0 0 6-0— E HYDROCRACKER CONTROL ROOM 0n C3 0 o cy Liu CD Figure 6 Hydrocracker Plot Plan Tosco Avon Refinery 12 . .......I.-I-1111.1.1.1.1����Ill'.1"-.-.-.-�..................,,................................... ................. ............ ................. R high alarm was 1500°F. When a point alarmed, the temperature reading appeared to "blink" and the background color behind the reading changed from black to red. The operator could acknowledge the alarm, after which the reading would be steady and the background would stay in the alarm color until the condition cleared. The data logger had one digital output for high temperature that was connected to the board annunciator. The temperature points signaled this alarm whenever they were in"new" alarm status. The board annunciator alarm consists of a flashing light and audible horn on the Stage 2 alarm panel. The operator would have to acknowledge the board annunciator to silence the horn and stop the annunciator flash. If the alarm was acknowledged on the data logger keyboard, it was no longer a"new"alarm and so the digital output turned off. This reset the systemfor the next "new" alarm that came in. The data logger also had alarms, with outputs to the annunciator, for points more than 50°F above or below the average temperature, and low skin temperature alarms. On the control board, a flashing signal alarm would occur for the quench controllers if quench valve was more than 50% open on Beds 2, 3, or 5 or more than 75%n open on Bed 4. 1.2.5 Operating Parameters The maximum oil feed rate to Stage 2 was about 53,000 barrels per day(BPD).' This corresponded to about 35,400 BPD of oil feed to Stage 1. Volume expansion and 40% oil recycle rate made up the difference between these two feed rates. Stage 2 reactor normally operated at 650-690°F and 1560 psig (pounds per square inch gauge). Typical operating pressures and temperatures for various process streams in Stage 2 are shown in Figure C-1 in Appendix C. The minimum hydrogen partial pressure in Stage 2 was maintained at 1100 psia. The recycle gas hydrogen purity was maintained between 75-84%. The hydrogen to oil ratio was maintained at 5500 (5000 minimum) standard cubic feet (SCF)hydrogen to barrel (bbl)of oil feed. The nitrogen level for feed to Stage 2 was not to exceed 14 parts per million (ppm). Critical operating limits were defined by Tosco to establish the safe operating range for the unit. Some of these are listed below in Table 1 for Stage 2 with the reported consequences of deviation. 13 Table 1 Critical Operating Limits for Stage 2 Reactors Operating Parameter Limit Consequences of Deviation Maximum reactor 800"F Possible temperature runaway. Passible vessel failure and temperature fire due to temperature runaway. Maximum temperature 690°F Possible downstream feed/effluent exchanger fire. for reactor outlet Possible fire, explosion if ignition source present. Maximum reactor bed 40"F Possible temperature runaway. Possible vessel failure and average differential bre due to temperature runaway. temperature Maximum reactor 75"F Possible temperature runaway. Possible vessel failure and differential fire due to temperature runaway. temperature 1.2.6 Emergency Depressuring A 100 psi per minute (psi/min) and 300 psi/min depressuring systems were installed in 1986. These systems were designed to rapidly depressure the reactors to reduce the reaction rate and high temperatures in emergency situations. Bath emergency depressuring valves were located at the gas outlet line of the HPS and discharged to the flare system. The 100 psi/min system was activated automatically if the recycle compressor shutdown. The system could also be manually activated by an operator in the control room. {ince the 100 psi/min system was activated, the following would automatically occur. Stage 2 charge pump is shut down; Fuel to the trim furnace is shut off; Makeup gas to Stage 2 is shut off; Hydrogen to recycle compressor suction and discharge streams are stopped; and The Hydrocracker reactor system is depressured at the rate of 100 psi/min to refinery flare system. In addition, the oil feed from Stage I would be manually diverted to storage tanks. If the 100 psi/min system was activated manually, the recycle compressor would continue to operate. The 100 psi/min system allowed the unit to be restarted quickly if the situation could be corrected before the unit was fully depressured. If reactor temperatures continued to increase while the unit was being depressured, the operators were instructed to activate the 300 psi/min depressuring system immediately. 14 .....................................I...111.111,11,1111, . . . ............................................................ ........................................ .... The 300 psi/min system was activated only manually using a switch in the control room. It depressured the Stage 2 high pressure system to the refinery flare, diver'ted make-up hydrogen, shut down the Stage 2 charge pumps and the recycle compressor, and stopped fuel to the trim furnace. If the 300 psi/min system was activated, the unit had to be depressured to less than 10 psig before the unit could be restarted. This is because the reactors are required to be under pressure after the vessels walls have cooled because of the risk of catastrophic failure due to temper embrittlement. 1.2.7 Operating Personnel The Hydrocracker operated continuously for 24 hours a day staffed by three eight-hour operating shifts.. There were normally five operators on duty at the Hydrocracker during each shift. One operator was known as. the No. I Operator who oversaw the shift, assisted with board duties if necessary and made outside rounds at least once per shift. The other operators were known as No. 2 Operators. One was the Hydrogen Board Operator who operated the control system for the Hydrogen Plant and Stage 1. Another was the Stage 2 Board Operator who operated the control system for Stage 2, including the high and low pressure systems. The other two operators were East Pad and West Pad Operators who were responsible for making rounds to check equipment, taking outside readings and obtaining samples as necessary for the East Pad (Hydrogen Plant) and West Pad (Stage I and Stage 2) high and low pressure system, respectively. Figure 6 shows the location of the Hydrocracker control room and Stage 2 Reactor 3 on a Plot Plan. 2.0 Description of the Accident This section describes the events that occurred on January 21, 1997 leading up to the explosion and fire at the Hydrocracker Unit. 2.1 Events of January 21, 1997 2.1.1 Night Shift(10 pm to 6 am) At about 4:50 am on January 11, a clamp on the flange of the Stage I Reactor A effluent exchanger began to leak. The pressure and feed rates to Reactor A were reduced to stop the leak, but this action was ineffective. The feed to Reactor A was diverted to Reactors B and C at about 5:20 am to stop the leak. The extra feed to these reactors lowered their temperatures and limited the hydrotreating reaction. This caused the nitrogen content in the Stage I effluent to rise above the specified limit of 14 ppm. .................................................................... .................................... ............................................ 2.1.2 Day Shift (6 am to 2 pm) At 8:10 am, the nitrogen content of Stage I effluent was 196 ppm, above the specified limit of 14 ppm. According to the swing shift Stage 2 Board Operator, the high nitrogen content material from Stage I had to continue to Stage 2 and could not be sent to the off-test tanks because they were full. Because of the high nitrogen levels in the feed to the Stage 2 reactors, the Stage 2 catalyst became "poisoned" causing the Stage 2 cracking reaction to decline. By 9:30 am, the quench flows to Stage 2 catalyst beds had begun to drop off, indicating a reduced reaction. At 10 am, the nitrogen content from Stage I was 352 ppm. At approximately 11:30 am, the strip charts showed no temperature differential across Reactor 3. During the day shift, the differential temperatures averaged less than I 01F per catalyst bed for all Stage 2 reactors and the unit was not producing any light product. Feed rate to Stage 1, Reactor B was reduced in order to enable bed temperatures to be increased. A contractor repaired the leak on the Reactor A exchanger flange clamp by injecting sealant into it. The leak was stopped but Reactor A remained down to allow time for the sealant to cure. Meanwhile, operators continued to adjust rates and temperatures in Reactors B and C in order to increase the reaction and reduce the nitrogen content in the effluent. At 12:13 pm. the Stage I stripper bottom nitrogen analysis was 66 ppm. Atl:10pm, itwas 40ppm. Sometime during the day of January 21, an operating plan was written in the shift logbook for the evening of January 21, to prepare for the introduction of oil to Reactor A the next morning at 8 am. The plan directed the operators to continue to raise temperature in Reactors B and C at a reduced rate, in order to get the nitrogen down to 5 ppm or less, and then to increase the rate to these two reactors as much as the nitrogen constraint aflowed. In addition, the operators were directed to gradually increase temperatures in Stage 2 in order to drive the nitrogen off the catalyst. 2.1.3 Swing Shift (2 pin to 10 pm) On the swing shift, two extra operators were added to help with Stage I problems. One was the No. I Operator on the day shift who stayed over on the swing shift to help out and monitor repairs on the Reactor A exchanger clamp. The other was a No. 2 Operator (worked night of January 20-21) who was brought in to get Stage I Reactor A up to temperature before planned introduction of oil at 8 am the next morning (January 22). At the start of the swing shift, there were no light products in the low pressure section of Stage 2, indicating little or no reaction occurring. Only a few quench flows (Beds 2 and 3 in Reactor 1, Bed 2 in Reactor 2 and Bed 3 in Reactor 3) were above 10% of full-scale flow which is also an indication of low reactor activity. Stage 2 bed inlet temperatures varied from about 612 to 640°F. At 5:38 pm, the nitrogen analysis for the Stage I stripper bottoms was 47 ppm. 16 ........................... .................. ...............­____..._.......................,-%%%1_-111-----------­­­ ...................I......I.......I..'','''',''... . ........................................................................................ .................................................... .............................. At 7:34:00 pin (corrected data logger time) the Reactor 3 Bed 4, Point 2 outlet temperature increased from 628°F to 823°F in 40 seconds. See Table 2 for temperature data. The data logger alarm sounded displaying a Bed 4 outlet high temperature and'also a high Bed 5 inlet temperature. The Stage 2 Board Operator heard the alarms and saw temperatures of about 690"F on Bed 4 outlet and 890°F on the Bed 5 inlet. According to data logger records, Reactor 3, Bed 5 inlet temperature had risen from 637'F to 860°F within one minute. The strip recorder on the control panel for Bed 5 inlet temperature went from about 640°F to full scale (800'F). The strip chart recording the Bed 4 Point 3 (center) outlet temperature appeared normal. About 7:34:20 (based on the data logger reading for Bed 5 inlet high temperature), the hydrogen quench flow to Bed 5 began to open further to reduce the temperature, as was seen on the strip chart recorder. It continued to open to 100% on the strip chart recorder. At about the same time, the makeup hydrogen to Stage 2 began to decrease. The Stage 2 Board Operator expressed concern over a potential excursion and within a minute the two No. 1 Operators joined him in evaluating the control board and data logger readings. They reported seeing the data logger temperatures start to bounce up and down, from normal range temperatures to 0 and back again. The Stage 2 Board Operator stated that the Bed 4 and 5 temperatures were swinging from 0 to 1200°F, then back to 650'F. The No. 1 Operator stated that they could not trust the figures. At some time prior to 7:37 pm, a No. 2 Operator went to check the temperatures at the field panel under Reactor 3. The sudden increase in quench flow to Bed 5 caused the hydrogen flow to the trim furnace(s) to fluctuate. This in turn caused the hydrogen flow control valve to the trim furnace to open further. Since the trim furnace hydrogen is temperature controlled, this caused an increase in fuel gas flow (to heat up additional hydrogen in the trim furnace) and dropped the fuel gas pressure. At 7:36:20 pm(alarm log history time), a high flow alarm occurred for the hydrogen flow to Reactor I trim furnace. By 7:35 pm, the Bed 4 Point 2 outlet temperature had decreased to 637°F and the quench flow to Bed 5 was still full open. The other four Bed 4 outlet temperatures remained normal during this time, which included Point 3 (center outlet) which was also recorded on the control panel strip charts. According to the data logger, by 7:35 pm, the four Bed 5 outlet temperatures had decreased by 15-30°F each in response to the Bed 5 quench valve opening. By 7:36 pm, the quench flow to Bed 5 had risen to full scale, and the Bed 5 inlet temperature had decreased to 633°F on the data logger and had also decreased accordingly on the strip chart recorder. At 7:36:00, the Reactor 3 outlet temperature had increased 9 degrees in 20 seconds, 2 The data logger recorded time that was 52 minutes ahead of actual time;this report uses the actual time. The data logger temperatures cited in this report are from the historian file created by the data logger computer, Because the historian file saves temperature data according to a specified program(see Section 1.2.4.3), it may not duplicate the exact same temperature that the operators saw on the data logger. 17 ............... from 641 to 650'F, but this was apparently not noticed by the operators. Operators said that they did not hear any other high temperature alarms. Throughout this time, the operators reported that the temperatures on the data logger continued to "bounce up and down", fluctuating between high, normal and 0 temperature readings. Between 7:36 and 7:37 pm, the fuel gas pressure at the Reactor 1 trim furnace had increased to 30 psi which was over the maximum limit of 28 psi. The extra No. 1 Operator reduced firing in the furnace to prevent overfiring. He took the trim furnace off temperature control and put it on fuel gas pressure control. He then switched the Bed 5 wench flow controller from automatic to manual control and closed the quench valve to Bed 5 because he was concerned about losing temperature in the reactor. The Stage 2 Board Operator stated that he saw high recycle flows through the Trim Furnace I and 2. The extra No. 1 Operator was blocking his view of the Trim Furnace 3 instruments. By 7:37 pm, the Bed 5 outlet temperatures had all started to increase in temperature, the highest being Bed 5 outlet Point I at 681°F. See Figures 7-8 depicting graphs of the relevant Reactor 3 temperature changes during this period of time. At 7:37 pm, the hydrogen makeup dropped to zero according to the Performance Monitoring System(PMS) computer. The Hydrogen Board Operator alerted the other operators of this change. He said the hydrogen plant was becoming over pressured. Excess hydrogen was directed to the header/flare system to prevent over pressure. At 7:39:02 pm(according to alarm log history), a high flow alarm for the hydrogen blowdown to the flare occurred. Between 7:37 and 7:39 pm, the extra No. I Operator controlled the operation of the trim furnace while the Stage 2 Board and No. 1 Operators continued to monitor temperatures and the data logger which continued to fluctuate. The Stage 2 Board Operator noticed on the control board that the quench flow to Bed 5 had been Manually closed, and at 7:38 pm, he re-opened it. Between 7:38 and 7:39 pm, all four Bed 5 outlet temperatures rose above 780°F, with Point I reading a maximum of 1255°F at 7:38:20 pm. All four Bed 5 outlet temperatures continued to rise until they defaulted to zero at 7:39:20 (see Table 2). From 7:36:20 to 7:39:20 pm, the Reactor 3 outlet temperature rose from 650°F to a maximum of 1220'F. The reactor inlet temperature increased from 649°F at 7:38:00 pm to 693°F at 7:39:00. The control board strip charts also recorded the sudden rise in reactor inlet and outlet temperatures. At approximately 7:39 pm, operators heard a radio message from the No. 2 Operator that was garbled and unclear. The Stage 2 Board Operator thought he heard "1250" on the radio, but was not sure. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to contact him. Two operators(East Pad and extra No. 2 Operator) went outside to check on him. The reactor outlet temperature reading on the data logger defaulted to 0 at 7:39:40 pm. 18 _._. ......... ............_._. . . .. ........ ..........._.. ......... ......... .__...... ......... Table 2 Some Reactor 3 Temperatures- Bed 4,Bed 5, Reactor Inlet/Outlet :Bed 4 Bed 5 Bed 5 Bed 5 Bed 5 ed 5 Rx 3 Rx 3 Outlet Inlet Temp Outlet Outlet Outlet Outlet utlet. Inlet Temp Temp Tem Tem Tem Tem: em Time(pm) t-13302 t-14003 -134C1 -13402 Pt-13404 -13405 Pt-141C Pt-125C 7:33:00 628.3 636.9 648.6 646.3 656.8 645.91 641.3 632.2 7:33:20 628.3 636.9 648.6 646.3 656.8 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:33:40 636.5 658.0 648.6 646.3 656:8 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:34:00 823.2 720.7 648.6 646.3 656.8 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:34:20 732.0 859.5 648.6 646.3 656.8 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:34:40 732.0. 859.5 648.6 646.3 656.8 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:35:00 637.31 792.4 624.2 627.7 633.4 645.9 641.3 632.2 7:35:20 637.31 715.7 624.2 627.7 633.4 615.4 641.3 632.2 7:35:40 637.31 664.4 624.2 640.3 633.4 615.4 6413 632.2 7:36:00 637.31 633.4 650.3 647.9 623.6 615.4 649.9 632.2 7:36:20 637.31 633.4 663.9 667.7 623.6 615.4 649.9 632.2 7:36:40 637.3 660.7 672.9 667.7 623.6 625.6 658.9 632.2 7:37:00 637.3 660.7 681.1 676.8 656.0 645.8 658.9 632.2 7:37:20 637.3 660.7 681.1 676.8 672.0 673.51 760.7 632.2 7:37:40 637.3 660.7 697.3 707.5 690.7 673.51 760.7 640.2 7:38:00 637.3 660.7 717,2 876.0 690.7 673.5 684.6 640.2 7:38:20 637.3 660.7 1255.7 0.0 783.0 705.8 701.8 648.8 7:38:40 637.3 660.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 744.0 788.8 660.0 7:39:00 637.3 648.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 889.0 983.1 693.0 7:39:20 637.3 648.0. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1219.6 754.7 7:39:40 637.3 655.6 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0 826.5 7:40:00 637.3 655.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 889.1 7:40:20 637.3 655.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 960.7 7:40:40 637.3 645.7 0.0 0.0 1397.1 879.9 0.0 1233.5 7:41:00 637.3 645.7 0.0 0.0 1398.4 694.9 0.0 0.0 7:41:20 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.o???? 0.0????1 0.0???? 7:41:40 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? 0.0???? Source: Data Logger Historian The time listed in the table above is the actual time;the time in the data logger historian report was 52 minutes ahead of actual time.Highest temperatures recorded per point are bolded. A reading of 0.0 means temperature was above 1400°F. A reading of 0.0????means loss of power to data logger computer. Bed 4 inlet temperatures did not vary during the incident. Only the Bed 4 outlet temperature that experienced an abnormal rise in temperature is included in the table. Unchanged temperature readings mean that temperature did not change more than 7°F from last reading,therefore data logger historian retains last previous recorded value. 19 _... ......... ......... ....._.. . .. ......... ._....... ... ......... ......... ...... ..........._. .. ................................................. . 1500 Figure 7 1400 --------------- --- Reactor STemperature s ------------------- 1300 ------------- ---------------- `--------------------- - 1200 ------------------ -- ------- -- ------ -------- --- LL 1100 --------_ Bed 4 outlet-Pt.2 Reactor outlet ---------- --------- ----- Bed 5 inlet Reaztor inlet C 1000 --------- - - ------ -------- ----- E :- 900 ---------------------- - ---------------- ----- -------- 800 ------ - -------------------- ----- ----------- 700 ------ - - --------- - - -- -------------- 600 I 73300 7:33:40 13420 7:3510 7:XOD 73x:40 7:37:20 718:00 1:38:40 719:20 7:40:00 7.40:40 7:3320 7:34AO 7.35:00 735:40 7:36:20 13700 7:37:40 7:38:20 7:39:00 7:3940 740:20 7:41.00 Source: Jan 21,1997 Data Logger Historian Time (pm) 1500 Figure B 14D0 ------------------ Reactor 3 Temperatures I-----------------0 `- 1300 ------------------------------------------------------------ 1200 {-- --------------------------------------- ---------------- u- N1100 -------- -----------.------------ ----------------- Bed 5 outlet Pt.4 Bed 5 outtet Pt.3 1000 ------- '0 -+- ------ ----------------- Bed 5 outlet Pt.2 Bed 5 outlet Pt.4 900 ----------------------------------------- - ---------- ---- 900 -------------------------------------- --- ----- ------- --- 700 -------------------------- ------- ---------- Gap in temp data due to data logger defaulting to zero. 600 7.3300 7.33:40 7:34 20 7:35:20 7:3800 7.-MAO 737'20 7:38'00 7:38:'40 1:39:20 7:40:00 7:4CA0 7:33:20 734.00 7.35:00 735:40 73620 737:00 73740 7:38:20 7:39:00 7:34:40 740.20 7:41:00 Source:Jan 21,1997 Data Lugger Historian 'rime(pm) 20 After 7:40 pm, the strip chart readings for the reactor inlet and outlet temperatures continued to read off scale high. The reactor inlet temperature reached a maximum of 1234F on the data logger at 7:40:40 pm before defaulting to 0. About the same time, the extra No. 1 Operator called the shift supervisor by phone, who immediately returned the call.. The operator requested the assistance of an instrument technician to work on the temperature logger on Stage 2. Also at this time, the Stage 2 Board Operator noticed that the reactor inlet temperature;had increased to over 800'F. In response, he reduced firing on the trim furnace and lowered the temperature set points to the top two beds, as a means of increasing quench flow. At 7:41 pm, the highest recorded temperature on the data logger was the Bed 5 Point 2 outlet temperature, which registered 13}8°F. At this time, the two outside operators had reached the northwest corner of the control room and the Stage 2 Board Operator was lowering the temperature set point on Bed 3. At approximately 7:41:20, an explosion occurred, followed by a fire. Seconds before the explosion, one observer driving by the Hydrocracker unit reported seeing a glowing red-hot pipe elbow in front of the Stage 2 reactors. Several Tosco and contractor employees reported hearing a pop or crack sound; followed by two explosions, one small and one bigger. A horizontal straight section of 12" diameter Reactor 3 effluent piping had ruptured just upstream of a 12"x 10" diameter reducer. Beyond the reducer, the 10" diameter pipe entered the top of the 40-foot high feed/effluent exchanger structure for Reactor 3. The hydrocarbon and hydrogen mixture released from the pipe rupture apparently autoignited very shortly after the 'initial release, causing a fireball over 100 feet high. Immediately following the explosion, the 300 psi/min depressuring system was activated and operators began to shutdown the unit. After the explosion, there was a power failure and the unit operated on backup power and batteries for several hours. Emergency response procedures and notifications were started. 2.2 Emergency Response Actions The news media reported that reverberations from the blast were felt 20 miles away, and smoke and flames were visible from nearby freeways. Within minutes of the explosion, Tosco responded by activating the Emergency Command Center and employee volunteer fire brigade. The Incident Commander was on site at the time of the explosion and immediately set up an Incident Command Post. Tosco notified various agencies, including Contra Costa County Health ServicesDepartment (CCCHSD), California Office of Emergency Services, Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD), California Department of Fish and Game,National Response Center, EPA Region IX, CAI..OSHA.and Santa Fe Railroad. Some problems occurred with communications and notifications because the phone lines were overwhelmed with incoming calls. Contra Costa County fire fighters were deployed outside the refinery and were available in case additional assistance was required. Tosco had its own fire brigade and did not request outside help during the incident. 21 Tosco requested at 8:26 pm that CCCHSD activate the Community Alert Network and sirens for a Level 3 incident. CCCHSD activated the Community Action Network, an automated emergency telephone notification system, which notified residents about an hour after the accident. The notification system reached 1,440 of 1,851 households in the Clyde and North Concord areas to warn them to stay inside as a precaution. The county tried to activate a new siren warning system for the first time, but it failed to work completely. The unit was isolated, depressured, and shut down while cooling water was applied to the fire and surrounding structures. Approximately 50 Tosco fire fighters participated in the response using portable fire monitors and all of the stationary fire monitors in the area. Additional fire pumps were started throughout the refinery as required to maintain fire water pressure. The firefighters spent most of the night battling the fire. The fire was contained to the Hydrocracker Stage 2 Reactor 3 outlet, control valves and associated piping, and eventually burned out. Nitrogen was purged through the reactor and damaged piping to remove hydrocarbon vapors and to prevent any further flare-ups. Some smoke was emitted from the burst pipe, after the nitrogen purge was initiated. Several flare-ups of the fire occurred the next day, due to seepages of hydrocarbons. 2.3 Consequences of Explosion and Fire 2.3.1 Death and Injuries A Tosco Hydrocracker operator, who was in the process of checking the temperature panel located at the base of Reactor 3, was killed. He was severely burned as a result of being in close proximity to the fire from the ruptured pipe. According to the coroner, he died of third-degree burns on 100 percent of his body and smoke inhalation. A total of 46 personnel were injured; eight were Tosco employees and 38 were contractor personnel. Injuries consisted of a fractured foot, emotional trauma, headaches, ringing ears, cuts and scrapes, and twisted knees. Thirteen injured personnel were taken by ambulance to local hospitals, treated and released. There were no reported injuries to the public or other offsite personnel. As many as 500 Tosco employees and contract workers were at the plant at the time of the explosion, working to complete maintenance turn-around projects. Some of the injured were inside or near contractor trailers close to the Hydrocracker Unit. The blast from the explosion blew out the windows of one trailer and the flames prevented workers from exiting the trailer door. The workers climbed out of the trailer window facing away from the fire. Many personnel in the surrounding areas were knocked down by the force of the explosion resulting in some of the injuries. Some workers who were knocked down were in a tent receiving a safety orientation. Other personnel fell or tripped as they tried to run away from the explosion and fireball. A few were knocked down by other running personnel. 22 .............................­­­-, ............................................................................................... ........................................................................ ............................ 2.3.2 Equipment Damage The rupture created about an 18 inch long tear in the Reactor 3 effluent piping. The photographs in Figures 9-13 show some of the resulting damage. The fire melted alight pole on the road next to the reactors. The lower part of a metal ladder on Reactor 3 was damaged bythe heat. Scaffolding around the Stage I and 2 reactors was misshapen from the heatof the fire, but there did not appear to be much blast damage. The fire fighting equipment next to Reactor Road(see Figure 6) was damaged. Wooden platforms near the unit were charred. The six reactors were covered with asbestos insulation overlaid with aluminum, which was blackened by the fire. A large valve on the fire water piping near the road was damaged. 2.3.3 Environmental Impact The wind during initial stages of the incident was out of the south-southwest;smoke, vapors and particulates released were blown by 5-7 mph wind towards uninhabited areas and Suisun Bay north of the Refinery. Tosco estimated that 13 pounds of friable asbestos insulation from the damaged piping and equipment was released. Air sampling for asbestos was conducted by Tosco in the immediate area of the accident. All results were below the detection limit of the test and below the OSHA standard of 0.1 fibers per cubic centimeter averaged over an eight-haur period. The Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD)received one public complaint during the incident. Air monitoring was conducted by BAAQMD which showed low (<2.4 parts per billion)but detectable amounts of six organic chemicals(toluene, methyl tent-butyl ether, benzene, methyl chloride, carbon tetrachloride and perchloroethylene). None of the concentrations detected were above levels of concern. 23 ................. Tosco Avon Refinery HydroGracker Unit Al ctors ry, #3 #1 ,A, R ;3 s 3 yj: R t A f" N. Figure 9 First and Second Stage Reactors 24 �> w 'A' Mm r E 'z ,: ST, SOL i PO ure'- n UK .� "t;; �.• �a,u �, «rope mrd;-u '8^,�s '�.�"`,,�'.'" z '�"'""'"`"� £4" S,"'..¢'S°a:',`y s_ Tosca Avon Refinery Hydrocracker Unit Reactor#3 Pipe ,. Rupture 1, i x ,;.. Figure 12 Back Side of Reactor 3 Effluent Piping Rupture F ft g +L y, - - R4 Figure 13 Ruptured Effluent Piping after Removal 26 2.4 Summary 2.4.1 Key Events Preceding the Day of the Accident Table 3 lists some events that occurred in the 11 days before the accident. Some of these events are discussed in more detail in Section 3 of this report. Table 3 Time Line of Key Events Preceding the Day of the Accident January 10 Stage 1 and 2 were in operation. Temperature monitoring for Stage 2 was Day shift switched from data logger to new I/A computer system (See Section 3.3.3.1 of this report for further discussion) January 11 An internal leak was detected in a Stage 1 heat exchanger, the stripper feed preheater. January 12-15 Stage 1 and 2 of the Hydrocracker were shutdown and internal heat exchanger leaks on Stage 1 were repaired. Various control valves were replaced on Stage 2. January 16 Stage 1 was put into operation. Reactor A feed/effluent exchanger began to leak externally from a flange but then stopped leaking on its own. January 17 Reactor A exchanger began to leak again. Leak was repaired by applying sealant to clamp on exchanger. L y 18 Feed was introduced to Stage 2. 19 Stage 2 was operating. Compressor B relief valve was replaced. iftm A temperature excursion occurred in Bed 4 of Reactor 1. Same temperatures exceeded 900°F. Operators did not depressure Stage 2 but conntrolled temperature by other means. Operators reported problems with UA temperature monitoring system. 20 The use of UA system.was discontinued and the data logger was put back ift into service. hift Feed rate to StMe 1 was increased. 27 2.4.2 Key Events the Day of the Accident Table 4 Time Line of Key Events the Dav of the Accident January 21 Reactor A effluent/feed exchanger clamp began to leak again and the leak 4:50 am could not be controlled. Feed to Reactor A was diverted to Reactor B and C, causing reactor cooling and high nitrogen content in effluent. 8:1.0 am Nitrogen content of Stage I effluent was 196 ppm, above the specification of 14 ppm. 10 am Stage 2 catalyst beds were poisoned from high nitrogen levels in the feed and cracking was greatly reduced. Nitrogen content from Stage I was 352 ppm. Sealant was injected into clamp on Reactor A heat exchanger. 2 pin Two extra operators were added on swing shift to help with Stage I problems. During swing shift, operators gradually increased temperatures in Stage 2 to drive nitrogen off the catalyst. 7:34 pm A temperature excursion occurred in Reactor 3, Bed 4. Inlet temperature to Bed 5 increased rapidly as a result. 7:35 pm The quench valve above Bed 5 opened wide. Data lugger temperatures bounced from zero to normal or high and back. Makeup hydrogen to Stage 2 began to decrease. Bed 4 outlet temperature point decreased to 637°F. 7:36 pm Bed 5 inlet temperature decreased to 633°F. Reactor 3 outlet temperature increased to 650'F.A No. 2 Operator went outside to check temperatures on the external panel sometime before 7:37 pm.. 7:37 pm Bed 5 outlet temperatures were increasing. Operator manually closed quench valve to Bed 5. Hydrogen makeup to Stage 2 dropped to zero. 7:38 pm Quench valve to Bed 5 was reopened. Bed 5 outlet, reactor inlet and outlet temperatures continued to rise;some of these exceeded 1200°F. 7:39 pm Operators heard a garbled radio message from No. 2 Operator. Two operators went outside to check on No. 2 Operator. 7:40 pm Bed 5 temperatures and the reactor outlet temperature read off scale on strip charts and defaulted to zero on data logger. Operators requested assistance of instrument technician. 7:41 pm One of the Bed 5 outlet points read 1398°F on the data logger. A section of the Reactor 3 effluent piping ruptured causing an explosion and large fire. The No. 2 Operator was killed. 28 3.0 Investigation USEPA Region 9 was notified of the accident at 9:03 pm on January 21, 1997 and an investigation to determine the root cause of the accident was begun January 23, 1997 by Region 9 and Headquarters investigators. The investigation was conducted under authorities contained in CERCLA, Section 104, 42 U.S.C. 9604 and the CAA, Section 114, 42 U.S.C.7414, Section 112r. The scope of the investigation was li nited to determining the causes and contributing factors associated with the explosion and fire in Stage 2, Reactor 3 of the Hydrocracker Unit. The purpose of identifying these causes and factors was to understand why the accident occurred so that the lessons learned could be applied by Tosco and other hydroprocessing facilities in order to prevent reoccurrence of similar accidents. 3.1 Approach The investigation team sought to determine why the reactor effluent pipe failed, triggering the explosion and fire. The team coordinated its efforts with other agencies to determine the causes of this event. 31.1 Coordination with Other Agencies This investigation was coordinated among investigators working for: • USEPA Headquarters, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO), Washington, DC • USEPA Region 9, San Francisco, CA • California Division of Occupational Safety and Health (CAL OSHA), Concord, CA • US Department of Labor (DOL)Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) Region 9, San Francisco, CA • Contra Costa County Health Services Division (CCCHSD), Martinez, CA • California Bay Area Air Quality Management District(BAAQMD), Martinez, CA The coordination consisted of consultation on agency information requests to avoid duplication of effort, sharing documents and'interview results, and jointly exploring the possible causes of the accident. CAL OSHA, with assistance of Region 9 Federal OSHA, concurrently conducted an investigation for violations of health and safety orders as well as a process safety management (PSM) audit. The Bureau of Investigation of CA Department of Occupational Safety and Health concurrently conducted a criminal investigation. Centra Costa County Health Services Department concurrently conducted an investigation into the root causes of the accident. BAAQMD concurrently conducted an investigation into possible violations of air quality control regulations., The personnel from each agency involved in the accident investigation are listed in Appendix G. 29 On May 29, 1997, CCCHSD and Tosco issued separate investigation reports discussing the events leading up to the accident, the causes and contributing factors, and recommendations. A presentation discussing the findings in both reports was made by Tosco and CCCHSD investigators to the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors at a public meeting on,Tune 3, 1997. 3.1.2 Physical Evidence Collection Pieces of equipment and evidence were collected, stored and identified by using a protocol approved by Tosco and the investigating agencies. Testing of the ruptured pipe and reactor thermocouples was conducted using a prescribed protocol. Physical evidence collected included a bull plug from a nipple on the 12" diameter effluent line, the thermowell and hardware, blind flange from bottom of reactor#3 effluent line, damaged section of effluent pipe, five hydrogen quench valves (inlet quench and 4 big quench valves), thermocouple bundles from Reactor 3, and catalyst samples from Reactor 3 (three samples per bed). 3.1.3 Information Sources Reviewed Interviews with Tosco operators and management personnel were conducted by CAL OSHA inspectors with interview questions developed with the assistance of all the agencies investigating. CAL OSHA then briefed the other investigators on discussions from the interviews. Investigators reviewed documents supplied by Tosco including procedures, process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), reactor temperature data, strip charts, process flow data, alarm logs, maintenance records, management of change documents, shift logs, shift superintendent logs, work permits, written witness statements, reactor internal drawings, catalyst data, incident reports, process hazard analysis, engineering memos and reports, pipe inspection data, equipment and piping design specifications, training materials, health and safety practices, test data(ruptured pipe, thermocouple, and catalyst tests), videotapesof reactor internals, and CCCHSD and Tosco Refining Company accident investigation reports. 3.1.4 Methodology An Events and Causal Factors(E&CF)chart was developed to establish a sequence of events for the accident. A workshop was held during the week of July 21-25, 1997 in Concord, California with investigators participating in reviewing'the E&CF chart and identifying contributing factors to the accident. See Appendix H for a list of participants in this root cause analysis workshop. The investigators participating in the root cause workshop used several methods to identify causes and contributing factors to the accident. A consultant in root cause methodology assisted the investigators in using the methodologies, and facilitated discussion of the analysis. investigators used the following methods to analyze the information collected during the investigation: 30 Hazard-Farrier-Target Analysis- used to analyze the fire/explosion hazard to the fatality(No. 2 Operator) and injured parties. Fault Tree Analysis- used to identify possible causes of pipe rupture, control system failures, and temperature excursion. Management and Risk Oversight Tree (MORT)- used to assess the adequacy of various management systems such as: Personnel Errors Control room operator errors Design Temperature and pressure indicating system, control room, field temperature panel,effluent piping system, reactor Human Factors Design of the control room information devices -charts, loggers Management Policy and Including services and management expectations Ilinplementation Maintenance Maintenance plan and implementation Readiness Monitoring system ready to operate Hazard Analysis Process Evaluating the installation and design of the new temperature logging system Procedures Routine and emergency operating procedures appropriateness and completeness Information System Information available to the operators regarding process monitoring system Supervision Detecting and correcting hazards, enforcing safety and emergency ractices. The investigators worked in teams using different methods on various areas of identified problems. Facts collected during the investigation were organized and documented to explain the adequacy or inadequacy of safety management. Root causes were identified and recommendations developed to address the root causes. A draft report with a description of the accident, facts and analysis, root causes and recommendations was developed and reviewed by the investigators. Petroleum refining consultants were called upon where needed to provide an assessment of information used in the report. 31 3.2 Testing results This section described tests conducted on the failed pipe, catalyst, reactor thermocouples, and the data logger. The purpose of this testing was to focus on the cause of the pipe failure and the temperature excursion in.Reactor 3 and the conditions present that led to their occurrence. 3.2.1 Ruptured Pipe Testing& Inspection The only inspection history available for the particular portion of the Reactor 3 effluent piping line was an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement of 0.94 inches from a 1991 inspection. There was no record of original gage thickness for the effluent piping, which was assumed to be original piping installed in 1963. There were no records showing that it had ever been repaired or replaced. The Reactor 3 outlet piping was originally specified to be 12-inch diameter piping of 1-1/4% Chromium and '/-i% Molybdenum alloy steel ASTM A335 Grade P11 with a wall thickness of 0.746" minimum or schedule 100. Schedule 100 12-inch diameter pipe has a nominal wall thickness of 0.843 inches. The current ASTM specification for standard A335 does not specify minimum pipe thickness but references standard A 530 for general requirements which includes pipe wall thickness. The current ASTM standard A530 states that minimum wall thickness at any point shall not be more than 12.5% under the nominal wall thickness specified. Fora nominal wall thickness of 0.843 inches, the minimum wall thickness would be 0.738 inches. Downstream from the point of rupture, the piping was welded to a 12"x 10" reducer to match the 10-inch diameter pipe that entered the feed/effluent heat exchangers. The piping specifications called for schedule 1.20 for 10-inch diameter pipe. Nominal thickness cif this pipe is 0.843 inches. The post-accident testing of the section of ruptured effluent pipe consisted of visual inspection, thickness measurements, ultrasonic measurements, liquid penetrant examination, magnetic particle examination, metal chemical analysis, tensile strength tests, hardness tests, microphotographic analysis, and metallographic analysis. The paint of failure on the section of pipe was not a weld, elbow or reducer. Nearly all(21 of 24)of the measurements of pipe thickness just upstream and downstream of the ruptured section were greater than the minimum pipe thickness specification of 0.746 inch. Testing results indicated that the pipe failed due to excessively high temperature. The temperature in the ruptured pipe reached 1700+'F at the point of failure, based on visual microscopic inspection by the lab. The pipe had been stretched resultingin a thickness of 0.3-0.4 inches at its thinnest point. At the point of failure, the pipe had expanded in circumference by approximately 5 inches, which created a localized bulge in the pipe prior to rupture. Other sections of the Reactor 3 effluent piping had also expanded. Chemical analysis for the base metal samples were found to conform to the requirements for ASTM A335-94, Grade P11 and the weld metal was found to be of the 1-'/a %Cr, '/i% Mo type- and was compatible with the base metal. The minimum tensile strength of the metal should be 60 32 ksi according to ASTM A335. This corresponds to a Rockwell Hardness number (HR) of 69 using the Rockwell B Scale. Testing showed that the hardness of base metal samples varied from 76 to 81 HRB (Rockwell Hardness number using Rockwell B ,Scale) while the hardness of the weld metal samples varied from 70 to 91 HRB. 3.2.2 Catalyst Testing Catalyst samples from all three Stage 2 reactors were collected and analyzed. Inspection of the catalyst bed after the accident revealed a fused hardened pillar of catalyst in Bed4 of each Stage 2 reactor. The catalyst samples from the pillars had 2.5 to 3 times higher carbon content than samples of loose catalyst from the same beds. This high carbon content was due to the buildup of petroleum coke. Catalyst samples from the middle of Bed 5 in Reactor 3 showed an 80% loss of surface area, consistent.with exposure to extreme temperatures. The catalyst had been in use for one year, since it was installed in the January 1996 turnaround. 3.2.3 Thermocouple Testing All thermocouples from the Reactor 3 arrays were tested to see if they would give temperature readings. All but three did, these had loose junctions in the silver soldered joint from the thermocouple to the lead wire, where an epoxy seal was located. According to the thermocouple vendor, the silver solder joint was likely to have been damaged by exposure to fire. Moving the lead wires around to make contact allowed readings to be taken. Bed 4 outlet and Bed arrays were tested using a propane torch to determine if the lead wires were shorted. The only problems detected were loose junctions as described above. The Reactor 3 thermocouples were also tested for temperature accuracy, using a;controlled heat source. The largest deviation was 16tip and all deviations were readings below the controlled source temperature. The thermocouple vendor indicated that moisture in the insulation on these thermocouples was probably leaking voltage across the insulation resulting in a low reading. Based on the test results, it is believed that the thermocouples were working properly prior to the accident. 3.2.4 Data Logger Testing Since the operators had reported problems with the data logger, tests were conducted on the data logger and thermocouple arrays using a simulator connected to the data logger. Various operating conditions and failures were simulated to determine the response of the data logger and to determine if it was malfunctioning. Results of the thermocouple and the data logger testing showed that they were likely to have functioned properly on the night of the incident,with the exception of one of the high temperature alarms, which is discussed further in a later section. 33 __ The outcome of these tests showed that for a YF change (slow or fast), the historian data did not change. For slow or fast 50°F and 5001°F changes, the screen updating time ranged from 13 to 02 seconds, depending on the number of input points showing. For temperature increases of 0.1°F every 20 seconds for 5 minutes,the screen update time was about 201-40 seconds. A loss of signal to the multiplexer caused the temperature display to default to 0.0. Data logger response to a short in a thermocouple wire was that the temperature points defaulted to the ambient temperature at the location of the short. Loss of power to the multiplexer or the interface unit resulted in screen and historian holding the last good value, even after 1.0 minutes. Removal of an input card to test the data logger response of failure of an input card resulted in readings of 0.0 for all thermocouples associated with that input card. If power was shutdown to the data logger computer, temperatures were displayed as "0.0????"on the data logger. High thermocouple readings were simulated followed by disconnection of the simulation. This tested high input to the data logger followed by thermocouple failure. The data logger points triggered an alarm at 780°F. However, the alarm status cleared when the temperature went above 140}0°F; data logger readings defaulted to 0.0. Using a controlled heat source, several thennocouples were heated, triggering a high temperature alarm on the data logger at 780°F. The alarm status cleared when the thermocouples were cooled below 780°F. Rapid full-scale changes (0 to 1400°and back) were simulated on several temperature points. No unusual readings were produced and the historian data showed the rapid changes. Heating the lead wires in the thermocouple sheath had no effect on the readings. Testing showed that points changing by +/- 5OT would alarm but would not change state (reading on monitor changing from blinking to steady) when acknowledged on the data logger keyboard. The +/- 501°F alarm would not be triggered again if another point were to exceed the limit. (See Section 1.2.4.5 discussing Alarms). This could explain why operators in the control room did not receive additional high temperature alarms during the January 21 incident. A point tested for low skin temperature (<300°F) would change state when it was acknowledged on the data logger. Tosco management stated they did not know how often the temperatures were being updated on the data logger display during the January 21, 1997 excursion. Tosco was not able to reproduce the operators' reports of temperatures dropping to zero because the data logger stored data differently than what was displayed in the control room. However, printouts from data logger showed zero readings for some thermocouples; some of which later indicated high temperatures. 34 3.3 Inforinaton Analysis 3.3.1 Effluent Pipe Rupture The results of the pipe testing show that the pipe failed because of extremely high temperatures. Tests indicated the data logger temperatures were correct except When they defaulted to zero because they exceeded the range of the data logger. Results of the catalyst testing showed that extremely high temperatures had occurred in Bed 5 of Reactor 3. Based on the data logger historian temperatures (Table 2), the high temperatures were initiated by a temperature excursion which originated from the outlet of Bed 4 of Reactor 3. The heat from this excursion caused an elevated inlet temperature to Bed 5, which subsequently increased the reaction rate and temperature rise across Bed 5. This caused the extremely high temperatures in the Bed 5 outlet and the Reactor 3 effluent piping. 3.3.2 Reactor Temperature Excursion Temperature excursions are not unusual occurrences in hydrocracking, especially during startup. The hydrocracking reaction generates heat which increases temperature and causes the reaction rate to accelerate. Since the hydrocracking process is exothermic (generating heat), once a reaction is initiated,reaction rate and temperature will continue to rise unless properly controlled. The common causes of temperature excursions in hydroprocessing include: • Uneven flow and heat distribution in catalyst bed, causing hot spots * Internal reactor failures, leading to catalyst migration and dead zones * Incomplete sulfiding of catalyst • Raising reactor temperatures too quickly when using fresh highly reactive catalyst • Feed temperature too high • Loss of recycle gas * Low recycle gas or oil flow rate • Inadequate reserve quench gas capacity Improper control,overreaction to some process change or operator inattention 3.3.2.1 Flaw and Heat Distribution Proper flow distribution is important to minimize risk of temperature excursions. Therefore, the conditions in the reactor that might have interfered with uniform flow or heat distribution were reviewed. Some of the conditions discussed below could be causes of flow or heat maldistribution and some are evidence that uneven flow or heat distribution had probably occurred. 'Technical Services(Tosco's Engineering Support group)noted in April 1996 that Bed 5 appeared to have the worst temperature differentials in the reactor. This was indicative of flow distribution problems and may have aggravated the generation of extremely high temperatures in Bed 5, but it was not the sole cause since the excursion was initiated by a high Bed 4 outlet 35 __ temperature. Appendix.D shows the location and description of inter-bed distribution system used on Stage 2. Distribution Tray Pluggaae A video inspection of the inside of the reactor internals showed some catalyst pellets and support balls on the distribution trays, but not in any significant amounts and not from every catalyst bed. Migration of catalyst from the bed down to the distribution trays can cause pluggage, which can cause flour distribution problems. The catalyst can migrate if the catalyst support screens are damaged or have holes in them. One way to determine if distribution trays were plugged or whether there was some other impediment to flow is to look at the pressure drop across each catalyst bed during operation. However, Tosco did not measure the pressure drop across each bed, only the total pressure drop across the reactor. The catalyst migration observed inside the reactor after the accident did not appear to be significant enough to interfere with distribution of flow. Catalyst Coking Coke deposits in catalyst beds are indicative of internal reactor problems, such as uneven liquid distribution. The videotape of internal inspection of all three reactors after the accident showed that fused coked catalyst pillars had formed in Bed 4 of all three stage 2 reactors. The other beds in all three reactors did not have coke pillars. Reactor 1 had a catalyst pillar on the bottom of Bed 4 at least several feet high with a circumference of F10" at the bottom and 17" at the top of the pillar. Reactor 2 also had a catalyst pillar on the bottom of Bed 4 which was approximately 5 feet high, 2'6" in circumference at the bottom and 1'6" in circumference at the top of the pillar. In Reactor 3, a pillar of fused catalyst was found in the center of Bed 4, extending 8 foot upward from the catalyst bottom support grid and measuring in diameter about 2 feet at the base and 8 inches at the top. Coke deposits in Bed 4 of Stage 2 reactors have been found in previous turnarounds. Coke pillars or balls forming in the catalyst are usually due to low flow or poor mixing. Coke can form at temperatures as low as 800 to 1000°F. Large coke pillars are usually formed over a long time and are not likely to be the result of one excursion. Large formations of coke in a catalyst bed is not a fully understood process. high temperatures can cause coking, but coking on the catalyst necessitates higher operating temperature to achieve desired reaction conversion. Also, coking can interfere with flow distribution which in turn can cause localized hot spots in the bed. Therefore, the presence of coke pillars in Bed 4'only of Stage 2 indicates some flow distribution and excessive temperature problems were occurring. Bed 4 OperatinProblems Temperature instability in Bed 4 of the Stage 2 reactors have been noted on prior occasions, which may have been evidence of flow maldistribution. More operational problems had been 36 experienced with Bed 4 in Stage 2 than with other beds. For example, in June/July of 1995, Technical Services noted that optimization was especially difficult to achieve in the fourth beds of Stage 2. In particular, controlling the Bed 4 inlet temperature appeared to be more difficult compared with other beds. Incidents involving Stage 2 Bed 4 temperature excursions had been documented in Reactor 1, on three prior occasions. One of these incidents occurred two days before the January 21 accident. These are discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.3.2 of this report. Inspection of Reactor 1 after January 21, 1997 showed that one thermocouple located in the center of lied 4 was slightly bowed, possibly indicating extremely high operating temperatures. As a result of a temperature excursions(s) that occurred on July 23, 1992, special operating guidelines were drafted in August, 1992 for Reactor 3, Bed 4. The temperature differential.across Bed 4 was to be limited to 25'F and the temperature increases were to be made)at half the recommended rate given for other beds. However, these draft procedures were never incorporated into the Standard Operating Procedures. Bed 4 Phase Change One factor that may have contributed to the temperature excursion was a change of phases (liquid to gas and vice versa) in Bed 4. It is common to have all gas phase in the lower beds of the reactor. Even at the top of the reactor, the process fluid is generally about 95%gas by volume. Beds 4 and 5 tend to have all vapor during normal operations. Tosco performed flash calculations that indicated that the reactants transitioned from wet to dry catalyst within Bed 4 of Reactor 3. Beds in which some of the catalyst is wet and some of the catalyst is dry are particularly susceptible to hot spots since the reaction rate and mechanism of heat generation and removal are different for wet, partially wet and dry catalyst. Temperature gradients are more sensitive to liquid distribution in the transition zone than in flow regimes where the catalyst is either completely wet or dry. Therefore, liquid distribution to the inlet of the catalyst bed is critical to temperature stability, especially in beds where a transition between phases occurs. The flow regime in Bed 4 possibly contributed to the formation of a"hot spot." 'Bed 4 Distribution Design The distribution trays above Bed 4 in each Stage 2 reactor were of a different design from the distribution trays above other catalyst beds in Stage 2. This could have been a factor explaining why Bed 4 had more flow distribution and operational problems. Bed 4 had no downcomer tray and the chimneys on the distribution tray were of a different design. (See Appendix D for details). The original Isocracker had four catalyst beds. Beds 1,,2, 3, and 5 were the same design as they were in the original Isocracker. When Tosco upgraded from the Chevron Isocracker to the Unocal Unicracker design in 1986, another bed of different design was added and called Bed 4. The modified reactor internals along with the other changes made at the time was then licensed by 37 __ ......................................... .................................. ........................................... ................................... Unocal as a Unicracker. Tosco stated that they were not able to determine if the design of distribution to Bed 4 was the cause of the coking problems. Levelness of Distribution Trays To achieve uniformity of flow, distribution trays must be fairly level. Several problems with Reactor 3 distribution trays were identified in an inspection in February 1992. The Bed 5 quench pan had thinned, Bed 4 and Bed 5 quench pans were bowed downward, and some of the distributor hanger support bolts for Bed 4 were missing. These items appeared on the maintenance work list for the January 1996 turnaround. However, no documentation was available to indicate whether this maintenance had been completed. Therefore, it is uncertain whether these problems still existed at the time of the accident and whether they could have been a factor in causing the temperature excursion. Some distortions of the distribution trays were seen from the internal inspection of all three Stage 2 reactors conducted after January 21, 1997. In Reactor 3 above Bed 4, about 1/4 of the quench tray was bent downward. The tray had slipped down about 12 inches below the tray support ring, and the manway was lifted 12 inches above the adjacent tray sections. The quench pan above Bed 4 appeared to be bowed downward. The upper surface of the Bed 4 catalyst had about a two foot deep depression in the center. The inspection after January 21 in Reactor 3 showed that the quench tray manway above Bed 5 was warped about 3 inches above adjacent tray sections. The Bed 5 quench pan had dropped down in one place and was touching the top of the sawtooth downcomers on the next tray. This seems similar to damage described from the internal inspection report in 1992 of"5th and 4th bed quench pans bowed down in center. 5th more severely, actualty resting on distributor tray."The downcomer tray in Bed 5 appeared to be wavy in some sections as though it had been pressed down between the tops of the chimneys of the distributor tray below. The post-accident inspection revealed that the quench tray above Bed 4 in each of the reactors appeared to have been disturbed. The pipe rupture would have caused a very large pressure drop in the lower part of the reactor because the pressure in the reactor was approximately 1560 psig as compared to the ambient pressure of 0 psig. Therefore, damage to distribution trays may have been a result of the dramatic pressure decrease during the pipe rupture. Because of this, it was not possible to determine with certainty whether unlevel distribution trays were a causative factor in the accident. Investigators were able to rule out a number of possible causes of the temperature excursion: 3.3.2.2 Catalyst Condition The catalyst had been in use for a year and it had already been suffided. Therefore fresh reactive catalyst was not a Rely cause. 38 ............................... .................................... ............................. ............................... As mentioned earlier, the Stage 2 reactors were operating with partially deactivated catalyst, which reduced the cracking/saturation reaction. Investigators considered the possibility that reactivation of the catalyst combined with raising feed temperatures might have;contributed to the temperature excursion. At approximately 7.00 pm, some cracking was occurring in Stage 2 but the temperature differentials across each bed were still less than normal. Under the direction of management, operators were gradually increasing temperatures in Stage 2 to restore catalyst activity. The strip chart-indicated that the reactor inlet temperature was increasing gradually as planned, no sudden control changes or temperature increases were noted. A slow, steady rise in inlet temperature from 625°F to 640'F occurred over a time period of 4 hours. At 7:36 pm, the reactor inlet temperature was 640.2°F on the data logger. Operators were also working on reducing the nitrogen content in Stage i effluent in order to run clean feed through the Stage 2 reactors. The operators expected that the Stage 2 catalyst would eventually clean itself up, if it was a temporary poisoning. According to county investigators, the catalyst manufacturer deactivated with nitrogen compounds some of the same type of catalyst used with Stage 2 and conducted some tests to see if they could induce a rapid temperature rise. They could not produce a temperature excursion. Based on consultation with engineers with hydroprocessing experience, EPA investigators do not relieve that the process of reactivating catalyst in Stage 2 contributed to the temperature excursion. 3.3.2.3 Feed Temperature There were no sudden increases in reactor inlet temperature that would have caused the feed to become too hot. The strip chart shows a slaw steady rise in reactor inlet temperature, which never rose above 640°F. Also, the rapid temperature rise first occurred in Bed 4 and not in the three beds above it. 3.3.2.4 Oil and Recycle Gas Flowrate The recycle hydrogen compressor did not fail and flow data from strip chart and computer printouts showed no interruption in recycle gas flow. Thus lack of recycle gas flow was ruled out as a cause of the excursion. The rate of recycle gas and oil feed did not appear to be a problem. The oil feed flowrate was approximately 6,000 BPIF in each of the Stage 2 reactors and was above the minimum required flowrate as specified in the operating procedures. The inlet recycle gas rate appeared to be sufficient for the amount of oil being feed to the reactor. The ratio of inlet(excluding quench)gas to oil flow was about 11,000 SCF/bbl and exceeded the design minimum of 6,000 SCF/bbl. If the gas rate is too low, the tendency for channeling and maldistribution of gas and oil flow within the 39 __ catalyst bed, and thus local hot spots, increases. Although a catalyst pillar was found in Bed 4, investigators believe its cross-sectional arca is too small to have much adverse effect on flow distribution. 3.3.2.5 (wench Flow to Bed 5 Because Bed 5 temperatures went out of control, investigators focused on the role of quench flow to Bed 5. The quench flow is controlled by the single Bed 5 inlet temperature, which is recorded both on the data logger and the strip chart. The quench valve above Bed 5 fully opened on automatic control in response to Bed 5 inlet temperatureexceeding its controller set paint. On the strip chart, the set point temperature appeared to be between 640 and 650°F. By 7:36 pm on January 21, the Bed 5 inlet temperature'had dropped back to about 625°l~on the strip chart (below the set point), so the quench valve automatically closed. At approximately 7:37 pm, the extra No. 1 Operator switched the Bed 5 quenchflow controller from automatic to manual control and closed the quench valve. He did this because he was concerned about possibly losing temperature in the reactor system as a result of the decreased Bed 5 inlet temperature. EPA investigators estimated that the quench valve to Bed 5 was closed at least one minute, perhaps two minutes. before it was later opened by the Stage 2 Board Operator. This was estimated by correlating temperatures and times from the data logger to temperature peaks on the strip chart (also accounting for time offset in strip chart pens) for Bed 5. This strip chart also recorded quench flow to Bed 5. Because quench was closed manually, the Bed 5 inlet temperature rose above its set point to about a maximum of 670aF on the strip chart. The data logger historian recorded the Bed 5 inlet temperature as 660°F between 7:36:40 and 7:38:40, for about 2 minutes. Also by 7:37 pm, all four Bed 5 outlet temperatures (as recorded by the data logger) were rising. By 7:38 pm, one of the Bed 5 outlet temperatures'had reached 717°F and another had reached 876°F. At approximately 7:39, the quench valve was opened manually by the Stage 2 Board Operator, who was not aware that it had been closed. Quench flow rose and reached almost full scale on the strip chart at approximately 7:41 pm. Temperatures continued to rise in Bed 5 until the explosion. If quench had been left on automatic control, it would have lowered the Bed 5 inlet temperature but it would not have responded to rising Bed 5 outlet temperatures. In order to determine if the temporary lack of quench was an aggravating factor in the accident, FPA performed a simplified' heat balance based on a Bed 5 inlet temperature of 860°F, the maximum temperature reached at 7:34:20 pm. The purpose of these calculations was to see if the heat generated within Bed 5 could have been cooled by maximum flow of quench gas, if the quench valve had been left fully opened by the operators when the Bed 5 inlet first abruptly increased. The results indicate that maximum quench flow to Bed 5 would have been insufficient'to cool Bed 5 back to a normal operating temperature of 650°F. At least three times the maximum design quench flow would have been required to cool Bed 5 back to normal operating temperature. 40 The calculations take into account only the amount of cooling.capacity available and do not factor in actual heat transfer rates, which means that actual heat transfer rate would have been slower than assumed in the calculations. Therefore, with the best heat transfer rate, the maximum quenching would not have been sufficient. However, the calculations assume that the entire bed contents would have undergone an accelerated reaction. Only one Bed 5 inlet temperature reading was available, so it is assumed that this temperature was fairly uniform across the inlet of Bed 5. The calculations used the maximum design quench capacity of 32 rnillicn standard cubic feet per day(MMSCFD), as referenced in the Unicracker manual provided by the licensor. The results of the heat balance calculations are not unexpected. Quench capacity is typically designed to handle minor temperature excursions. The significant increase in Bed 5 inlet temperature accelerated the reaction rate, which in turn, accelerated the generation of heat from the reaction. The hydrocracking reaction rate doubles for approximately every 20°F increase in temperature. Therefore, an increase of 223°F would have increased the reaction rate by approximately 4000 times. The elevated temperatures in Bed 5 went beyond the point where they could be effectively controlled by quench. The reaction rate could only be slowed down by lowering the hydrogen partial pressure, which requires depressuring. 3.3.3 Control of Temperature Excursion If additional quench gas is unable to control a temperature excursion in a hydrocracking reactor, then lowering the partial pressure of the hydrogen will slow the reaction; this is normally accomplished by depressuring. Depressuring not only reduces the hydrogen partial pressure, but reduces the stress on the reactor shell and connected piping. In some situations, stopping the oil feed is enough to slaw down the reaction. In other cases, feed may be continued to serve as a heat sink. Operators at the Hydrocracker Unit had available written emergency operating procedures which were dated October 1991. The procedures covered 23 different emergencies, and how operators should handle each part of the Hydrocracker Unit (Hydrogen Plant, Stage 1 and Stage 2) during an emergency. One of the emergency procedures covered how to handle temperature excursions. This procedure was also posted on the control board. For a temperature excursion on Stage 2, the procedure required the Stage 2 Board Operator to take the following actions: (1) For any reactor temperature point 5°F above normal, change reactor controls to return the temperature point to normal. This may include reducing trim furnace outlet temperature, increasing quench to hot beds, speed up IIR compressor or add quench to reactor inlet via FIG 729, (2) For any reactor temperature point 25°F above normal, do the following: Hit the "six shorts" unit alarm, close appropriate oil feed control valve, reduce trim furnace firing, circulate maximum hydrogen through hot reactor, and maintain normal unit pressure. Reduce temperature in hot reactor to 50°F below normal operating level as quickly as possible. Add quench to reactor 41 inlet as needed via FIC-729. Continue to cool reactor at a rate of 100°per hour to 500°F or 100°F below operating temperature prior to shutdown, whichever is lower. (3) For any reactortemperature 501F above normal or if any reactor temperature exceeds 800°F, immediately activate the 300 psi/minute depressuring system which causes the following: (a) IIR compressor shuts down.' (b) Stage 2 charge pump shuts down. (c) Makeup hydrogen to Stage 2 stops. (d) Trim furnaces trip. (e) Recycle gas from HPS Separator Overhead stops. (f) Recycle gas to HDS'No. 1&2 Unit stops. The written emergency procedures also contained specific instructions for each of the other Hydrocracker Unit operators for assisting the Stage 2 Board Operator during any ofthe'above three cases of temperature excursions. Although some of the temperatures observed by operators on the data logger monitor exceeded 800°F during the January 21 incident, the operators did not depressure the unit as required by the emergency procedures. 3.3.3.1 Awareness of Emergency Situation The operators initially did not take the specified steps to control the temperature excursion because they did not comprehend that the temperature excursion was real.. There were several reasons why they were unsure of the situation that was occurring the evening of January 21: Confusing Temperature Readings The data logger temperatures on the'control room monitor were fluctuating between high, low, and zero readings, and then back to normal, causing the operators to believe the readings were in error. Just prior to the explosion, one operator reported that at least half of the thermocouples on the data logger for'Stage`2 were not working properly. Based'on post-accident testing, it was determined that the data logger displays "0" when the temperature reading is over 14001 F. Operators did not understand the significance of these "o readings. Problems with Temperature Monitoring Operators thought temperature data might be erroneous because the data logger had experienced malfunctions at times. The data logger had been malfunctioning only one day earlier on January 20. On January 10, 1997, the data logger was taken out of service and a new temperature monitoring system, known as a Foxboro Intelligent Automation (VA) distributed digital control system, was installed to display reactor temperatures in the control room. During the time that the Stage 2 IJA system was operational, operators reported that over half of the temperature 42 ... _....... ....-..... ........ .::..:r::::.::::::..:: .,ham ...... ........ _ ............:............... ................................................................. ...................... points were periodically dropping to 0. The Stage 2 temperature monitoring system was switched from the ICA system back to data logger on January 20 because the UA was incorrectly calculating the weighted catalyst averages. It was averaging in zeros for seven of the twelve points per thermocouple bundle because the additional seven points were not wired into the VA system yet. In addition, operators had experienced computer problems with Stage I UA system in the past and stated that the problems they saw on the Stage 2 data logger looked similar to those problems. During September 1996, the Stage 2 data logger failed to perform properly on two occasions. Once, the data logger stopped updating twice and had to be reset by instrument technicians to restore service. On another occasion, it was reported that the data logger had stopped working and repairs were made to restore it to service. Operators relied on board mounted instruments to continue operating the unit. In July 1996, the Stage 2 Reactor 3 outlet temperature signal to the control board as well as the data logger display was lost, apparently due to a failed thermocouple. In the past,operators had seen the Stage 1 data logger display "lock up", meaning the temperature readings did not change. According to the operators, it was difficult to determine that there was a problem with the display until it was noticed that the temperatures had not changed in response to a control change. Strip Chart vs. Data Logger Data The Stage 2 Board Operator heard the data logger alarm for the high Bed 4 outlet and Bed 5 inlet temperature and stated that he acknowledged the alarm on the data logger. However, the control board strip chart for Bed 4 looked normal because the Bed 4 outlet point that caused the alarm is not the same point that is linked to the control board display. The Bed 5 inlet temperature increase was displayed on the control room strip chart, but dropped back to normal after the quench valve to Bed 5 fully opened. Audible Temperature Alarms A Bed 4 outlet(point 2) temperature and the Bed 5 inlet temperature exceeded both the high temperature alarm setting of 780°F and the +50'F over normal alarm setting on the data logger. The operators stated that they heard one high temperature alarm on the data logger for Bed 4 outlet and Bed 5 inlet high temperatures. From operator statements, it appears that there was no delay between the occurrence of the Bed 4 outlet and Bed 5 inlet high temperatures and the alarms received because of them. Operators did not receive additional audible high temperature alarms from the data logger, despite Bed 5 outlet and reactor inlet and outlet temperatures later exceeding high temperature alarm set points. Operators did not immediately notice the Bed 5 outlet, reactor inlet and outlet temperatures rising above critical limits. There was a different alarm system for the temperature points on the strip charts than for those points on the data logger. The alarm for temperature points (center inlet and outlet of bed) on the 43 ............ ................ control board was a flashing light on the control board. Alarms for data logger temperatures produced an audible alarm and flashing light on the control board. The numbers on the data logger screen would turn from black to red and blink on the screen When the acknowledge button was pushed on the data logger keyboard, the reading stopped blinking but the background color remained red. When the temperature came back into normal range, the red background reverted to black. The data logger must be reset to receive new audible high temperature alarms. In post-accident tests for+50°F above normal temperatures, the data logger would not re-alarm while it was in the abnormal condition when the acknowledge button was pressed on the keyboard. It also took 2.5 minutes for the alarm to clear when the temperature dropped to non-alarm levels. During the January 21 incident, the Bed 4 outlet (point'2) and Bed 5 inlet temperatures'rose and returned to normal,according to the data logger historian file (see Section 1.2.4.3 and Table 2), which should have cleared the alarm status on the data logger. The Stage'2 Board Operator stated that he acknowledged the alarm on the data logger. It seems clear from the data logger tests that for the +50°F above normal condition, the data logger alarm cannot be reset in a reasonably short time. This situation would prevent operators from receiving high temperature alarms from other points in the reactor. Makeup Hydrogen Flow and Recycle Hydrogen Purity Operators were confused by makeup hydrogen flow dropping to zero. Typically, an increase in reactivity consumes'more hydrogen and causes an increase in demand for hydrogen. This was what operators normally'expected to see during a temperature excursion. Increased pressure in the recycle gas caused the makeup hydrogen flaw to decrease because the makeup hydrogen to Stage was pressure controlled. The increase in pressure was clue to formation and buildup of methane in the recycle gas, which increased its density and pressure. When the temperature excursion began, the methane was generated from a high temperature reaction called hydrogenolysis. Hydrogenolysis created great amounts of methane and heat. This reaction normally occurs at temperatures over 800°F. The increase in methane content caused a drop in the hydrogen purity of the recycle gas. Operators did not know that the recycle gas (hydrogen)purity had dropped because of a time lag in receiving analysis from the hydrogen purity analyzer. The hydrogen purity readings appeared normal to the operators prior to the explosion(92.7% at 7:36:18 pm). A post-incident study by Tosco of the analyzer and sampling system determined that the time required for the analyzer to indicate a change in the process was approximately 7'minutes. This meant that the normal reading at 7:36:18 pm was actually the hydrogen purity of the recycle gas 7 minutes before, due to the analysis lag time. A low hydrogen purity alarm occurred at 7:41:26 pm, very close to the time of the explosion, confirming that purity had dropped because of an increase in the methane content: 44 ......... .. ._ kA This 7:41 pm alarm was caused by the methane produced seven minutes earlier when the temperature excursion began at 7.34 pm. Accessibility of Temperature Data Operators did not have access to all the Stage 2 reactor temperature data in the control room because some of the readings could only be obtained at the field panels outside underneath the reactors. The operators typically used the field panels to verify questionable control room readings or temperature excursions. For example, during a temperature excursion that occurred on January 19 (see Section 3.3.3.2), operators obtained verification of temperatures from the field panel before taking any action. On January 21, an operator went outside to the field panel to obtain temperature data as had been done in past practice. Operators inside the control room did not take any action to depressure the unit because they did not believe the data lugger. The control room operators were not able to understand the garbled radio transmissions from the No. 2 Operator outside. if the control room operators had received a,report of high temperatures, this might have caused them to activate the depressuring system. Twomoreoperators went to check on the No. 2 Operator outside. The explosion occurred just after the two operators left the control room. When the field panels were installed in January 1996, operators asked management to bring this temperature data into the control room. They expressed concerns to management about having to obtain temperature data from the panels outside. Operators were told by management that the readings from the additional thermocouples available from the field panels could not be made available in the control room due to cost and that they should "just live with it" The Stage 2 Board Operator stated that it was very time-consuming to read and record temperatures from the field panels. To take readings from a field panel required about 45 minutes. Operators stated that they took readings from the field panels once per day,called them in by radio and logged them onto an entry log. Tosco management personnel provided conflicting information about the purpose of the panels, and why they were installed under the reactor. The Production Area Supervisor;said that he did not know why the panels were installed under the reactor as opposed to in the control room, although he did say their function was to give additional data points with which to monitor the reactor temperatures, The Production Technical Services Manager stated that the thermocouples were added,as an engineering project to better detect hot spots in the beds and to determine weighted catalyst averages. A contract engineer had recorded the readings for this purpose. The Production Technical Services Manager's understanding was that the panels were never intended to be used by the operators to operate the unit, but to collect data to determine if installation of a new l/A temperature monitoring system was justified. The Control Engineer did not.know why the panels were installed under the reactor, but thought that the panels had been used to help Technical Services monitor catalyst activity rather than used as an operating tool. 45 __ No Management of Change (MOC) was developed and/or implemented for the field panel installation and use. No written operating procedures were incorporated into SOPS for obtaining data from the field panels during normal or abnormal conditions. Based on the data collected from the panels, Technical Services concluded in June of 1996 that the points in the Stage 2 reactors with the highest temperatures were those which could only be read at the field panels. On January 20, 1997 the use of the I/A system was discontinued because the I/A was incorrectly calculating the weighted catalyst average temperature (WCAT). If the I/A system had been properly connected'to all 96 thermocouples and accurately calculating WCATs, the operators would have had immediate access to all Stage 2 reactor temperature data in one place in the control room. This might have given them more time to respond to increasing temperatures, especially those temperatures from thermocouples which tended to read higher than other monitoring points. Testing of the UA equipment and software should have occurred before they were put into actual use. MOC# 150108 dated February 5, '1996 covered"Planned Changes to Existing Hydrocracker Control System." This document included work on the transfer of temperature information from the existing PC-based monitoring system to Plant'Information(PI) computer system and I/A systems after unit startup. Although it is not clearly stated to which part of the Hydrocracker Unit this transfer applied, investigators assumed that it applied to Stage 2 since the I/A system was already in use for Stage 1. The MOC stated that the new equipment and software would be tested before the system was commissioned. In addition to operational problems; operators had no advanced notification that the I/A temperature monitoring system was to be implemented on January 10, 1997. They were not instructed how to use or access information from the new I/A system. The Stage 2 Board Operator said he was not involved with any MOC for the change to the UA system. The Production Area Supervisor stated that there was no MOC for the switch to I/A for Stage 2 because it was a display change only with more data points. He acknowledged that there were no formal training sessions on the Stage 2 change to IIA,just on-the-job(OTJ) training, and that Stage 2 operators were already qualified on the I/A'in general from being qualified on Stage 1. Radio Communications According to operators,the radio transmission from the No. 2 Operator who was sent outside on January 21, was fuzzy with excessive static sounds. Operators had indicated in the past that radios did not always provide reliable communication because of bad batteries, busy channels, and no designated emergency channel. 46 3.3.3.2 No Emergency Depressiuring.Used Even after operators,realized, moments before the explosion, that the Reactor 3 outlet and inlet temperatures had climbed,above 800°F, they did not depressure the reactor as the emergency operating procedures required. The 100 psi/min and 300 psi/min emergency depressuring systems, installed in 1986, were intended to be used to rapidly reduce pressure and reaction rate and bring a temperature excursion under control. Instead of depressuring, the operators began to adjust quench gas flows in order to coal the reactor. Prior Temperature Excursions Operators did not depressure the reactor because their past practice to control large temperature excursions had been to.increase quench,reduce reactor inlet temperatures, and/or stop feed flow to the reactor. Many of the operators reported that they have experienced numerous temperature excursions, but most could recall only one instance when the unit was depressured using either the 100 or 300 psi/min system. One operator indicated that the depressuring system had been used only once in the last five years, perhaps only twice in the last ten years. Documentation was available for three previous temperature excursions that occurred on July 23, 1992;March 19, 1996; and January 19, 1997, summarized below: July 23, 1992 As operators were raising temperatures in Stage 2 to start cracking, temperature excursions occurred at about t pm in Bed 4 cutlet of Reactor 3 and Bed 1 outlet of Reactor 1. Adding additional quench hydrogen was not effective in controlling the excursion. Feed was stopped and the 100 psi/minute depressuring system was activated, resulting in a grass fire at the flare. Some of the documentation for this event references temperature excursions in Reactor 2, so it is not clear whether the excursion occurred in two or all three Stage 2 reactors. March 19, 1996 On March 19, 1996, there was a temperature excursion in Stage 2, Reactor 1, which began in Bed 3 and progressed to Be&4 and 5. During this excursion, the Bed 4 temperature was over 800°F for 13 minutes and reached a maximum of 100fy'F. The maximum estimated reactor outlet temperature during the excursion was 920°F. The operators did not activate the emergency depressuring system. The operators stopped oil feed to Reactor I about 17 minutes after Bed 3 outlet temperature exceeded 800°F and about 3 minutes after the Bed 4 outlet temperature exceeded 800°F. About 7 minutes after feed was discontinued, temperatures at the outlet of Bed 4 began to fall. Within another 6 minutes, the reactor outlet temperature began to fall. As a result of the incident, the temperature control guidelines for Stage 2'reactors were reissued on April 4, 1996 to the operators, posted on the control board and reviewed in safety meetings. These guidelines were: 47 L- _ ... __ (1) Maximum axial or radial temperature differentials in a catalyst bed must be held to less than 45°F. (2) Bed inlet temperature must be reduced if any temperature rises 5°F above normal. (3) Oil feed to a reactor must be stopped if any point is 25°F above normal. (4) The unit must be depressured at 300 psi per minute if any point is 50°F above normal or over 8WF. January 19. 1997 At about 10:20 pm on January 19th, a temperature excursion occurred in Bed 4 of Reactor 1. The center outlet temperature in Bed 4 increased from 653°F to over 800°F during a 20-minute period. Operators did not activate the emergency depressuring system. During this excursion, the automatic quench control was overridden and more quench'flow was added manually to Beds 2 and 4. Bed inlet temperatures came down,but the Bed 4 center outlet temperature'continued to increase to more than 800°F as indicated on the control board display. The No. 2 Operator went outside to check the field panel and reported temperatures in excess of 900°F. Feed to the reactor was stopped and fuel gas flow to the trim furnace was reduced. About 5 minutes after pulling the oil feed, the Bed 4 center outlet temperature reached a maximum of 998°F. The temperature then decreased, falling below 800°F in about I minute. The operators then continued lowering Reactor 1 temperatures to 550°F, and reintroduced feed approximately one hour later. Supervision Emergency depressuring was not employed before the explosion on January 21, even though the operators realized in the last few minutes before the explosion that temperatures did exceed 800° F. The operators did not have authority to delay this decision. Because operators did not activate the required depressuring for this and prior temperature excursions, supervisory roles and responsibility for enforcing practices were reviewed as possible root causes for this accident. Tosco's Hydrocracker Training Manual stated that No. 1 Operators should provide leadership for the rest of the operators for work and personal safety, environmental protection, energy conservation and maintenance-cost containment. They must thoroughly know the operations of the entire unit to provide proper guidance and resolve problems in a timely manner. They must be able to'respond to emergencies in a calm., composed and effective manner. The manual also stated that"However, since the No. 2 Operators have a primary responsibility to tend to the equipment, the No. I.Operators should always give them first chance to correct any problems. The No. 1 Operator should only intervene when the situation clearly calls for such actions. The No. I Operators walk'a fine line.They should be on top of things and provide leadership for the operation of the Complex, but they should always avoid doing the jobs of the No. 2 Operators." The Training Manual also stated that the Stage 2 Board Operator is authorized to initiate emergency steps for controlling a runaway reaction without first consulting with the No. I 48 Operator. The Stage 2 Board Operator is responsible for taking decisive steps to minimize the danger of a runaway reaction. In the event of a Stage 2 temperature excursion, the Emergency Operating Procedures stated that the No. I Operators should: 1) Advise Stage 2 Board Operator as needed. 2)Notify the Tract -A Foreman by radia and ask him to coordinate the activities of other units. The procedures for responding to a temperature excursion(as discussed in Section 3.3.3 of this report), were listed under the section for the Stage 2 Board Operator in the Emergency Procedures. Although it is the Stage 2 Board Operator who would normally activate the depressuring system, the No. I Operators did not ensure that standard operating or emergency procedures were followed when temperatures exceeded 800°F on January 21 or on previous occasions. The Stage 2 Board Operator stated that all qualified operators have authority to shutdown the unit and everyone in the control room had this authority. Tosco management stated in a meeting with investigators that although they knew of the January 19, 1997 temperature excursion right after it occurred, they were not immediately aware that the temperature had gone as high as 900°F. The actual temperature reading was not written on any of the operator or supervisor logs. The Production Area Supervisor stated in an interview that to his knowledge the 800°F limit had not been exceeded while he has been supervisor. The Production Area Supervisor stated that failure to use the emergency depressuring system for a temperature exceeding 800°F would be considered a serious matter and could be subject to disciplinary action although to his knowledge no operator has ever been disciplined for not initiating this action as required. There was no formal delegation of authority for No. 1 Operators to have management responsibilities. Two No. 1 Operators were on shift the night of the explosion. There was no written policy for designating who is in charge of operations when two No. 1 Operators are on the same shift. The shift supervisor for the Hydrocracker had responsibility for other units in his zone(Tosco's refinery;,operations are divided into three zones for management purposes)and was not always on-site at the Hydrocracker. The Hydrocracker Unit is part of one zone, which also included the following units : No. 3 HDS, No. 3 Reformers, No. 1 HDS,No. 2 HDS, Butadiene, Benzene Saturation System, Reformate Fractionation, Alkylation Plant, #2 Hydrogen, API Separator, Wastewater Treatment Plant, No. 1 isomerization, MTBE plant,,No. 2 Reformer. Training Training for the Hydrocracker operators was reviewed to determine if operators had the necessary preparation and knowledge to operate the Hydrocracker reactors safely. Tosco's Hydrocracker Training Program document, dated May 1989, discussed runaway reactions and how to respond to them by using the emergency depressuring system. 49 The following guidelines for dealing with an uncontrollable temperature rise are stated in the Stage 2 Control Board section of the training manual. "l. When any reactor temperature as indicated by the Moore controllers is 5°F above normal,you must change the control set points to bring it back to normal. Consult the Emergency Procedures Manual for methods to accomplish this. 2. When any reactor temperature as indicated by the Moore controllers is rising and is 25°F above the normal temperature, you must pull the oil feed out of the hot reactor. You can leave the oil in the other reactors. 3. When the temperature continues to rise and is 50°F above normal (or has exceeded 800°F, whichever is reached first),you must activate the 300 psi/min depressuring system and dump the contents of the Second Stage to the flare. As the board person, you are authorized to take'these steps without first consulting with the No. I Operator. You are responsible for taking decisive steps to minimize the damage of a runaway reaction." One of the Hydrocracker operators (then on loan to the Training Department) stated that most of the training for the Hydrocracker operations is on-the-job training instead of classroom training. Each operator performed a task under review of other operators. Operators took an an oral exam given by a supervisor and senior No. I Operators. Operators had no formal training sessions on the Stage 2'change to IIA system,just on-the-job training, according to the Production Area Supervisor. In interviews, most of the operators stated that they knew the conditions that required emergency depressuring,but acknowledged that depressuring was rarely used as required for extreme temperature excursions. This on-the-job practice unfortunately may have lead operators to believe that temperature excursions could usually be controlled without using depressuring. Operators may not have understood the elevated risk of losing control of the reaction at temperatures near 800°F, which is why depressuring is required. Training records for the Hydrocracker showed no documentation for unit-specific initial, supplemental or refresher training. The Production Training Supervisor stated that Hydrocracker, unit-specific refresher training had not yet been.developedbecause the Training Department was not sure what was required for refresher training. Some training that was conducted during the utility shift and weekly safety meeting might have constituted refresher training(such as emergency procedures and drills) but this training had not been documented as refresher'training. Some operators had received some reactor safety training, which was given by a consultant. The training included the causes and prevention of temperature excursions in hydroprocessing reactors. Six of Tosco's 25 Hydrocracker operators, including two who were on the evening shift on January 2I, attended this training. Operators were told during the training that unchecked hot spots could result in catastrophic failures of reactors or piping. 50 ..................................................................................... ............................ It is unknown whether all Hydrocracker operators at Tosco received training on the following: operating with deactivated catalyst, how the hydrogen purity analyzer operated, or the impact of methane formation in pressure control of recycle gas. The operators did not know that when the temperature of the thermocouple went beyond 1400°F, the data logger would.show zero readings. Emizency De pressuring System Reliability One operator stated that the depressuring system does not always work right and is not reliable. The Production Area Supervisor stated that to his knowledge, he doesn't believe the depressuring system can be tested, certainly not on-line. The Control Engineer stated that the depressuring system can be tested and that it was tested in 1986 when the unit was first brought on line as a Unicracker. He was_not aware of any tests since 1986,but he said he would not be expected to be involved in subsequent tests. Testing procedures for the 100 and 300 psi/min depressuring system were described in the 1986 Unicracker Process Manual, although Tosco did not incorporate them into their operating procedures. Operators had encountered difficulties when the depressuring system was activated for temperature excursions in the past. These difficulties included grass fires at the flare(July 22 and 23, 1992)and a generation of a cloud of flammable vapor(July 22, 1992). The 100 psi/min depressuring system was automatically activated on July 22 when the recycle gas compressor tripped. These experiences could have contributed to the operators'reluctance,to employ emergency depressuring and reinforced operators' decisions to handle severe temperature excursions by other means. Procedures Investigators reviewed the Hydrocracker Startup and Shutdown procedures, Emergency procedures and the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Emergency procedures had not been updated since October 1991. Most of the SON have not been updated since 1991. Some of the procedures did not match equipment and instrumentation in the process flow diagram(PFD), process and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)or discussion of equipment in the HAZOP study. Operators may not have followed written procedures if the procedures were outdated, no longer matched process conditions or equipment, or were no longer relevant. Operators also performed several tasks for which there Were no written procedures. One example of a mismatched procedure was in the Emergency Operating Procedures for the situation of reactor temperatures 5°F or 25°F above normal. In this case, the Emergency Operating Procedures instruct operators to add quench to the reactor inlet by activating FIC-729 and not to add emergency quench to the reactor outlet (chain valve). The process flow diagram and P&ID only show a hand-operated quench flow valve after Bed 5, (HC-729A on the PFD and HV-729A on the P&ID). The HAZOP study(see Section 3.3.4)stated that an open or leaking emergency inlet quench valve HV-729 could cause a deviation of"more flow"of hydrogen to 51 ...................... reactor. However, the HAZOP did not identify these quench valve(s) HC-729 or HV-729 specifically as a means to control either high temperature or"more reaction" deviations in the reactor. So it was not clear if quench could be added to reactor inlet or outlet or perhaps both. An example of a SOP that may have no longer been relevant was SOP#20 which required that when operators depressured Stage 2 they must first manually close the makeup hydrogen control valve from Stage 1 to Stage 2 to prevent a depressuring of Stage 1. This valve reportedly would not close because the control valve wiring was apparently damaged in March 1989 and was never repaired. According to design, activation of the emergency depressuring system would automatically close this valve. Tosco management did not know whether this procedure was still valid as of January 21. SOP#20 was undated. Temperature operating limits varied among the different documents providing operating instructions. For example, the Hydrocracker'Operating Limits document stated that the Stage 2 reactor outlet temperature maximum is 690°F while SOP#9- Reactor Operations-Summary of Limits and Guidelines stated that the Stage 2 reactor maximum outlet is 800°F. The Hydrocracker Operating Limits stated that the trim furnace tube wall temperature maximum is 1000°F, while SOP#9 stated that the trim furnace skin temperature is 950°F maximum. The Stage 2 startup procedures stated that no bed'temperature rise should exceed 30°F, while SOP#5 &#9 stated that there should be no more than 40'F rise per bed. It is assumed that this applied for the maximum average temperature difference, since SOP#25 said to use average temperature of the bed instead of the individual paints when evaluating the maximum reactor bed outlet temperatures. The inconsistent temperature'operating limits could have led operators to not take limits seriously. SOP#5 dated March 8, 1990 stated that Unocal's recommendation called for no more than 30°F temperature differential per bed, however, it noted that Tosco's experience had shown that 40°F per bed was well within safety limits. SOP#5 noted that "In fact often times we must operate with such a high delta temperature to balance out cracking in the entire reactor system." But this SOP also stated'that "A reactor bed will become increasingly unstable as the bed'differential temperatures get'higher and higher. A'bed can develop runaway reactions and one will have a dangerous situation on hand." In a Technical Services memorandum dated April 4, 1996, new operating guidelines for Stage 2 reactors were proposed based on temperature data from additional thermocouples installed in January 1996 and the March 19, 1996 temperature excursion. One of the guidelines was to maintain a maximum 45°F radial and 45°F axial temperature differential. The 45°F maximum temperature differential`applied to both control room and field readings. In March of 1996, Technical Services noted that Reactor 1 Bed 1 outlet radial differential temperatures remained as high as 54°F. In June of 1996, Technical Services engineers found that five out of fifteen Stage 2 reactor beds had axial and radial differential'temperatures greater than 52 45°F. In July 1996, Technical Services reported that five beds had maximum temperature differentials between 45-55°F and two beds had maximum temperature differentials above 55°F. There were ether indications that operators perhaps could not always stay within operating limits or follow written procedures. SOP#2 stated that the quench valves in the Stage,2 should not be opened up more than 50% (or more than 75% for Bed 4, which has a bigger quench valve). But the SOP also said that the quench valves may have to be opened up too much in order to maintain a flat temperature profile for the catalyst beds (that is, keeping the outlet temperatures from all beds as close to each other as possible). Some operators explained a different problem with the quench valves; although the control board setting indicated they are closed, some hydrogen flow would continue. To compensate for the quench valve leaking, operators would operate the bed above each quench valve at higher bed outlet temperatures. Written procedures (SOP#2) directed operators to maintain same outlet temperatures for each bed, but stated that this is rarely possible because the trim furnace was usually a limitation (firing too hard). Some operating practices were left up to operator judgment and discretion, since there were no written procedures for: • Operating with deactivated catalyst • Shutdown of one reactor and transference of its feed into two parallelreactors + Dealing with leaking heat exchangers during startup + Operating reactor without the data logger functioning • Reading temperatures at outside field panel + Safely operating during possible instrument malfunction or when temperature indications were judged unreliable. Raising bed temperatures to compensate for leaking quench valves. The Production Training Supervisor in the Production Department stated that the Hydrocracker does not have all of it procedures formalized or included in Tosco's procedure management system. In interviews, Tosco management acknowledged that the operating procedures are incomplete. Updated procedures for the Hydrocracker had not yet been developed. Procedures for the Hydrocracker Unit Stage 2 were not kept current with changes in process, equipment or operating practices and did not appear to have been tested for integration in the operating environment. For example,the written procedures were not updated to reflect installation of the IfA system, including thermocouples added in the reactors, the temperature field panels installed underneath the Stage 2 reactors, and temperature display hardware in the Hydrocracker control room. In another example, MOC#15004 indicated that a>change in operating procedures was required but the written procedures were not updated. This MOC involved making a piping change so that hydrogen can be supplied to HDS/HDA Unit (see Figure 2) from#2 Hydrogen Plant when the#1 .Hydrogen Plant is down. In February of 1996, the catalyst in all top beds of Stage 2 were replaced with a more reactive catalyst. No changes were 53 i made to the written operating procedures to reflect the catalyst change and the increased risk of temperature excursions due to increased reactivity. The written procedures did not address the potential hazard for reading temperatures at the outside panels when reactor temperatures exceeded operating limits, The procedures did not considerhuman factors such as incorrect acts, acts'out of sequence, failure to take action, and acts taken which were not appropriate or necessary. Recommendations from incident investigations were not incorporated into written procedures. For example, the recommendations shown below emerged from the Adverse Happening Report of July 23, 1992 and were drafted into SOP#49 but the draft was not formally approved and incorporated into procedures. Limit pre-cracking bed inlet temperature increases to 20°F per hour. • Once cracking has been initiated,limit bed inlet temperature increases to 10°F per hour. • Limit any single bed'inlet temperature increase to 2°F maximum per move. • Limit the Reactor 3, Bed 4 temperature differential to a maximum of 25°F. • After cracking has been initiated, limit Reactor 3, Bed 4 inlet temperature increases to half the above recommended values for the other beds, It appears that excess heat transferred from the beds above tend to boost the inlet temperature of the next lower bed more than desired, e.g. a 2aF change can;easily be boosted to a 3-5 of or even higher increase, • Do not raise Reactor 3, Beds 2 and 4inlet temperatures at the same time. • Look into the adequacy of the bed inlet temperature controllers. In January 1992, a more reactive catalyst was installed in the Stage 2 reactors.. A temperature excursion on July 23, 1992 resulted in suggestions on the Adverse Happening Deport to raise temperatures in Stage 2 a bit slower next time as the new catalyst is still"hot," Safety and Performance Goals One negative consequence of using the 300 psi/min depressuring system is that it completely shuts `downs the Stage 2 reactors, halting production. One operator stated that there is a lot of expectation from'the Engineering Department to produce barrels and keep up temperatures. Tosco management stated that they did not know why operators did not depressure Stage 2 during past temperature excursions. They stated Haat perhaps the operators took pride in keeping the unit operational. Tosco may have had problems balancing production goals with maintaining safe temperature limits. Because of the firing limitations of the trim furnaces; sometimes bed temperatures would have to be increased to compensate'for the heat needed. In March of 1996, Technical Services stated that to reduce high bed temperature differentials, trim furnace firing would have to be 54 _..... - increased to maintain the desired reaction conversion level. However, they also noted that with charge rates above 32 MBPD, there was little capacity left in the trim furnaces without reducing rate or increasing diesel production. On April 11, 1996, Technical Services acknowledged that poor Stage 2 reactor stability would probably not allow them to achieve less than 0.5%butane content in the light hydrocrackate product. In July 1996, Technical Services reported that operators were not able to reduce diesel production to target levels due to Stage 2 Reactor bed temperature differentials. Five beds had maximum temperature differentials between 45-55°F and two beds had maximum temperature differentials above 55°F. The maximum temperature differential limit is 45°F, Supervisors and operators did not appear to have been given guidance to resolve conflicts between safety and performance goals. For example, no guidance was given on how to achieve desired production rates within specification without exceeding operating limits such as maximum bed temperature differentials and maximum trim furnace firing. Operators felt that they were expected to keep the Hydrocracker operational under a number of adverse operating conditions. For example, operators would get data only from control board strip charts(data from Moore controllers), when the data logger was not functioning.. One operator felt that they were"running blind" when they relied only on center point reading from the Moore controller. Several occurrences of Stage 2 reactor operations continuing despite instrument malfunction were previously discussed in Section 3,3.3.1. The Production Area Supervisor said that relying only on temperature data from the control board would not be an acceptable situation; this would be insufficient information to operate the reactor and the reactor would have to be shut down. This supervisor said he was not aware of any period in January 1997 when both the temperature logger and the IIA were not functional at the same time. The reactor feed/effluent heat exchanger flanges tended to leak during every startup because of thermal stress on the piping. These leaks sometimes resulted in smoking and vapor clouds. Operators would use steam rings(shrouds) and steam lances to disperse vapors at the leaking flanges. The staging in front of the Stage 2 exchangers was used by operators to attach steam lances. 3,3.4 Process Hazard Analysis(PHA) A process hazards analysis(PHA) technique known as a hazard and operability study(HAZOP) was performed for Stage 2 during the period June 1 through July 31, 1994(baseline). The purpose of a PHA is to identify safety hazards and operability problems, associated causes and 55 consequences, safeguards, and risks. The analysis helps determine where improvements to the process design and operation'are needed. The 1994 Stage 2 HAZOP was reviewed by investigators to see if the safety'hazards involved in the January 21 accident has been identified, and if so, how they were addressed. This was done to determine if some deficiency in the HAZOP contributed to the accident. The HAZOP study included Stage 2 equipment and associated piping, which were divided into discrete nodes for systematic analysis. For each hazard scenario identified in the HAZOP, safeguards were identified, which included both manual and automatic means for detecting, preventing, or mitigating; the identified hazard. Recommendations were made by the HAZOP team when existing safeguards were not considered adequate. One of the stated assumptions for the HAZOP was that the baseline HAZOP took credit for procedures being in place. The 1994 HAZOP also stated that"However, not all of the unit procedures have been completed. The operations representative is assisting in the development of unit procedures.'• One of the stated assumptions that was applied throughout the HAZOP study was that "the IgA system provides a great deal of flexibility with alarms and indications for the operators. This study considered only those alarms and control indications noted on the P&IDs." It is not clear whether the HAZOP team assumed use of the Stage 2 UA temperature monitoring system., which was not yet in place. However, the P&IDs only included those temperature indications, alarms, and controls associated with the data logger and Moore controllers/indicators. The Process Hazard'Analysis Manager(who was not PHA Manager when the 1994 PHA was done)could not clarify whether use of the UA system had been assumed by the Stage 2 HAZOP team. In any case, the IIA system was not reliably functional in Stage 2 and was not used to provide temperature indications at the time of the preparation of the PHA in 1994. Temperature alarms that would have been available with the IIA system were not in fact available to the operating employees at the time the PHA was prepared. The 11A system provided temperature readings but was not a controller of the bed temperatures for Stage 2. The level of detail in the HAZOP safeguards for Stage 2 reactors were not specific as to which type of instrument control systems were in place. It only specified whether there was, for example, an alarm, flow indicator or automatic or manual controller to control the process parameter. For example, for higher reactor temperatures, one of the safeguards listed was that temperature alarms were available for all beds. It was not specified whether these alarms were connected to the data logger or the IIA system. Alarms were not installed for those temperature paints that were read at the field panel; however the field panels were not in place in'1994 when the HAZOP was done. Another assumption stated for the HAZOP was that the results of a catastrophic fire at the - Hydrocracker Unit were not addressed in the HAZOP. The loss of individual components or the 56 ::r ;. ..............................................................................I....1.1111,..... . ......................................................................................... ........................................... control because the Stage 2 reactors were not depressured and shut down as required when the reactor temperatures exceeded allowable limits (800°F). 4.2 Cause of the Temperature Excursion When heat generated from a hydrocracking reaction is not uniformly dissipated across the catalyst bed, an area of higher temperature is created to hot spot), which can accelerate the reaction rate in that area and in turn, create more heat. On January 21, a hot spot apparently occurred in Bed 4 of Reactor 3 which temporarily elevated one of the Bed 4 outlet temperature points. The immediate cause of the temperature excursion in Bed 4 was probably poor flow and heat distribution within the catalyst bed. Past problems with temperature control in this bed and the excessive coke deposit,buildup are evidence of this poor distribution. The coke pillars found in Bed 4 after the accident were likely formed over a long period of time and were not the result of only the January 21 excursion. The presence of the coke pillars indicate uneven liquid distribution, which in turn, caused temperature hot spots that probably occurred in the beds during their operating history. Occurrence of coke pillars in only Bed 4 of all Stage 2 reactors reveal that the flow distribution in the fourth catalyst beds was somewhat different from the other catalyst beds. Tosco stated in their report that the flow regime in Bed 4 was a possible factor that contributed to formation of the hot spot. Their explanation was based on flash calculations they performed, which indicated that the reactants transitioned from wet to dry catalyst within Bed 4 of Reactor 3. Tosco explained that beds in which some of the catalyst is wet and some of the catalyst is dry are particularly susceptible to hot spots. Their analysis also supported poor flow distribution as a cause of the temperature excursion. Historically, Tosco had problems with temperature instability in Bed 4, which led Tosco to develop special operating limits and guidelines for this bed. However, these guidelines were not incorporated into the written operating procedures. Although Bed 4 had a differently designed flow distribution system than the other catalyst beds, investigators do not have enough information to conclude whether the different design contributed to operating problems with this bed. Other possible reasons were considered and ruled out as the likely causes of the temperature excursion, based on information and evidence available. These factors were discussed previously in Section 3 and included: closing of the Bed 5 quench valve, deactivated catalyst, feed temperature too high, loss of recycle hydrogen, plugged distribution trays, and insufficient oil or gas flowrate. Investigators could not determine whether the internal damage to the distribution trays and quench zone was a cause of the excursion since the damage might have been an effect of the 59 incident. For example, the distorted distribution trays could have been a result of the rapid depressuring after the failure of the effluent pipe. 4.3 .Failure to Control Temperature Excursion Initially, the operators did not take appropriate steps to control the temperature excursion because they did not comprehend that a temperature excursion was happening. There were several reasons why operators were unsure of the situation including; • The data logger temperatures were fluctuating between high, low, and zero readings, causing the operators to believe the data was in error. Operators did not know that the readings on the data logger defaulted to zero when the temperature exceeded the range of the data dagger. • Operators thought temperature data might be in error because the data logger had experienced malfunctions at times. It had malfunctioned one day prior to the accident. • Operators believed that opening the quench valve to Bed 5 controlled the temperature excursion because the Bed 5 inlet temperature reading that had risen abnormally returned to normal. The Bed 4 outlet temperature reading also returned to within normal range. • The temperature data on the Bed 4 strip chart appeared normal and did not verify the high Bed 4 outlet temperature on the data logger. While this is consistent because a different Bed 4 paint was displayed on the strip chart, operators may have expected to see more than one Bed 4 outlet point rise during an excursion. w Hydrogen makeup decreased, not increased, as operators expected during an excursion. Operators were confused by makeup hydrogen flow dropping to zero. Operators were unaware that the methane buildup in the recycle gas caused the makeup hydrogen flow to drop. Operators did not know that the recycle gas (hydrogen) purity had dropped because of the time lag for receiving analysis from the hydrogen purity analyzer. • Operators did not immediately notice that the Bed 5 outlet, reactor inlet and outlet temperatures had risen above critical limits. Operators did not receive additional audible high temperature alarms from the data logger. • Operators were distracted from noticing that Bed 5 outlet temperatures were increasing because they were busy trying to control the trim furnace firing. 60 The operators heard and responded to a high temperature alarm for the Bed 4 outlet and Bed 5 inlet high temperatures, but did not receive any other audible high temperature alarms despite Bed 5 outlet and reactor inlet and outlet temperatures also exceeding high temperature alarm set points. One Bed.4 outlet and the Bed 5 inlet temperature exceeded the +50'F over normal alarm set point, but post-accident tests showed that the data logger would not reaalarrrm in this situation when the acknowledge button was pushed on the data logger keyboard. Testing also showed that it took 2.5 minutes for the+50T alarm to clear when the temperature dropped to non-alarm levels. Therefore, for the+50°F above normal condition, the data logger alarm cannot be reset in a reasonably short time. This situation would prevent operators from receiving high temperature alarms from other points in the reactor. Even when operators realized, moments before the explosion, that the reactor outlet and inlet temperatures had climbed above 800°F, they did not depressure the reactor as the emergency operating procedures required. Instead they began to adjust quench gas flows in order to cool the reactor. Operators did not depressure the reactor because their past practice to control temperature excursions had been to increase quench, reduce reactor inlet temperatures, and/or stop feet/flow to the reactor. 4.4 Root Causes and Contributing Factors Root causes are the underlying prime reasons, such as failure of particular management systems, that allow faulty design, inadequate training or deficiencies in maintenance to exist. These, in turn, lead to unsafe acts or conditions which can result in an accident. The contributing factors are reasons that, by themselves, do not lead to the conditions that ultimately caused the event; however, these factors facilitate the occurrence of the event or increase its severity. Because of the complexity of causes for this accident, no distinction has been made between the root causes and contributing factors. However, they are presented together in relative order of importance . The root causes and contributing factors identified,below for the January 21 accident have broad applications to a variety of situations and should be considered lessons for industries that operate similar processes, especially for chemical and petroleum refining industries. • Conditions to Support and Encourage E ployees to Operate RI-actors in a Safe Manner Were Inadequate. Although Tosco management indicated in its safety policy that safety was a priority, it failed to implement its safety policy consistently for all levels of the company. This lack of emphasis for safe operation of the Hydrocracker Unit led to risky practices. On past occasions, the emergency depressuring system was not used to control excessive operating temperatures in Stage 2 reactors as required by Tosco's written emergency operating procedures. Tosco management did not take sufficient corrective action that would ensure use of the emergency depressuring system. A conflict existed between prescribed procedure and past practice; past practice was to verify data and get control of reactor temperatures without 61 __� depressuring. Inaction on the part of management may have been interpreted by operators as unspoken management support of operators' actions to control severe excursions without shutting down the Hydrocracker.' When operators had not followed prescribed emergency depressuring procedures in the past, they had not encountered any operating problems as a result. Operators were able to bring temperature excursions under control by other means without equipment damage. However, they had encountered difficulties when the 100 psi/min depressuring system was activated. These difficulties includedgrass fires at the flare and a release of flammable vapor. Grass fires at a flare usually are caused by spillover of liquid from the flare to the ground. Normally, a knock-out drum:separates liquid from gas before the gas continues to the flare, but under extremely heavy flow release conditions, the drum's separation capacity may be exceeded. This problem would be more severe if the 300 psi/min depressuring is activated since more flowrate is involved. Depressuring creates an upset condition in the unit for which operators must be prepared and trained. For example, on one occasion when the 100 psilmin depressuring was automatically activated, the splitter lost liquid level, which in'turn,'caused a pump seal failure. The pump seal failure resulted in'a vapor release. These negative experiences may have contributed to operator' reluctance to employ emergency depressuring and reinforced operators' decisions to handle severe temperature excursions by other means. Operators kept the Hydrocracker Unit running despite adverse operating conditions, such as some reactor temperature data not quickly accessible (available only at field panels), malfunctioning temperature instrumentation, leaking exchanger flanges, leaking quench valves, poor radio performance etc. Running the Hydrocracker Unit to full capacity caused control problems for operators and made it difficult to maintain safe temperatures. Documentation indicated that sometimes production was limited by the trim furnace firing capacity. Fluctuations in trim furnace firing caused operators to make many manual adjustments to reactor temperatures. One operator stated that there is "a lot of expectation to produce barrels." Use of the 300 psi/min depressuring system is very disruptive and halts production since the unit must be shut down and then later be restarted. Operators were naturally reluctant to shut the unit down and be accountable for the negative consequences of interrupting production. However, the risk of runaway reactions in the hydrocracking'process dictates that operators must quickly stop flow of feed or depressure even at the risk of sometimes shutting the unit down unnecessarily. In rebuilding Stage 2 reactors and controls after the January 21 accident, Tosco designed the depressuring system to automatically activate when temperatures rise abnormally high.' Therefore, depressuring is no longer an operator decision under specified conditions. However, the root causes associated with operator actions and attitudes regarding production versus safety need to be addressed in order to prevent either accidents. Maximum bed temperature differential limits were stated inconsistently in various documents. Tosco was not operating within the original catalyst bed temperature limitations (maximum of 62 30°F differential per bed) as recommended by Unocal in 1986 (Hydrocracker licensor), even though they had changed to a more reactive catalyst. The basis for allowing higher bed differentials (maximum of 40°F average and 45°F axial and radial)is not clear. Operators were not always able to maintain bed temperature differentials even within the highest limit cited, 45°F. The operating temperature guidelines reissued.on April 4, 1996 as a result of an excursion did not define the normal temperatures that must be maintained. Increasing bed temperature differential limits increases the risk of temperature excursions. Written documents indicated that operators found it necessary to increase bed temperatures to stay within other operating constraints such as maintaining minimum conversion per bed, maintaining production rate and shifting higher temperatures to beds to reduce;trim furnace firing, and compensating for leaking quench valves. Documentation shows that Tosco management was aware of the conflicts between safe operating limits and performance goals but took no action to address these conflicts. Management's lack of regard for firm operating limits contributed to a culture where operators may not have taken the limits seriously. Operators were aware that they had taken chances in the past by operating with malfunctioning instruments and without the data logger. When performance goals and risks were not defined by management, decisions about hazards and risk were left up to operator discretion. • Human Factors Were Poorly Considered in the Design and Operation of the Temperature Monitoring System. The control room was not designed and planned with a proper fit of people, equipment and environment, which limited operators`ability to quickly recognize and respond to a temperature excursion. The temperature monitoring system for Stage 2 Hydrocracker reactors was inadequate for operating a complex reaction under high temperature and pressure. Operators were required to adjust temperatures (many times manually) and remain within certain constraints while achieving target production goals. Operating constraints and production targets often changed depending on feed characteristics, output needs, catalyst age and other operating conditions. These constraints included maintaining a specified bed temperature profile, not exceeding trim furnace firing capacity, achieving specified product conversion, not exceeding reactor and catalyst bed temperature limits, avoiding hat spots in beds, and minimizing coking of catalyst. In order to operate the Hydrocracker efficiently and safely, sufficient reactor temperature data is critical and needs to be readily accessible. The operators were using three different. instrumentation systems to obtain reactor temperature data. These systems were not integrated and thus required more effort to effectively monitor the reactor conditions. The May 1989 Hydrocracker Training,Program document described the control room as a"hodgepodge"of instruments and acknowledged that replacement of instruments had not followed any overall plan. Without the necessary temperature data, operators could not readily detect or respond to hot spots in a catalyst bed, and runaway reactions could occur. During the January 21 incident, operators relied on the strip chart data to make decisions, since data from the field panel was not readily accessible and they did not believe the data logger readings. The strip charts gave an 63 incomplete picture of the reactor condition since the charts only displayed a few of the total thermocouple readings. The field panel temperature data was needed by operations for safe and efficient operation of the Stage 2 reactors. Operators were instructed by management to collect and record field panel data daily. Most of the highest (most critical) temperatures were those that could only be read outside at the field panels. Obtaining field panel temperatures required too much time, which did not allow quick decisions to be made. When a temperature excursion does occur, getting temperature data immediately is vital for operators to be aware of the situation and respond appropriately in time. On the night of the accident, minutes were lost while the outside operator was trying to relay field panel readings. The installation and use of field panels to acquire additional temperature data was not managed appropriately. leo management of change process'wvas conducted to consider the impacts of using the field panels. The purpose of the installation of the field panel was not clear to all personnel associated with the Hydrocracker. Some thought the temperature panel was an experiment to determine if a capital expenditure was worthwhile, while operators relied on it for additional temperature monitoring. Also, there was no defined time line for when data from the additional thermocouples would be available in the control room. Poor communications existed between management and operators on this issue. Operator concerns about the panels were not addressed. Operators had to manage with conflicting temperatureinformation from the different systems. Management recognized this conflict in the standard operating procedures, but no procedures were in place to specify how to operate when one of the instrument systems was malfunctioning. There was limited redundancy of temperature readings, which did not allow an accurate assessment of possible instrument malfunction. The only redundant temperature points were those on the control board strip charts which displayed only the center inlet and outlet of each bed. Operators did not have hydrogen purity information needed to assess the situation on January 21 because of a seven minute lag time in getting information from the hydrogen purity analyzer. This delay contributed to operators not being aware of excessive methane generation as the temperature excursion began. There was limited automatic control of quench flow since the controllers used only one temperature point per bed. Responding quickly to temperature excursions in some cases required the operators to override the automatic quench controller in order to control hot spots in the catalyst bed near temperature points that were not linked to the quench valve controller. Operators would open the quench flow valve using manual control versus the automatic control. When multiple temperature points exceeded the high temperature alarm setting, no additional alarms could be received until the first high temperature alarm was'acknowledged and reset. The high temperature alarm was set at 780"F, which meant operators might not be aware of a problem 64 ......... :+..:. ......... :+.. ...... .:.::. ......... fi. ......... -:.......... .. ... ...... ............................................................................................................. until temperature had ahnost exceeded the maximum safe operating temperature of the reactor. Yet the operators were required to take steps to control temperatures 25°F above normal (without depressuring) as stated in the emergency operating procedures. On January 21, some of the Bed 5 outlet temperatures increased by more than 25°F, but board operators were distracted by trim furnace firing and did not-notice the Bed 5 and reactor outlet temperatures rising. The design of instrumentation was not well integrated and was not adequate to address the situations of temperature rising very rapidly, and many temperature points exceeding limits. • Supervisory Management Was Inadequate. It appears that supervisory control of operations for the Hydrocracker was deficient and contributed to the lack of adherence to required emergency procedures. Inconsistent application of the use of emergency operating procedures was tolerated. Supervision was not present at the unit even though there had been a succession of operating problems just prior to the final temperature excursion that lead to the explosion and fire. The No. I Operator was present to provide leadership for the other operators, but his authority to make sure required procedures are followed was not clear. Supervisors were not always aware of temperature excursions or maximum reactor temperatures that had been experienced in the past. Management was not aware that Stage 2 had been operated without the data logger functioning. In some cases, supervisors did not know which procedures were or were not in effect. An example of this is SOP#20 which instructed to manually close the makeup hydrogen control valve before activating emergency depressuring. Supervisors failed to recognize all the hazards associated with the Hydrocracker Unit startup and operation. These hazards included allowing operators to access field panels during potentially severe temperature excursions, allowing operations of heat exchangers that leaked chronically, and having continued operation-of Stage 2 reactors when the data logger was out of service. Supervisors also did not have a plan for implementing the use of the UA temperature monitoring system and were not following management of change procedures that would have identified the consequences of change to the system and prepared operators for its use. Root cause investigations conducted for previous excessive temperature excursions were inadequate. It appears that not all temperature excursions were documented, and management may have been unaware of the serious nature of some of the excursions. Management did not investigate why operators were reluctant to follow emergency operating procedures, and failed to develop solutions to address the causes. The failure to fully investigate several "near miss" temperature excursions and address causes of these incidents demonstrates the lack of proper management oversight and concern. The lack of attention sends the wrong message to operators about the real danger posed by the temperature excursions. In addition, no abatement efforts were made in regard to excessive reactor bed temperatures, other than reissuing guidelines. 65 ................. ....................­,'''',......................................................................................................................................................................................................... ............................................................................— ................... • Operational Readiness and Maintenance Were Inadequate. Poor facility functional operability and poor maintenance were contributing factors in the accident. Twice in January of 1997, operators had to rely on single bed inlet and outlet temperature points from the Moore (strip chart)controllers while switching from the UA system to the data logger and vice versa. No interim system was available to ensure that the operating employees had sufficient operating data to safely operate the reactors. For ten days in January of 1997, Stage 2 was operating with a new temperature monitoring system that was not fully functioning (the UA system). No pre-startup safety review was conducted for the,implementation of the Stage 2 IIA system. The UA system was not reading all the thermocouple temperatures and was incorrectly calculating weighted catalyst temperature averages. Operators had also experienced recent operating problems with the data logger, which was one factor leading operators to doubt data logger readings on the evening of January 21. One type of alarm for the data logger was not functioning properly. The temperature rise in Bed 4 outlet and Bed 5 inlet on January 21 exceeded the alarm setting of more than 50°F above normal. Post-incident data logger testing demonstrated that the data logger alarm would not re- alarm for another high temperature when the acknowledge button was pushed on the data logger keyboard. The data logger alarm for greater than 50'F above normal would also not reset itself in a reasonably short time (less than 2.5 minutes) after the temperature dropped back to normal. This situation would prevent operators from receiving high temperature alarms from other points in the reactor. Unreliable radio communications equipment were used by operators. The radios were required to relay both routine and emergency information between the outside operator and the control room personnel. Based on operator statements, problems existed with mairitaining proper battery power and having enough channels available to accommodate communications needs. Problems maintaining battery power were acknowledged in SOP#30 dated May 1990 and apparently these problems had still not been addressed by the time of the January 21 accident. The Stage 2 quench valves would not fully close all the time and operators had to make adjustments to bed temperatures to compensate, which sometimes resulted in higher bed temperatures. The higher the operating temperature of the bed, the more likely the possibility of temperature runaway since reaction rate increases with temperature. Adjusting temperatures to compensate for leaking quench valves may have made it more difficult for operators to stay within prescribed bed temperature differential limits. Operators were expected to deal with adverse situations without adequate operating procedures i or technical support from management. The deactivated catalyst may not have contributed to the accident, but the conditions causing the deactivation and the lack of preparation to handle this 66 ....................... . .......... ................. ............ -------------------­- ................. ........... . ........................vvv��vs .. ........ situation show deficiencies in operational readiness and operating procedures. For example, the catalyst deactivation started when feed from three reactors was forced into two reactors because of lack of room in tankage needed to divert some of the feed. A wiring problem identified in SOP#20 would not have allowed operators to depressure Stage 2 without first manually closing a hydrogen control valve. This situation existed because of wiring on the control valve that had been damaged in March 1989 and, according to SOP#20, was never repaired. The emergency depressuring system was not tested regularly to ensure it would function when needed. Operators,operated with heat exchangers that chronically leaked during startup. These leaks required maintenance intervention during startup to stop the leaks and created operating hazards from flammable vapor clouds. These leakage problems delayed startup of the unit in January 1997. Tosco identified the need to replace missing support bolts for distribution trays in Stage 2 reactors for the January 1996 maintenance turnaround. The documentation for this needed work was incomplete and investigators are not certain if the work was done. The section of effluent pipe that ruptured had been ultrasonically tested for metal thickness only once (in 1991) during its 33 years of life. A single pipe metal thickness measurement is not a reliable way to predict an accurate corrosion rate for piping in hydrogen service. • Operator Training and.Support Were Inadeguate. The Hydrocracker Training Manual was out of date and did not reflect changes made to the process over time. The unit-specific training at the Hydrocracker was mostly on-the-job training with little or no classroom training. Also, documentation of unit-specific training was limited. An example of too much reliance upon on-the-job training included the past practice of controlling severe temperature excursions without depressuring. Management had not developed required unit-specific refresher training. The technical information system in place was less than adequate for safe operation of the Hydrocracker. Operators lacked adequate training on instrumentation; they apparently did not know the limitations of some of the monitoring and control instruments used in Stage 2. For example, they,did not understand the significance of zero readings on the data lugger. Operators had not received training on the new UA temperature monitoring system installed for Stage 2 when it was operationalfor 10 days in January. The operators did not understand the significance of a sudden decrease in makeup hydrogen flow. This decrease conflicted with the operators' past experience involving temperature excursions, which had generally caused makeup hydrogen flow to increase. Not all the operators had 67 __ sufficient training on the reaction kinetics of hydrocracking and the importance of taking prescribed actions once temperatures have exceeded certain limits. • Procedures Were Outdated and Incomtslete. The lack of complete, specific, and integrated operating instructions for the Hydrocracker Stage 2 contributed to the failure to control the temperature excursion. Because operators were used to operating with outdated procedures, they may not have taken written procedures as seriously as they should have when they chose to controlextremely high reactor temperatures by means other than depressuring. Written operating procedures were out-of-date, and were not updated as multiple changes were made to the Hydrocracker Unit. A change was made to use a more reactive Stage 2 catalyst in March of 1996, but the written operating procedures were not updated to reflect this change in process chemistry. The procedures were not updated as changes were made to the temperature monitoring system. The operating procedures did not match equipment in the unit or in the control room. The operating procedures did not match descriptions of operations and equipment described in the process hazard analysis. Conflicting guidance regarding bed temperature differential limits was provided in different documents as discussed in Section 3 of this report. Laving different operating limits for the same operating variable may have contributed to operators not understanding or not taking stated limits seriously. After the July1992 temperature excursion, the catalyst manufacturer and Technical Services recommended that the temperature differential of Bed 4 of Reactor 3 be limited to a maximum of 25°l~. This recommendation was contained in a draft'SOP with guidelines for raising rate of cracking, but it was not incorporated into the approved written procedures. Bed temperature differential limits were not clearly stated in the procedures. Investigators assumed that average differential is the difference between the average outlet and average inlet temperatures. Tosco's written standard operating procedures and startup operating procedures do not explain the difference between maximum average and maximum bed temperature differential limits. Recommendations from several incidents and accidents at the Hydrocracker Unit were not incorporated into the written procedures. Written operating procedures did not exist for dealing with many of the conditions or situations that operators were handling in the time leading up to the accident on January 21, such as operating with deactivated catalyst, transferring feed from three reactors to two, and suspected instrument malfunction. There was no written operating procedure developed or implemented that provided clear instructions for safety checking the field panels. Decisions about risks involved with field panels were left to the discretion of the operators. 68 .................... :.:. No written procedure was available to manage the change from the temperature indication data logger to the I/A temperature display on January 10, 1997 or the switch back to the data logger on January 20. Process safety information and operating procedures regarding the change were not updated as required by MOC procedures. The SOPs did not reference conditions when emergency operating procedures should be implemented. Consequences of deviation from operating limits (such as hire and explosion) were generally not addressed or mentioned in the written operating procedures, although they were listed in a separate document. • Process Hazard Analysis Was Flawed. Hazards were not properly identified through a current process hazard analysis, causing a misunderstanding of risks associated with temperature excursions, design changes, equipment modifications, and operating anomalies. Possible hazards from changes made in the control room or instrumentation were not adequately considered through management of change procedures. The 1994 HAZOP study assumed that indicators and alarms for all bed temperature readings were available in the control room. While this assumption was valid for the 1994 HAZOP, it would no longer be valid after the field temperature readout panels were installed in January 1996. Checking temperatures at the field panels became the accepted practice to verifyelevated or questionable reactor temperatures. Operators were put at serious risk when they`,vent to check field panels while the reactor may have been exceeding its safe, maximum allowable temperature of 800°F. The failure to recognize hazards associated with operators using the field temperature panels was a factor contributing to the operator fatality. Potential risk involved with reading field temperature panels during abnormal conditions was never evaluated because no safety analysis of this activity was conducted. Management did not respond in a timely manner to operators' concerns about having the locating the temperature panels under the Stage 2 reactors. Safe work practices were not developed or implemented for reading temperatures from the field panels. Likewise,no established written procedures or training was developed to tell operators when it was safe or unsafe to check field temperature panels. The HAZOP assumed that necessary procedures were in place for all operations. The HAZOP for Stage 2 of the Hydrocracker Unit did not address all existing known hazards and operating abnormalities and was not appropriate for the process as it actually existed. In several instances, the HAZOP was flawed in that it was not based upon the way the process actually operated at the time the analysis was conducted. It is not clear if the HAZOP assumed that the I/A temperature system was functional or not. Control of temperature within critical operating limits is essential for safe operation of the Hydrocracker. The use of the 140 and 300 psi/min emergency depressuring systems was not mentioned in the HAZOP as a safeguard for reactor temperature excursions. The HAZOP did 69 __ ........ .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... ................................................................................ not address loss or dysfunction of temperature monitoring systems or emergency depressuring systems. The HAZOP mistakenly stated that automatic activation of the 100 psi/min emergency depressuring would occur for the emergency condition of loss of oil flow through the reactor. The 100 psi/min depressuring is automatically activated only if the recycle gas compressor trips. The HAZOP did not address the use of emergency quench to the inlet of the reactor as was discussed in the Emergency Procedures for a temperature excursion. The process hazard analysis did not adequately address previous incidents that had a likely potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace, such as previous reactor temperature excursions and failure to maintain temperatures below $00°F. The HAZOP did not identify fire and explosion as consequences from extreme temperatures in reactor effluent piping and feed/effluent exchangers. The HAZOP did not correctly identify the frequency and thus the risk of hydrocarbon and hydrogen sulfide releases from exchanger flange leaks, because it ranked Y 0 - these occurrences as not likely over plant lifetime, when actually these leaks occurred frequently. The HAZOP did not identify excessive methane generation from a temperature excursion as a cause of low hydrogen purity. 0 Barriers Against HazardousWorkConditions,Were Inadequate. The Tosco employees and contractors who were injured during the explosion and fire were not properly alerted to or protected from hazardous work conditions. Contractors were not notified that the unit was experiencing operational problems. Operators did not follow emergency operating procedures that required them to sound the process unit emergency alarm so that contractors could evacuate. 5.0 Recommendations As described in the Root Causes and Contributing Factors section above, the root causes of this accident are complex and interconnected. Investigators developed recommendations addressing the root causes of the accident to prevent a reoccurrence or similar event at this and other facilities. Taken individually, the recommendations described below may not convey the significance to prevention of a recurrence or of a future similar accident; together, however, they illustrate how multiple layers of protection work to prevent catastrophic incidents. Tosco has implemented many of the recommendations from their own investigation report and from the CCCHSD investigation report, which were both finalized in May 1997. A list of actions undertaken by Tosco is in Appendix I. The recommendations in this report apply not only to Tosco but are good practices that should be carefully considered for possible implementation by hydroprocessing operations at other facilities as well as other process industries. 70 ................... ........ . . .......... .. -------------------------- ................................. ......................................... .......... ..X,5�5.......... ....................... ........ . . .......... ..... .......................... ................................................................................................ ............................................................. • Management System Policy and Implementation Tosco, and all industry management, must implement and maintain an environment that fosters safe operations day after day. Management must actively demonstrate a commitment to safety by ensuring that operating decisions are not based primarily on cost and production and that employees at all levels of the organization can articulate the company safety policy. This commitment includes defining realistic performance goals and operating risks, and communicating these effectively to all employees. Facility management must set safe, achievable operating limits and enforce practices to maintain operations within those limits. Tosco needs to establish a firm policy that limits are not flexible and must not be exceeded, and that if necessary, production rates should be reduced to stay within operating limits. Facility management must ensure that employees fully understand the need to use and follow emergency systems and procedures. Management must design, thoroughly examine and test emergency systems and procedures to ensure their effectiveness and to minimize negative consequences to the process and to safety if such procedures or systems are used. Management must ensure that all procedures, especially emergency procedures, are up-to-date and reflect all current practices. Mangers must insist that all procedures be followed and that operating limits be observed; when procedures or limits are not followed or observed, management must determine the underlying reasons, such as an evaluation of whether the limits or procedures are faulty, and take immediate corrective action. Human Factors Considerations The Hydrocracker temperature instrumentation and controls at Tosco should be designed considering human factors so that there is a good fit of people, equipment and environment consistent with good industry practice. The system should be reexamined and revised as necessary to enable appropriate operator monitoring and intervention. Hydroprocessing facilities should consider, as Tosco has addressed consolidation and integration of all temperature indicators for hydrocracker reactors in one control system with all temperatures displayed in the control room. Facilities with complex reactions and process flow systems, such as hydrocracking, should consider use of a system that requires less operator manual manipulation to stay within critical operating limits. For example, computer monitoring and control of critical process parameters may allow operators greater flexibility and management of the process. For hydrocracking, use of a computer system would allow quench control to be linked to more than one temperature point or be programmed to respond quench control can be linked to more than one temperature point in the system or be programmed to respond based on a wider variety of temperature situations. The computer can also be programmed to make incremental temperature changes based on a input rate, allowing easier start up and shut down of the unit. 71 ................ ....... ................. ....................11.................................................................................................................................. ............................................. Hydroprocessing facilities should consider having a backup system of critical temperature indicators, to allow redundancy of temperature data. Such redundancy will help to identify instrument problems with confidence and allow continued safe operation when one temperature system is malfunctioning. Industry in general, should examine the process parameters that are critical to safe operation and consider redundant instrumentation as a backup in case of instrument malfunction. The temperature indication and control system used at the Tosco Hydrocracker should have an alarm system that has sufficient high priority alarms that can be received independently of one another. Other industries should examine their process monitoring and control instrumentation to ensure that in emergency or upset situations, control room operators are appropriately notified of the status of critical parameters so the operator can take necessary steps to correct the situation. Safety critical alarms should be distinguished from other operational alarms. Alarms should be limited to the number that an operator can effectively monitor. However, ultimate plant safety should not solely rely on operator response to a control system alarm. Tosco should improve or eliminate lag time in recycle gas analyzer and provide additional capability for the detection of recycle gas abnormalities. Tosco may want to consider the use of a continuous real-time analyzer dedicated to Stage 2 recycle gas analysis. Human factors and risks from temperature control malfunctions should be incorporated into the unit's process hazard analysis. 0 Supervision Tosco management should consider formal delegation of task assignment authority to No. I Operators. A shift supervisor should be present at the unit during emergency or abnormal situations or when a greater potential for problems exist, such as startup after maintenance or introduction of new equipment. As an interim step, additional supervisory coverage should be provided until procedures are updated and training is improved. Tosco management should consistently enforce proper actions and promptly address any improper actions with respect to emergency procedures. Supervisors should ensure that procedures for hazard analysis and management of change are followed. Supervisors must ensure that operators are trained and tested to implement emergency procedures. Supervisors should be educated on the hazards associated with all aspects of o r pre-startup operation, startup and shutdown of Hydrocracker Unit and should conduct thorough'pre-st tup and pre-shutdown safety reviews. Supervisors should identify critical operating limits and ensure that operating conditions stay within safe limits. Events in which operating limits have been exceeded should be thoroughly investigated by supervisors to determine the root causes of these events. Equipment, and procedural and job performance issues that relate to such events should be corrected. 72 ............................ ........................ ----------------------------- .................. ......... Tosco management, and industry, must investigate all deviations from expected process conditions and procedures to understand the underlying reasons for these deviations; especially for safety critical parameters. If the underlying reasons are not sufficiently identified and addressed, then the deviations can reoccur.The investigation process should include,soliciting and responding to operator input regarding operating practices and procedures. Tosco management must investigate Hydrocracker temperature excursions and determine the cause and corrective action necessary to prevent such excursions such as engineering and design changes necessary to ensure uniform flow distribution within the Hydrocracker catalyst beds. Facilities should freely exchange safety related lessons learned among others within their industry. • pacgity headiness and Maintenance All facilities should establish requirements for equipment integrity and not operate unless integrity is maintained. Tosco should properly maintain reactor internals to ensure that the hydroprocessing equipment can be operated within established safe operating limits. All temperature instrument systems that are critical to safe operation and:emergency shutdown equipment must be maintained in reliable operating order. Equipment functions, including alarms and radios, should be tested regularly. Facilities must address any problems with emergency systems immediately and not operate until these systems are fully operational. Practice emergency drills should be held on a regular basis. Since it is not unusual for problems to develop when equipment is first being used or started up, management should have technical and maintenance support personnel available at the unit during startup of new equipment or after major maintenance has been performed. Tosco should develop a permanent solution for the problem of leaking heat exchanger flanges and make the necessary changes to prevent hazardous hydrocarbon leaks. Also, quench valves should be maintained so that they do not leak. The facility's maintenance program should include implementation of a mechanical integrity testing and inspection program for vessels and piping that is consistent with current process industry recommended practices. • Tmining,_and Sgpport Tosco and all industry must provide training for operators when any changes to temperature indication and control systems are made. Managemeent should provide training for operators on the reaction,kinetics of hydrocracking, and causes and control of temperature excursions.The training should include the behavior of the hydrogen system in the Hydrocracker, especially during severe temperature excursions. {operators should be trained to understated the lire-itations of the process instruments, the instrument default values, and how to handle potential instrument malfunctions. All operators should be retrained on the use of the emergency depressuring system, and the rationale for implementing emergency procedures. 73 • Procedures Every hydroprocessing operation should developwritten operating procedures to cover all anticipated phases of operations. Management should develop a format for operating procedures which provides specific steps for each operational phase including reference to equipment and controls in the control room. This format should also address operating limits for each phase and the consequences of deviation from those operating limits, Facilities need to implement a method of reviewing and updating procedures so that approved and tested changes are incorporated'into the procedures document. Tosco must revise procedures to reflect current operating methods and equipment and consolidate all previous SOPs, memos, and procedures into one manual for ease of operator use. The procedures should include instructions for operators to follow when instrument problems are suspected or other process upsets or anomalies'occur. The operating procedures need to be updated with a description of the instrumentation default values and limitations. Tosco should specifically review and re-issue operating procedures related to temperature excursions at the Hydrocracker. Although these recommendations regarding procedures are directed'at Tosco, all industry should examine their procedures to ensure that similar conditions are addressed. • Process Hazard Analysis Facilities should evaluate process hazards based on actual equipment and operating conditions present and used in their own operations. The PHA should reflect the actual instrumentation and equipment in use at the time the PHA is done. Tosca should revise their PHA based on the actual temperature instrumentation in use and the procedures available. The use of emergency systems should be appropriately specified in the FHA and the descriptions of emergency equipment or systems described in the PHA should match the'equipment in the field. Tosco should ensure that use of 100 psi/min and 300 psi/min depressuring systems and emergency quench are correctly described in the PHA. Risks or operating problems identified from actual operating practice, near misses or accidents should be addressed and evaluated in the process hazard analysis. For example, the PHA needs to identify excessive methane generation as a possible cause of low hydrogen purity. The process hazard analysis process should have input and review by operating'personnel. The process hazard analysis should consider the failure of critical operating systems, such as temperature monitors or emergency operating systems. Tosco needs to review and update the Stage 2 Hydrocracker process flow'diagrams, and process and instrumentation diagrams to reflect current equipment configuration. Management of Change (MOC) reviews should be conducted for all changes to process,equipment or procedures 74 -- :: Kik r::r......... :.� :...... ..... to ensure that all necessary hazard or safety reviews are executed, training is conducted and document control is executed. 75 AP'P'ENDICES Appendix A References 1. Report on the January 21, 1997 Hydrocracker Incident at the Aeon Refinery. May 29, 1997. Tosco Refining Company, Martinez, California. 2. 30-Day Written Final Report, Hydrocracker Explosion and Fire, Tosco Avon Refinery, January 21, 1997. February 19, 1997. Tosco Refining Company, Martinez, California. 3. 72-hour Written Follow-up Notification, Hydrocracker Explosion and Fire, Tosco Avon Refinery, January 21, 1997. Tosco Refining Company, .Martinez, California. 4. Summary Report to the Board of Supervisors on the Investigation of the Causes of the Tosco Avon Refinery Incident of 1-21-97. May 29, 1997. William H. Alton and Laura L. Brown. Contra Costa County Health Services Department, Martinez, California. 5. Laboratory analysis of 5 air samples in Contra Costa County. January 21, 1997. Bay Area Air Quality Management District. San Francisco, California. 6. Citations and Notifications of Penalty Issued to Tosco Avon Refinery for Violations of California Labor Code. July 10, 1997. Department of industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, State of California. CAL OSHA Concord District Office, Concord, California. 7, Documentation Worksheets for Citations and Notifications of Penalty Issued to Tosco Avon Refinery for Violations of California Labor Code. July 10, 1997. Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, State of California. CAL OSHA Concord District Office, Concord, California. 8. Notes from Meeting between EPA investigators and Tosco management. July 28, 1997. 9. Notes from Meeting between EPA investigators and CCCHSD investigators. July 17, 1997. 10. Management Oversight and Risk Tree(MORT). October 1996. Conger & Elsea, Inc., Woodstock, Georgia. 11. Management Oversight and Risk Tree Manual. 1996. Dorian Conger and Ken Elsea, Woodstock, GA. 12. Videotape of Contra Costa County Board of Supervisor's meeting, Agenda Item D.7 April 22, 1997. Contra Costa County Television, Martinez, California. A-I ......... ::. _.. .............. ......................................................''I'll, ..........................I.I.I.I.I.....................................,.,.I.............. 13. Videotape of Contra Costa County Board of Supervisor's meeting, Agenda Item D.7 June 3, 1997. Contra Costa County Television, Martinez, California. 14. Reactor Safety In Hydroprocessing. March 1987. Charles S. McCoy, Orinda, California. Paper No. AM-87-56 presented at the 198.7 National Petroleum Refiners Association Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, March 29-31, 1987. 15. Hydrocracking, Section 4.4 of Petroleum Refinery Enforcement Manual. June, 1980. Prepared for US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC by PEDCo- Environmental, Inc., Arlington, TX. National Technical Information Service Document No. PB84-188861, 16. OSHA Instruction TED 1.15, CH-1, Section XY: Chapter Z, Petroleum Refining Processes. Draft. November 7, 1995. OSHA Office of Science and Technology Assessment. 17. Petroleum Refining for the Nontechnical Person. 2nd edition. 1985. William L. Leffler. PennWell Books, Tulsa, Oklahoma. 18. Petroleum Refining, Technology and Economics. 1994. James H. Gary and Glenn E. Handwerk. Marcel Dekker, Inc., New York, New York. 19. Chemical and Process Technology Encyclopedia. Hydrocracking. 1974. Douglas M. Considine, ed. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York. 20. Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents. 1992. Center for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, New York, New York. 21. Notes from meeting between EPA investigators and Richard Palmer of Palmer and Associates in Mill Valley, CA. July 18, 1997 22. Chemical Engineers' Handbook 1973. Fifth edition. Perry, Robert H. And Chilton, Cecil H., editors. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, New York. 23. CAL OSHA Investigation Summary and Narrative of Tosco Refining Company Event of 1121197. June 5, 1997. Investigation Investigation Summary Number 201480126, Reporting ID 0950622, OSHA-36 Number 361162992, Inspection# 125766932. 24. Marks'Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers, "Fable 8.7.3- Properties of Commercial Steel Pipe". 1987. Ninth Edition. Eugene A. Avalone and Theodore Baumeister III, editors. McGraw-Hill Book Co. New York. A-2 ........... ...................... 25. Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Volume 01.01- Steel- Piping, Tubing, Fittings. "ASTM Designation A 335IA335M-94.'StandardSpecification for Sean-less Ferritic Allay-Steel Pipe for High-Temperature Service." 1995. American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA. 26. Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Volume 01.01 Steel- Piping, Tubing, Fittings. "ASTM Designation A 530/A530M-92a. Standard Specification for General Requirements for Specialized Carbon and Alloy Steel Pipe." 1995. American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA. 27. Annual Book'of ASTM Standards, Volume 01.01'- Steel- Piping,'Tubing, Fittings. "ASTM Designation A 370-94. Standard Test Methods and Definitions for Mechanical Testing of Steel Products." 1995. American Society for Testing and Materials, Philadelphia, PA. 28. Independent Review of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department of the Tosco Avon Refinery Incident of January 21, 1997. January 1998. The National Institute for Chemical Studies, Charleston West Virginia. A-3 Appendix B History of Major Process Changes 1963 Hydrocracker was constructed under a license from Chevron Research Corporation and put into service. Unit was known as the Isocracker. 1976 Tosco purchased Avon Refinery from Phillips Petroleum. 1978 Original Honeywell analog electronic controllers and recorders for Stage 2 were changed to Foxboro Spec200 analog electronic controllers. 1986 Modifications were incorporated in accordance with a technology license from Union Oil of California making the unit a Unicracker. Modifications included a depressuring system, new reactor thermocouples, new hydrogen quench rings in Stage 2, new internals in Stage 2, and new single loop digital controls (Moore 352 controllers) for the hydrogen quench system. An additional bed(Bed 4) was added which had a larger quench valve than the other existing four beds. 1986 A Foxboro Videospec Distributed Control System(DCS) was installed on Stage 1 and the Hydrogen Plant. 1989 The low pressure section of Stage 2 was converted to Moore 352 single loop digital controllers and PC based data loggers for Stage 1 and Stage 2 were installed. 1990 The Videospec DCS system for Stage 1 and the Hydrogen Plant was replaced with Foxboro Intelligent Automation (UA)DCS system. Jan 1992 Catalyst was changed to Z-753 type (106) in Stage 2 reactors. 1994 The Stage 1 I/A system was upgraded by providing additional consoles and alarm displays. Jan 1996 Major maintenance turnaround occurred. The Stage 2 catalyst (Criterion Z-753) was removed and sent off for regeneration and then recharged to the lower four Stage 2 beds. The top beds in Stage 2 were charged with a new type (more active) of catalyst(Criterion Z-763). The Stage 2 thertnowells and thermocouples were replaced with 12- point array style thermocouples. Additional thermocouples added were installed with field panel display only. The top quench distributors were modified. Dec 24, 1996 The Stage 1 monitoring points were brought into the I/A system. Feb 16, 1996 Hydrocracker was started up. Jan 10, 1997 The 40 temperature monitoring points displayed on the Stage 2 data logger were transferred from the data logger to the UA system Jan 12-15,1997 An unscheduled maintenance turnaround occurred to repair tube leak in a Stage 1 heat exchanger. Jan 20, 1997 Stage 2 points were removed from I/A system and returned to data logger. B-1 _� Appendix C Stage 2 Hydrocracker Process Flow Diagrams E t t t ----------------- rna d 2-11 k �o ......_---- ------- --------- -----` ----- t�=) I L a 0 Out r C L d S � ' w +� t �\ n j t j �i 3 9z5 tI// t tw I C-1 ....:. ........................................................................................ ............ .................................................... ....................................................... FAST- SLOW 300 pi;J !0D pati sh"ff Control Room per minute \V2 > rminuw Vgno* Shutdown Panel stage 2 Charge Pump Toil"Iturna" f4"Cle compreswr 'ev W To flare jk header IOXIZ Ir High IE� pressure Header U4 30 Ifth M 4x ON$ _Header C-2 20 inch Eno Mo to C.-is to(fare pmsure HY*O"ftRftY4zI-& S#P*ratCW Kfttk-OUt DrUM wn Ftaw 01' O C4 Low Pressum separator Figure C-2 Stage 2 Emergency Depress uring System - SimplIfied Diagram C-2 ................... Appendix D Interbed Quench and Distribution Sketches I-T) A Distribution tray(slotted chimnmeys) A _ * ,4 Quench ring Quench tray B Quench pan Downcomer tray NO hit nf!L. Yd +F Distribution tray(sloped chimmeys) 4 Quench ring .F. .. Quench tray �--�� Quench pan C ._.......... Distribution tray(staffed chimmeys) X Pf PM 7F g Wire mesh,screen M�4 o�Ca 4 Layer of inert ceramic balls g8t�' 4----- Catalyst pellets OC a a 4,_,.,,.,,,,,.„ Layer of inert ceramic balls -.-- Wire mesh screen (Drawing is not to scale) Figure D-1 Stage 2 Reactor Internals Sketch D-1 , �:::::::< ......... ::<..... ......... v Tg2 View Quench ring Reactor wall L � Y � y ys Ouench tray :0 DO Two 8"x12"holes Quench pan E,.1 Side and End Details Downcomer tray `Sawtooth downcomer 2"tail x 10"wide Side Detail' Sloped chimney Slotted chimney Distribution tray wlchimneys 4 0 b fJ P b yI 6 8 4 tt O +D d • FL7 B 6nd a 0 0 O d A • O 2%"dia. x 3"tali 4"dia. x 8"tail Figure D-2 Stage 2 Reactor Interbed Quench and Distribution Details D-2 _ _ Appendix E Stage 2 Reactor Thermocouple Points per instrument Display Bed 1 Location of Strip Data Field Total Thermocouple Charts Logger Panel Bed inlet Bed middle 2 2 Bed outlet 1* 5 5 10 Total 1* 5 7 IZ Bed 2, 3, and 4(per bed) Location of Strip Data Field Total Thermocouple Charts Logger Panel Bed inlet 1* 5 5 10 Bed middle 4 4 Bed outlet 1* 5 5 10 Total 2* t 10 J..14 24 Bed 5 Location of Strip Data Field Total Thermocouple Charts Logger Panel Bed inlet 1* 1 4 5 Bed middle 2 2 Bed outlet 4 l 5 Total 1* 5 7 12 *This point is also the same point displayed on data logger. E-1 ...:... ::..... ... .......: Appendix Irt Average Bed Differential Temperature for Reactor 3(pre-incident) Reactor 3 catalyst bed temperatures at 20:00:00 (data logger time)or 7:08 pm actual time Pt.1 Pt.2 Pt.3 PtA Pt.5 Avg. AT OF OF OF OF OF OF across Bed, of Reactor inlet 632.2 632.2 Bed 1 outlet 659.1 640.6 645.6 645.5 653.5 648.9 16.7 Bed 2 inlet 625.8 623.5 625.7 630.2 629.3 626.9 Bed 2 outlet 639.4 629.1 634.4 635.1 640.4 635.7 8.8 Bed 3 inlet 619.2 616.3 622.0 621.2 623.1 620.4 Bed 3 outlet 628.1 623.8 627.7 630.2 626.2 627.2 6.8 Bed 4 inlet 620.3 618.5 622.1 624.3 620.9 621.2 Bed 4 outlet 632.6 628.3 630.0 630.5 632.3 630.7 9.5 Bed 5 inlet 629.3 629.3 Bed 5 outlet 657.0 646.3 648.3 645.9 649.5 20.2 Reactor outlet 641.3 641.3 According to the strip chart, about 10 hours before the accident, the quench to Bed 5'began to decrease. This means that the poisoning had started to affect Bed 5 at approximately 9:30 am January 21. The strip charts for Beds 3 or 4 also show the quench falling off at approximately the same time. F-1 .............................................................................................................................. ................................................................... Appendix G Agency Personnel Involved in Tosco Accident Investigation David Chung, Senior Chemical Engineer U.S. EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO) Washington, DC Kathleen Franklin, Chemical Engineer U.S. EPA Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office Washington, DC Gordon Woodrow, Environmental Scientist U.S. EPA Region 9 Superfund Division, State Planning and Assessment Section San Francisco, CA N. Ake Jacobson, Chemical Engineer U.S. EPA Region 9 San Francisco, CA Ron Anderson, Chemical Engineer USEPA contractor, Ecology and Environment, Inc. Superfund Technical Assessment & Response Team (START) San Francisco, CA Carla M. Fritz, Safety Engineer California Dept. of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health Concord, CA Richard Roberts, Safety Engineer California Dept. of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health San Jose, CA Jean Patterson, Investigator California Dept. OF Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health Bureau of Investigations San Francisco, CA G-1 . ........................................... .......... .... ........................... ................ ..................................................................................... ......................................................................... ................................................... Andy Salcedo, Regional Safety Engineer U.S. Dept. of Labor Occupation Safety &Health Administration, Region 9 Office of Technical Support San Francisco, CA William H. Alton, P.E., Hazardous Materials Consultant Contra Costa County Health Services Department Environmental Division Martinez, CA Laura L. Brown, Hazardous Materials Consultant Contra Costa County Health Services Department Environmental Division Martinez, CA Jeffrey Gave, Air Quality Inspector 11 California Bay Area Air Quality Management District Enforcement Division San Francisco, CA G-2 .................... .................. .................. ......................................................................................... ..............................................................-... ..................................... Appendix H Participants on Tosco Avon Refinery Root Cause Analysis U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Craig Matthiessen, Sr. Chemical Engineer David Chung, Senior Chemical Engineer Kathleen Franklin, Chemical Engineer N. Ake Jacobson, Chemical Engineer William Weis, CERCLA Enforcement Case Manager Gordon Woodrow, Environmental Scientist Ron Anderson, Engineer- Ecology &Environment (contractor) U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Andy Salcedo., Regional Safety Engineer California OSHA Dick Roberts, Associate Safety Engineer Carla Fritz, Compliance Safety Engineer Bay Area Air Quality Jeffrey Gove, Air Quality Inspector Mohamad Moazed, Air Quality Engineer Dick Wocasek, Air Quality Engineer Facilitator Dorian Conger, General Manager- Conger&Elsea, Inc. H-1 ............................ ------------------------- ........................... ..................................... .............................. ....................... ................. Appendix I Follow-up Actions Undertaken by Tosco as of June 1997 After the January 21, 1997 Hydrocracker accident, Tosca installed a number of features: • Complete control of the Stage 2 on the UA system(a computerized distributed control system. • Maintained hard-wired shutdown buttons. • Bed temperature differential greater than 60 degrees automatically activates quench flow. • Computer controlled temperature ramping for reactor start-up. • Increased response time (from 7 to 3.5 minutes) for the hydrogen purity analyzer. • Replacement of reactor internals(distributor trays, quench rings, etc). Added two more reactor effluent temperature points. • The Plant Information (PI) system will store average temperature data for a year. The control room will store temperature readings every 2 seconds for a six month period. Tosca has installed temperature deviation safeguards for the following conditions: • Any temperature point in the reactor more than 5°F and 15°F above normal activates an audible alarm. + Any temperature point in the reactor more than 25°F above normal activates the emergency hydrogen quench system, adds hydrogen,stops feed, and shuts down the trim furnace for a single reactor. • Any temperature point in the reactor more than 50°F above normal or any 2 points over 800°F automatically activates the 300 psilmin depressuring,system. If one point goes over 800 degrees, the system"remembers"it for 10 minutes. If another temperature point goes over 800 degrees within that same 10 minute period, theta the automatic shutdown will be implemented. • Any two of the three thermocouples in the reactor effluent pipe over 800'F activates the 300 psi/min depressuring system, which shuts down all three reactors. Instrumentation(thermocouple)default values are now displayed as **** instead of defaulting to zero (any point over 949.99°F will default to ****). The operators can click on the **** to see what the temperature was, if it was less than 1400°F. A reading from bad thermocouple will be displayed as 999. Operators received training on 62 different operating procedures, three days of training on the I/A system, four hours of training on reaction kinetics. They will receive an 8-hour training session on runaway simulations on the I/A system. Management discussed with the operators the need to shut down the plant without fear of disciplinary action if safety is in question. Tosco is working on over 100 different procedures. I-1 Appendix J Glossary API American Petroleum institute ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials autoignition Instant self-sustained combustion of flammable materials in contact with air when the materials are at a temperature high enough to self-ignite. BAA MD Ba Area Air Quality Management District(State of California) blind flange Also known as a solid blank. A solid metal disc with bolt holes to allow it to be fitted to a pipe or vessel for itive closure. BPD Barrels per day BTU British Thermal Unit-a unit of enaly buil plug cylindrical solid piece of pipe stock which is threaded into a pipe coupling or flanged to a pipe opening. CAA Clean Air Act CAIT EPA's Chemical Accident Investigation Team CAL OSHA California Division of Occupational Safety and Health CCCHSD Contra Costa Coun!j Health Services Department CEPPO EPA's Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office' CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental R se,Compensation,and Liability Act Cr Chromium CSB U.S.Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board DCS Distributed Control S stein-com'uterized instrument controls. Deadband A predetermined amount of change between two measured values, such as temperature readings, Dead zone An area inside tate catalyst bed where little or no flow is occurring,resulting in increased residence time in this area. E&CF Event and Causal Factors FCC Fluid Catal is Cracker flash Calculation of rate of phase change from liquid to vapor for hydrocarbons under specific calculation 22eratinconditions(temperature,prmure,concentration). Flow controlled (As opposed to manually controlled). Automatic control of a process stream that uses its measured fiowrate as input to an instrument called a controller which automatically opens or closes a control valve to maintain a specified(setpoint)flowrate. FOIA I Freedom of Information Act J-1 ...................... .......... ....................................................................... HAZOP Hazard and_Qp--jability Study gas oil A middle-boiling point range(450-800 of)fraction which is an intermediate product from a crude oilseparation or distillation processes. HDA A process that reduces the level of aromatic compounds in diesel to by reacting them with hydraen. HDN Hydrodenitrogenation-a hydrogen process that separates nitrogen components from a feed stock. HDS Hydrodesulfurization-a hydrogen process that separates sulphur products from a feed stock. BPS High Pressure Separator HRB Rockwell hardness number,HR using the Rockwell B scale. The number is derived from the net increase from a test indentation as a force on the indenter is increased from a specified preliminary test force to a specified total test force and then returned to the preliminary test force. UA Foxboro Intelligent Automation distributed digital control system. lsoparaffin A branched hydrocarbon consisting of single carbon-carbon bonds. IIR Isocracker Ingersoll Rand(hydrogen recycle compressor) LED A semiconductor diode that converts applied voltage to light and is used digital displays on instruments. LPS Low Pressure Separator M Thousand MBPD Thousand barrels per day MgO Magnesium Oxide MM Million MMSCFD Million standard cubic feet per day Mo Molybdenum moc Management of Change MTBE Methyl tert-butyl ether. A oxygenated additive used to increase the octane rating of blended gasoline. multiplexer A electrical device with input cards that convert millivolt signals from the thermocouple wires to digital signals which are sent to a computer(data logger)in the control room. nipple A short piece of small diameter pipe J-2 .................. .................. _.._.___-__----_____--_ - NTSB, U.S.National Transportation and Safety Board off-test A term used to describe product or streams that do not meet manufacturing specifications. olefin A straight chain hydrocarbon having double carbon-carbon bonds. paraffin A straight chain hydrocarbon consisting of single carbon-carbon bonds. PFD Process Flow Diagram PHA Process Hazards Analysis PI Plant Information computer system-Used for management purposes. P&ID Process and Instrumentation Diagram PMS Performance Monitoring System. A computer system continually gathers data ftom over 1,000 instruments in the refinery and displays critical information to operators in different, often distant,parts of the refinery.Uses a Foxboro Spectrum Monitor to display._ ppm parts per million psi,psia,psig unit of pressure:pounds per square inch,pounds per square inch absolute,and pounds per square inch gauge. Absolute pressure includes the pressure of the ambient atmosphere while gauge pressure does not. Pressure Automatic control of a process stream that uses a measured pressure to control another controlled process variable such as heat or flo-wrate. The pressure is input to an instrument called a controller which automatically opens or closes a control valve to maintain a specified(set point)pressure. PSM Process Safety Management reaction Quantitative study of the rate at which a chemical reaction occurs,the factors on which this kinetics rate depends,and the molecular acts involved in the chemical reaction. SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus scf Standard cubic foot- volume of an ideal gas at standard conditions of 14.7 psia and 60'F (petroleum and gas industry). SCF/bbl Standard cubic foot of recycle gas per barrel of oil feed SCFD Standard cubic feet per day skin Temperature of exterior metal shell of vessel. temperature SOP Standard Operating Procedure - � � � � � � � � � � Sulfiding Fresh or regenerated catalyst must be activated by sulfiding prior to its use. Suifiding involves heating the catalyst at a controlled rate while contacting it with hydrogen sulfide which converts the metal oxides to metal sulfides,the form most active for hydrogenation. Temperature Automatic control of a process stream that uses a measured temperature to control another controlled process variable such as heat or flowrate. The temperature is input to an instrument called a controller which automatically opens or closes a control valve to maintain a specified(set point)temperature. Temper A condition in which thick walled vessels are subject to high stress during rapid embrittlement temperature change. Under these conditions the steel is brittle and may fracture. The effect is more severe at low temperatures and with the vessel under pressure. thermocouple A thermoelectric device for measuring temperature,composed of a two wires of dissimilar metal.in a circuit. The electrical potential difference generated between the points of contact(2 'unctions)of the wires is used as a measure of temperature difference. thermowell A metal tube into which a thermocouple or thermometer can be inserted for measuring the temperature in a pipe or vessel. The tube is closed at one end and externally threaded or flanged at the other end so it can be fitted to a coupling in the pipe or Gressel. TRI System Tosco reliability system. TRI was a tool for scheduling,planning, tracking, and documenting plant systems and equipment maintenance. The TRI system has been replaced by a news stem called IMPACT. turnaround Major maintenance of equipment following shutdown of operations for an extended period of time, USEPA U.S.Environmental Protection Agency WCAT Weighted Catalyst Averaged Temperature zeolite A type of catalyst made from aluminum-silicate based materials characterized by a very porous structure. J-4 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS �. 20 NOV 98 To; Board of Supervisors From. William B. Walker, M.D.,Health SVes tor by Lewis G. Pascalli, Jr.,Director,Hazardous Materials Programs Subj-. Staff Report on Safe Work Practice The Board of Supervisors on 11 AUG 98 directed the Health Services Director to convene the appropriate stakeholders to provide recommendations regarding the development of a safe work practices protocol in order to assure the highest possible level of worker safety. This report summarizes the information gathered and makes a recommendation for further direction by the Board. " BACKGROUND During discussions surrounding the Draft Industrial Safety Ordinance, the issue of worker safety arose around concerns involving contractor safety training. At the major petrochemical plants contractors are utilized to perform work during large maintenance and unit turnaround projects. The presence of these temporary workers in facilities having large processing units with high pressure and temperature parameters raises safety concerns. f The question posed is whether the contract workers are adequately trained in safety protocols around these plants. To address this concern the industry formed the non-profit Bay Area Training*Corporation (BATC) in 1991 whose stated primary goal is to maximize the safety of their employees, contractors and the community. A board was formed with voting and non-voting memberships involving industry, employee representatives and contractors. " The BATC established a contractor training program, through a Curriculum Development Committee, which required that all contract workers who would be in a facility performing work receive eight (8) hours of training in a Contractors Refinery Safety Skills Testing Program. They would have to pass a test and receive 'a certificate of training before being allowed in the facility to work. Once in the facility they would then have to attend a site specific training orientation for 1-11/2 hours before being allowed on the job site. Every three (3) years the contractor would have to attend a four (4) hour refresher training course given by BATC;pass a test and be given a certificate. Page 1 Contractor Skills Tests for crafts were created for skilled crafts. These involved metal skills, millwright, electrician and instrument technician crafts. There was agreement that these tests, based on testing the skill of the craftsperson appears to address concerns of safe work being performed on refinery pressure retaining or energized equipment that have the potential to produce an ignition source, cause a process upset or cause a release to the environment. Industry believes that the BATC has accomplished a contractor safety orientation program, Contractor Process Safety Management, which is seen as a',standard for the industry. The employee representatives are of the opinion that while',this was a good start, there needs to be a mechanism to assess the ongoing effectiveness of the safety training. Once the contractor workers have received their BATC training, been issued a certificate and are given the site specific training at the facility; the way that a facility monitors the contractor's safety performance and the effectiveness of their overall contractor safety program varies among facilities. PROCESS Discussions were held with interested stakeholders at a meeting convened by the Health Services Department. The background and history of the safe worker protocol issue was shared by all. The BATC program was reviewed with a focus on what could be done to assess the progress made to date and evaluate the effectiveness of BATC's overall safety program in the refineries. The attendees believe that there has been no third party evaluation of the BATC program to date. There was an interest that such an evaluation would be worthwhile if it included the internal auditing policy and procedures of the refineries' contractor safety programs. CONCLUSION The stakeholders at the meeting reached a consensus that it may be appropriate to have a third party evaluate the BATC training program, the effectiveness of the program in the refineries and the refineries' contract worker safety audit programs. Toward this end the Health Services Department recommends that the Board order the Department to convene additional meetings, of the stakeholders to develop a bid package and recommend an entity to contract to assess and report back to the Board on the Bay Area Training Corporation's safe contract worker protocol program, its effectiveness in the refineries and the refineries' internal auditing policy and procedures of contract workers safety. There are no funds allocated in the Hazardous Materials Programs budget for this contract. An allocation for costs will need to be made to the participating refineries. Page 2 CONTRA COSTA HEALTHSERVICES HAZARDOU A IALS PROGRAMS UA TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISO S FROM: LEWIS G. PASCALLI JR. k SUBJECT: PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SA TY DINANCE DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1998 19� CONSOLIDATED REDLINE DAT D 11123198 DATE: 11/23/98 CC: The following reviewers submitted their reports, 'including recommendations, on the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to the County Administrator's office on November 19, 1998: * Consultants: Ray Witter and the National Institute for Chemical Studies * Contra Costa Health Services Department + Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Commission * Contra County Planning Commission The attached Consolidated Redline dated 11/23/98 incorporates changes to the ordinance submitted by the preceding reviewers. Additionally, the reviewers made the following recommendations for further consideration. National Institute for Chemical Studies ♦ The county legal staff should review the provision in Section 450-8.016(c) to determine whether the county may legally exclude all or part of a Root Cause analysis from disclosure in a legal proceeding. ♦ The Department should write implementing policies to indicate under which cira.imstances the Department will and will not conduct such inspections (meaning Root Cause analysis and incident investigations). ♦ The Health Services Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient qualified staff to handle the expected workload increase resulting from adding processes to the existing PNT requirements, including processes within facilities covered by CalARP; conducting root cause analysis for major accidents and releases; and reviewing and evaluating Human Factors e �- programs. Similarly,the Community Development Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient staff in the event it is determined that the proposed risk management program will require review under CEQA. ♦ The county legal staff should review existing enforcement authorities to clarify which tools are available to the county to enforce the proposed ordinance. Section 450-8.028 should be amended to more clearlyidentify these enforcement actions. ♦ The Board, after consultation with County Counsel, should consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance classifying certain serious'violations, such as false filing of information,as misdemeanors. ♦ The Board should consider including a provision that would require the ordinance to be reviewed triennially after three years of full implementation. This would enable the Board to review the performance of county agencies and the regulated industries under the new requirements, evaluate the effectiveness of the ordinance, and determine whether any changes are needed to improve public safety. Kay E.Witter ♦ The County Health Services Department develop a criteria document outlining the requirements for a written human factors program. Two of the proposed ordinance discussed training as an element of process safety. One proposal only addressed contractor-training programs while the second recommended that training be developed as a separate ordinance. Training for process safety includes supervisors, operators, plant maintenance personnel as well as contractors performing plant maintenance work, major maintenance projects, new construction, and specialty operations. It also requires qualifications for the trainers, development of training modules, and methods of determining that the participants understood the training. Based on the complexity of the element and the various groups that need to be involved in the development of an overalll training program, it is suggested that training not be included in the proposed ordinances but rather be developed separately. Hazardous Materials Commission ♦ The Commission recommend that issues raised during the public meeting may be the basis of an appeal,and is concerned that the legal definition of"public meeting" (as distinct from"public hearing")may not allow for that. Th Board 2 z` should direct County Counsel to include the issue in his review of the ordinance. ♦ That the Board direct Health Services to solicit questions and concerns from the public prior to the public meeting so that staff can better act as a technical resource for the public * That the Board set aside$50,000 from the General Fund for a one-year technical assistance grant pilot project to assist in the review of Safety Plans. Contra Costa Health Services County Counsel will be specifically asked to review sections 450-8.012 and 450- 8.018 of the proposed ordinance and add language, as necessary,to ensure that within 30 days following a Major Chemical Accident or Release it is at the discretion of the Department when (within the 30 days) the safety inspection or incident safety inspection will commence. 3 DRAFT CONSOLIDATED REDLINE ORDINANCE NO. 98- INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows(omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the official text of the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Code): SECTION I. SUMMARY. This Ordinance adds Chapter 450-8 to the County Ordinance Code. Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations which supplement the requirements of California Health and Safety Code Article 2(commencing with section 2553 1)of Chapter 6.95 concerning hazardous materials management by enacting measures to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental releases of regulated substances that have the potential to cause significant harm to the public health and increase participation by industry and the public to improve accident prevention. These measures include submission of a Safety Plan to the County, stringent requirements for the contents of a Safety Plan and Safety Program,public review of the Safety Plan, authorization for the County to require changes in the Safety Plan , an expansion of the list of regulated substances beyond those covered by the Federal and State Risk Management Program regulations, and uthorization for the Compty to expand audits and inspections to all units within the Stationary Source. Root Cause Analysis is required for all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. A public outreach and information program is established. This ordinance substantially readopts Chapter 84-63,originally added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance No. 96-50,and repeals Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-50. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63,as added by this ordinance, set forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material which encourage business and other entities,in planning such projects, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Article 84-62.14 is readopted in its entirety. SECTION II. Chapter 450-8 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read. CHAPTER 4508 RISK MANAGEMENT 450-8.002 BACKGROUND and FINDINGS. The Board of Supervisors ofm Contra Costa County finds as follows: (Aa) Recent incidents in Contra Costa County at industrial chemical,petrochemical,and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews,inspections,and audits that supplement existing federal and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public health and safety from accidental releases. 11/23/98 Page 1 DRAFT (B4) Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act(42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(4))required the Ffederal Environmental Protection Agency("EPA")to promulgate the rule known as the "Risk Management Program",which is intended to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances,as defined in the Federalroram, and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur. All, facilities subject to this federal regulation must prepare a Risk Management Plan{RMPlbased on a Risk Management Program established at the facili ,that includes a hazard assessment of the facility,and accidental release prevention program,and an emergency response program(404- CFR§ 684x). The wee-facilitymust submit the Ffederal RMP to the EPA by June 21, 1999 (404-CFR§68.150-68.185). The Ffederal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (Ce) The California Health and Safety Code article 2(§ 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1, 1997 to implement the Ffederal EPA's Risk Management Program rule with certain State-specific amendments. The State's Risk Management Program is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention(CaIARPIProgram. (Dd) The County recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safety, and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention, preparedness,and response at the local level. Preventing accidental releases of regulated substances is the shared responsibility of industry,government,and the public. The first steps toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and assessing the risks. Once information about chemical hazards in the community is openly shared,industry,government,and the community can work together towards reducing the risk to public health and safety. (je) The success of a Safety Program is dependent upon the cooperation of industrial chemical and oil refining facilities within Contra Costa County. The public must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented,including changes or actions required by the Department or the Stationary Source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. 450-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS. (Aa) The purpose of this ordinance is to impose regulations which improve industrial safety by the following: (1) requiring the conduct of process hazards analysers for Covered Processes handling hazardous materials not covered by the Federal or State Risk Mana e�rnent Pro _ s; (2) requiring the review of action items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the Stationary Source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3) requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of Stationary Sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and a alyse4s for the determination of the Root Cause for certain incidents; (4) providing review, inspection,auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and regulations; 11/23/98 Page 2 DRAFT (5) providing for public in utainto-e€the Safety Plan and Safe Program and public review of any inspection and audit results; (6) facilitating cooperation between industry,the County, and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at Stationary Sources; (7) expanding the application of certain provisions of the Federal and State Risk Management Programs to processes not covered by the Federal or State Risk Management Prog_ras;-ate (8) requiring the development and implementation of a written human factors program;and (9) p eventing,and reducing the number,frequency,and severity of accidental releases in the County. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.006 AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials and to assure protection of the environment. ' (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.008 ADMINISTRATION. The Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord. 98-®, § 2.) 450-8.010 APPLICABILITY. (Aa) This ordinance shall apply to Stationary Sources; and (B4) The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except Sections 454- 8.016(C)and Q.and 8.018 (F) and(G): (1)-storage tanks containing a non-regulated substance, except for storage tanks that contain a material that meets the combustible liquid definition of 49 CFR 173.120(b) ` . 8 of the Gali f f ffi. 140alth affd sag ice:t'"A& Cit...+iAn ass;-2(g). �-� 3 (2) drum storage of a non-regulated substance• less than 10,004,founds of a Hazard Category B material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release,• and for a Hazard Category A material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a sintzle release,at less than the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Substances list(Appendix'A to 40 CFR Chanter 1. Subchapter 3. Part 355,as amended from time to time)or 500 hounds whichever is less; (3) activities inrte ocess 11ant laboratories or laboratories that axe.under the spMrvis on of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3 (ee) of 40 CFR This exemption does not appy to sRgeidty Qmical'production 11/23/98 Page 3 ..............I--..................................... .. ............................................................................................................... KRAFT manufacture, processing or use of substances in pilot plant scale-operations; and activities conducted outside the laboratory;-ate (4) utilities, except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit;and (5) any waste tanks, containers or other devices subject to the Federal and State hazardous waste laws including,the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act f!CRA)-40 CFR Chapter 1, Subchapter 1, commencing with Part 260,the California Hazardous Waste Control Law, California Health and Safely Code, commencing with Section 25 100 and the California Code of Regulations, Title 22 Division 4.5 Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous Waste. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.012 INSPECTION. The Department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this Lehapter, Sections 450-8.016 and 450-8.018 and to supporting documentation retained by the Source for the purpose of determining compliance with this Cehapter. (Ord. 98--, § 2) 450-8.014 DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this chapter the definitions set forth in this section shall apply. Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40 CFR § 68.3)and in California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95,unless the context indicates otherwise. (a) "AeeideffW Release"means an unapAieipated emissien of a Re"Iated Subata*e@ thA gimWaas g4r.fikqa; a statiefiaFy squfee. (A4) `°Covered Process"means any process tmit-at a Stationary Source. (L "Department"—bo) " artment"means the Contra Costa County Health Services Department. p m ble of being accomplished in a successful a noble odof e ng in o acc t econo - , techno ic (d) "Hazard Category A Materials"are substances which meet the Hazard Category A Material definition as setforthin Section 84-63.1016. (e) "Hazard Catepwry B Materials"are substances which meet the Hazard Categor ---v B Material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016. (f0) "Industry Codes,Standards,and Guidelines" means the edition of the codes,standards, and guidelines in effect at the time of original design or construction for the design,construction, 11/23/98 Page 4 DRAFT alteration,maintenance or repair of process units, industrial equipment, or other industrial facilities, structures or buildings published by the American Petroleum Institute(API),the Chemical Manufacturers Association(CMA),the American Society of Mechanical Engineers(ASME)or the American National Standards Institute(ANSI). (go "Inherently Safer Systems" means Inherently Safer Design Strategies as discussed in Oke 1996 Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication"Inherently Safer Chemical Processes" and meansl.ie alternative equipment,processes,materials,lay-outs,and procedures meant to eliminate,minimize,or reduce the risk of a Major Chemical Accident or Release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples includeiag,but are not limited to,substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure, lower flammability,or lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous processes; and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. (hg) "Major Chemical Accident or Release" eans an incident that meets the definition of a Level 3 or Level 2 Incident in the Communit arnin S stem incident level classification s stem defined in the Se tember 27 1997 Contr Costa Coup uideline for the Communi WarningSystemas determined by Departmen dor results in the release including, but not limited to air water or soil of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) results in one or more fatalities; �- (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of ,ee or more persons; (3) causes on and/or off-site property damageincludin clean-u l restoration activities) initially estimated t $500,000 or more. 4n-site estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off--site estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the Department.; m+a deli fe the Gewrir u aky�I7n...r� r.S rob +++ J „b ,l i (5) results in a flammable vapor clouds of more than 5000 pounds. (Cd*) "Regulated Substance"means(1)any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California Health and Safety Code section 25532 (g),as amended from time to time,or(2) a substance which satisfies the provisions of is listed-ice Hazard Categories A or B in section 84-63.1016. Mixtures containing less than I%of a Regulated Substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. (i) "Risk Management Program"means the documentatiom develo merit irnvlementation. and integration of management systems by facility to comply with the regulations set forth in 40 CFR, Part 68 and the California Health and Safety Cade Article 2 commencing_with Section 25531. 11/23198 Page 5 ............................­­­­ ...................... ............................................I ...... ........................................................ .............................................. ........................ DRAFT (ki) "RMP" means the Risk Management Plan required to be submitted and Pro pursuant to the requirements of the 40 CFR§ 68.150-68.185 and the California Health and Safety Code article 2(Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95. (jl ) "Root Cause"means prime reasons, such as failures of some management systems, that allow faulty design, inadequate training, or improper changes, which lead to an unsafe act or condition, and result in an incident. If root causes were removed, the particular incident would not have occurred. (Mk) "Safety Plan" means the padgty Plan whish is required to be submitted to the Department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.016 of the chapter. Un "Safety- eV Program"means the documentation,development implementation,and integration of manwement systems by the Stationary Source to comely with the safety requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016 of this chapter. (q) "Stationary Source"or"Source"means a facility which includes at least o�erocess uftitras defined in 40 CFR 68.10 that isar-e subject to(Federal Risk Management Program Level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code(NAICS)is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing)or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. The Stationary Source shall submit a Safety Plan to the Department within one year of the effective date of this ordinance or within three years of the date a facility becomes a Stationary Source that.t t complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection(A�) below. In addition,the Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections(A4)through Vie)of this section and shall include a description of the manner of compliance with these subsections in the Safety Plan. A new Covered Process at an existing SigigM Source shall comply with.subsections(A)through(E)prior to initial startup. (Aa) Risk Management Pro ram Elements. Those Covered Processes not included in the 4Eedeml program level 3 Risk Manag ment shall be subject to the Rask Management Pr9Z_=elements listed below. The Safety Plan shall include a description of the manner in which these Ri—sk Mani-gement Program elements listed below shall be applied to the Covered Process. These Risk Management Pro am elements shall be implemented in conformance with the Federal and State Risk Management Programs and the Safely Plan shall follow 7 and 6 Chapters dated July , — - 1. 1998,and Chapter 9 dated November 2. 1998 of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department RMP guidance document,June. 1998: . (1)-process Safety Information:---(a) of w_ijstn Mocess safe information before co 9 _g by this ananlicgo nductin any process hazard analMis as Le uired ter. TSourced the cam written process gfety.information is to enable the Station= employees-involved in operating the Covered Process to,identify and understand 11/23/98 Page 6 ..........1.1.11........I................................1.111.11,111,111,11, .. .... ...... ................................................................................................ DRAFT the hazards posed by the Covered Process. This process safety information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or produced by the process, information pertaining to the technology of the process, and information pertaining to the equipment in the process. Information pertaining to the hazards of the Regulated Substances in the process. (i) This information shall consist of at least the followim: toxicity._information-, permissible exposure limits, physical data,• reactivity data: corrosivity data-, thermal and chemical stability data, and hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that could foreseeably occur. Qii -,Material Safety Data Sheets meeting the requirements of Section 5189 Title 8 of California Code of Regulations May be used to comply with this requirement to the extent they contain the information required by this subsection. (iii) Informationpertainingto the technology of theprocessshall include at least the following: a block flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram process chemis=, maximum intended inventory, safeupper and lower limits for such items as temperatures, pressures, flows or compositions; and, an evaluation of the conseguences of deviations. Where the original technical information no longer exists, such informationmay' be developed in cgaiunction with the process hazard analysis in sufficient detail to support the analysis (iv) Informationpertainingto the equipment in the process shall include: materials of construction; piping and instrumentdiagrams (P&ID's), electrical classification•, relief system design- and desimn basis-,-ventilation system design ; design -codes andstandardsemployed, material andenergybalances for processes built after the compliance date of this Chapter,• and safety systems(e.g. interlocks,detection or suppression systems). (b) The Stationary Source shall document that a�ment complies with recognized and generally accentedgood eagineerini2ractices. (c) For existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use, the Stationary Source shall determine and document that the equipment is designed,maintained, inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner. Q -Operating Procedures: (a) The Stationary Source shall develop and implement written gperatin g procedures that, provide clear instructions for 50el y conducting- activities involved in each Covered Process consistent with the process saLe-ty information and shall address at least the following elements: (i) Steps for each oRLra—tim phase, inifiA §La=: normal operations,• tem- porary ongra—tions. emergency shutdoM including the conditions under which emergency s, butdown is reguired. and the assignment of shutdown resWnsibilily to guajifigd operators to ensure that-,emergency shutdown is executed in a safe and timely manner, emag%acy _p nomgl shutdown, and, statqI2 following a !=awround perations, , or- after an emergg-nsy shutdown. (UlOperating limits: consgQuences of deviation,• and stem_required to correct or avoid deviation. & Safely andhealthconsiderations: properties of and hazards presented b e chemicals used in the process, precautions ngcgLs ge _y, th _M to twevent exposure. including enginqprin controls. administrative controls. and l2ersonal_"o ctiveEgu jpm e nti-control megMs to be taken if p-hysical contact, or airborne exsureoccurs, -quality control I for raw materials and control of hazardous chemical inventory levels,• and, M special or unique-Ijazards. 11/23/98 Page 7 .................I...............I....I..............I.......................... ......................................................................................................................................... DRAFT (c) Safety systems and their functions. (d) Operating procedures shall be readily accessible to employees who work in or maintain a process. fe) Theoperatingprocedures shall be reviewed as often as neepaM to assure that they reflect current operating practice— including changes that result from changes in process chemicals, technology, and equipment, and changes to stationary sources. The Stationary Source shall certify annually that these operating procedures are current and accurate. (f) The Stationary Source shall develop and implement safe work practices to provide for the control of hazards duri Lag operations such as-lockout/ tagout.• confined space o=,• opening pLocess gquipment or piing; and control over entrance into.-a statin nM source h maintenance, contractor, laboratory, or-other support personnel. These -safe work practices shall apply to employees and contractor employees. (3)_Employee Participation:-_(a)The Stationary Source shall deygloawn e'tt n p -plan of action regardin&the implementation of the employee participation required bythis chapter (2)The StationgCLSource shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and-development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements of the Safety Program in this chapter. (c)The Stationary Source shall provide to employees and theirrepresentativesaccess to process hazard analyses and to all other information required to be developed under this chapter. (4) -Training: -for each employee in such Covered Process:. (a)Initial training. (i)Each employee presently involved in operating a Covered Process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned Covered Process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating pLocedures as specified in Section 450-8.016 LA)(2). The t_raining shall include ern hasis on the spgcific safety and health hazards, ememency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the employee's iob tasks, In lieu of initial training for those employees already involved in operating ap_rocess on an owner or operator may certify in writing thattheemployee has the reguired knowledge,skills.and abilities to safely caLry.out the duties and responsibilities as Wegified in the opgrating-prote dores. 02)Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at least_eve t—bree years, and more often if necess .toeacheml2loyee involved in opgrating a Covered Process to assure that the em to understands and adheres to the current 2perating procedures of the Cover d Process. The Stationary Source, in consultation with the employees involved in opgMtLing the pmeess, shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. Le) Training documentation.The Stationary Source A .all ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section. The Statigna Z Sourge shall Rre a record which contains the identhy of the emRlQyee,the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the tna-niW,. (5) Mechanical Integrity. including the use of Industry Codes, Standards,and (luidelines: (a)Application. Para the following graphs(b)through(f)of this section gpRly to proc ,ess eguipinept: 12ressure vessels and storage,tanks;2i:ving systems Cincluding Ripin com nents such as valves)•,relief and vent aystems and devices, mer enc shutdown systems,• controls fincludigg monitoring devices and sensarsalarms, and interlockg)and,Rumps. 11/23/98 page 8 1 DRAFT (b) Written procedures. The Stationary Source shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrityof process equipment. (c) Training for process maintenance activities The Stationary Source shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-goin integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (d) Inspection and:testing. (1)Inspections and tests shall be performed bn recess puipment. Insnection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and,general! acce ted good engineering ractices. The fre uenc of ins ctions and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and ggod engineering ractices and more frequently if determined to be necessM by prior operating experience. The Station Source shall document each inspection and test that has been performed onprocess equipment The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test the name ofth_gerson who performed the ins etion or test the serial number or ether identifier of the eqtupment on which the inspection or test was performed a description of the inspection or test performed and the results of the inspection or test. - (e) Equipment deficiencies. The Stationary Source shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits(defined by the process sgfely infolnation in Section 454-8.106fA)(1))before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessM means are taken to assure safe operation. Quality assurance. In the construction of new l2lants and a ui ment the Station Source shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used Aprropriate checks and 1ns,.pections shall be performed to assure that e ui ment is installed woverly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions. The Stationary Source shall assure that maintenance materials spare parts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be used (6) Management of Change:_(a)The Stationary Source shall establish and implement written procedures to manage changes Lexcept for "rgiplacements in kind" to --oDr, ces chemicals technology,a ui ment andprocedures-, and changes to stationary sources that affe t a covered rocess. The procedures shall assure that the following considerations are addressed pAor to any change:-.the technical basis for the prop2sed change-, impact of chap a on§A&V and healft modeficatibns to operating procedures- necessar time mriod for the ehan e, an4 authorization ree uirements for the proposed change. Employees involved in oWrating a process and maintenance and contract ern to ee whose job tasks will be affected by a change in the process shall be informed o ,and trained in the chane prior to start-up of the process or affected part of the process Q If a change covered by this section results in a c-h-a—n&in the process safe information r uir d by Section 450-8.016(A)(1). such information shall be updated accordin 1 . (e)If a chane covered by this section results in a chp- a in the operating procedures or mctices re aired:by Section 450-8.016(A)L2), such procedures or pogfices shall be u dated accordingly. 11/23/98 Page 9 ................................I.................................................... . ............................................................................................................................. DRAFT (7) Pre Start-Up 9&4ty Reviews:-(a) The Stationary Source shall Wrfo a pre-startup safety review for new stationM sources and for modified-stationary sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. (b)The pre-startup safety review shall confirm thatpriorto the introduction of regulated substances to a Covered Process: construction and equipment is in accordance with desiun spe ications, safe1y,D . maintenance,and emeMLne in 12lace and are gif grating -y- X_procedures are adeguate-, for new Covered Processes, a-process hazard analysis has beenan perfortu&d d recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startw-, and modified Covered Processes meet the Leguirements contained in management of chme.Section 450-8.106(A)(6), and_training of each employee involved in operating a process,has been completed. (8) Compliance Audits: (a)The Stationary Source shall certify that thehave evaluated compliance with the provisions of this section at least ever three years to verify that.thc procedures and practices developed under this Chapter are adNuate and are being followed M The compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process. (c) A report of the findings of the audit shall be developed. (d) The Stationary Source shall promptlydetermineand document an appropriate response to each of the findings of the compliance audit,and document that deficiencies have been corrected. (ej The Stationary Source shall retain the two most recent compliance audit reports. (9)-Incident Investigation: _Ua -TheStationarySource shall investigate each incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a regulated substance, (2) An incident investigation shall be initiated as promptly as 2ossible,but not later than 48 hours followinp,the incident. — Lc) An incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the Covered Process involved,including a contract employee.if the incident involved work of the contractor,and other rsons with VZopriate knowledge and SAperience,to thoroughly investigate and analyze the incident. - - -- 1(4) Arertshall be Mr pared.at the conclusion of the inves-tigation which includes at a minimum: date of incident- date investigation beizan , the f ;a description of the incident, actors that contributed to the incident.and,recommendations resulting from the investigation. The written summM shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting fro M thy investigation are specific only to the process or eguipmeat involved in the incident,or are Mlivable-to-other processes or gguipment at the Sjgfi2na_a Soiree. The incident investigation report shall be made available to the Department upon reguest. (e) The StatioaM-Source shall establish a system to proMfly address and resolve the incident report findims and recommendations. Resolutions andcorrectiveactions shall be documented. (f) The Mort shall be reviewed with all affected personnel whose-job tasks are relevant to the incidentfindingsincluding contract employees app3licable. - (g) Incident inyesti&4fon reports shall be retained fairfiveyears, 11/23/98 Page 10 I1 11 1 1 1 DRAFT (10) Hot Work: (a) The Stationary Source shall issue a hot work permit for hat work operations conducted on or near a covered process (b) The permit shall document that the fire prevention and protection requirements in 5189 of Title 8 of California Code Reizulations have been implemented prior to beginnina the hot work operations, it shall indicate the date(s) authorized for hot work, and identify the object on which hot work is to be performed. The permit shall be kept on file until co-npleton of the hot work operations. 11) Contractors Safety P-og (a)Application. This section applies#o contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround major renovation,orspecial work on or adjacent to a covered process. It does not-Ml to co tractors ovidin incidental services which do not influence process safety,such as janitorial work food and drink services faunIgundry, deliyery or other supply services. b StationM Source responsibilities. i The Stationga Source when selecting a contractor,shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator's safety performance and 1rograms. (ii) The Stationary Source shall inform contract owner or aperator of the known potential fire explosion or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process fiii) The Stationary Source shall explain to the contract owner oro en ra#or the applicable provisions of the emergency response program Section 450-8 016(a 12). (iv) The Stationary Source shall develop and implement safe workrp actices consistentwith Section 454-8.01 qAto control the entrancepresence,and exit of the contract owner oroperator and contract employees in Covered Process areas. (v) The Stationary Source shall periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or ol2erator in fulfillim their obligations as specified in Section 450-8.0l gA)(11)(c). c Contract owner oro rator responsibilities: i The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is trained inthe work practices necessary to safely perform his/her job..{ii)The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fire explosion or toxic release hazards related to his/her job and the process,and thea licable provisions of the gmergogy action Dlan. iii The g2atract owner or v erator shall document that each contract employee has received and understood the training re aired by this section. The contract owner or operator shall RMare a record which contains the idenifty of the contract em to ee the date of training, and a means used to vg6 that the employee understood the training. iv The contract owner or ogmtolshall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the Statiopffly Source including the safe work actices re aired by Section 450-8.01 A 2 v The contract owner or onerator shall advise the Stationary Source of unique hazards presented by the contract owner or operator's work or of any hazards found by the contract owner or operator's work (12) Emergency Response Program: (a) The Stationary Source shall develop and im lement an timer enc res nsero ram for the se of rotectin u `c health and the environment. Such Drogram shall include the following elements: i An emer enc res e lap -which hall be maintained at the statio source and contain at. lust the following elements: procedures for informal the public and local ernes ertc reonse a enci s ab ut accd pial releases emer enc lannin and ewer enc res nse doc entation of roer first-aid and emerggacy emergencymedical treatment necessM to treat accidental human ex osur s• and 11/23/98 Page 11 __ " DRAFT rocedures and measures for emergency res onse after an accidental release of a regulated substance ii Procedures for the use of emer ene res onse e ui merit and for its ins ection testinand maintenance iii Training for all employees in relevant raced es and the Incident Command System, and (ivl Procedures to review and update. as aDnropriate a emer enc res rise 121an to reflect changes at the stationM source and ensure that em In ees are informed of changes. 02) A written plan that com lies with other Federal continggricy pLan re Mations or is consistent with thea roach in the National Res onse Team's Inte rated Contin enc flan Guidance ("OnePlan") and that among other matters includes the elements provded in Section 450-8.016 A 12)(g), shall satisfy the requirements of this section if the Station Source also complies with Section 450 8.016(A)(12&). --_Lcl The emergency response plan develo ed under this section shall he'c rdinated with the coM untX emer enc res onse Ian.developed under 42 U.S.C.-11003. U on r nest of the local emerggncy planningcommittee or emergency response officials the StationM Source hall 12roMptlx provide to the local emergency response officials information necess', for develoj2iag and implementing the community emergency response 121an. (Bb) Human Factors Program. (1) Stationary Sources shall develop a written human factors program that follows the human factors guidance document deve o ed or ado ted by the Dgpartment The gram shall be developed within one year following the issuance-of-the Contra Costa County gut documents or the effective date of the ordinance=o-whichever is later. The Human Factors Program shall address-€ddroor, : (i) the inclusion of human factors in the Process Hazards Analysis process; (ii) the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for an incident that could reasonably have resulted in Major Chemical Accident or Release; (iii) the training of employees in the human factors program; (iv) operating procedures; and (v) the requirement to conduct a Management of Change prior to staffing changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations or emergency response. Employees and their Representatives shall be consulted in Management of Changes. (2) Employees and their Representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3) The program shall include,but not be limited to,issues such as staffing, shiflwork and overtime. (4) A description of the human factors program(h)(1)throu?h Malabove shall be included in the Safety Plan prepared by the Stationary Source. ( o) Root Cause Analysis and Incident fnves figation. ).,.Stationary Sources shall conduct a Root Cause analysis for each Major Chemical Accident or Release which occurs after the effective date of this chapter. Stationary Sours s shallriodigd to thgnn t o facts related to there or inciden and the status of a R t Cause Anak sis conducted pursuant to this s tion atm titin s schedu ed b the De artme t in coo ration) a Statin ` o e. o 11/23/98 Page 12 DRAFT the maximum extent feasible the Department and the StationM Source shall coordinate these meetin s with ether a encies with jurisdiction over the Station Source. Within 30 da s of com leti a Root Cause Analysis performed 12ursuant to this section the Stati2nM Source shall submit to the De artment a final report containing that anal sis including recommendations to be im lemented to mitigate against the release or incident re-occurring,if an and a schedule for completion of resulting recommendations. The methodology of the Root Cause analysis shall be one of the recommended methodologies from the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall be reviewed by the Department to determine substantial equivalency. (2) The Department may elect to do its own independent Root Cause analysis or incident invention for a Major Chemical Accident or Release. If the Department elects to conduct a Root Cause analysis or incident investigation the Stationary Source shall cooperate with the Department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of Department and Stationary Source personnel and without placing unduw burdens on the operation of the Stationary Source: (i)allow the Department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms,physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment, (ii)provide the Department with pertinent documentation,(iii)and allow the Department to conduct independent interviews of Stationary Source employees, subject to all rights of the Stationary Source and employees to be represented by legal counsel and/or management and union representatives during such interviews. If in the course of the Department's Root Cause analysis or incident investigation access is required to areas of the Station Source which in the enthe�of the Stationary Source require personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the Department shall provide it=s personnel with such equipment and training. To the maximum extent feasible the Department shall coordinate any Root Cause analysis or incident investigation it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source to minimize the adverse impacts on the Stationary Source and/or its employees. Q_No part of the conclusions,findings or recommendations of the Root Cause analysis conducted by the Department or Stationary Source or incident investigation conducted by the Department,relating to any Major Chemical Accident or Release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. ) Process Hazards Analysis/Action Items. Process hazards analyses will be conducted,for each of the Covered Processes not included in the€Federal program level 3 Risk Management Pry according to one of the following methods What�If,Checklist What- If/C ecklist Hazard and Orabili StLd_y HAZQP Failure Mode and Effects Anal sis MEA Fault Tree Anal sis or an a ro nate gquivalent methodology roved b the Dee ent riot to conducting the process hazard analysis. 6 199(e)(1) (Wooess Safety M&RagefaefA). The process hazard analysis shall be appr�rpriate to the cQrnr)lexily of the Covered Process and shall identify.evaluateand control the hazards involved in the Covered Process. The process hazard analysis shall address; the hazards of ft rocess• the identification of My previous incident which had a likely-potential for catastro hk copse ue ces' engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hgzmds and their 11123/98 Page 13 ...................................................................................................................1.11.1.1111,..... ...... ............................................................................................................................................. DRAFT interrelationships such as appropriate aMlication of detection methodoloRkes to proyLde early warning-of releases. (Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarm—s and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors.)-, consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; Covered Process and Stationary - Human Factors, and a qualitative evaluation of a rang Source siting, e of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls. All process hazard analysesshallbe performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the yocess being evaluated, Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology beingused. (2) The process hazards analyses shall be conducted within 1 year of the effective date of this Chapter and no later than the submittal date of the Safety Plan. -Previously completed process hazards analyses that comply with the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, Section-5189, and/or the California Code of Re-gulations, Title 19, Section 2760.15189 99T44 are acceptable for the purposes of this Chapter. Process hazards analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least once every 5 years after completion of the initial process hazard-.gp�Isis. Updated and revalidated process hazard analyses completed to,comply with the California Code of Regulations, Title 8, . V Section 5189-and/or the California Code of Regulations.Title 19, Section 2760 are acceptable for A/ meeting the update and revalidation requirement. as spesified in Ge&few4a Cede efR-egu414A44,; 4 T-We 8 seetion 5 199(e)(5)(Preeoss Safety Manftemeo. External events,including seismic events,shall be considered for processes containing a substance defined in the California Code of Reaulations, Title 19, Chapter 4.5 1, Section 2770.5,if the distance to the nearest public receptor for a worst case release scenario specified by the California Code of Regulations.Title 19,Chapter 4.5 1,Section 2750.3 is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint as defined in California Code of Regulations,Title 19,Chgpter 4.5-1., Section 2750.2Ua . (3) For all Covered Processes Tthe Stationary Source shall consider the use of Inherently Safer Systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazards analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities. --- (4) For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shalldocumentthe decision made to imp!ement or not implement all process hazard analysis recommendedactionitems and the results of recommendations for additional study. tThe Stationary Source shall complete recommended actions identified by the process hazard-,analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source as follows: all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed within one year after submittal of the Safety Plan; all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled.turnaround of the applicable process subsequent to one year after submittal of the Safety Plan unless the Stationary Source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Department that such a schedule is infeasible. Forrecommendedactions not selected for imnlementatiom the Stationary Source shall include the justification for not iMlementing the recommended action. For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall retain documentation of closure,and any associated justifications,of actions identified by the process hazards analysis. 11/23/98 Page 14 DRAFT (Ee) Accident history. _lff he Stationary Source shall include an accident history in the Safety Plan of all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases from June 1, 1992,through the date of Safety Plan submittal to the Department. For each Major Chemical Accident or Release the Stationary Source shall report the following information,to the extent known: date, time and approximate duration of the release; chemicals released; estimated quantity released in pounds; type of release event and it=s source; weather conditions at the time of the release; on-site impacts; known off-site impacts; initiating event and contributing factors; Root Cause(s); whether off-site responders were notified; and operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. (2) The Stationary Source shall annually submit a report of the accident history to the Department. The first report shall be due two years after the effective date of this ordinance and subsequent reports shall be due on the anniversaries of the effective date of the ordinance 450-8.0 8 REVIEW,AUDIT,AND INSPECTION. (Aa) Upon submissiopaubmi#wg of a Safe Plan the Stationary Source,the Department shall review the Safet-y_P1an to determine if all the ele is required by Section 450-8.016 are included com let e De ent shall provide to the Stationary Source a written Notice of Deficie ei s if any. The Stationary Source shall have 60 calendar days from receipt of the Notice of Deficiencies to make any corrections The Stationary Source may request, in writing,a one time 30 day calendar day extension to correct deficiencies. By the end of the 60 calendar days or any extension period the SIgggnaly Source shall resubmit the revised Safety Plan to the Department. After the Department determines that the Safety Plan is complete,the Department shall schedule a public meeting on the Stationary Source's Safety Plan to explain its contents to the public and take public comments The Department shall make portions of the Safety Plan which are not protected trade secret information available to the public for the public meeting. (B) (1) The Department shall,within one year of the submission of the Stationary Source's Safety Plan,conduct an initial audit and inspection of the Stationary Source's SgfM Program to determine compliance with this Chapter. Based upon the Department's review ofthe Safe rti1 Plan and the audit and inspection of the Stationary Source the Department marerequire modifications or additions to the Safety Plan submitted by the Stationary Source or Safety Progaram to bring the Safety Plan or Safety Program into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safely Program are required shall be in writing,collectively referred to as the"Preliminary Determination" The Preliminary Determination shall explain the basis for the modificationsor additions required to bring the Safety Plan or Sd=Pro into coMliance with the requirements of this C ter. The Preliminga Determination shall be mailed to the Stationary Source 11/23/98 Page 15 DRAFT M The Stationary Source shall respond in writing to the Preliminary Determination issued by the Department. The response shall state that the Stationary Source will incorporate into the Safety Plan-or-Safely Program the revisions contained in the preliminary determination or shall state that the Stationary Source rejects the revisions,• in whole or in partFor each rejected revision the Stationary Source shall explain the basis for rejecting such revision Such explanation may include substitute revisions. -- _- (3) The Stationary Source's written response to the Department's Preliminary Determination shall be received by the Department within 94 days of the issuance of the Preliminary Determination or such shorter time as the Department specifies in the Preliminary Determination as beim necessary to protect public health and safety. Prior to the written response beim due and upon written request from the Stationary Source the Department may provide in writing,additional time for the response to be received. -- (4) After receiving the written response from the Stationary Source the Department shall issue a public notice per the Department's Public Participation Policy and make portions of the Safe Plan,the_Preliminary Determination and the Stationary Source's responseswhich are not protected trade secret information,available for public review. Public comments on the Safety Plan shall be taken by the Department for a period of 45-34 days after the Safety Plan,the Preliminary Determination and the Stati2M Sources responses are-is made available to the public. The Department shall schedule a public meeting on the Stationary Source's Safety Plan during the 45-48 day comment period. The_public meetings shall be held in the affected community on evenin s or weekends. shall,(b4 44+0 PepaAmOR4 getwee7 } > at its > (Cd) Based upon }-the Department's Preliminary Determination.review of the Stationary Sources responses and review of public comments on the Safety Plan,the Preliminary Determination and the Stationary Source's responses gee—,the Department may require modifications or additions to the Safety Plan submitted by the Stationary Source or Safe Program to bring the Safety Plan or Safety Program into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program are required,and any determination that no modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program are required shall be in writing, g, 11/23/98 Page 16 DRAFT (collectively referred to as"fFinal 4Determination")shall be mailed to the Stationary Source and shall be made available to the public, The Department may not include in a Final Determination any aesso+A4igep.,4-requirements toiR a Safety Plan or Safety Program which would cause a violation of, or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. Qe) Within 30 days of the Department's(Final 4Determination,the Stationary Source and/or any person may appeal the(Final dDetermination to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee. The Opeal must be limited to issues raised during the public.comment Deriod. The notice shall state the grounds for any such appeal,including i)the reasoning t the appeal is necessary because the StationM Source is in com liance with this Chapter,or(ii)the-reasoning that the Weal is necesM to bring the Stationat y Source into compliance with this C ter. In acting on the appeal,the Board shall have the same authority over the Final Determination a&5as the Department. The Board may require modifications or additions to the Safety flan or Safety Program to bring the SafePlan or Safe Program into com Bance with the re uirements of this Chapter. The Board may not include in its decision on the Final Determination My ENWements to a Safety Plan or SafM SafeProgram which would cause a violation of or conflict with an State or Federal law or re ulation or a violation of My permit or order issued by an State or.Federal a rent . The decision of the Board of Supervisors shall be final with respect to the Final Determination; €e-,Plan. (Et) The Safety Plan shall be valid for a period of three to- o-ye Depafteae from the date of final action and shall be reviewed and updated by the Stationary Source every three te- e-years pursuant to the requirements of this ordinance. Any revisions to the Safety Plan as a result of the review and update shall be submitted to the Department and shall be subject to the provisions of this Section'. ffh) The Department maysW&,within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release-at the disefeition 99 the Pepaftme conduct a safety inspection to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016. The Department shall review and audit the Stationarv8ationaff Source's compliance with the provisions of Section450-8.016 at least once every three 4e-years. The Department may audit the Stationary_Source based upon any of the fQ11mming criteria: accident histo of the Station Source accident histo of other StatioaM Sources in the same Indus uanti of Re u ated Substances resent at the Station Source location of the StationM Source and its proximily to the pablic,and eg3jrgpmental recti tors the presence of spgcific rremulated substances and the hazards identified in the Sde Plan. The Stationary Source shall allow the Department to conduct these inspections and audits. The Department, at its option,may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting said inspection. (Ge) Within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release the Department may commence an incident safety inspection with respect to the proceLsegaipmetit involved in the incident pursuant to the provisions of Section 450-8.015(Ce). 11!23/98 Page 17 .............................................................................................. ...................................................................................... ....................................................... DRAFT LH)_-LI) Based upon the Department's audit, saf tins ction.the Department may re wire modifications or additions to the(Safet Plan subrniIU b the tion Source or Sgfqiy Program to bring the Safety Plan or Safero ram into r.—pli –ce wi the re uirements of this chapter. Any determination t the De art be in t' d shall be mailed to the Stationary Source(referred to as the Notice of Findings) Thi tionarySource shall have 60 calendar dans from receipt of the Notice of Findings to make M corrections. The Stationary Source may request,in writing,a one time 30 day calendar dgy extension to make corrections. The Department may not include in its Notice of Findings requirements to a,Safety Plan or Safety Proararn which would cause a violation of,or conflict , _y site or federal with gn tat law or-regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued bey state or federal agency. The Notice of Findingsmadeby the Department will be available to the public. (2) Within 30 days of the Department's Notice of Findings,the Stationary Source and/or any person may appeal theNoticeof Findings to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and payment of the WRlicable appeal fee. The meal must state the arounds for M such-opeal, including Ci) the reasoning that the Weal is necessary because the Stationary is in compliance with this Chapter, or-Wil the reasoning that the appeal is necessary to bring the StationarySource into comWiance with this Chawer. In gg"n on the appeal,the Board shall have the same authority over the Notice of Findings as the Department. TheBoardmgy re wire modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program to bring the Safely Plan or Safety Program into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. The Board may not include in its decision on the Notice of Finding any,requirements to a Safety Plan or 5ffejy Program which would cause a violation of,or conflict with,any State or Federal law or regulation or a violation of Mpermit ororderissued by My State or Federal aggggy. The decision of the Board of Supervisors shall be final with respect to the Notice of Findings. &) Nothing in this section shall preclude,limit,or interfere in any way with the authority of the County to exercise its enforcement, investigatory,and information gathering authorities under any other provision of law nor shall anything in the Chapter effect or diminish the rights of the Stationary Source to claim legal privileges such as attorney client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the Department. (Ord. 98-, § 2.) 450.8.020 TRADE SECRET. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section 25538, as amended from time to time,or as otherwise protected or required by law. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 11/23/98 Page 18 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... DRAFT 450-8.022 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OMBUDSPERSONe®l: i; OU .. The Department shall continue to , 1498,employ an ombudsperson for Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in Contra Costa County regarding;environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the Department. The ombudsperson's role will be one of" "as well investigating concerns and complaints, facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs, procedures, or issues. The Ombudsperson may provide technical assistance to the public if it is requested. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 454-8,024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BANK. The Department shall collect and provide ready access,including the use of electronic accessibility as reasonably available, to public documents which are relevant to the goals of this chapter, including at a minimum, business plan inventories and emergency response plans,Risk Management Plans, Safety Plans, and Department incident reports. This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law. The public information bank shall be completed by December 31, 2000. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.026 FEES. The Department may, upon a majority vote of the Board of Supervisors, adopt a schedule of fees to be collected from each Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter. Any review, inspection, audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those costs reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter, including costs of staff and/or consultant time or public hearings and administrative overhead. The fee schedule shall include the cost of the ombudsperson position. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.02 PENALTIES. Regardless of the availability of other civil or administrative remedie ro dures for enforcing this chapter,every act or condition prohibited or declared unlawful by this chapter, and every knowing or willful failure or omission to act as required herein, is a violation of this code and shall be punishable and or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-6 of the County Ordinance Code specifically includi but not limited to Article 14-6.4 thereof(public nuisance). f (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) re SECTION III. ORDINANCE NO. 96-50. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63,added by Ordinance No. 96-50 is hereby repealed. 11/23/98 Page 19 ..........................................................................................................-...... ............................................................................................................................................ ............ I)RAFT SECTION IV. ORDINANCE NO. 96-20. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance 96-50, is modified and added to the County Ordinance Code. CHAPTER 84-63 LAND USE PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL Article 84-63.2 General Ordinance No. 98- (Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Material) The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Code): SECTION I. SUMMARY. The County Ordinance Code requires land use permits for the specified development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material in the L-I light industrial, W-3 controlled heavy industrial, and H-1 heavy industrial land use districts. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 86-100, regulates land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material. This ordinance repeals Chapter 84-63, and adds a new Chapter 84-63 in its place. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as added by this ordinance, sets forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material, which encourages business and other entities, in planning the project,to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of the new Chapter 84-63 continue to require land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. Article 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63,added by Ordinance No. 90-73,is renumbered and readopted in its entirety as Article 84-63.14. SECTION H. Chapter 84-63 of the County Ordinance Code, added by Ordinance No. 86-100 and amended by Ordinances Nos. 91-49, 90-92 and 90-73, is repealed in its entirety, and is replaced by new Chapter 84-63, added by Section Ill of this ordinance. SECTION III. Chapter 84-63 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read: 11/23/98 Page 20 _ ......... ......... ......... ....._... ... .. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _.... _. _ _.._... ......... ......... ......... ......... ..............._... . .. ........................................................................... DRAFT 84-63.202 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to promote the health, safety and general welfare of residents and persons in the County by encouraging businesses and other entities, in planning and developing projects involving hazardous material or hazardous waste,to consider factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community, and by requiring land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health. safety and the environment. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86- 100.) 84-63.204 Conflict. This chapter is not intended,and should not be deemed,to prevent or preempt compliance with federal or state laws, regulations, rules or orders, or to excuse compliance with any other County ordinance, including other requirements of this code. (Orris. 98-_ §5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.4 Definitions 84-63.402 General. As used in this chapter, the words and phrases defined in this article shall have the meanings given unless the context otherwise requires. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.404 "Baseline Period." "Baseline period" means the consecutive twelve month period of time during which activity is measured for purposes of this chapter. The baseline period shall be any twelve consecutive month period within five years of the date of the submittal of the application that is reflective of a normal year of operation. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.406 "Change-in-risk project." A "change-in-risk project" means a new use of an existing building, structure, or facility, not involving construction other than minor alterations, which use will involve a hazardous material or hazardous waste in a higher hazard category and which use will result in a hazard score higher than the hazard score of the previous use. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.408 "Commercial property." "Commercial property" means all properties with a commercial designation in the general plan including but not limited to the following: commercial,regional commercial,airport commercial,office, and business park. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.410 "Development project." (a)A "development project" means a new permanent building, structure or facility to be constructed that will manage hazardous materials or hazardous waste,or a permanent change-in-risk project. As used in this section, "permanent" when used to describe a building, structure,or facility,or the new use of an existing building, structure, or facility(change-in-risk project) 11/23/98 Page 21 _ ......... ......... ......... ......... ....._... ... 1111.. 1.1._.11 .. ......... . ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ...... .. _........... _ __.. _ .. ......... ......... . ........ ......... DRAFT means that the building, structure, facility or use is intended to be in operation for more than six months. (b)A "development project" does not include: (1) Pipelines and related equipment more than 300 feet from commercial or residential property. Delated equipment includes but is not limited to items such as valves, fittings, pine supports, insulation instrumentation, corrosion protection systems, heat tracing systems, leak containment systems and fire protection systems Related equipment does not include storage tanks storage vessels process unity or plants mechanical rotating eauipmen#{e.g.,pumps, compressors motors turbines, internal combustion engines, etc.). However, the Zoning Administrator may determine at the Zoning Administrator's sole discretion that minor equipment defined above as not related is exempt from the ordinance. (2) Any project consisting only of maintenance, repair, and replacement or minor modification of existing equipment provided the storage design capacity is not increased and the hazard category of hazardous material or hazardous waste handled is not increased. (3) Any transportable treatment unit that has obtained all required permits and is used solely for site remediation or waste treatment purposes, provided the transportable treatment unit will be located on site for a maximum time limit of one year. The Director of Community Development will have the authority to grant a one year time extension if the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director that the unit is temporary. Otherwise, a land use permit will be required if the unit will remain on the site beyond the time limit specified above. (4) Any project for which permit applications have been deemed complete on or before the effective date of this chapter by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District or other government agency with jurisdiction over the project-provided the project wDlication has been deemed complete within one calendar year and has completed CEOA documentation, The proponent of a project described by subsection(4) of subdivision(b)of this section may elect to be subject to the requirements of this chapter in lieu of any requirements in effect prior to the effective date of this chapter. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) 84-63.412 "Dispose." "Dispose" means to discharge, deposit, inject, dump,or place any hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 11/23/98 Page 22 DRAFT 84-63.414 "Equipment." "Equipment" means pipes, pumps, vessels and other similar types of apparatus. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.416 "Facility." "Facility" means a group of buildings, structures, or units with the same purpose on contiguous parcels (including parcels separated by a right-of--way, as defined in section 1002-2.002 of this Code)under common ownership or control. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.418 "Finished Product"means a material which can be sold to market as a commodity. 84-63.44520 "Hazardous material." "Hazardous material" means any material that, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics, poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment, and includes any material that is listed in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Section 172. 101 (Hazardous Materials Table), as amended from time to time. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.42922 "Hazardous waste." "Hazardous waste" means any substance which is regulated as a hazardous waste by the California Department of Health Services under 22 California Administrative Code, Division 4, Chapter 30, or defined as a hazardous waste under Health&Safety Code section 25117, generally as follows: (a) "Hazardous waste" means either of the following: (1) A waste, or combination of wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical,chemical, or infectious characteristic may either: (A) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness. (B) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or environment when improperly treated, stored,transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. (2)A waste which meets any of the criteria for the identification of a hazardous waste adapted by the State Department of Toxic Substance Control pursuant to the Health& Safety Code section 2514 1. (b) "Hazardous waste" includes, but is not limited to, federal Resource Conservation and Recover Act("RCRA")hazardous waste, extremely hazardous waste and acutely hazardous waste. (Orris. 98 § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) 11/23/98 Page 23 __ s ; DRAFT 84..63.424 "intermediate Product" means a material which requires further process treatment on-site or off-site to produce a finished product which can be sold as a commodity. 84-63.422426 "Manage." "Manage" means to generate, treat, store, transport, use or dispose of hazardous material or hazardous waste. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.428 "Process Unit" means a collection of interconnected vessels and a ui ment designed to arate,vurireact combine or otherwise chemically or Rhysically alter one or more feed m terials to produce one or more finished or intermediate productsgrid associated wastes defined blot or bounds limits. Far exam 1e a catalytic cracking it a hydrocracking eom lex etc. Pieces of a process unit such as um s com res or towers reactors vessels and other such e ui lent and appurtenances. do not constitute a oeess unit. 84-63A42430 "Project Description." "Project description" means a written description and explanation of the construction and operation of a development project. A'project description shall address all phases of and for the life of the project. The project description shall include the following information as well as any other information deemed necessary by the Community Development Director for the purpose of determining the hazard score: (a) A description of the facility location with respect to major freeways,and immediate neighbors,and the size(in square footage or acreage)of the property on which the facility is located. (b) An area map showing the facility in relationship to the surrounding;community; and (c) A description of all significant operations involving hazardous material and/or hazardous waste currently being managed, and/or proposed to be managed, including a brief general history of the facility. d A sW=@U of the baseline data for all five years and a Justification for the selection of the re resentative baseline Year of data used in the calculation of the hgMd score. The Community Development Director may waive the requirement of submitting any or all of the information required by paragraphs(a)through(ed), above. (Ords. 98-®§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84.63.4432 "Residential property". "Residential property" means all properties with a residential designation in the general plan.,including but not limited to the following: single family residential,multiple family residential, and mobile homes. (Ords. 98--§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 11./23/98 Page 24 DRAFT 84-63.43434 "Sensitive receptor." The term "sensitive receptor" includes schools, general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, licensed child day care facilities, and similarly less-mobile populations, and detention facilities including jails, youth camps and other locked facilities. These facilities have more than twelve people. For the purposes of this section, 'general acute care hospital" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Cade section 1250(a), "long term health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1418(a), and "child day care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1596.750. "School" means any school used for the purpose of the education of more than 12 children in kindergarten or any grades 1 to 12, inclusive. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.4346 "Store." "Store" means an act to contain hazardous waste or hazardous 1 material for any period of time in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste or hazardous material. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 86-100.) 84-63.43338 "Transport." "Transport" or"transportation" means an act to move hazardous waste or hazardous material by truck, rail,sly-marine vessel or pipeline. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.6 Applicability 84-63.602 Applicability. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person proposing a development project which might otherwise be allowed in any zoning district shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. develemRent (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20,86-100.) 84-63.604 Exemptions. The following projects and structures are exempt from the provisions of this chapter: (a) Any project built solely to comply with federal, state, regional or local agency enforcement orders under a compliance time schedule that precludes timely review under this chapter. This section is primarily intended to allow exemptions for compliance with laws, regulations,rules, or administrative or judicial orders such as nuisance abatement orders or other short-term or immediately necessary actions. This section is not intended to allow automatic exemptions for projects being undertaken to comply with changed federal, state,regional or local laws. A facility claiming an exemption under this section must file a copy of the enforcement order and proposed project description within thirty (30)days of receipt of the order. 11/23/98 Page 25 f 15RAFT (b) If any building, structure, or facility is destroyed or damaged by disasters such as earthquakes, floods, offsite fires, or an act of god or the public enemy, the facility may be rebuilt under the following conditions: (1) The rebuilt project is used for the same purpose as the destroyed damaged project; (2) The rebuilt project complies with all environmental regulations in effect at the time of rebuilding, including Best Available Control Technology(SACT)or at least the same level of control that previously existed, whichever provides the greater level of protection to the public; (3) The rebuilt project does not have a higher hazard score than the destroyed or damaged project(both rebuilt and destroyed or damaged project to be scored as if they are new); (4) The hazard category of chemicals used in the rebuilt project is not greater than used by the destroyed or damaged project; (5) Construction is commenced within one year unless an extension is granted by the Community Development Director; (6) The rebuilt project is at least 340 feet away from the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor and no closer to the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor than the destroyed or damaged project; and (7) The rebuilt project will not manage Hazard Category A materials in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project, will not manage hazardous wastes in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project, will not manage Hazard Category B materials in quantities greater than 10%more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project,and will not manage Hazard Category C materials in quantities greater than 10%more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project. (c) A development project in which both the size,as defined in section 84-63.1012 and the monthly transportation quantity are less than: (1)for Hazard Category C materials -4400 tons (2)for Hazard Category B materials- 5 tons (3)for Hazard Category A materials -the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials List(Appendix A to 40 CRR Chapter I, Subchapter J, Part 355, as amended from time to time), or 500 pounds, whichever is less. (Ords. 98-_. § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-144.) Article 84-63.8 Standards and Procedures 84-63.802 Application for Applicability Determination; Exemption. Any person proposing a development project which may be used to manage hazardous waste or hazardous material shall apply to the Community Development Director for review and a determination 11/23/48 Page 26 .11.1.1. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ..........._....11.1.1. _ .. ......................... __....... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... __. .11.11 ......... . ........ DRAFT whether a land use permit may be required under Article 84-63.10 or whether the project is exempt under section 84-63.604(x)or(b)or 84-63.606. Projects exempt under section 8463.604(c) are not required to submit an application pursuant to this section. If the hazard score of a project is 69 or less and the project does not increase the amount of hazardous waste or hazardous material managed as compared to the baseline of the last three years, a determination of non-coverage and an application therefor are not required. The application shall include all information necessary to complete and!verify the hazard score of the project, such as chemical identification, distances to nearest receptors,aff4 transportation routes.,and a summary of the five year baseline data. The application shall be accompanied by all fees established by the Board of Supervisors. (Orris. 98 § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 90-92, 86-100.) 84-63.844 Application, Review, Determination. No later than ten calendar days after receipt of an application, or the submittal of additional information,the Community Development Director shall inform the applicant in writing that the application is complete or shall inform the applicant what additional information is required. Within twenty calendar days of the application being deemed complete,the Community Development Director shall issue a written determination of non-coverage pursuant to section 84-63.806, an exemption pursuant to section 84-63.604 (a) or(b), or a determination that a land use permit is required pursuant to section 84-63.1002. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92.) 84-63.806 Determination of non-coverage. Upon determining that a proposed project has a hazard score up to and including 79 or that the project is exempt pursuant to section 84- 63.604,the Community Development Director shall issue a determination of non-coverage or exemption. A determination of non-coverage for projects with a hazard score between 70 and 79, inclusive,.means that the project is not subject to the requirements of article 84-63.10,but is subject to sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. Projects with a hazard score below 69 and projects which are exempt pursuant to sections 84-63.604 are not subject to the requirements of sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.808 Determinations-Public Notice. All determinations of non-coverage made pursuant to section 84-63.806 shall be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator within ten calendar days of issuance of the determination. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20, 91-49, 90-92, 86100.) 84-63.810 Determinations -Further Public Notice. For projects with a point assignment between 70 and 79, inclusive, within five working days of issuing a determination of non-coverage,the Community Development Director shall mail notice on the date of the determination to all organizations and individuals who have previously submitted a written request for such notice. The Community Development Director shall publish a four-inch by six inch advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation within ten calendar days of issuing a determination of non-coverage. The notices required by this section shall state the name of the 11/23/98 Page 27 .. I ` DRAFT applicant, briefly describe the project, provide the names and phone numbers of a representative of the Community Development Department and a representative of the applicant who will be available to answer questions about the project, and shall state the date by which an appeal must be filed. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 90-92.) 84-63.81.2 Appeals. Any appeal of a determination of non-coverage shall be filed within ten calendar days of the date the determination is listed on the Zoning Administrator's agenda or ten calendar days from the date of publication pursuant to section 84-63.810,whichever provides the longer period of appeal. Appeals from a determination of non-coverage shall be heard by the Board of Supervisors. Except as expressly provided in this section, appeals from all decisions and determinations made pursuant to this chapter shall be governed by the land use permit provisions of article 26-2.24 and are subject to the provisions of article 26-2.30. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.10 Land Use Permits-When Required 84-63.1002 Hazard Score; Permit Required. Unless otherwise exempt from the requirements of this chapter, a land use permit shall be required for a development project proposed for the management of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste if.any of the following aptly; faJ_the development project obtains a hazard score of 80 or more pursuant to the formula set forth in section 8463.1004;; or 02) for hgZard tate o A materials the develop merit ro'ect stores twice theuan i s cified as the T reshold Plannina,Quantilyon the Extremely Hazardous Materials List A eridx A of 40 Code of Federal Re Mations Ch ter I Subcha ter J P 3 55 as amended from time to time or 2000 pounds whichever is less,or c forhaz d category A or B materials the develo Ment proigct will result in a new rocess units unless the _cess unit complies 'th Section 84-63.1404 d 1 throu h 6 -Credit for reductions or ro'ects to be closed. Modifications to an existin rocess unit does not constitute a new 12rocess unit:; or d for hggKd category B materials any development pLojeqt that has a fill to the MgNimum ca ac of 40 000 tons or more unless the develo mens ro'ect�corn lies with Section 84-63.1004 d 1 through 6 -Credit for reductions.gr projects to be.closed. 11/23/98 Page 28 i j KRAFT subject to the provisions of this article. (Ards. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1004 hazard Scare. (a) Formula. The hazard score of a proposed development project shall be determined pursuant to the following formula: [(T+ C +P) x H] +D +A; where the following symbols have the following designations: "T" refers to the point assignment for "Transportation Risk"; "D" refers to the point assignment for "Community Risk- Distance from Receptor"; "C" refers to the point assignment for "Community Risk- Type of Receptor"; "A" refers to the point assignment for "facility Risk- Size of Project-Total Amount"; "P" refers to the point assignment for "facility Risk- Size of Project-Percent Change"; and "H" refers to the point assignment for"Hazard Category of Material or Waste. (b) Project Hazard Score. If more than one category of hazardous material or hazardous waste is used.,the formula set forth in this section will be used to calculate a separate score for each material category. The material hazard category which results in the highest hazard score- for the project will be used. (kc) Point Assignment. The factors set forth in subdivision(a), above, shall have the following point assignments: TRANSPORTATION RISK(T) POINT Trunk-residential/commercial 10 (>25% increase or new) Truck -residential/commercial 9 (>5 - 25 % increase) Truck- Industrial (>25%increase or new) 8 Truck- Industrial (>5 - 25%increase) 7 Rail - (>25%increase or new) 6 11/23/98 Page 29 .....-.-..- - II bRAFT Rail - (>5 - 25% increase) 5 94iP-Marine'Vessel- (>5% increase) 3 Pipeline- (>5% increase) 1 0 - 5% increase 0 COMMUNITY RISK Distance of project from receptor(D): 0-300 feet 30 >300 -400 feet 29 >400 - 550 feet 28 >550 - 700 feet 27 >700 - 900 feet 26 >900 - 1200 feet 25 >1200 - 1500 feet 24 >1500- 1800 feet 23 >1800 - 2100 feet 22 >2100-2500 feet 21 >2500 - 2800 feet 20 >2800 - 3200 feet 19 >3200 - 3500 feet 18 >3500 - 3800 feet 17 >3800- 4000 feet 16 >4000 -4200 feet 15 11/23/98 Page 30 __ .. . . _ DRAFT >4200 -4500 feet 14 >4500 - 4800 feet 13 >4800 - 5400 feet 12 >5400 - 5700 feet 11 >5700 - 6000 feet 10 >6000 - 6500 feet g >6500 -7300 feet 8 >7300 - 8000 feet 7 >8000 - 8600 feet 6 >8600 - 10,000 feet 5 >10,000 - 11,000 feet 4 >11,000 - 12,500 feet 3 >12,500- 14,000 feet 2 >14,000 - 16,004-15,840 feet 1 Type of receptor(C): Sensitive(Receptor 7 Residential Property 5 Commercial Property 4 FACILITY.RISK: SIZE OF PROJECT Total Amount of Change,tons (Conversion to tons; 1 ton=2000 pounds)(A): 11/23/98 Page 31 .. .;.. .... l GRAFT >40,000 30 >32,000 - 40,000 29 > 18,000- 32,000 28 >10,000 - 18,000 27 >6,000 - 10,000 26 >4,000 -6,000 25 >2,100 -4,000 24 >1,200 - 2,100 23 >750 - 1,200 22 >400 - 750 21 >200-400 20 >150 - 200 19 >90 -150 18 >50 - 90 17 >30 - 50 16 >20 - 30 15 >10-20 14 >6- 10 13 >4 - 6 12 >2-4 11 >1 -2 10 >0.8 - 1 9 >0.5 - 0.8 8 11/23/18 Page 32 .-.-.-.-.-.- ..... »»» I GRAFT >0.35 - 0.5 7 >0.25 - 0.35 6 >0.20 - 0.25 5 >0. 18 -0.20 4 >0. 14 - 0.18 3 >0. 12 - 0.14 2 >0. 10 - 0. 12 1 no change (0. 10 or less) 0 Percent Change (P) New 6 >200% 5 >100% - 200% 4 >50%- 100% 3 >10%-50010 2 >1% - 10% 1 0%-1% 0 HAZARD CATEGORY OF MATERIAL (H) Category A 5 Category B 3 Category C 1 11/23/98 Page 33 ...... 'I DRAFT (ed) Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. A development project that would have a hazard score of 80 or more as determined by the formula in this section shall be entitled to a reduction credit for project closures and/or reductions in accordance with the criteria set forth in this subdivision. Reduction credit shall be given if the Community Development Director determines that the applicant will concurrently close another project or reduce its operations and finds that all of the following criteria are met. (1) The project to be closed or reduced is in the same facility in which the development project is proposed. (2) The project to be closed or reduced is currently in operation and has been in operation for at least three years prior to the date of application, during which period the production schedule has been reflective of a normal production schedule; (3) The project to be closed or reduced is the direct result of the proposed development project; (4) The project to be closed or reduced has a higher hazard score than the proposed development project; (5) The hazard category of the material or waste in the development project will be no greater than the hazard category of the material or waste in the project to be closed or reduced; and (6) The development project will be more than 340 feet from the property line of the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor. The hazard score for the project to be closed shall also be determined by the formula set forth in subdivisions(a) and(b) of this section and pursuant to the provisions of this article. An determining the hazard score for the project to be closed or reduced, said project shall be deemed a new project. The hazard score of the development project shall be subtracted from the hazard score of the project to be closed or reduced. The resulting difference will then be subtracted from the hazard score of the development project to obtain a hazard score adjusted for the closure or reduction. The adjusted hazard score shall be the basis for determining whether a land use permit shall be required under this chapter. A determination by the Community Development Director that a project is not subject to the land use permit requirement of this chapter as a result of credit afforded for a project closure or reduction shall be reported to the Zoning Administrator pursuant to section 84-63.808 and shall be subject to the public notification requirements set forth in section 84-63.810. (de) Closure, reduction required. Projects proposed for closure or reduction for which closure or reduction credit was afforded under this section shall be closed or reduced as proposed within one year of completion of the development project. This subdivision(dg)applies only in cases where a land use permit would have been required but for the closure or reduction credit afforded under this section. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 11/23/98 Page 34 ... bRAFT 84-63.1006 Determination of Transportation Risk. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated based upon planned total quantities of materials in a hazard category, measured in terms of tons per year for each hazard category proposed. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated for each mode of transportation proportionally within a single hazard category. That transportation point assignment shall be compared by hazard category with the total amount of material in the hazard category transported during the baseline period in order to obtain the percent change in section 8463.1004(b), Transportation Risk. For purposes of determining whether truck transportation is through residential/commercial or industrial areas, the shortest legal route from the closest two-lane(or larger)freeway shall be considered. If the route used in the County does not traverse a two-lane (or larger) freeway, the entire route shall be considered. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1008 Determination of Community Risk-Distance to Receptor. "Distance to Receptor" shall be the shortest distance between an exterior wall or other part of the development project and the property line of the residential property, commercial property or the sensitive receptor used to determine the hazard score of a development project. (Ards. 98-- § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1010 Determination of Community Risk-Type of Receptor. A hazard score shall be developed for each type of receptor(residential property,commercial property and sensitive receptor)within three miles of the development project based upon the distance of the parcel of each type of receptor that is closest to the development project. The receptor that produces the highest hazard score shall be used to determine the hazard score of the development project. Receptors more than three miles from a development project shall not be considered. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1012 Determination of Project Risk-Size. The size of a development project shall be measured in terms of tons of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste stored as a result of the development project,based upon the fill-to-the-maximum capacity of the development project, including amounts stored in tanks;reactors;columns;process lines; tank cars,tank trucks or rail cars when connected to process equipment; or any other receptacle used for the containment of hazardous materials and/or hazardous wastes. The amount of material in hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project will be used to determine the total amount of change. If more than one category of hazardous material is used, the amounts of materials (A, B, or C) shall be used with the respective hazard category in the formula in section 84-63.1.004. The specific gravity of hazardous materials or hazardous wastes may be required to calculate the number of tans(or pounds)of hazardous materials and/or hazardous waste managed at the development project. The standard of 2000 pounds equaling one(1)ton shall be used. 11/23/98 Page 35 ' DRAFT The point assignment for storage of containerized material in buildings, such as labs or warehouses, shall be based upon the maximum anticipated amount of materials for each hazard category as a result of the development project. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20) 8463.1014 Determination of Project Risk-Percent Change. The percent change of a hazard category shall be determined by comparing the amounts of materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project to the total amount of all materials for the respective hazard categories A,B, or C handled at the site from the baseline period. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1016 Determination of Hazard Category. (a)Method of Determination. The hazard category of a material or waste shall be determined pursuant to this section. (1) The primary method of determining the material hazard category of a hazardous waste or material shall be by reference to the Winter 1994 version of the U.S. Department of Transportation("D.O.T.") Code of Federal Regulations,Title 49(1149 CFR"), Section 172. 101,Hazardous Materials Table." From columns(3)and(5),extract the "Hazard Class or Division" and "Packing Group" information,then proceed to 49 CFR 173.2 to determine the "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision(c)of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. 1f a material is listed in 49 CFR 172. 101 more than once,the rating that results in the highest hazard category shall be used. The hazard category of a mixture is determined according to its common name as defined in Title 49. (2) Where a hazardous material,er---waste.,or mixture is not referenced in 49 CFR 172. 101,and the hazard category cannot be determined using the primary method, refer to the manufacturer's MSDS for the D.O.T. "Hazard Class or Division," "Packing Group" and"Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision(c)of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A,B or C. (3) Where the preceding methods are not successful,the Contra Costa County Health Services Director or his designee shall be responsible for determining a material's hazard category. (4) Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth above, materials with the word"poison" in column(6) of 49 CFR 172. 101,Methyl chloride, and the metals Antimony, Mercury, Lead, Arsenic,Thallium.and Cadmium and their compounds, shall be Hazard Category A materials,and denatured alcohol and methanol shall be Hazard Category B materials for purposes of this chapter. (b) Exclusions. Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth in subdivision(a),above,Hot Coke, Hot Coal Briquettes, and materials not regulated by D.O.T. or which have no D.O.T. Hazard Class or Division are not regulated by this chapter. (c)Lazard Categories. 11/23/98 Page 36 i DRAFT Hazzard Category A Materials I. Forbidden Materials As referenced in 49 CFR 173.21 and 173.54. I1. Explosives and Blasting Agents Class 1, as defined in 49 CFR 173.50(b)(1) through 173.50(b)(6). III. Reactive Materials A. Air Reactive Materials -Class 4, Division 4.2 as defined in 49 CFR173.124(b)(1) and(2). B. 'Suter Reactive Materials- Class 4, Division 4.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(c). C. Organic Peroxides - Class 5, Division 5.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173,128. IV. Radioactive Materials Class 7 as defined in 49 CFR 173.403(y). V. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group I Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group I is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(I). VI. Poisons,D.O.T. A. Poisons, Class 6, Division 6.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.133 (applies to all hazard zones). B. Infectious Substances, Class 6, Division 6.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.134. VII. Poison Gas Class 2, Division 2.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(c). Lazard Cate ory B Materials VIII. Flammable Liquids Class 3 Packing Groups I and 11 as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(a). 11/23/98 Page 37 x CRAFT IX Flammable Solids Class 4, Division 4.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(a). X. Oxidizers,D.O.T. Packing Group II Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group 11 is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(ii). XI. Flammable Gases Class 2, Division 2.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(x). XII. Corrosives, D.O.T. Packing Group I or II Class 8 Packing Groups I or II as defined in 49 CFR 173.136(a) and 173.137(a) and(b). Hazard Category C Materials XIII. Non-flammable Compressed Gases Class 2, Division 2.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(b). XIV. Combustible Liquids Class 3 Packing Group III as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(b). XV. .Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials Class 9 as defined in 49 CFR 173.155. XVI. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group III Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group III is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(iii). XVII. Corrosives D.O.T. Packing Group III Class 8 Packing Group III as defined in CFR 49 173.136(x)and 173.137 (c). (Orris. 98--§5, 96-50, 96-20.) Article 84-63.12 11/23/98 Page 38 _ _ x^KRAFT Land Use and Variance Permits 84-63-1202 Granting. An applicant for a land use permit shall submit a project description. Land use permits required under this chapter may be granted in accordance with the provisions of chapters 26-2 and 82-6. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) Article 84-63.14 Offsite Hazardous Waste Facility Compliance With County Hazardous Waste Management Plan 84-63.1402 Authority. This article is enacted pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 25135.4 and 25135.7, concerning the siting of offsite hazardous waste facilities. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73.) 84-63.1404 Definitions. (a) General. Unless otherwise specified in this section or indicated by the context,the terms used in this article have the meanings ascribed to them in Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.5 (§ 25100 et seq.). (b) "County Hazardous Waste Management Plan" means the county hazardous waste management plan adopted by the Board of Supervisors on August 29, 1989 and amended by the Board of Supervisors on January 30, 1990,approved by a majority of the cities',within the county which contain a majority of the population of the incorporated area,and approved by the State Department of Health Services on February 28, 1990,as said plan is amended from time to time. (c) "Hazardous waste facility" means all contiguous land and structures,other appurtenances, and improvements on the land used for the treatment,transfer, storage,resource recovery, disposal, or recycling of hazardous waste. A hazardous waste facility may consist of one or more treatment,transfer, storage, resource recovery,disposal,or recycling hazardous waste management units, or combinations of these units. (d) "Offsite hazardous waste facility" means a hazardous waste facility at which either or both of the following occur: (1) Hazardous waste that is produced offsite is treated,transferred, Mored,disposed or recycled. (2) Hazardous waste that is produced onsite is treated,transferred, stored, disposed or recycled and the hazardous waste facility is not owned by, leased to or ander the control of the producer of the hazardous waste. Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-20, 96-50, 90-73.) 84-63.1406 County Hazardous Waste Management. All land use permit, variance or other land use entitlement granted for the operation or expansion of an offsite hazardous waste facility shall be consistent with the portions of the County Hazardous'Waste Management Plan 11123/98 Page 39 ­DRAFT which identify siting criteria,siting principles or other policies applicable to hazardous waste facilities. Before granting the application,the division of the planning agency hearing the matter initially or on appeal shall find that the application complies with the applicable siting criteria, siting principles and other policies identified in the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan, and that the proposed offsite hazardous waste facility is consistent with the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73; Health& Safety Code, §§ 25135.4. 25135.'x.) 84-63.1408 Exclusion. The requirements of this article do not apply to projects which are exempt projects under section 84-63.604. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50,96-20, 90-73.) SECTION V. SEVERABILITY. This ordinance shall be construed to achieve its purpose and preserve its validity. If any provision or clause of this ordinance or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the ordinance are declared to be severable and are intended to have independent validity. SECTION VI. PREEMPTION. Nothing in this ordinance is intended, and nor shill it be deemed,to excuse or prevent compliance with any state or federal law. If any provision of this ordinance, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found by,'<a court of competent jurisdiction to be preempted by any applicable state or federal law,the Board of Supervisors declares that its intent(1) that such provision be severable from the remainder of the ordinance, and(2)that the remainder of the ordinance be given effect in accordance with the provisions of Section I of this ordinance. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between this ordinance and applicable federal or state statutes or regulations,the federal or state requirements shall control. SECTION VI. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance becomes effective 30 days after passage, and within 15 days after passage shall be published once with the names of the Supervisors voting for and against it in the CONTRA COSTA TIMES, a newspaper published in this County. PASSED on by the following vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTEST: Phil Batchelor, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and County Administrator 11/23/98 Page 40 a - - RAFT By: Deputy Chair [SEAL] 11/23/98 Page 41 f .: ......... «:: REPORT TO CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ORDINANCE REVIEW PROJECT PREPARED BY RAY E. WITTER REW CONSULTANTS, TNC. ST. LOUIS, MO TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. Scope of Work B. Methodology II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Good Neighbor Ordinance III. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDINANCES A. Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Good Neighbor Ordinance IV. REVIEW OF OTHER ORDINANCES A. Safe Communities Ordinance B. Supervisor Ulkema' s proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance V. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS A. Comparisons with Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Review of point score with Midwest refineries C. Conclusions D. Recommendations s ORDINANCE REVIEW PROJECT I. INTRODUCTION A. Scope of Work Review the Industrial Safety Ordinance dated August 11 , 1998 and the existing Ordinance 96-50 focusing on: o technical aspects of addressing industrial safety o whether public and worker safety will be increased due to adoption of the ordinance o ability of industry to comply with ordinance requirements Provide comment on the Safe Communities Ordinance and Supervisor Ulkema" s proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Discuss with appropriate environmental, labor, and industry representatives their perspectives on the Industrial Safety Ordinance Consider concerns from citizens heard at public meetings regarding the issues of public and worker safety in the ordinance and industries ability to 'comply Prepare report and make brief presentation at the Board of Supervisors meeting on November 3, 1998 and be available to answer questions B. Methodology Review ordinances for. -New or expanded requirements from existing county safety ordinances -Determine relationship between new ordinances and current federal and state safety regulations -Attempt to compare these ordinances with ordinances of counties in other states with similar industries -Determine and evaluate the requirements of the ordinance relating to community and public right to know Meet, one on one, with representatives of environmental groups, labor organizations, industrial trade groups, and industries involved. Follow up on meetings with telephone calls and FAX communications Analyze the new requirements to determine whether o public and worker safety will be improved' o industry has ability to comply with ordinances Evaluate only those portions of land use ordinances that pertain to process safety Evaluate the resources and expertise of the County Health Services to monitor and audit the ordinances -1 _ II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Industrial Safety Ordinance overview This ordinance is on the cutting edge of providing improved worker and public safety at the local level and well ahead of the current federal and state safety requirements. It focuses on those safety management systems which are most necessary for improvement in worker and public safety. Specific areas of improved incident prevention measures: o Requires written safety plan submitted to the county o Requires adherence to national codes and standards and Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) o Extends the prevention program elements of the risk management program and emergency response program to all units in a covered facility o Requires root cause analysis for major chemical accidents or releases o Requires specific considerations of human factors o Establishes a time frame for implementation of Process Hazard Analysis action items Areas of county monitoring and auditing o Facilities must provide history for major chemical accidents or releases o Provides Health Services Department review of safety plans, auditing and plant inspection o Allows the Health Services Department to perform a root cause analysis at their discretion following a major chemical accident or release Community and public information o Provides public review of safety plans o Establishes ombudperson position o Establishes a Public Information Bank B. Ordinance 96-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance Overview The emphasis of this ordinance is on land use permits. It does not address the elements of a safety management system that are generally accepted as required for process safety improvement. It specifies requirements for Major Maintenance Projects, however, based on review of hazardous material incidents, there have been few, if any, major releases or incidents associated with major maintenance or turnaround projects. This conclusion is based on _2_ ? I Ordinance 96-50 - Good Neighbor Continued an analysis of two reports. First, the "Report on Hazardous Material Data Incidents, Notifications and Complaints in Contra Costa County 1989--199>6" of Level I incidents showed that process safety elements, such as mechanical integrity, procedural, and human systems during operation were the causes of these incidents. The second report "1997 Selected Facilities Incident List" dated January 15, 1998 for Level I and Level II incidents did not identify any incident relating to a major maintenance project. Provisions relating to safety o Establishes definitions of Serious Incident, Major Incident, and Major Maintenance Projects, based on a shutdown of more than two weeks and costing $1 ,000, 000 or more. However, there have been questions regarding specifically what is included in the $1 million as well as what is included in the 2 weeks shutdown. o Establishes Public Safety Agreement between the county and a facility that meets certain requirements o Provides for exemptions for projects or facilities meeting certain criteria County monitoring o Provides review of applications and notification to applicant by the Community Development Director o Determination of non-coverage to be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator Community and public information o Provides for public notice in newspaper and notices to interested organizations and individuals o Establishes procedure for appeals to be heard by the Board of Supervisors III. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDINANCES A. Industrial Safety Ordinance 450-8.004 - Purpose and Goals The ordinance focuses on imposing regulations which will result in improved safety management systems. OSHA, EPA, the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, American Petroleum Institute, and various consulting groups have concluded that the most effective way to improve process safety is to develop and implement key elements of process safety management systems. This is the basis for the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard and the prevention section of the EPA Risk Management Program. -3- 450-8. 004 Continued This ordinance builds on the OSHA and EPA base by requiring additional components of the process safety management systems. These include requirements for completion of action items from process hazard analyses, root cause analysis of major chemical accidents and releases, development of a written human factors program, and including additional operating units in facilities covered by the Federal and state risk management programs. These key elements focus on reducing releases and accidents in processes handling hazardous materials. 450-8.012 - Inspection This section allows the county access to any part of a Stationary Source covered by this ordinance and to supporting documentation pertaining to compliance with the ordinance. This ensures that the county will be able to determine any deficiencies that exist in the management systems of the stationary source. 450-8. 014 - Definitions (e) Industry Codes and Standards not only include the organizations listed in the ordinance, but also the broad spectrum of codes, standards, recommended practices, and guidelines considered as "Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices", commonly called RAGAGEP. These have been developed over many years to provide a criteria for design, installation, and inspection of process equipment. The process safety information element of the OSHA PSM Standard requires documentation of the codes, standards, and practices used in the design of facilities. Examples of RAGAGEP utilized in design are National Fire Protection Association publications on Venting of Deflagrations and Explosion Prevention Systems and American Institute of Chemical Engineers Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems. Examples used in mechanical integrity are American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice for Pressure Vessel Inspection and Inspection of Piping, Valves and Fittings. {f} It is recognized that no chemical process is totally without risk, but all chemical processes can be made safer by applying inherently safer concepts. These concepts include reduction of inventory of hazardous materials, substitution of a less hazardous material, process design improvements, facility siting, and process and procedural simplifications. The use of inherently safer concepts in process design and process hazard reviews will enhance overall risk management programs, both in reducing frequency of incidents and consequences of a potential release or accident. This is a key element in improving safety management systems. -4- 450-8. 1016 W- Stationary Source Safety Requirements (a) This section provides for additional processes to be covered that are not included in federal program 3 RMP. The result is that processes in Program 1 and 2 in a facility covered by RMP will be required to be in conformance with the elements in the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard and the prevention section of EPA RMP. This provision significantly broadens the number of processes covered by process safety management requirements. (b) This section requires a stationary source to develop a written human factors program within one year based on criteria listed in the section. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only regulation or ordinance requiring this 'depth of human factor considerations for chemical process safety. This requires inclusion of human factors in root cause analysis, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training in human factors, and management of change rather than only man-machine interface ergonomic issues. Employees and their representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program, ensuring that worker input is achieved. The program includes staffing, shiftwork, and overtime which includes scheduling of rotating shifts and; work practices. These issues can involve labor contract issues, human resources input, and employee needs, in addition to human factors issues. In addition, well-designed human systems can produce inherently safer plant designs and operating procedures. Human systems include: o appropriate training o design reviews o audits and inspections o error correction cycles Likewise, the equipment can be made inherently safer for human factors by: o making the operation of equipment easier', to understand o making it easier to do what is intended o limits on what be done to equipment This section provides a systematic approach to human error including techniques for human error analysis. (c) This section requires a root cause analysis for each Major Chemical Accident or Release. This procedure is much more rigorous than the requirement outlined in the OSHA PSM Standard the EPA RMP Rule, and the CalARP program regulations. It provides flexibility to allow the facility to select a recommended methodology from many that are available. Methodologies include Tap Root, Fishbone, Multiple Causal Factors, and others listed in the literature. This is a significant step forward in incident investigation. -5- I 450-8.0116 - Stationary Source Safety Requirements - Continued An accident investigation that only considers the initiating cause of an accident will help in preventing that particular accident in the future, but does not 'determine the underlying causes that could result in similar failures in different processes or units in the future. As an example, the cause might be listed as "operator error". This does not determine why the error occurred. it might be due to inadequate operating procedures, procedure difficult to understand, lack of procedures, insufficient training, inadequate equipment or piping design,', or lack of proper identification of controls, valves, or interlocks. Another example would be failure of a pressure relief valve to open at the desired pressure, causing a vessel rupture. This could be listed as "valve failure" without determining the cause of the failure. This might be due to pluggage of the valve seat, corrosion, spring failure, or other reasons. Without root cause analysis the failure may be repeated in the future as the deficiency in the process safety management system has not been properly identified and addressed. The above examples might require a change in developing operating procedures to ensure operator understanding, revised training programs, or improved equipment identification. The valve failure might be the result of incorrect materials of construction, poor installation, need of rupture disc under relief valve to prevent pluggage, or long interval between valve inspections. By identifying causes and revising safety management systems, both worker and public safety will be enhanced. (d) This section requires that process hazard analyses be conducted on both Program 3 RMP processes and those covered processes not included in federal program level 3. These process hazard analyses shall be conducted within 1 year of the effective date of this ordinance and no later than the submittal date of the Safety Plan. Previously completed process hazard analyses complying with state requirements are acceptable. This is a marked improvement as it now requires a process hazard analysis on all covered processes in a facility, not just those in program level 3. The required use of considering inherently safer systems concepts will result in improved mitigation of potential releases and a reduction of incidents involving releases of hazardous chemicals. By incorporating inherently safer design concepts into existing safety and process hazard reviews a facility will improve the effectiveness of hazard reviews in reducing risk. Emphasis on inherently safer systems will promote an awareness among engineers, chemists, and managers. This heightened awareness will encourage the application of inherently safer principles as part of the normal, everyday work process, instead of something that is only considered at safety review meetings. -6_ I 450-8. 016 -- Stationary Source Safety Requirements - Continued The importance of incorporating inherently safer systems concepts into the process hazard analysis procedure cannot be over emphasized. Experience with inherent safety reviews indicates that frequently equipment can be eliminated thus reducing the number of places where releases might occur. Another area of improvement from federal and state regulations is the time frame to complete safety action items identified in the process hazard review. Items not requiring a shutdown shall be completed within one year with the only exception being that the facility can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the county that such a schedule is not feasible. This might include long delivery items such as special alloy steel or scheduling fabrication of a major piece of equipment. These exceptions would be documented. All items requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround. These provisions ensure that action items are promptly addressed with documentation of closure. The county has the authority to inspect both the facility for compliance and the documentation to be certain all items have been completed as required. The requirements for inherently safer system considerations, inclusion of detailed human factor issues, and completion of safety action items within one year or by the next turnaround are all over and above current state and federal requirements. (e) This section requires a facility to report specific information concerning major chemical accidents or releases from June 11 1992 to the date of submittal of the Safety Plan. The section provides the criteria for reporting, including root causes. In addition, operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release or accident must be included. This will require the stationary source to provide documentation that the safety action items on the reports have had closure. These reports must be kept for five years as the incidents and the action items must be considered during the next process hazard analysis (A PHA is required every five years on covered processes) , or when a management of change review is required. 450-8.018 (a) This section ensures that Safety Plans submitted by stationary sources will be made available for public comment for 30 days. The county shall then schedule a public meeting on the Safety Plan after the 30 day period. (b) This section provides the authority for the county to conduct a safety inspection in the event of a major chemical accident or release and periodic audits of the safety program. -7- 450-8. 018 - Review, Audit, and Inspection (e) This section provides an appeal process to the County Board of Supervisors, which has the final decision with respect to the Safety Plan. This allows for a prompt, orderly appeal process. 450-8. 022 - Community Outreach The ordinance requires the county to hire an ombudsperson for hazardous materials program by December 31 , 1998. This person has been on board for some 5 months with :no cost to the county as the budget is fee based to industry. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in the county and should provide an effective voice in solving problems, investigating concerns and complaints, and in providing information about issues and procedures. 450-8.024 -- Public Information Bank This program is an unique approach at the county level of government. While use of electronic accessibility is in use by OSHA, EPA, and state agencies, this is an excellent step forward to provide this information at the local: level. This will probably require additional effort to provide information at additional locations. III. B 95--50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance 84-63. 202 Purpose The stated purpose is to promote health and safety of persons in the county by encouraging businesses involved in handling hazardous materials to consider factors which involve hazardous material, to consider factors which involve health and safety risks, and by requiring land use permits for certain projects. The scope of my review was to focus on the technical aspects of process safety, whether safety will be increased, and the ability of industry to comply with the ordinance requirements. Therefore, as major maintenance projects are considered both process safety and land use permit issues, these will be reviewed from the process safety point of view. The purpose does not provide guidance regarding aspects of process safety management that businesses are to address to improve and decrease the safety risks to residents and persons in the county. It is my understanding that some process safety procedures are included in sections of CEQA, without some degree of specificity it is difficult to evaluate the technical aspects of the ordinance. -8- __ 84-63.421 Definitions The definitions of "Serious Incident" and "Major Incident" focus on release of hazardous material that may have posed an imminent threat to the public health, the environment or property. It does not address worker safety other than persons being sent to the hospital. The relationship between process safety management and safety risks to the surrounding community is not addressed in the Purpose and Goals or in the Definitions. 84-63.425 Public Safety Agreement It is my understanding that the Public Safety Agreement was prepared to allow flexibility in developing agreements with various facilities that had different situations. However, it does not provide criteria for determining the process safety systems necessary to meet the requirements of the Public Safety Agreement. I was informed that no Public Safety Agreements have been requested, perhaps due to the lack of a criteria document. As an example, the Public Safety Agreement requires "a commitment to use best technology for safety improvements" which is vague and ill-defined. 84-63.602 - Applicability Both development projects and major maintenance projects are covered by this ordinance. It is difficult to determine the technical basis for including major maintenance projects as a review of releases and accidents indicates that none of the major releases or accidents occurred during turnaround operations. The data to substantiate this is given in the overview section of the Executive Summary of the Ordinance. 84-63. 604 Exemptions (b) 3 - Provides for exemption for a rebuilt project destroyed by disasters if the rebuilt project has' a hazard score, lower than 50% of the destroyed project. In instances such as these the rebuilding is normally accomplished by replacement in kind and it is improbable that any of these type of projects could achieve a 50% reduction. ( f) The exemption for emergency repairs is ambiguous as it does not define unexpected event. For example, ' a unit is taken down for a routine repair to unplug a pump. When the unit is opened up, it is discovered that there is not only one piece of refractory plugging the pump but an entire area needs replacement. This results in the column being down 15 days with $1 , 500, 000 repair costs. This would be an unexpected event, however, it is not clear if this the intent of the exemption. -9- Ordinance 96-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance - Continued 84-63. 806-8-10 Determinations - Public Notice These provisions provide for County review of projects to determine that a land use permit is required, or a written determination of non-coverage or an exception. This requires public notice to inform the community of the project and appeal procedure. 84-63.812 - Appeals Appeals that are filed shall be heard by the Board of Supervisors. IV. REVIEW OF OTHER ORDINANCES A. Safe Communities Ordinance This ordinance provides many common provisions relating to safety that are included in the Industrial Safety Ordinance. While there are some differences in language, the intent appears to be similar for: o PHA required for defined covered processes o Root cause analysis o Safety Plan coverage o County audits and inspections o Considerations of Industry Codes and Standards o HSD Authority to require program change o County enforcement, including provisions for misdemeanors o Public hearings and community input Differences in the Safe Communities and Industrial Safety Ordinance include: o Applicability-differences in definition of covered processes o Additional requirements for information submitted with RMP, such as process safety information and operating procedures o Human factor considerations are contained in the elements of the process safety management program o Plan contains requirements for contractor training not in other ordinances, including apprenticeship at an approved training center for each craft or equivalent certificate and annual skill training for journeymen at an approved training center. o Requirement that projects costing $100,040 or more by authorized by the County o Provides an annual grant of $50,000 for community outreach -10- B. Proposed ordinance submitted by Supervisor Uilkema This ordinance also provides many common provisions relating to safety that are included in the Industrial Safety ordinance. While the wording may be different, the intent appears to be similar for. o PHA coverage o Root cause analysis o County audits and inspections o HSD authority to require program to reduce risks o County enforcement provisions o Public hearings on development projects Differences in this proposal and the Industrial Safety ordinance include: o Proposal does not require safety plan o Proposes task force to develop Worker Training and Safety Ordinance o Proposal relies on federal Process Safety Management Standard provisions for Human Factors considerations V. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS A. Comparisons with Industrial Safety Ordinance Contacts were made to determine the existence of local safety ordinances in communities with heavy concentration of chemical and petro--chemical facilities in the mid-west, gulf coast, and the east coast. A representative sampling of communities indicated that there was no ordinance similar to the Industrial Safety Ordinance. There were provisions for boiler inspections, fire code requirements, and building code requirements, but no overall safety ordinance. Closest to this ordinance is the New Jersey Toxic Catastropic Prevention Act and the proposed ordinance expands on the scope of that act. B. Review of point score of midwest refinery projects Reviews of multi-million dollar safety projects for two refineries in the midwest (neither company has a ' facility in California) were used to develop point-scores for projects developed to reduce the potential for a release of hazardous chemicals to the atmosphere. In one case the facility was installing a spare vessel with auxiliaries to provide storage in the event to a rupture or leak of hydrofluoric acid in the existing tank. There was no increase in inventory, so the score should remain the same. However it could be interpreted that there is an ability to increase inventory, so the point score would be .increased anda land use permit would be required. This seems to defeat the purpose of the ordinance. In the second case the point score would not reflect the reduction in risk, although community safety would be improved. The refinery is installing a sulfur recovery unit to convert hydrogen sulfide to sulfur rather than transfer it by pipeline to an adjacent plant. The adjacent plant will receive credit for the point score reduction, however, the point score for the refinery will not be decreased. The evaluation indicates that the refinery would require a land use permit for this installation. C. Conclusions Industrial Safety ordinance The ordinance addresses those technical elements of a safety management program which are accepted by safety professionals as critical to the reduction of incidents: o Adherence to national codes, standards and Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (REGAGEP) in developing process safety information o Use of root cause analysis in investigating incidents o Development of a written human factors program o Concepts of inherently safer processes o Establishes specific time frame for PHA action items o Requires audits and review by local agency to ensure continued compliance with the ordinance The ordinance extends the process safety management requirements to all operating units in a covered facility, which will ensure consistency of application in a stationary source. Implementation of these elements of PSM will result in improved worker and public safety as these provisions are on the leading edge of local safety regulation. The stationary sources covered by this ordinance have the resources and expertise to meet the requirements and effectively implement the process safety management program. However, as this ordinance only applies to the unincorporated areas of the county, facilities in incorporated areas were not reviewed in this study. In my opinion, the county has the staff and expertise to monitor and audit the program. The staff has four degreed chemical engineers and one mechanical engineer wi>>th 5 to 35 years experience in safety and health activities in industry and government. This, with leadership in the Health Services Department, should provide the proper control of the program and improve the safety of both the public and workers. -12- Ordinance 95-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance This ordinance appears to apply to existing'' covered processes only when there is a major maintenance or turnaround situation. The procedure for obtaining a permit can result in delays of major maintenance shutdowns. Based on information received from various stakeholders, there is a belief that neither the refineries, workers, or the community are best served by a delay of maintenance projects, and I concur with this belief. As previously discussed, a review of previous incidents did not indicate any major release as a result of a turnaround. Therefore, this provision does not appear to enhance worker or public safety. D. Recommendations 1 . The County Health Services Department develop a criteria document outlining the requirements for a written human factors program. 2. 450-8.016 !(d) Process Hazard Analysis states that "the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source----" . This tends to imply that the source can select which safety action items are to be completed, which, is not the intent. Perhaps stating '"the Stationary Source shall resolve and document closure on actions identified by the process hazards analysis as follows--". This, or similar language would allow for closure based on criteria that the actions were not related to safety, a different action was deemed to be more effective, factual errors in developing the action, or the action item renderedobsolete by other process changes. 3. Two of the proposed ordinances discussed training as an element of process safety. One proposal only addressed contractor training programs while the second recommended that training be developed as a separate ordinance. Training for process safety includes supervisors, operators, plant maintenance personnel as well as contractors performing plant maintenance work, major maintenance projects, new construction, and specialty operations. It also requires qualifications for the trainers, development of training modules, and methods of determining that the participants understood the training. Based on the complexity of the element and the various groups that need to be involved in the development of an overall training program, it is suggested that training not be included in the proposed ordinances but rather be developed separately. -13- `h REFERENCES PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS Center for Chemical Process Safety (COPS) ( 1992) , Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition with Worked Examples, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Wagoner, R.I. , Hazards Analysis of Petroleum Systems (HAPS) : An Adaptation of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Technique, AREYE Corporation, Friendswood, TX 1988 INHERENT SAFETY SYSTEMS Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) ( 1996) , Inherently Safer Chemical Processes - a Life Cycle Approach, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Englund, S.M. ( 1993) , Process and Design Options for Inherently Safer Plants, Prevention and Control of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Gases, ed. V.M. Ftthenkis, 9-62, New York: Van. Nostrand Reinhold HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS Cemnter for Chemical Process Safety (COPS) ( 1994) , Guidelines for Preventing Human Error in Process Safety, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Lorenzo, D.K. ( 1990) , A Manager' s Guide to Reducing Human Errors: Improving Human Performance in the Chemical Industry, Washington, D.C. , Chemical Manufacturers Association ROOT CAUSE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) ( 1992) , Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, New York, American Istitute of Chemical Engineers TapRoot (TM) Incident Investigation System, Systems Improvement, Inc. , Suite 301 , 238 Peters Road, Knoxville, TN 37920 Multiple-Cause, Systems-Oriented Incident Investigation (MCSOII ) Rohm & Haas Texas Incorporated, P. 0. Box 672, Deer Park, TX 77536 Noy.ember 23, 199$ OMMUNITXES ORi .A, Lantra Costa Counjr. B tard of Su,pervis©rs .. B- tITER Admnistrative Bplding 651 .Pira Street Martinez; 0A. ,94553-1229: ativos Re Proposed'Amendments to Contra Costa County's Good Neighbor � Dear Board .of Supervisors: Communities.for a Better Environment "CBE" writes to urge the, B � Supervisors to reject the proposed amentlments to the ,tac+r�d Neighbor Ordinance .-which lower the threshold triggering environmental review for projects 'Inv lving ,:hazardous materials, ("proposedamendment").' . These proposed ordinance arrsendmerits pose potentialty ,sian.ificant adverse .impacts to the environment and the health. `of .Cfra Costa County , residents., Contra ,Coati County will "violate the California Environmental Quality Act (TEQA"), Pub:" .Resources Cade section 2100 et seq., and CEt A`s implementing Guidelines '("CEQA Guidelines" . Title 14-:of the California Code afl Regulations Section 1500 et seq.., if the County does -.not prepare an Environmental Impact 'Report (" RRI before considering the proposed amendiments. An.EI:R is required because there `is a fair argument that the '.proposed. amendments.. may have significant environ ehtal+ impact. . An 'I El R- must be prepared whenever substantial :evidence supports a' fair argiment that a proposal, may have a'.significant adverse impact on, the. envlronrnert#. ;; Laurel Heights' Improvement Assn vs. regents oV the-'Univ: " Of 'Calf.- (1993) 6 Cal.4th .1112, 1123; 26 ,Cal.Rptr.2d 231. A significant environmental impact exists' when '-there is .a' substantial or, potentia"Ily substantial adverse:change to the environment. Piab. Res. Code 0321060; 'f Gal. Code. Regs (31533.2. There is a,substarttlal adverse change to the 'environment if there :is a reasonable pability that the proposal '.will result in a si:gnificarit impact. No Cil Inc. v.. City:,of L.os Angeles, (1.974) 13 Cad. 68 83, fn. 16' 11 CRptr 34. Significant . Eri.virnnmental Impacts. The proposed .amendments will Dave :significant' .advsrse. environmental impacts: The; proposed-.amendments concerning;the scoring system used to determine when environmental review is conducted for:, development projects 504 HOWArd St e,et, Suiite,,506 .San t ranc.i cd, CA 941 06 '• (415) 243 ln'Sorithern Cdlifbrnia,605 W. Olympic Blvd:,Suite 850 • Lbs Angeles,IbA 90015 • {213)_,486-5114 Chlorine•Frege 100%post.,Consumer' .» involving hazardous material may pose significant health and environmental risks to residents throughout Contra Costa County. The existing Good Neighbor Ordinance, adopted in '" 199 , was specifically enacted to address the irreparable human and environmental injuries that resulted from unsafe and unsound maintenance, construction, expansions and other projects at oil refineries. Under the existing Good Neighbor Ordinance, proposed projects is exempt from environmental review if it has a hazard score of 59 or lower. In other words, a proposed project with a hazard score of 60 or higher undergoes an environmental review before any issuance of a land use permit. The proposed amendments seek to raise the hazard score' triggering environmental review to 80. The proposed amendments clearly weaken the ability of the pubic and governmental agencies to monitor and minimize harm to the environment caused by industrial facilitiesand thus, the proposed amendments will adversely impact the environment and public health. The residents of Contra Costa County live amidst serious environmental hazards. Contra Costa County industrial facilities have caused 53 major accidents between 1989 and July of 1997. Rising Risks to Refinery Communities: The Troubling Trend in Toxic Spills in Contra Costa County California 1989-1997, Communities for a Better Environment, et al. (July 1997). (Attached as Exhibit A). From January 1996 through July' 1997, Contra Costa County has experienced an average of one major industrial accident every 5 weeks. Id. Moreover, the San Francisco Bay area recently had its clean air status revoked by the United State Environmental Protection Agency. Thus, any new emissions of criteria pollutants in Contra Costa County must be considered significant.`, Chemical safety expert Fred Millar, Ph.d. has concluded that raising the hazard score triggering environmental review of new development projects from 60 to 80 would' result in some more hazardous projects being approved without the full review now provided under existing law. Even with the additions of the proposed "backstop" measures regarding increases in the most hazardous chemicals and "new" process units, some more dangerous could be approved under the new Industrial Safety Ordinance as written. For example a near completely new process unit built upon the remants of an existing unitcould escape the "new" unit backstop. Simply put the existing lower threshold for full reviewof 60 points is more protective of public/worker health and the environment. Therefore the adoption the Industrial Safety Ordinance with the proposed increased score of 80 points' with backstops is still less protective. - 2 - There is clearly a fair argument that the proposed amendments to the Good Neighbor Ordinance may have significant adverse environmental impacts. Even if there were contrary evidence that the proposed amendments would not cause significant environmental impacts, an EIR would still be necessary. See No Oil Inc., 13 Cal3d at 83. Therefore, Contra Costa County must prepare an EIR before making a determination about the proposed amendments. For all of the above reasons, CBE respectfully requests that the County reject the proposed amendments to the Good Neighbor Ordinance until an EIR has been prepared and circulated for public comment. Please' feel free to contact Beatrice Wong at (415) 243-8373, ext. 202 with any questions or concerns. Co dully, Beatrice Wong, Staff Attorney Richard T. Drury, Legal Director Denny Larson, Northern California Program Director Fred Millar, Chemical Safety Expert y COMMUNITIES FOR A In SF BF<TI`tR (415)=4 S� -73 ext.204 (415)243-8980 fax ENvII;(3MENT cbesfngc.org In LA. (213)486-5114 ext.201 DONALD,R. BRO WN ebela@ige org fax Executive Director ADVOCATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 5W Howard�SErec;-,State W,Sar Fran(:wo;-A 942£35 605 VV.plyfr0c- >,)s Angeles,('A W015 — 3— memo101398a.u0c CONTRA COSTA_ HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS FROM: LEW PASCAILLI SUBJECT: STAFF REPORT ON PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE DATE: 11/15/98 CC: This staff report addresses the direction given to the Contra. Costa Health Services (CCIE) Hazardous Materials Division Ombudsperson and the CCES Hazardous MaterialsDivision during the August 11, 1998 Board of Supervisors meeting. CCHS HAZARDOUS MATERLUS DTVISTON OMBUDSPERSON The OOHS Hazardous Materials Division Ohnbudsperson was directed to publicize and organize public hearings in the impacted communities and to provide the Board with an implementation plan for the hearings. The ombudsperson organized and conducted seven community meetings to allow the public the opportunity to ask questions,give their opinion,and share their concerns. Five of the community workshops consisted of a presentation by a CCH representative followed by public comments. The Clyde and Pittsburg community workshops consisted of a presentation from CCI-S; presentations from labor, industry, and environmental group representatives; and public comments. Video and/or audio tapes from these meetings were forwarded to the independent consultants (i.e., Mark Scott and Jan'Taylor of the National Institute of Chemical Studies and Bary Witter of REZW Consulting) for consideration during their evaluations of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The dates and locations of the community meetings were as follows: • October 7, 1998 Rodeo Senior Citizens Center • October 14, 1998 W Martinez City Council Chambers • October 15, 1998-Crockett Community Center • October 21, 1998--Clyde Community Center • October 22, 1998-Pittsburg City Council Chambers • October 28, 1998-Pinole City Council Chambers • Ober 29, 1998-Hercules City Council:Chambers 1 1►rEmoI02398A.DOC: There were a total of approximately 300 attendees at the seven community workshops. Common concerns raised during the community workshops were addressed in the Question and. Answer document included in Appendix A.This document was distributed at the community workshops. CCHS HAZARDOUS MATERIALS DMSION The CCHS Hazardous Materials ]Division was directed to evaluate the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in the areas of public health, safety, and the environment. The Hazardous Materials Division was also directed to report to the board at the same time as the County Planning and Hazardous Materials Commissions submit their reports. CCHS evaluated the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance for its ability to prevent and mitigate accidental releases during all phases of operation (e.g., startup,emergency shutdown). Public health, safety, and the environment will benefit from prevention and mitigation of accidental releases. CCHS also evaluated the proposed. Industrial. Safety Ordinance for its ability to require land use permits for development projects that could significantly and adversely affect public health, sa gty, and the environment. Finally, CCB developed modifications to clarify and further strengthen the proposed ordinance. Prevention and Mitigation of Accidental Releases Programs,policies,and procedures developed and implemented to satisfy the following requirements of the proposed ordinance have the potential to reduce the probability and severity of accidental releases and to improve mitigation of accidental releases. • Risk Management Program Requirements - The stationary source must extend the following requirements to all processes during all phases of operations; Process Safety Information - information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substance, the technology of the process (e.g., process chemistry, an evaluation of the consequences of deviations), and the equipment in the process (e.g., relief system design, safety systems) must be maintained accurate and current. This information must also be made available to employees. Operating Procedures- Written operating procedures must be developed and implemented for each operating phase including but not limited to, emergency shutdown, normal shutdown,and startup fallowing a turnaround. These procedures must provide clear instruction for safely conducting the activities and roust address operating limits, safety and health considerations, and safety systems and their functions. The stationary source must also develop safe work practices such as lockoutltagout, confined space entry, and line or equipment opening These operating procedures must be reviewed as often as necessary to assure that they reflect current operating practices. They must be annually certified as current and accurate. Employee Participation - Employees must be consulted with on the conduct and development of the process hazard analysis (PHA) and on the development of all other elements of the risk management program. Employees must also be provided with access to PFWs and all other information required to be developed as part of the risk management program regulations. 2 C NiEmor41398A.ruoc Training - The stationary source must provide initial and refresher training to employees involved in operating a process. The training will emphasize specific safety and health hazards,emergency operations including shutdown,startup,and safe work practices. Mechanical Integrity - The mechanical integrity program requires stationary sources to develop procedures to meet the requirements of four basic categories. First, the stationary source must develop a program for quality assurance in the construction of new plants and equipment (e.g., proper installation of equipment, ensuring that design specifications are met). Second, the stationary source must develop written procedures for maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment.Third,the stationary source must develop a training program for employees involved in.maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment. Fourth, the stationary source must develop an inspection and testing program that follows recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (e.g., standards developed by the American Petroleum institute(APl or the Chemical Manufacturers Association(CMA)). Management of Change - The stationary source must develop and implement written procedures to manage changes to process chemicals, technology, equipment, and procedures. The procedures shall assure consideia tion of items including,but not limited to the impact of change on safety and health,and the technical basis for the proposed change. Pre-Startup Review - The stationary source must conduct pre-startup reviews for new sources and modified sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety information. The pre-startup review shall make specified confirmations including, but not limited to completion of training of each employee involved in operating a process. Compliance Audits - The stationary source must certify that they have evaluated compliance with the provisions of the risk management program regulations every three years. A report of the compliance audit must be developed and the two most recent audits retained. Incident Investigation-The stationary source shall investigate each incident that resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in, a catastrophic release of a regulated substance. A report must be developed,including but not limited to,the date of the incident a description of the incident,and the factors that contributed to the incident. Hot-Work Permits - The stationary source must implement applicable fireprevention and protection regi ureents and issue hot work permits for hot work operations. Contractors -- The stationary source must inform the contractors of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. The stationary source must ensure, through periodic evaluation of performance, that each contrast employee is trained in the work practices necessary to perform his or her job safely. The stationary source must also ensure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices. Emergency Response Program -- The stationary source must develop' an emergency response program that will depend upon whether the source intends on responding to incidents or depending upon local response agencies. Regardless of whether the source will respond or not,they must develop procedures for notifying and interfacing with public and local emergency response agencies. They must also ensure that they, and the public response agencies,have the adequate resources to respond to incidents. 3 } MEMo101398A.DOC OOHS personnel are responsible for conducting audit and inspections of the programs,policies, and procedures developed and implemented to satisfy the preceding requirements. CCHS is also responsible for developing, and making publicly available, a written audit report including required .modifications or additions to these programs. • Root Cause - The stationary source must conduct a root-cause analysis of all"major chemical accident or releases" as defined in the ordinance. A root-cause analysis is an in-depth incident investigation to identify the rudimentary cause(s) and contributing factors in an;incident. CCHS may elect to perform an independent root-cause analysis within 30 days of aMajor Chemical Accident or Release. The stationary source's cooperation in the OCHS root-cause analysis is required and defined in the proposed ordinance. • Human Factors Program-The stationary source must develop,and train their employees on, a written human factors program. The program will focus on the interaction or interface between employees and the process and attempt to identify and minimize those factors that can cause human error (e.g., poorly organized control boards, excessive overtime), Human factors will be included in process hazard analyses and incident investigations. • Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items - The stationary source must conduct a process hazard analysis (PHA) on all processes using an appropriate methodology. PHA's can be very detailed studies identifying the consequences caused by equipment failure,human error,etc. The PHA team also formulates recommendations to prevent, detect, or mitigate the cause or consequences. The existing federal and state regulation only requires that the stationary source assure that recommendations be resolved in a timely manner. The proposed ordinance defines "timely manner" to mean within one year unless a process shutdown in required.. If a process shutdown is required, the recommendation shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround. • Public Information-The stationary source must develop a Safety Plan that will be available for public review and comment for 30 days. C -iS shall schedule a public meeting on the Safety Plait following the 30-4 comment period. C CHS must formulate "final determinations" summarizing required modifications or additions following the public review of the Safety Plan and CCHS's review of the Safety Plan.The"final determinations" are public documents that can be appealed to the Board of Supervisors by any person who has submitted public comment on the Safety Plan. GCHS will also develop and make publicly available written audit reports and written incident reports. The proposed ordinance also provides for electronic availability of documents ents such as business plan inventories, emergency response plans, Risk Management Plans,Safety Plans,and Department incident reports. Land Use Permit Requirements Additionally,the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance includes a land use permit section intended to ensure that land use permits be obtained for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health,safety,and the environment. The proposed ordinance requires sources to obtain land use permits for development projects if the project is not otherwise exempt and,if any of the four conditions provided below is satisfied. Development projects satisfying at least one of these conditions should represent most, if not all, of the development projects that could significantly and adversely affect public health,safety,and the environment:. • Development project scoring 80 points or above(out of a possible 175 points)using the hazard score formula. NOTE. The proposed ordinance applies the hazard score and hazard score 4 mmoIOIMA.Doc formula developed by the Hazardous Materials Commission for inclusion in ordinance number 96-20. Refer to Question 4 of Appendix A for additional information regarding the hazard score selection process used by the Hazardous Materials Commission. • For hazard category A materials, the development project stores twice the quantity specified in the "Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ) on the Extremely Hazardous ''Substances List (Appendix A of 40 CFR t hpt. 1, Subchapter J Part 355)or 2000 pounds, whichever is less. Hazard category A materials are the most hazardous and include explosives, poisons, radio- active materials,spontaneously combustible material,materials that are dangerous when wet,the most hazardous oxidizers, and infectious substances. This now provision of the ordinance is more protective of worker and public health because it requires a land use permit for storing relatively small,quantities of Category A.materials regardless of hazard score. 'Projects storing less than twice the TPQ or 2000 pounds would be subject to hazard scoring per 84-63.1004 of the proposed ordinance. Projects handling less than 'CPQ or 500 pounds, whichever is less would be exempt per 84-63.604(c)(3)of the proposed ordinance. • For hazard category A or B materials, the development project will result in a new process unit(s) unless-the process unit complies with Section 84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6 - Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing process unit do not constitute a new process unit. Hazard category B materials are .materials such as certain corrosives and flammable liquids,gases, and solids. NOTE:One of the reasons cited for decreasing the hazard score required for obtaining land use permits for development projects from 80 to 60 (in ordinance number 96-50)was that the 80 point threshold would not have captured the Chevron Richmond Refinery Cleaner Fuels Project had it been in the unincorporated area of the county. This new provision of the ordinance would capture any new process, unless it complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.1004,handling a hazard category A or B material regardless of hazard score,and would have captured the Chevron Cleaner Fuels Project. • For hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with Section 84-63.1004(d) 1 through 6-Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. The main effect of this provision will be to require obtaining land use permits for large storage vessels handling flammable liquids';and flammable gases, unless the new vessel complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.1004. NOTE: Vessels storing less than 40,000 tons would be subject to hazard score per Section 84- 63.1004 of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Recommended Modifications to the Proposed Ordinance GC HS recommends the following modifications to the proposed Industrial. Safety Ordinance to clarify and further strengthen the requirements. Appendix B includes a redlined copy of the ordinance with the following modifications incorporated. • The summary should be revised to state that C UIIS can require changes in the Safety Plan and the Safety Program, We also suggest that"more stringent inspection and audit requirements" be replaced with "authorization of the City to expand audits and inspections to all units within the Stationary Source". 5 M EMO 10 t398A.DOC • Section 450-8.002(b) should be revised to replace "stationary source" with "facilities subject to the federal regulation". Stationary source is defined in this ordinance differently than in the federal Risk Management Program rule or the CaIARP program regulations. • Section 450-8.002(c) should be revised to reflect that the California Health and Safety Code adopted the federal Risk Management Program with certain state-specific amendments. Specifically, it should be revised to "..-to implement the federal EPA's Risk Management Program rule with certain state-specific amendments.". • Section 450-8.010 should be revised to limit the exemptions of this ordinance. - There should be no exemptions for stationary sources or CUB (at their discretion) to perform root cause analyses following an incident that meets the definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release. There should also be no exemptions for Accident history reporting. Specifically, (b) should be revised to "...provisions of this chapter except Sections 450-8.016(c) and(e),and 8.018(f)and(g). - The current proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance exempts storage tanks unless they contain chemicals included in the CaDW program. Storage tanks storing regulated substances, as defined in the proposed ordinance, should be included. Additionally, storage tanks containing combustible liquids should also be included. Specifically,(b)(1) should be revised to "storage tanks containing a non-regulated substance,except for storage tanks that contain a material that meets the combustible liquid definition of 49 CFR 173.120(b)". - The current proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance exempts all drum storage regardless of chemical and volume. This is inconsistent with the existing CLW program regulations. Specifically(b)(2)should be revised to"drum storage of a non-regulated substance;less than 10,000 pounds of a Hazard Category B Material in a single location; and for a Hazard Category A material in a single location, less than the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials list (Appendix A to 40 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter J,Part 355,as amended from time to time)or 500 pounds,whichever is less". - Subsection (b)(3) should be revised to be consistent with the CkPARP program regulations that also exempt laboratories from threshold quantity determination if certain conditions are met~ Specifically, (b)(3) should be revised to "activities in process plant laboratories or laboratories that are under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3(ee) of 40 CFR This exemption does not apply to specialty chemical production; manufacture, processing, or use of substances in pilot plant scale operations; and activities conducted outside the laboratory". - A Subsection(b)(5) should be added to exempt hazardous waste storage already covered by existing regulations and legislation. Specifically, (b)(5) should read "any waste tanks, container or other devices subject to the federal and state hazardous waste laws Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RC RA), 40 CFR Chapter I, Subchapter I, commencing with Part 264, and the California Hazardous Waste Control Law, California Health and Safety Code,commencing;with Section 25100,and California Code of Regulations,Title 22, Division 4.5,Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous'waste." • Section 450-8.014 should be revised- 6 mEmoI01398A.boc - "Accidental Release" should be removed. Accidental Release is used in the human factors program to require that human factors be considered in incident investigations of "near hits". "the consideration of Manan systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for Accidental Releases of Regulated substances that could reasonably have had the potential to become a Major Chemical Accident or Release" This sentence must then be re-written as %or for an incident that could reasonably have resulted in a Major Chemical Accident or Release". Incident is a less restrictive term than release and includes excursions such as high temperature or high pressure. - The definition of"Major Chemical Accident or Release" should be expanded to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community Warning System guidelines regardless of the chemical released This provides C CHS the authority to conduct a root-cause analysis or incident investigation based on the effects of the incident not based solely on the chemical released. - The definition of "Major Chemical Accident or Release" should specifically state that the Level 2 or Level 3 Incident determination is made by the Department. - The definition of"Major Chemical Accident or Release" should be revised to ensure that the onsite property damage is initiaUy estimated by the stationary source but the offsite Property damage will be initially estimated by appropriate agencies and compiled by the Department. The term "property damage" will also be expanded to explicitly include clean-up and restoration activities. Specifically, (g)(3) should be revised to "causes on and/or off-site property damage(including clean-up and restoration activities)initially estimated at$500,000 or more. On-site estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off-site estimates shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the Department.". - Add a definition of Safety Program:"the documentation,development, implementation, and integration of management systems by the Stationary Source to complywith the safety requirements set forth Section.450-8.016". • Section 450-8.016(a) should be revised to ensure that the Stationary Source complies with the safety requirements listed as"RMP Eements". • A subsection 450-8.016(b) should be inserted and include provisions for facilities that become stationary sources after the effective date of the ordinance. The provisions should be consistent with the CaLARP Program regulations. Specifically,subsection (b)(1) should include "A hu Uy that becomes a Stationary Source after the effective date of this ordinance shall submit a Safety Plait to the Department within three years of becoming a Stationary Source the complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection.(c) below. In addition, the. Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections(c)through(g) of this section and include a description of the mariner of compliance in the Safety Plan. (b)(2) A new covered process at an existing Stationary Source shall comply with Sections(c)through(g)prior to initial startup." • Section 450-8.016(a)'RMP-Elements- should be revised to state that the Safety Plan shall follow Chapters 6 and 7(dated,July 1, 1998) and Chapter 9 (dated November 2, 1998) of the guidance document. The titles for the RMP elements should also be revised to reflect the actual titles in 7 MEiM0101398A.UOC the CLARP program regulations (i.e., Pre Start-Up Reviews, Compliance Audits, Contractors, and Emergency Response Program) • Section 450-8.016(a)RMP Elements - should be revised to "Incident Investigation. The written summary of an incident investigation required by Section 2755.7 of the CaLW regulations shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting from the investigation are specific only to the process or equipment involved in the incident, or are applicable to other processes or equipment at the stationary source. The incident investigation shall be made available to the Department upon request." • Section 450-8.016{6} Henan Factors Program- should be revised to require OCHS to develop or adopt guidelines specifying the requirements of the Human Factors program. Guidelines are necessary to ensure that the requirement for a Human Factors program is applied consistently to all stationary sources. Also,the term"that could reasonably have had the potential to become" should be replaced with"that could reasonably have resulted in". • Section 450-8.016(b)(ii) Human Factors Program - should be revised to replace "Accidental Releases of Regulated Substances"with "an incident". Process excursions (e.gl, a>high pressure excursion in a reactor) may occur which do not result in a release but which do merit an investigation. • Section 450-8.016(c)Root rause Analysis-should be revised - Rename the subsection Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. - Include provisions for CSS to be updated on the progress of the Stationary Source's root cause analysis following a Major Chemical Accident or Release or a release of a regulated substance. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "Stationary Sources shall periodically update the Department on facts related to the release or incident,and the status of a Root Cause analysis conducted pursuant to this section, at meetings scheduled by the Department and the Stationary Source. To the maximum extent feasible,the Department and Stationary Source shall coordinate these meetings with other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source". - Include provisions for OCHS to review the final documentation for root causes analyses, including recommendations to be unplenxented to mitigate against the release reoccuring. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "The Stationary Source shall allow the Ueparu-nent to review the kraal Root Cause analysis report, including recommendations to be implemented to mitigate against the release or incident reoccuring". - Include provisions for the stationary source to submit a written summary of the root cause analysis to the department, within 30 days of completion of the root cause analysis. The written summary shall include a schedule for completion of the recommendations. Specifically, revise the initial paragraph to include "Within 30 days of completing a Root Cause analysis performed pursuant to this section, the Stationary Source shall submit a written summary of the Root Cause analysis to the Department that includes the recommendations to be implemented and a schedule for completion of the recommendations". - Include "root causes analysis or an incident investigation" dwoughout the Department's requirements. 'l his allows CCI-IS flexibility in conducting an appropriate analysis for the incident. 8 mFmo1O13"A.Doc • Section 450-8.016(d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items a Process Hazards Analysis should be replaced with Process Hazard Analysis throughout the ordinance. • Section 454-8.016(d) Process I-Iazard Analysis/Action Items - should be expanded to explicitly include the acceptable PHA methods (e.g.,What-If, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)). Also,expand the ordinance to specifically include the requirements of Title 8 Section 5189(e)(5) rather than reference the CaIARP program regulation. • Section 450-8.016(d) Process Hazard Analysis/Action Items - should be revised to require the stationary source to conduct seismic analyses on processes containing chemicals included in the CaIARP program regulations which have the potential for a worst-case release to reach a public receptor at the endpoints specified in the CalARP program regulations. • Section 450-8.016(e) Accident History - should be revised to require annual submission of an update of the accident history. Specifically, the section should be revised to "The stationary source shall annually submit an accident history report to the Department. The first annual report shall be due two years after the effective date of this ordinance, and subsequent reports shall be due on the anniversaries of the effective date of the ordinance." • Section 450-8.018 Review, Audit, and Inspection - should be revised to include the following clarifications and revisions: - Revise subsection(a)to explicitly identify the procedure and timeline for initial review of the Safety Plan for completeness prior to the comment period. Specifically,revise (a)to include "The Department shall.provide the Stationary Source with a written notice of deficiencies. The Stationary Source shall have 60 calendar days from receipt of the notification of deficiencies to make any corrections. The Stationary Source may request, in writing, a one time 30 calendar day extension to correct deficiencies. By the end of the 60 calendar days or any extension period., the stationary source shall resubmit the revised Safety Plan to the Department. After the Department determines that the Safety Plan is completed, the Department shall issue a public notice per the Department's Public Participation Policy- and... olicyand..." - Revise subsection (a) to extend the public comment period from 30 days to 45 days,to be consistent with the existing CalARP program.requirements. - Revise subsection (a) to allow flexibility in whether the public meeting will be held at the beginning or end of the comment period. Community members may revise or develop comments following the public meeting;therefore,it is important for the continent period to be open for some period following a public meeting. - Move subsection(d)to subsection(b)and revise it to include"Based upon the Department's review of an public comment on the Safety Plan or,following a safety inspection required by subsection (f, an incident inspection required by subsection , or an initial, audit required by subsection (e),...". .Also revise subsection (d) to reflect that the Preliminary Determination is a compilation of determinations that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program ate required. Include larsguage, taken from the Sections 2775.2(e),(f), (g), and (i) of the CalARP program regulations outlining the procedures and timelines for Preliminary and Final Determinations. 9 M£M0101398A.U0C Revise subsection (b) to include a second public comment period to be conducted on the preliminary determination which will include additions or modifications to the Safety Plan and the Safety Program. Move subsection (e) to (c) and revise the appeals process so that appear to the Board of Supervisors within 30 days of the Department's final determination are limited to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who raised therm. This may also require that a public hearing rather than a public meeting be held to ensure that all comments are documented. - Ensure that the Department shall be required to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 every 3 years as opposed to every 3-5 years as stated in the 8/11/98 version of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. - Include criteria, from Section 2775.2(6) of the C.aDkRP program regulations for audit prioritization (e.g., Accident history of the Stationary Source, Quantity of Regulated Substances present at the Stationary Source) County Counsel will be specifically asked to review sections 450-8.012 and 4503-8.018 of the proposed ordinance and add language, as necessary, to ensure that within 303 daps following a Major Chemical Accident or Release it is at the discretion of the Department when (within the 30 days)the safety inspection or incident safety inspection will commence. 10 mFmol01398A.DOC APPENDIX A mE moI01298.Doc DRAFT 10/29/98 CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETYORDINANCE? Below are answers for common issues raised during the community meetings. 1. How can the public participate in ensuring safety under the current'ordinance, and under the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? Both the existing 96-50 ordinance and the land use permit section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance are covered by CEQA. The risk management section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance may also be covered by CEQA. (The Community Development Department (CDD) Director is currently reviewing information submitted by CCIH.) There are numerous opportunities for public participation and appeals through the CEQA process, including but not limited to the following: - Initial determination of CEQA applicability is subject to appeal by members of the public - Proposed negative declarations or mitigated negative declarations shall be provided for a public review period of not less than 20 days - Members of the public can challenge the findings of the CEQA review to an appellant division within IO days of the decision" - Draft Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs) shall be provided for a public review period of 30 to 60 days - The County holds a public hearing on EIRs(not a state requirement) - The findings from negative declarations, mitigated negative declarations, and EIRs including the adoption or rejection of mitigation measures is subject to public review - The mitigation monitoring and reporting program for a mitigated negative declaration or EIR is presented during a public hearing The risk management section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance also includes the following opportunities for pubic participation and appeals regardless of whether CEQA applies or not: MEmolO1298.00c DRAFT 10/29/98 - A 30-day public review and comment period on the Safety Plan - A public meeting shall be held by the Department following the 30-day public comment period - Persons who commented on the Safety Plan can appeal the "final determination" of the Safety Plan to the Board of Supervisors within 30 days of issuance of the`final determination". Additional information is provided in Attachment A. 2. The proposed ordinance has some previsions about accidental chemic releases. Are releases to the air,water, and soil all covered by these previsions? Yes. The root cause analysis performed by the Stationary Source and by CCHS, inclusion in the Accident History, and a safety inspection to review and audit compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 are all'triggered by a Major Chemical Accident or Release. The definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release is shown below and is independent upon release medium (i.e., not restricted to air,water,or soil). Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that results in the release of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the fallowing criteria: (1) results in one or more fatalities; (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or more persons; (3) causes property damage(on and/or off-site) initially estimated by the Stationary Source at$500,000 or more; (4) meets the definition of a Level 3 or Level 2 Incident in the Community Warning System incident level classification system defined in the 9/27/97 county guideline for the Community Warning System; or (5) flammable vapor clouds of more than 5000 pounds. Additionally, the proposed ordinance extends the federal Risk Management Program prevention program elements and the emergency response program to all process units not otherwise covered under the federal program. The federal Disk Management program was developed in response to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The majority of chemicals covered by this regulation (and the California regulation which adopted the federal regulation with certain state-specific amendments) were chosen because of their toxicity and volatility, or flammability characteristics. These chemicals have the greatest potential to quickly get off-site and impact environmental and public receptors. However, process units do exist that use chemicals with relatively high-toxicity and low nmEmo101298.DOC DRAFT 10129/98 volatility characteristics. These chemicals are not going to form vapor clouds but they may be hazardous if released to mediums other than air (e.g., water). The proposed ordinance would extend the prevention program 'elements (e.g., mechanical integrity, training, management of change) and the emergency response program to those process units to prevent releases from occurring and to quickly mitigate releases that do occur. 3. Under the proposed ordinance, who performs the assessment of$500,000 property damage for the determination of a"Major chemical Accident or Release"? Section 450-8.014(g) of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance includes a definition of Major Chemical Accident or Release(which is provided in Question 2). Currently, the stationary source develops the initial estimate. CCHS will review the potential consequences of the assessment and recommend a revision to the proposed ordinance as appropriate. Also, the definition states property damage, but may need to specifically state that property damage includes clean- up and restoration activities. 4. Both the current and proposed ordinance rate certain proposed industrial projects with a"Hazard Scare". If a certain scare is reached,the facility is required to obtain a land use permit before it can proceed.. The current ordinance calls for a permit application at a score of 60 out of 180. The proposed ordinance calls for a permit at a scare of 80 out of 175. Does this ensure that, under the proposed ordinance, facilities with significant projects will be required to obtain land use permits? The Hazardous Materials Commission set the Hazard Score required to obtain a Land-Use Permit at 80 (out of maximum score of 175) following years of review and documented-evaluation. This review included scoring numerous projects, real and fictitious,to identify those projects that merit the review associated with obtaining a Land-Use Permit. The hazard score of 80 represents consideration of a number of factors including,but not limited to: • Requiring land use permits for projects that could significantly impact public safety • Focusing resources on projects with the greatest potential to impact public safety • Avoiding overburdening small businesses • Providing incentive for facilities to perform risk reduction projects such as substituting higher hazard category materials with lower hazard category materials and moving equipment and vessels away from the fence line t EmO101298.Doc DRAFT 90/28/98 Projects scoring between 70 and 79 are subject to a determination of non- coverage under 84-63.1306 of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. Determinations of non-coverage are appealable to the Board of Supervisors. More importantly, the proposed ordinance does not simply rare the hazard score back to the original score of 80. It raises the score to 80 AND includes certain development projects that require a Land-Use Permit REGARDLESS of hazard scare. These development projects are described in Attachment B. 5. What safety training for workers is required under the 96-50 ordinance, the Safe Communities Ordinance,and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? The existing 96-50 ordinance does not specifically include any training requirements. The initial study conducted as part of the +CEQA process for "major maintenance project." may indirectly review training but there are no specific requirements for operator, maintenance personnel,- or contractor training. The intent of section 450.8.016 of the Safe Communities Ordinance is to extend the risk management program elements,including prevention program elements and emergency response, to all covered processes. NOTE: the ordinance actually states that the risk management plan, which is very different than the program, be extended to covered processes. Covered processes is defined as "a process that has a regulated substance present in more than a threshold quantity or a state threshold quantity or a process where the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint for a worst case release assessment is equatµto or more than the distance to any public receptor. If there is no threshold quantity or state threshold quantity for a regulated substance, the threshold quantity shall be deemed to be 1000 pounds." Therefore, the intent is for the prevention program elements including but not limited to training, mechanical integrity, and contractors (included in Attachment C)which address training requirements for operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors respectively to be extended to covered processes. Additionally, section 450-8.016(m)(1), (m)(2), and (m)(3) of the Safe Communities Ordinance requires that journey level workers have completed apprenticeship training, apprentices employed are in an approved California apprenticeship program,and journey level employees have completed specified upgrade training within the last year. The proposed Industrial Safety ordinance extends the federal Risk Management Program prevention program elements and emergency response program to all units in the stationary source. There are 11 prevention program elements, including training, mechanical integrity, and contractors 'that specifically MEM0101298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 address training requirements for operators, maintenance personnel, and contractors respectively. Additional information regarding the requirements of the training, mechanical integrity, and contractors elements is provided in Attachment C. 6. What safety improvements have local industry carried out that were required by Centra Costa Health Services under current hazardous materials law? Hundreds of improvements have been required and implemented. See Attachment D for a memo entitled "Quantifying the Effectiveness of the Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP)". The County Disk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) was established in 1989 to help prevent accidental releases of acutely hazardous materials (AHMs). The AHMs under the RMPP include 360 chemicals. In January 1998, RWP legislation and regulations were replaced wiib the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program regulations. Facilities are required to implement their RMPP until they are asked to submit a risk management pian (RMP) under the CalA RP program. Sources with federally covered processes are required to submit RMP's in July of 1999. Information similar to that included in the attached memo will be maintained by CORS for submittal to the Office of .Emergency Services (OES). Sections 2780.5 and 2780.6 of the CaIAARP program regulations specify an annual performance audit submission and administering agency performance evaluation respectively. 7. What are the enforcement penalties for the current 96-50 ordinance,the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance,the Safe Communities ordinance, and the ordinance introduced.by Supervisor Uilkema? � .- Violations of county ordinances are infractions unless otherwise specified in the ordinance as misdemeanors. Infractions are punishable by the following fines. - First violation in one year: a fine up to$100/day - Second violation of the same ordinance in one year. a fine up to$200/day - Third and subsequent violations of the same ordinance in one year: up to $X00/day This applies to the current%-50 ordinance, the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance,and the ordinance introduced by Supervisor Uilkema. The Safe Communities Ordinance specifies violation of the ordinance as a misdemeanor. Misdemeanors are punishable by up to 6 months in county,fail, by dine not exceeding$1000.00,or by both. mEmO101298.Doc DRAFT 10/29/98 8. What is the difference between the Safe Communities Ordinance and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in regards to community outreach? The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance requires that the CCHS Hazardous Materials Programs ombudsperson act as the single point of contact for Contra Costa County residents regarding environmental health concerns,questions, and complaints about the Hazardous Materials Programs. The Safe Communities Ordinance requires CCHS to develop a Public Outreach and Information program, including the utilization of one or more non-profit community based organizations as a public outreach contractor. CCHS would annually place in its proposed budget a request for approval, appropriation, and allocation of the sum$50,000 for the Program. 9. Will members of the public require technical assistance to review and comment on the Risk Management Plans and Safety Plans submitted to satisfy the requirements of the CalARP program regulations and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance respectively? No. The primary purpose of both the Risk Management Plan (RMP) and Safety Plan is to communicate information (e.g., the hazards, prevention, and emergency response) to the public. Therefore, the document must be written to be understandable by members of the community, with little if any technical assistance required. The preamble to the federal Accidental Release Prevention Requirements (i.e., 40 CFR Part 68, Risk Management Program regulations) suggests that less than five pages of text will be required to convey the necessary information in the RMP submitted to the federal Environmental Protection Agency(EPA). See Attachment E for theApplicable sections of the preamble to the federal regulation. Section 2735.5 of the CaIARP program regulation requires the stationary source to closely coordinate with CCHS to implement the requirements of the CaLAR.P program and to determine the appropriate level of documentation required for the RMP. The Community Awareness Emergency Response (CAER) Group, Inc. formed subcommittees (i.e., steerings guidelines, technical, communication) With representatives from County staff, industry, Tabor, and environmental/community groups to determine an appropriate level of detail for the RMP"s submitted in Contra Costa County. A guidance document was developed and distributed for comments twice (Le., initial draft and final draft). It (Contra Costa Caunty .CaURP Program GuidanceDocument) was finalized July 1 1998 and is available to stationary sources and members of the public through the CCHS Hazardous Materials Programs. The level of documentation deemed appropriate by the subcommittees is substantially greater than that suggested in the preamble to the federal Risk Management Program regulations. MEM0101298.0m DRAFT 10/29/98 However, the RMP must still be understandable to members of the community, with little if any technical assistance required. The Communications Committee has the fallowing activities planned to inform and educate the public and owners and operators of stationary sources: a video discussing the risk management program is being produced; a brochure on the risk management program is being developed; a workshop with JBIa Associates is being held on November 30 to assist stationary sources on communicating their RMP (members of the public are welcome); templates are being developed to assist stationary sources develop brochures and fact sheets to discuss their sources and the chemicals they use; a web page is being developed to address the risk management program; and a second workshop regarding risk communication is planned for the spring (members of the public are welcome). If you would like more information, contact Randy Sawyer at CCT Hazardous Materials Program(925)646-2286. 10. Which facilities will be covered by the risk management section of the Safe Communities Ordinance and which facilities will be covered by the risk:management section of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance? The following information is based on information provided earlier this year to CCHS by affected facilities. The estimate is subject to change after worst case release scenarios are conducted (i.e., some of the program 3 covered processes may be eligible for program I status due to worst case release scenario modeling). • The Safe Communities Ordinance applies to industrial facilities (undefined in the ordinance) in unincorporated areas with program 3 covered processes under the federal Risk Management Program regulations: This includes Air Products — Shell, Air Products — Tosco, Criterion Catalysts, General Chemical Bay Paint,GW' Power Systems,Polypure Incorporated, Martinez Refining Company, Randal-Bold 'Nater Treatment Plant, Rodeo Sanitary District, Tosco Avon, and 'Tosco Rodeo. There are three additional facilities which could be covered,but which may make process/chemicalchanges that would exclude them from the program. These facilities include: E.I.:DuPont, Crockett Cogeneration,.Delta Diablo Sanitary District. • The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance applies to facilities in unincorporated areas with program 3 covered processes under the federal Risk Management Program and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). This includes Air Products — Shell, Asir Products -- Tosco, Criterion Catalysts, General Chemical Bay Point, Polypure Incorporated, Martinez Refining Company, Tosco Avon,and Tosco Rodeo. MEM0101298.Doc DRAFT 10/29198 NOTE: The preceding discussion applies to the risk management sections of these ordinances only (i.e., applicability is not the same for the land use permit sections of either ordinance) Other questions were asked during the workshop regarding enforcement and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These questions have been referred to the appropriate county departments (i.e., County Counsel and the Community Development Department). Answers to those questions and concerns will be provided as they become available. If you have additional questions or comments please contact County Ombudsperson, Michael lent at(925) 313-6587 MEM0101298.DaC DRAFT 10129198 ATTACHMENT A CEQA is triggered by the act of granting a land use permit in the "Land-Use Permit for Development Projects"sections of all ordinances discussed in the workshop. The Community Development Department (CDD) Director is currently reviewing criteria supplied by Centra Costa Health Service (e.g., CalARP guidance document, audit protocols)to determine whether acceptance of the Safety Plan by Contra Costa Health Services (CCHS) in the "Risk Management" section of the proposed ordinance triggers CEQA. If CEQA clues apply to acceptance of the Safety Plan (in the proposed ordinance) by CCHS and a negative declaration is proposed, members of the public have 20 days to review the Department's determination (e.g., Negative Declaration) and submit comments. NOTE: This assumes that none of the statutory or categorical exemptions are applicable. The decision making body trust consider the public comments before issuing their decision. Any member of the public can,ehallenge the findings of the CEQA review to an appellant division(e.g.,the Board of Supervisors)within 10 days of the decision. This challenge can be either based on the content of the findings or on the process used by the permitting/accepting body to snake the decision. however, the appellant must demonstrate that there is substantial evidence that the impact would be significant for the permitting body to require mitigation measures. The permitting body can also require a measure as a Condition of Approval without it being a mitigation of a significant impact, although there does have to be a connection between the measure and the project. The Department cannot,through the CEQA process,require mitigations of impacts unless they are deemed significant and supported by evidence. Members of the public may file a lawsuit against the final decision made by the Board of Supervisors regarding the appeal. Whether CEQA applies to the proposed ordinance or not, the public will be able to comment on the Safety flan during the 30-day review and comment period. These comments will be considered by the Department during the development of the"final determination" which includes determinations that additions or modifications to the Safety Plan are required. The stationary source or any person who commented on the Safety flan during the 30-day period, can appeal the Department's decision to the Board of Supervisors. Members of the public may file a lawsuit against the final decision made by the Board of Supervisors regarding the appeal. NOTE: CCHS recommends that the proposed ordinance be revised to limit appeals to issues raised during the comment period,not to individuals who raised them. The existing 96-50 ordinance requires land-use permits for maintenance projects costing at least one million dollars and requiring that the unit be taken out of service for more than two weeks'. A majority of projects meeting these criteria will be ' rection 84-63.604(d), (e), (g), and (h)of the existing 96-50 ordinance allows exemptions for obtaining land-use permits for major maintenance projects. For example, Section 84-63.604A(d) exempts a major maintenance project covered by a Public Safety Agreement entered into by the County and the facility MaM010129$.croc DRAFT 10/20/98 turnaround projects for the refineries. The County Community Development Department (CDU) must determine whether the land-use permit is subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CDD may determine that the maintenance project is "categorically exempt", thereby not triggering CEQA 2. If they determine that CEQA is triggered, then CDD must conduct an initial study. The initial study conducted under CEQA will include an assessment of the effects that the "major maintenance project" will have on air quality, water quality, noise, risk of upset, and transportation among other topics. This assessment determines whether there is substantial evidence that the proposed project would present significant environmental impacts and to identify measures to .mitigate any significant impacts. If there are no significant impacts, CDD will issue a "negative declaration". If mitigation of significant impacts is required and agreed to by the applicant, CDU will issue a "mitigated negative declaration". Members of the public have 20 days to review the determination and submit comments. If the significant impacts can not be mitigated or if certain types of significant impacts are identified, CICU will require that an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) be prepared. Mitigation measures resulting from these determinations are typically included in a mitigation monitoring plan approved by the County Planning Commission, and included in the permit's Conditions of Approval. The existing 96-50 ordinance does not apply to maintenance projects casting less than I million dollars or requiring that the unit be taken out of service for less than two within five years prior to the time the major maintenance project application is submitted to the department. Section 84-63.604(g)of the existing 96-50 ordinance allows an exemption for major maintenance projects at facilities covered by a Risk Management Plan. Extending the Risk Management Program elements to all units and defining regulated substance to include Hazard Category A and 13 materials satisfies many if not all of the requirements for this exemption. 2 CEQA Guidelines, Section 15300.2 restricts the use of the categorical exemptions under certain circumstances,one of which is the possibility of a significant impact:"A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances." The Department has used this statement to determine that the two Tosca major maintenance projects(Avon and Rodeo)did not qualify for the categorical exemption presented in the CEQA Guidelines Section 15302(c). This section categorically exempts"replacement or reconstruction of existing utility systems and/or facilities involving negligible or no expansion capacity. 3 To conduct "Risk of Upset" for the Tosco land use permit, CCHS required that the stationary source review stamp and shutdown procedures for accuracy and review safeguards to ensure that they are adequate protection against human error. CCHS representatives reviewed the safe work practices at the source. MEM0101298.noc DRAFT 10/29198 weeps (e.g., a maintenance project costing $750,040 or requiring less than two week downtime would not be covered). The existing 96-50 ordinance does not apply to any other phases of operation (e.g., emergency shutdowns, normal operations). The "major maintenance project" portion of the existing 96-50 ordinance does not apply to any units in the stationary source other than those being shutdown for major maintenance. MEM0101298_Doc DWT 10/29/98 ATTACHMENT B Regardless of Hazard Score,the following types of development projects will require the stationary source to obtain a land use permit in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: • For hazard category A materials, the development project stares twice the quantity specified in the Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ) on the Extremely Hazardous Substances List (Appendix A of 40 +CFR. Chpt. I, Subchapter J Part 355)or 2000 pounds, whichever is less. Hazard category A materials are the most hazardous and include explosives, poisons, radio-active materials, spontaneously combustible material, materials that are dangerous when wet, the most hazardous oxidizers, and infectious substances. This new provision of the ordinance is more protective of worker and public health because it requires a land use permit for staring relatively small quantities of Category A materials regardless of hazard score. Projects storing less than twice the TPQ or 2000 pounds would be subject to hazard scoring per 84-63.1004 of the proposed ordinance. Projects handling less than TPQ or 500 pounds, whichever is less would be exempt per 84- 63.604(c)(3)of the proposed ordinance. • For hazard category A or B materials,the development project will result in a new process unit(s) unless the process unit complies with Section 84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6 — Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing process unit do not constitute a new process unit. Hazard category B materials are materials such as flammable liquids, gases and solids. One of the reasons cited for decreasing the hazard scares required for obtaining a land use permits for new development projects from 80 to 60 was that the 80 point threshold would not have captured the Chevron Richmond Refinery Cleaner Fuels Project had it been in the unincorporated area of the county. This new provision of the ordinance would capture any new process, unless it complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-63.1004, handling a hazard category A or B material regardless of hazard score,and would have captured the Chevron Cleaner Fuels Project. • For hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with: Section 84- 63.1004 (d) 1 through 6—Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. The main effect of this provision will be to require obtaining land use permits for large storage vesselshandling flammable liquids and flammable gases, unless the new vessel complies with closure or reduction credits per Section 84-613.1004. MEM0101298.Doc DRAFT 10129/98 ATTACHMENT C The federal Rask Management Program was adopted by California with certain state- specific amendments. This attachment includes the regulatory requirements for 3 of the I 1 prevention program elements extended to all process units not otherwise covered by the federal regulation. training,mechanical integrity, and contractors. These prevention program elements address operator training,maintenance personnel training, and contractors training respectively. Section 2760.4 Training. (a)Initial training. (1) Each employee presently involved in operating a process, and each employee before being involved in operating a newly assigned process, shall be trained in an overview of the process and in the operating procedures as specified in Section 2760.3. The training shall include emphasis on the specific safety and health hands, emergency operations including shutdown, and safe work practices applicable to the esnployec.`s.. job tasks. (2) In lieu of initial training for these employees already involved in operating a process on .Tune 21, 1499 an owner or operator may certify in writing that the employee has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely carry out the duties and responsibilities as specified in the operating procedures. (b) Refresher training. Refresher training shall be provided at least every three years, and more often if necessary, to each employee involved in operating a process to assure that the employee understands and adheres to the current operating procedures of the process. The owner or operator, in consultation with the employees involved in operating the process,shall determine the appropriate frequency of refresher training. (c) Training documentation. The owner or operator shall ascertain that each employee involved in operating a process has received and understood the training required by this section. The owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the employee, the date of training,and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training Section 2760.5 Mechanical Integrity. (a)Application. Sections(b)through(f)of this section apply to the following process equipment: (1)Pressure vessels and storage tanks; (2) Piping systems(including piping components such as valves); (3)Relief and vent systems and devices, Proposed CalARP Regulations 5/01198 Page42 (4)Emergency shutdown systems; (5)Controls(including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms,and interlocks);and, (6)Pumps. (b) Written. procedures. The owner or operator shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain the on-going integrity of process equipment. MEM0101298.t)oo DRAFT 10129198 (c) Training for process maintenance activities. The owner or operator shall train each employee involved in maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. (d)Inspection and testing. (1)Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. (2) Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices. (3)The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. (4) The owner or operator shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment. The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test, the name of the person who performed the inspection or test, the serial number or other identifier of the equipment on. which the inspection or test was performer!, a description of the inspection or test performed, and the 'results of the inspection or test. (e)Equipment deficiencies. The owner or operator shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in Section 2760.1) before further use or in a safe and timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure safe operation. (f) Quality assurance. (1) In the construction of new plants and equipment, the owner or operator shall assure that equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for,which they will be used. (2)Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions. (3)The owner or operator shall assure that maintenance materials,spare pans and equipment are suitable for the process application for which they will be;used. Section 2760.12 Contractors. (a)Application. This section applies to contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a coven process. It does not apply to contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety,such as janitorial work, food and drink services, laundry,delivery or other supply services. (b)fawner or operator responsibilities. (1)The owner or operator,when selecting a contractor,shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract owner or operator's safety performance and programs. (2)The owner or operator.shall inform the contract owner or operator of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. mEmo101298moc DRAFT 10129/98 (3) The owner or operator shall explain to the contract owner or operator the applicable provisions of Article 7. (4) The owner or operator shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with Section 2760.3(d), to control the entrance, presence, and exit of the contract owner or operator and contract employees in covered process areas. (5) The owner or operator shall periodically evaluate the performance of the contract owner or operator in fulfilling their obligations as specified in section(c). (c)Contract owner or operator responsibilities. (1) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices necessary to safely perform his or her job. (2)The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to his or her job and the process, and the applicable provisions of the emergency action plan. (3)The contract owner or operator shall document that each contract employee has received and understood the training required by this section. The contract owner or operator shall prepare a record which contains the identity of the contract employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify that the employee understood the training. (4) The contract owner or operator shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the stationary source including the safe work practices required by Section 2760.3(d). (5)The contract owner or operator shall advise the owner or operator of any unique hazards presented by the contract owner or operator's work, or of any hazards found by the contract owner or operator's work. MEM0101298.00c DRAFT 10/29/98 ATTACHMENT D QUANTIFYING TBT EFFECTIVENESS O THE RISK MANAGEMENT AND PREVENTION PROGRAM Introduction The County Risk Management and Prevention Program(RMPP)was established in 1989 to help prevent accidental releases of acutely hazardous materials(AHMs). The AHMs under the RMPP included 360 chemicals. The program requires facilities that handle AI-1Ms to submit a Risk Management and Prevention Plan to Health Services. As part of the RMPP,the facility is required to perform the following: • A Hazard and Operability Study(Haz0p) • An Off-site Consequence Analysis(OSCA) • A seismic analysis • Implement management practices to prevent accidental releases of AHMs • Manage the risk at the facility • Implement the mitigations from the Hazflp and seismic analysis A facility's RIAPP is described in the Risk Management and Prete^ntion Pian, which is a public document that is available for public review. There were 120 facilities covered-. by the Risk Management and Prevention Program. How effective is the RMPP, since there are still accidental releases of AHMs? Following is a list of some indicators that demonstrate the effectiveness of the program within Contra Costa County: • Dramatic reduction in the volume of AHMs handled in the County • Implementation of a vast number of process safety improvements by AHM-handling facilities = Implementation of many new and upgraded management and process safety programs as a direct result of the program. Reduction in AS's Handled Between 1990 and 1994 there was a 60 million pound decrease (179 to 118 million pounds) in the amount of AHMs Dandled in Contra Costa County, which is a 33% decrease. Some examples are listed below are some of the decreases in the AHMs handled in Contra Costa County: AHM LARGEST 1994 PERCENT QUANTITY - QUANTITY DECREASE lbs. albs. tbs. Ammonia 12 800,707 4,432,658 65% Chlorine 7,650,897 5,159,269 33% __Hydrofluoric Acid 400,400 84,082 90% Hydrogen Fluoride 1,650,000 1,450,000 12% .H dru en Sulfide 625,542 223,075 64% Olcum 16,474,762 1 16,408,602 1% Sulfur Dioxide2,551,027 749,30172% Since 1994 there has been an additional decrease of 600,000 pounds of hydrogen fluoride handled and at least 2,0001,000 pounds of oleum handled in the county. The decreased inventories of AHMs are an inherently safer way to handle these materials. In many eases, there is not only decreases in the AHM inventories, but alternativesafer chemicals are replacing the AHMs in many processes. Improvements Made as a Result of the RMPP Hundreds of changes were made as a result of the RMPP. They include changes in the management systems, mechanical changes to the processes, and upgrades to prevent potential damage from an earthquake. Included with this paper are three pages of examples of changes made by the different facilities. The three pages of examples that follow are excerpted from a seventy-three pages list of changes made by six facilities (four oil refineries and two chemical companies). Management and Process Safety Programs As a result of the Risk Management and Prevention Program and Cal/OSHA"s Process Safety Management requirements, '`.sere have been numerous new management systems.implemexed to prevent and respond to accidental releases. Some of the new management systems that were implemented by many facilities as a result of the RMPP are listed below: • Process Hazards Analysis • Process Safety Information(updating Piping and Instrument Diagrams, etc.) • Management of Change programs • Training programs 4n January 1, 1997 the RMP was replaced by the California Accidental Release Prevention Program, which incorporates the federal EPA Risk Management Program. The CalAitP Program incorporated the best parts of the RMPP with the EPA's Risk Management Program. For more information please contact an Accidental Release Prevention Specialist at(925) 616-2286. � e c� C14 p 0 0 , (14 cit 0 v vl � u U a a v 0 " I C7 `C3 ra tp ts1 U cr " U c a> to rco p J c 0 15 0 C9 tip = 0 w `�C+Sr «Gt �r ,,,tom' C v} cCf Ll tr> C�3 tom. 2 > C14w Cd is p 0 4? � ,.� C� �' t�., � # �` ya qty "tJ f'te� 5�'`j +�• Ca '.�+ +-f 7 « cd GO 0 CU Cd fn O r, 0 4, s «' 0 Cd bon� -a " to V3 0 CEJ 0 v: V3 fn ,`> tn 0 07 C-a ' cn 4-1 cf `3rn cct 'L3 + xef +..-� 03 + C3 ti0 0 .) 4-0) � tom, [3 � Com' c3 Contra TOS BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Costa ....; r Count/ FROM: DENNIS M. BARRY, AICD l + , COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR � b DATE: November 3, 1998 SUBJECT: INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE, COUNTY FILE #ZT1-98. SPECIFIC REQUEST(S) 09 RECOMMENDATION(S) & BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION B COMMS DATIONS I. DETERMINE that the adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance is exempt from CEQA as a CLASS 8 Categorical Exemption (Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the Environment) . 2. OPEN the public hearing, receive testimony on the proposed ordinance. 3. CONSIDER the recommendations of the County Planning Commission contained in Planning Commission Resolution 113-1998 (attached. as Exhibit 1) . 4. CLOSE the Public Hearing. 5. DIRECT staff to incorporate any desired modifications and determine a date for staff to return with the ordinance for possible introduction. FISCAL IMPACT, The cast of administering the requirements of the ordinance will be barn by applicant fees. CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: Y. YES SIGNATURE r RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR — RECOMMENDATIOX OF BOARD C)MM TTEE __. APPROVE „___ OTHER SIGNATURE(S) : ACTION OF BOARD ON APPROVED AS RECOMMENDED — OTHER VOTE OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS 18 A UNAXIMOU8 (ABSENT TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF AN AYES: NOES i. ACTION TAKEN AND ENTERED ON THE ABSENTS ABSTAIN: MINUTES OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE SHOWN. CcntaottD*nnis M. Barry, AICP 335-1294 Origs Community Development Department ATTESTED cc: CAO PHIL BATCHELORr CLERK OF County Counsel THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Health Services-Hazard Materials Div. AND COUNTY ADXINIS'TAATOR BY . DEPOTY Page Two On August 11, 1998, the Board of Supervisors referred the Industrial Safety ordinance to the County Planning Commission and the Hazardous Materials Commission. Additional background information is included in the staff report to the Planning Commission dated September 8, 1998 (attached as Exhibit 2) . on September 22, 1998 having fully considered the proposal, the staff analysis, the proposed CEQA exemption (see pp. S-7 S-8 of the staff report) , and all testimony received, the planning commission recommended that the Board of Supervisors adopt the industrial Safety ordinance with the following modifications: I. Modify Section 84-63.602 and make the ordinance applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise Summary and Section 450-8.018 to clarify that Contra Costa Health Services Department may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program in order to find a plan in compliance with ordinance requirements. 3. Expand the definition of "Major Chemical Accident or Release" to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines regardless of the chemical released. 4. Globally revise the ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CaiARP) program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.018 review, audit, and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e. Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a major chemical accident or release) , to make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issued raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal to the stationary source or persons who commented. Staff has reviewed the ordinance for conformity with the County General Plan and suggests that the Hoard of Supervisors find the proposed ordinance consistent with the plan, particularly with reference to the Hazardous Materials Uses Section of the Safety Element (pages 10-54 through 10-63 of the County General Pian) and Hazardous Waste Management Section of the Public facilities and Services Element (pages 7-58 through 7-68) . RESOLUTION NO. 13-1998 RESOLUTION OF THE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, INCORPORATING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE PERTAINING TO LAND USE PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, County File' ,#ZT 1-98. WHEREAS, on August 11, 1998 the Board of Supervisors referred to the County Planning Commission and Hazardous Materials Commission the Draft Industrial Safety Ordinance for report and recommendation; and WHEREAS,in the Board of Supervisors referral, two chapters are proposed. Chapter 450-8 requires oil refineriesand chemical plants to file a Safety Plan with the Health Services Department within one year after adoption of the ordinance with specific criteria, guidelines and review. Chapter 84-63 would repeal and replace the provisions of ordinance 96-50, including changes in the requirements for a land use permit on development', projects and delete such requirements for major maintenance projects. This ordinance would apply throughout the unincorporated area of Contra Costa County; and WHEREAS, after notice was lawfully given, a public hearing was scheduled before the County Planning Commission' on Tuesday, September 8, 1998 and subsequently continued to September 22, 1998, whereat all persons interested might appear and be heard; and WHEREAS, on Tuesday, September 22, 1998, the county Planning Commission having fully reviewed, considered and evaluated all the materials provided by staff, including the Class 8 Exemption from CEQA, along with the testimony and evidence submitted in this matter,and; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the County Planning Commission recommends to the Board of Supervisors of the County of Contra Costa, State of California, that the Board of Supervisors ADOPT the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance with the following changes: 1. Modify Section 84-63.602 to male the ordinance applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. 2. Revise Summary and Section 450-8.018 to 'clarify that Contra Costa County Health Services Department may require changes to both the Safety Pian and the program. 3. Expand the definition of "Major chemical Accident or Release" to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level. 3 Incident according to the Community warning guidelines, regardless of the chemical released. PAGE TWO RESOLUTION NO. 13-2998 4. Globally revise the Ordinance to reference the California Accidental Release Prevention (CalARP) program regulations as opposed to federal regulations. 5. Revise Section 450-8.0318 review, audit, and inspection to clarify the activities that will be conducted (i.e. , Safety Plan review, routine audits and inspections, and activities that may be performed following a major chemical accident or release) , to make the process consistent with the CalARP program regulations, and to allow appeals on issues raised during the comment period rather than limiting standing to appeal to the stationary source or persons who commented. BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the direction to, prepare this resolution was given by the County Planning Commission at its meeting of September 22, 1998 by the following vote: AYES: Commissioners •- Clark, Pavinec, Gaddis, Kimber, Terrel, Wong, Hanecak NOES: Commissioners - None ABSENT: Commissioners - None ABSTAIN: Commissioners - None BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Secretary of the County Planning Commission shall respectively sign andattest the certified copy of this resolution and deliver the same to the Board of ,Supervisors all in accordance with the Planning Laws of the State of California. JOHN HANECAK, CHAIR County PlanningCommission, County of Contra Costa, State of California ATTEST: DENNIS M. BARRY, Secreta y of the Planning COZY County of Contra Costa, State of California DMB/df bo3:ztl-98.res .............. -............... EXHI]Brr"2" Agenda Item #4 Community Development Contra Costa County COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 'TIESDAY.AY. S. 1998 - 7:00 P.M. I. INMD=QN This is a referral from the Board of Supervisors of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The proposal would substantially readopt Chapter 84-63, originally added by Ordinance 96-20 and repealed by ordinance 96-50 (The so-called "Good Neighbor Ordinance") and repeals Chapter 84-63, added by ordinance 96-50, and containing criteria for land use pen-nits for development projects involving hazardous wastes or hazardous materials. In addition, the ordinance would add Chapter 450-8 to the County Code, containing measure to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental release of hazardous substances, including requirement of a safety plan and program for regulated industry, public participation in the review of that plan and program, an expanded list of regulated substances beyond those required of the Risk Management Plan, Root Cause analysis of all major chemical accidents or releases, inspection and audit requirements and a public outreach and information program. The proposed ordinance would apply in the unincorporated area of Contra Costa County. 11. BACKGROUND In December, 1996, the Board of Supervisors adopted ordinance 96-50, which substantially modified the County requirements for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous wastes and hazardous materials. The ordinance required land use permits for major maintenance projects, as defined, and modified the system for project scoring for new development projects and substantial modifications to facilities in order to expand the number of projects subject to land use permit requirements. db'JSO.sr S - 2 Since the adoption of the ordinance, the County has been involved in litigation brought by industrial and business interests attempting to overturn the adoption of the ordinance. In addition, Supervisors DeSaulnier and Canciamilla have been attempting to bring the various interests involved in the issue together to reach agreement on an alternative means of providing industrial safety,without the requirement of land use permits. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance is the resultof these efforts. 'Where are two parts to the proposal; a new Chapter 450-8 and a new Chapter 84-63. These sections are discussed separately below. Chapter 450-8 This section would require that within one year after 'adoption of the ordinance, a stationary source as defined (including aril refineries and chemical plants subject to federal risk management program requirements) must file with the Health Service Department a Safety plan which includes an expanded list of covered processes beyond those subject to the federal requirements (See section 4503.841.6(a)), a Human Factors program (8016(b)), the conduct of a Root Cause analysis for any major chemical accident or release (which the Health Services Department may elect to conduct itself) (8016(c)), a Process Hazards Analysis and;implementation of action items resulting therefrom (8016(d), and an accident history from June 1, 1992 through the date of the .Safety Flan Submittal (8016(e)). Following the submittal of the Safety Plan, the Department will make the portions which are not protected trade secrets available for public review for 30 days and will thereafter conduct a public meeting to solicit comments on the plan. Within 30 days after a major chemical accident or release , the department will inspect and audit the facility to determine compliance with the safety plan provisions, and shall do so at least every three years. ' dMO.sr S - 3 Based upon the review of the Safety Plan, or in response to the inspection/audit provisions, the department may require modifications or additions to the Safety plan in order to bring it into compliance with the ordinance. Such determinations shall be subject to the administrative appeal provisions of the County Code at Chapter 14-4. (Under article 450-8.018(e), an appellant is either the stationary source or a person who submitted public comment on the safety plan.) The Safety Plan will be valid for a period of three to five years, at the discretion of the Health Services Department. In addition, the ordinance provides for Community Outreach (450-8.022). This section requires the employment of an ombudsperson for the investigation of complaints, environmental health concerns or questions about hazardous materials programs for people who live or work in Contra Costa County. The ordinance also requires the creation of a Public Information Bank to provide ready public access to information relevant to the'purposes on the ordinance, but at a minimum including business inventories and emergency response plans, Risk Management flans, Safety Plans and department incident reports, to the extent such information is not protected trade secrets. Anal Health Services Department Hazardous ;Materials Division staff have advised the Community Development Department that the proposed addition of Chapter 450-8 to the County Code, along with the changes in Chapter 84-63 would provide a higher level of worker and public protection than the current land use permit provisions of ordinance 96-50 (The so-called"Good Neighbor Ordinance"). HSD staff is proposing some modifications to proposed Chapter 450-8 in order to clarify and: strengthen certain of its provisions. Those proposals will be provided under separate db1LSo.sr S - 4 cover, and HSD Staff will be present at the Planning Commission hearing on this matter to address any questions which may arise. The addition of this chapter to the code will significantly expand the areas for which industrial uses must provide information, audits and inspections, and physical and human factor changes to increase the safety of the covered processes involving the use of hazardous materials and hazardous wastes over and above the requirements of the Federal Risk Management Program. In referring the proposal to the Planning Commission, the Beard is asking for recommendations on both the zoning ordinance changes contained in Chapter 84-63 and the addition of Chapter 450-8. Therefore, staff suggests that the Commission in making its recommendations comment both on the specific provisions of the proposal and on the proposed shift from: reliance on the land use permit process to the dual approach including both land use permits for a narrower range of projects, and the requirement of safety plans, audits and inspections, expanded covered processes beyond RMP and Human factors and (toot Cause analyses. Char 84-63 The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance would repeal Ordinance 96-50, and adopt a new Chapter 84-63 Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Materials. The effects of the changes are basically as follows: 1. The ordinance would apply only in the Heavy Industrial, Light Industrial, Controlled Manufacturing districts and in the Planned Unit Development District,where the underlying General flan Land Use designation is for industrial use. asuso.sr S - 5 2. Major maintenance projects would no longer be subject to the requirement of land use permits or, alternately, Public Safety Agreements; 3. The scoring system for determining that a project involving hazardous waste or hazardous materials requires a land use permit would be revised to increase by twenty points the aggregate score at which permits would be required. This change would return the level to that in effect prior to the adoption of ordinance. 96-50, as adopted by ordinance 96-20. (i.e., a score of 80 or higher would require a land use permit). It should be noted that unlike ordinance 96-20, the proposal would require a land use permit for projects which stores twice the quantity specified as the threshold planning quantity of hazard category A materials on the Extremely Hazardous Materials list, or 2,000 pounds, whichever is less, and for projects which add new process units handling category A or B materials, unless credit is available for reductions or projects to be closed in the same facility. In addition, any vessel that has a fill to capacity level of 40,000 tons or more would require a land use permit, unless credit is available for reductions or projects to be closed in the same facility. (Definitions of "Process Unit," "Intermediate Product" and "Final Product" are added in connection with the foregoing provisions)'. 4. Unlike ordinance 96-50, but consistent with Ordinance 96-20, the proposal does not include in the scoring the "R." factor, which adds up to five points to the aggregate score on the basis of the incident record of the facility. For ease of reference for comparison purposes, copies of Ordinance 9E-20 and Ordinance 96-50 are being included in the Commissioners' packets for the September 8, 1998 meeting. db\Iso.sr S - 6 AnaWis Ordinance 96-50 ("Good Neighbor") contains substantial exemptions for those facilities which have a good safety record. It is conceivable that some facilities could undergo numerous major maintenance projects without being subjected to the land use permitting requirements of Ordinance 96-50. The adoption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance would "level the playing field" in this respect, since all facilities would be subject to its provisions, without exception. Large new development projects would generally still require land use permits, particularly since any new process unit handling category A or B materials will require a land use permit, unless a credit is granted for reduction or an offsetting project is closed in the same facility. (Section 84-63.1002(c)). Staff of the Health Services and Community Development iDepartments do not support the proposed limitation of the applicability of Chapter 84-63 to the districts listed in section 84-63.602. There is a possibility that projects in other non-residential districts could handle hazardous materials or hazardous wastes, and thus, there is a possibility that: a project which should be subject to the use permit requirement would not be. Staff favors the provisions in ordinance 96-50, which made the provisions applicable in any non-agricultural zoning district. Otherwise, the proposed ordinance is essentially the same as Ordinance 96-20, with the exceptions noted above increasing permit requirements where new process units are proposed. CEQA Compliance Staff has determined that the adoption of the proposed ordinance qualifies as a Class 8 Categorical Exemption from CEQA. "CLASS 8 Actions by Regulatory Agencies for the Protection of the Environment Class 8 Consists of actions taken by regulatory agencies, as authorized by State (law) or local ordinance, to assure the ab\M.sr S - 7 maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the environment where the regulatory process involves,procedures for protection of the environment. Construction activities and relaxation of standards allowing environmental degradation are not included in this exemption" (CEQA Guidelines Section 15308). The adaption of the Industrial Safety Ordinance is an action taken by the County as a regulatory agency which is authorized by State Law and local ordinance. The requirement of land use permits and the requirement and review of Safety.plans and procedures for responding to accidental releases of hazardous materials, inspections, audits and other provisions of the ordinance are all procedures to protect the public health and safety and the environment. These procedures are intended to avoid and reduce the potential for hazardous materials to be released into the air, water and ground, where they could have a significant and adverse effect on these resources and to people, both on and off site. No construction will result from the adoption of the ordinance, and no relaxation of standards will result in environmental degradation. Although the point score for requiring land use permits is increased, HSD staff have advised that the addition of the provisions of Chapter 450-8 will result in a higher level of protection for the onsite employees and the public generally than that available presently through the land use permit provisions of Ordinance 96-50. III. RECOMMENDATEMNS Direct Staff to prepare a resolution recommending that the Board of Supervisors adopt the Industrial Safety Ordinance, with the modifications proposed by staff. DMB\ db\ISO.sr 8/28/98 dbVSo.sr CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMISSION November 19, 1998 Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors 651 Pine Street Martinez, CA 94553 Dear Supervisors: Thank you for referring the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to the Hazardous Materials Commission for our review. As you are aware, the Commission has devoted many hours to the drafting and review of industrial safety ordinances over the last several years. We authored an earlier ordinance,Ordinance 96-20,which is incorporated with some amendments into the current proposal. We concur with those amendments,which address gaps that came to light during the hearings on Ordinance 96-50. The Commission has reviewed the full proposal extensively during nine committee and full Commission meetings, and heard staff reports and public comments. Several Commissioners attended the Board meetings on the proposal, as well as the public meetings convened by the Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson, and reported back to the Commission on concerns heard there. Our recommendations follow. 1. The ordinance should be revised throughout to reference the CaIARP program regulations,as distinct from the federal regulations. The primary implication of'this change is that external events,including seismic events,will have to be included in the Process Hazards Analysis(PHA)when there is a potential to reach a public receptor at the endpoint defined in the CaIARP program regulations. 2. Enforcement provisions of the ordinance should be adequate to attain compliance. The Commission recommends that the Board and County Counsel review enforcement tools for the draft ordinance,particularly for Chapter 450-8,Risk Management. 3. Section 450-8.004:PL,TRPOSE AND GOALS. (a)(5)providing for publie review of the Safiity Plan; proo-) dding for Pub is imul into the Sakly Plan and UQlic, w .. itt the Members: Ledlte Stewart,Chair Pum Aguilar Marta Alegria Scott.Anderson Henry Clark Paulette Lagana Marl Leeds>Steven LtwW Jim Payne Michael Polkabla Jimmy Rodgers Mike S`himansky Stuart Shoults Gayle B.Lklkema F recutive Assistant: Elinor Blake 20 Allen Street,Martinez, CA 94553 (925)370-5022 Fax(925)370-5098 Board of Supervisors Page 2 Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance November 19, 1998 4. Section 450-8.006. AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials aid mm protection of the!enviro gent 5. Section 450-8.014(a) and Section 450-8.016(b)(h): The term"Accidental Release," referring to releases to air, is used only in Section 450-8.016(b)(ii). The term"major chemical accident or release"is also used in that Section, and encompasses releases to all media. The use of both terms invites confusion. The definition of"Accidental Release" in Section 450-8.014(a)and subsequent use of the term should be deleted. 6. Section 4550-8.014(g): `Major Chemical Accident or Release' means an incident that results in the release of a Regulated Substance including but not limited to the air water pt soil and meets one or more of the following criteria:...f continue as in the proposed draft). # The definition should be expanded to include any incident that results in a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident according to the Community'Warning System guidelines,regardless of the chemical released. This change provides CCHS the authority to conduct a root-cause analysis based on the effects of the incident,rather than solely on the chemical released. 7. Section 454-8.016 Human factors: stationary sources shall develop a written human factors program that LQ-flowsnt deyelpmd or D=u=e 0t The program dhall be devel within one year following the issuance of t-he C9 AMU ggld= issuance or the effeWyet f the.ordinawe. _whidLem ' 1 ter he human fatozs nrrazn shallress [...and continue as in proposed draft]. 8. Section 450-8.016(b)(u): To carry out Recommendation 5 (to delete any reference to "Accidental Release")this Section should be amended as follows: Section 450-8.016(b)(ii)the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for that could reasonably have had the potential to become a Major Chemical Accident or Release; 9. Section 450-8.018.This section should be revised to clarify the activities which will be conducted,and make the process consistent with the CaIARP program regulations. ♦ The appeals process should be limited to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented. In addition, the ordinance should otherwise assure the public's right to appeal the County's decision regarding,a.Safety Plan. i The Commission recommends that issues raised during the public meeting may be the Board of Supervisors Page 3 Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance November 19, 1998 basis of an appeal, and is concerned that the legal definition of "public meeting"(as distinct from"public hearing")may not allow for that. The Board should direct County Counsel to include this issue in his review of the ordinance. 10. In Section 450-8.0018 Review,Audit, and Inspection. (a)the ordinance should provide that the public meetings be held during rather than after the public comment period. In line with the Commission's recommendation("...and limit the appeals process to issues raised during the comment period rather than to persons who commented),issues raised during those meetings should be among those that could be the basis of an appeal,with whatever procedures(such as recording the meetings)that may be required to secure that right of appeal. To address the issue of meeting time, the Commission recommends the following action by the Board of Supervisors if the Board adopts the proposed ordinance. + That the Board direct Health Services to take into account the community's time needs when scheduling the public meetings. 11. Section 450-8.018 Review, Audit,and Inspection: (b)The Department sll mU within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release, , conduct a safety inspection to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016. ...[continue as in the proposed draft] 12. SUMMARY and Section 450-8.018: The Summary and Section 450-8.018 should be revised to clarify that CCHS may require changes to both the Safety Plan and the program. This will alleviate any concerns that CCHS can require modifications only to the written Safety Plan, as distinct from the implemented program. 13. Section 450-8.022 Community Outreach. By recommendation of a Commission member,the Commission was asked to consider replacing the language of this section,which provides funding for the Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson, with language to establish a Health Services Public Outreach and Information Program for the Safety Plans and their public review. The Program would include a community-based non-profit organization as a contractor. The Commission supported ensuring funding for the Ombudsperson. To address the provision of technical assistance,the Commission recommends the following actions by the Board of Supervisors if the Board adopts the proposed ordinance: Board of Supervisors Page 4 Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance November 19, 1998 That the Board direct Health Services to solicit questions and concerns from the public prior to the public meeting so that staff can better act as a technical resources for the public, and; ♦ That the Board set aside$50,000 from the General Fund for a one-year technical assistance grant pilot project to assist in the review of Safety Plans. Contra Costa County is known nationally as a leader in forging local environmental health and safety policies and programs. We hope these comments are helpful to you in your deliberations on this important issue. Sincerely, Leslie Stewart Chair cc: William B. Walker,M.D. Hazardous Materials Commission KIM 2300 MacCorkle Avenue, S.E. Charleston, West Virginia 25304 U-tl 346-6264 » (500) 282-2796 +'FAX (304) 346-6349 a E-mail: nicsinfoGaol.com November 18, 1998 Lewis C. Pascalli, Jr. Director, Hazardous Materials Program Contra Costa Health Services 4333 Pacheco Boulevard Martinez, CA 94553 Dear Mr scalli: Enclosed is the final report to the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors regarding our review of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, in partial fulfillment of Contract No. 23- 222-1 between the county and the National Institute for Chemical Studies. I will be prepared to present this report at the Board meeting December 1, 1998. Thank you for the opportunity to work on this project. Sincerely, Mark A. Scott President x+'. r u. Charles M.Jones Mlchaed A At�tert Isi]#t� 1�11t1k1f A SOW +�r Chairman Mary Frances Bleldt 0t s e.J rretf Edward C.Armbrecht,Jr. Thames C_Burns Paul J.Morris EX OFFICIO I ie fw;. tib �Ph Vice Chairman Hazo W.Carter,Jr.,Ed.D. Linda M.Nielsen . Senator Robert C.Byrd f8rdi#f; Donald M.Rosenberg,M.D. wittiam W.Carter Brady R.Paxton Senator John D.Rockefeller IV Secretary 'Thad 0.Epps Robert G.Seymour Congressman Butt Wise Ronald R.Potesta Halcott P.Foss Charles R.Smith Governor Cecil H.underworld Treasurer Ann S.Green Ronald W.Steib Lila J.Hilt H.Bernard Wehrle III REPORT TO THE CONTRA COSTA COUNT BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Review of Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Contra Costa County, CA Contract No. 23-222-1 National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) 2300 MacCorkle Avenue, SE Charleston, WV 25304 (304) 346-6264 nicsinfo@aol.com Mark A. Scott,President Jan R. Taylor, Ph.D., Vice President Principal Investigators November 19, 1998 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICs) REVIEW OF PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Protecting the public from industrial accidents is an obvious concern in Contra Costa County. Based upon records made available by county staff,there have been a numberof significant chemical accidents and releases in the county since at least 1989. The steps being taken by the county to amend and replace Ordinance 96-50 are important for the future protection of county residents and the environment. The National Institute for Chemical Studies (MICS)has undertaken an evaluation of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance before the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors. Additionally, NICS has reviewed existing Ordinance 96-50,the Safe Communities draft ordinance, and a draft ordinance offered by Supervisor Uilkema. Based upon our knowledge and research, no other state or local government jurisdiction has enacted an ordinance with such far-reaching public safety requirements as contained in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance adds several new public safety provisions not contained in the existing Ordinance 96-50. Compliance with these requirements by the regulated community should provide a greater degree of protection to county residents. Addition of a required Safety Plan and Program for all pr. ocesses in large refineries and chemical plants in the unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County should enhance public safety and the environment. Land use permit requirements are appropriate for new processes;using Hazard Category A or B chemicals and permanent change in risk projects. The land use permit provides additional levels of review for new potential hazards that will be present for longer periods of time. NICS recommends that the Board of Supervisors consider several amendments for improving the proposed ordinance. Several of these recommendations are to modify language to make the meaning of the ordinance more clear; these recommendations are detailed in the body of the report. Other recommendations address public safety and participation: the definition of "accidental release"; increasing the public comment period for review of safety plans; amendment of the rules of the Community Ombudsperson; allowing for increased penalties for serious violations and other general recommendations. MICS recommends that the Board of Supervisors adopt the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance with the suggested amendments. Report to the Centra Costa Board of supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) REPORT TO THE CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS REVIEW OF PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE National Institute for Chemical Studies .November 19, 1998 INTRODUCTION This report is submitted to the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors by the National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS), in fulfillment of a contract to review and evaluate the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. Scope of contract The scope of this contract as developed by the Board of Supervisors directed NICS to do the following: Review the Industrial Safety Ordinance that was presented to the Board of Supervisors on August 11, 1998; the existing Ordinance 96-50; the Safe Communities Ordinance; and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance of December 2, 1997(introduced by Supervisor Uilkema) from an agency's perspective. Provide comment on all areas of the ordinance but focus on the following: -- the agency's ability to implement and enforce this ordinance -- the land use aspects of the ordinance --the overall public safety elements Methodology MICS undertook the following tasks to complete this project: ■ Reviewed the provisions of Ordinance 96-50 and the three proposed ordinances • Met with county officials to review the scope of the project and receive background information(see Appendix A) ■ Met with key stakeholders identified by the county to solicit input on the proposed ordinance and identify critical issues(see Appendix B) 2 .................... ......................................... Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) ■ Reviewed documents provided by the county and key stakeholders (see Appendix C) ■ Reviewed video and audio tapes of six of the seven public meetings, and reviewed the summary notes prepared by county staff of one meeting where recording equipment was not operable ■ Conducted follow-up telephone calls with county staff and stakeholders as necessary to clarify comments or seek additional information ■ Participated in conference calls on October 14 and October 21 with county officials to provide progress reports ■ Prepared and submitted final report to Board of Supervisors 3 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) EVALUATION OF ISSUES Both the existing ordinance 96-50 and the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance, as well as the other two drafted ordinances, are intended to increase public safety by reducing risks from industrial facilities. This purpose guided NICS' review of these ordinances, that is, the provisions of these ordinances were evaluated in terms of public safety, first and foremost. This required the evaluation of both the land use elements and risk management considerations throughout the ordinances. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance was compared with Ordinance 96-50 using the following criteria: 1) Does the proposed ordinance address risks not previously addressed? 2) Does the proposed ordinance provide incentives to reduce risk? 3) Does the proposed ordinance reduce or prevent the creation of new risk? 4) Can the proposed ordinance be implemented and enforced effectively? The other drafted ordinances were also assessed to determine if provisions found in those ordinances could strengthen the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance(ISO). Proposed Chapter 84-63, Land Use Permits for Development Project Involving Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Material. Proposed Chapter 84-63 requires land use permits and substantial public review for development projects that could pose significant risk to the community and the environment. The proposal differs from the existing Chapter 84-63 in ordinance 96-50 in several significant ways. Interviews with.key stakeholders and review of the videotapes and audiotapes from the public workshops around Contra Costa County provided NICS with a clear picture of the issues important to citizens,industry and government in the county. These issues will be addressed in our review of the ordinances. Applicability. In the proposed ordinance, applicability is specifically targeted at industrial districts. In 96-50,all non-agricultural districts are subject to the provisions of the chapter. It is highly likely that any development projects that would otherwise be subject to the land use permitting provisions would occur in industrial districts. However,to assure that no projects"slip through the cracks,"to assure the public that there is no intent to eliminate coverage, and to prevent the creation of potential new risk,NICS recommends that the language in 96-50 be retained. 4 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICs) Land Use permit Required. The proposed ordinance requires a land use permit for development projects with a hazard score of 80 or greater. This is the threshold score developed by the Hazardous Materials Commission after extensive work with the scoring system. According to individuals who served on the Commission during that time, the threshold value was determined by scoring hundreds of development projects,both real and hypothetical. The scored projects were judged to be of varying degrees of riskiness using the professional judgement of the Commissioners. The score of 80 was then chosen so that the more hazardous development projects would require the land use permit. This score was set at a level where many projects might be redesigned to lower the hazard score below the threshold to avoid the land use permit process. In lowering the score to avoid the land use permit, risk to the community and the environment would concurrently be reduced. NILS reviewed documents from the hazard scoring process. Dozens of the projects were reviewed by MICS staff member, Peter Howell, PE, an experienced chemical engineer with many years in process safety and accident review. Mr. Howell rated these projects and other projects with which he was familiar using the Hazard Score formula. Subsequent evaluation by MICS concluded that the Hazardous Materials Commission had done a good job in setting a reasonable threshold that would meet public safety needs. (See Appendix D for an evaluation of the Hazard Scoring methodology) However, in addition to the hazard score threshold for change-in-risk projects (new use of existing structures), the proposed ordinance adds provisions that have significant public safety benefits. The most significant of these is the requirement of a land use permit for gny new process that uses hazard category A or B materials(unless the process unit complies with the requirements for receiving credit for reductions or projects to be closed). The land use permit process triggers a CEQA review. This review allows for significant public input into the development process. CEQA review is appropriate for land use permits since process units,once constructed, are typically operated on a long-term basis and should be carefully assessed for the potential to create negative effects on public safety and the environment. Implementation of the land use permit provisions and any subsequent CEQA review by the county may necessitate involvement by Health Services Department staff. Contra Costa County Health Services personnel assured NICS that current staff in the Hazardous Materials Program can implement this portion of the ordinance. Enforcement of the land use permit requirement will depend on the ability of the Community Development Department(CDD);staff to be aware of development activities that may be subject to land use permits. Health Services Department staff may monitor facility activities during safety inspections under proposed chapter 450-8 and report those to the CDD,but more likely,facility activities will be reported to the Departments through the application for various permits. This may mean that some development activities 5 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICE) might slip through the cracks, but in general, sufficient enforcement ability will be available to the department, and to citizens through the public notice process. Proposed Chapter 450-8, Risk Management Proposed Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations based upon the federal Risk Management Program (RMP)rule and the California Accidental Release Prevention(CalARP)program. This chapter goes beyond the requirements of the federal and state programs in its goal to improve industrial safety. The proposal is a completely new addition to the County Code and did not exist with Ordinance 96-50. Interviews with key stakeholders and review of the videotapes and audiotapes from the public workshops around Contra Costa County again gave NTCS a clear impression of the issues important to citizens, industry and government in the county. Applicability. The proposed chapter addresses an expanded scope of risks not covered by federal and state programs. All processes at facilities that contain an federal RMP Program 3 process are covered by the requirements of this chapter. This means that every process in chemical, petrochemical and oil industry facilities must undergo a rigorous evaluation for development of a Safety Plan under this ordinance. The Safety Plan must include not only elements from the federal and state RMP,but also a Human Factors Program,requirements and authorities for conducting Root Cause analyses of Major Chemical Accidents or Releases, implementation schedule requirements for action items developed from Process Hazards Analysis, and an expanded Accident History requirement. The above requirements for the Safety Plan are mentioned in the introductory statement at Section 450-8.016. Although a full reading of this section clarifies that subsections(a)through (e) are part of the Safety Plan,NICS recommends that the language of this paragraph be modified to more clearly reflect that these requirements are all part of the Safety Plan and are, therefore, subject to review by the Department and the public. The Safety Plan is required to address"accidental releases"and"major chemical accidents or releases." Both terms have significance for the plan. "accidental releases"are included in the Human Factors Program to evaluate releases that have the potential to become major chemical accidents or releases; "major chemical accidents or releases"trigger the requirement for root causes analyses and inspections by the county,and also must be recorded in the accident history. Although the intent of the proposed ordinance is to address releases to the environment, the definition of "accidental release"is written to only apply to air emissions. MICS recommends that the definition of"accidental release"be amended to include releases to waster and land as well as to ambient air. Root Cause Analysis.This section provides authority for the Department to conduct root cause analysis investigations. It also gives the Department the rights to enter the facility, examine pertinent documents and interview employees. This authority clarifies the County's right to be 6 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(MICS) involved in accident investigations from the very beginning. The impact of accidents on the county's residents clearly provides a strong reason for county officials to be involved in the investigation. However, it is very important for the Department to coordinate with investigations conducted by other agencies with authority over the facility. First, root cause analyses investigations are expensive to conduct, and in order to provide accident reports in a timely manner, maximizing resources by cooperating with other agencies is important. Secondly, coordination with other agencies will reduce adverse impacts on the facility and its employees. Even in the serious business of accident investigation, numerous requests for the same information are unnecessary. Finally, this section provides that the conclusions, findings or recommendations of the Root Cause analysis conducted by the Department or the facility cannot be admitted as evidence or used in any legal action arising from matters mentioned in the report. A similar provision is found in the Clean Air Act provisions for investigations conducted by the U.S'. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. However, it is unlikely that the County has the authority to implement a similar provision. While we have no detailed knowledge of the California rules of evidence, this provision may establish a standard not supported by state law. MICS recommends that County legal staff evaluate this provision for its propriety under state law. Process Hazard Analysis/Action items. The Process Hazard Analysis requirements for all processes at covered facilities lead to action items designed to reduce the hazards identified. In addressing these hazards, facilities must consider Inherently Safer Systems. While this is not a requirement to adopt Inherently Safer Systems, it does require that the consideration of these systems and adoption or rejection decisions be documented. Additionally, all decisions regarding action items from the PHA must also be documented for review by the Department and the public. The chapter provides for a 30-day public comment period on a facility Safety plan in Section 450-8.018 (Review, Audit and Inspection). Safety Plans can be complex documents and will require significant effort from the general public to review and comment. A 30-day comment period seems short for complex documents. NICS recommends that at least a 45-day comment period be required as presented in the proposed"Safe Communities Ordinance." The proposed ISO also provides for a public meeting at the end of the comment period. Public meetings such as those held on behalf of this proposed ordinance can be very useful for informing the public as well as hearing comments from the public. The HST) should have discretion in the timing of the public meeting so that,when appropriate, the meeting can have an informational role as well as a place for public input on proposed Safety Plans. Informational meetings should be held during the comment period and not at the end. In addition,whenever possible such public meetings should be held in the communities where the facilities are located. MICS recommends that the language of the proposed ordinance be amended to reflect flexibility in timing for the public meeting and to specify that the public meeting be held in the affected community. 7 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) Within this section, the language addresses the implementation of action items identified in the PHA. The section includes the following language: "For all Covered Processes, the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source . . . "If the section is read in full, it can be assumed that the documentation of decisions will show what the facility plans to do and why the action items were prioritized in a particular manner. However, the above language can also be interpreted to mean that the facility can choose to implement all or none of the action items. NILS recommends that the language be amended to reflect more clearly that all action items must be addressed. Review,Audit, and Inspection.This section of the proposed ordinance gives the county authority and duty to review the facility's Safety Plan, conduct safety inspections after Major Chemical Accidents and Releases, and to require modifications or additions to Safety Plans to bring the facility's Plan.and Safety Program into compliance with the provisions of the ordinance. Stakeholders and participants at the public meetings offered numerous comments with the concern that the department could only require modifications to the paper document and not necessarily to the underlying safety program at the facility. NICE recommends that the language in subsection(d) be clarified to reflect that required modifications not only affect the document but also the Program at covered facilities. In section 450-8.018 (b), the proposed ordinance states that the"Department sha1,within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release at the discretion of the Department , conduct a safety inspection . . ." This statement is inconsistent and should be modified. NICS recommends that the Department be given discretion and that"shall"be changed to"may"and the phrase"at the discretion of the Department"be deleted. While the Department should be encouraged to conduct a safety inspection following accidents, there may be times when the timing is impractical or other agency activities(such as root cause investigations)keep the department from conducting a safety review under this section. The implementing policy of the Department should address this issue. Further,this section states that the Department shall review and audit, . . compliance . . . at least once every three to five years."We understand that the 3-5 year time frame for both audits and updates of the safety plan was intended to allow the Department and covered facilities to time the Safety Plans with the federal RMP and CaIARP program requirements. However, it seems likely that the passage and date of effectiveness of a new ordinance will be close enough to the implementation date(6121/99)of those requirements that the 3-5 year time fixe can be eliminated. We recommend that the Safety Plans be valid for three years, and that the Plans and Program be audited by HSD staff or consultants for compliance at leas once every three years. Community Outreach. An ombudsperson for hazardous materials issues has been hired by the County and is paid currently from county funds. Under this program,the funds necessary to support the ombudsman program would be paid from fees authorized in Section 450-8.026. The role of the ombudsperson in this section is clearly defined. However, the statement that his or her role"will be one of complaint prevention"is open to interpretation, much of it:unfavorable. 8 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) NICS recommends that this role be deleted from the description. There is some concern that a single person will be unable to provide the assistance needed by citizens. In the experience of NILS, an ombudsperson with sufficient resources available to him or her can be effective fulfilling the roles contemplated in this section. An ombudsperson can provide direct assistance or refer citizens to resource agencies and organizations for help in other instances. Implementation and Enforcement The proposed requirements for both risk management and land use permits raise issues regarding the county's ability to implement and enforce the ordinance. Interviews with county officials and key stakeholders and review of the public meeting videotapes identified two primary issues of concern: staffing capability and enforcement authority. Staffing. The proposed risk management requirements have the potential to increase the workload of the implementing agencies and to require additional technical expertise. The Health Services Department may expect increases in the number of safety plans to be reviewed as processes not regulated under CalARP and the federal RMP are added with this ordinance. New requirements for human factors programs and root cause analyses of major accidents and releases will require specialized expertise. The Community Development Department may also experience significantly increased workloads if it is determined that Safety Plans are subject to CEQA review. Although existing Health Services staff members have significant expertise in chemical and mechanical engineering, additional staff and additional skills may be required. It seems likely that the HSD will need to add staff and/or consultants to fully implement the CalARP program and the federal Risk Management Program. Additional process units added due to the proposed ISO may not add significantly to that workload. However, NILS recommends that both the Health Services Department and the Community Development Department review their staffing capabilities to ensure that there will be sufficient qualified staff to implement the new requirements.. Enforcement. In order for the county to assure compliance with the ordinance, sufficient enforcement authority is needed to provide a credible deterrent to noncompliance. Section 450- 8.028 provides that all violations of the ordinance are subject to the enforcement provisions of Chapter 14.6 of the County Ordinance Code. This chapter provides procedures for both civil and criminal enforcement. County enforcement authority is limited by state law. County Counsel staff advised NICS that violations of the proposed ordinance may be considered as either civil offenses(public nuisance)or criminal offenses(infractions), at the discretion of the county. A recently-passed state statute allows the county to impose administrative penalties;County Counsel has drafted an ordinance allowing the imposition of such penalties,which is currently being reviewed and will be presented to the Board of Supervisors in the near future. It is arguable whether existing enforcement authority provides a credible deterrent.', Administrative, civil and:criminal penalties available under the State Business Plan law have higher limits and would provide greater deterrence. MICS recommends that the County Counsel review existing 9 Report to the Contra Cosh Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chernioal Studies(MICS) enforcement authorities to clarify what enforcement options are available, and to advise the Board on how they may most effectively used. Several suggestions were made by key stakeholders and the public to treat all violations of the ordinance as misdemeanors. Strong criminal enforcement action should be kept as an option for the most serious violations,such as false reporting of information. It would be inappropriate to classify all ordinance violations as misdemeanors, however, since many potential violations of this ordinance would not rise to the seriousness of a criminal offense. Further,classifying all violations as misdemeanors could create a significant judicial backlog due to the time necessary to prosecute misdemeanor criminal cases. NTICS recommends that the Board, after consultation with County Counsel,consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance specifying certain serious violations as misdemeanors. 10 _. . .1111._..........1.111. .. ........... ....._... ......... ...........111.1. . ........................................................... _..... ......... ............... ............................. Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies{NICS} CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions I. Protecting the public from industrial accidents is an obvious concern in Contra Costa County. Based upon our review of available records, there have been a number of significant chemical accidents and releases in the county since at least 1989. The steps being taken by the county to amend and replace Ordinance 96-50 are important for the future protection of county residents and the environment. 2. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance adds several new public safety provisions not contained in the existing Ordinance 96-50. Compliance with these requirements by the regulated community should provide a greater degree of protection to county residents. 3. Based upon our knowledge and research, no other state or local government jurisdiction has enacted an ordinance with such far-reaching public safety requirements as contained in the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance. In an ongoing study for EPA by NICS of state and local government accident investigation procedures, we have discovered no jurisdiction that has undertaken root cause analysis of accidents such as is proposed in the Industrial Safety Ordinance. Discussions with knowledgeable industry observers and experience in the major chemical-producing communities around the country have also revealed no comparable requirements for industrial safety at the local level. 4. The proposed ordinance will apply only in unincorporated areas of the county. As such, there will be areas of the county that will not be subject to the same level of protection provided to unincorporated areas. 5. The quality of safety training provided to workers in industrial facilities will have a significant effect on the safe operation of those facilities. While we acknowledge the importance of such training, it is appropriate for the county to address the issue separately from the proposed industrial safety requirements because of the complexity of training issues and the manner in which they are regulated. Recommendations Prosed Chapter 4508 Risk Management l. Section 450-8.014(a), definition of"Accidental release,"should be amended to include emission of a Regulated Substance into water and soil as well as ambient air. 11 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICE) 2. Section 450-8.016 should be amended to clarify that the Safety Plan to be submitted under this section includes the Human Factors program, requirements and authorities for conducting Root Cause analyses, implementation schedule requirements for action items developed from the Process Hazards Analysis, and the Accident History. 3. The county legal staff should review the provision in Section 450-8.016(c) to determine whether the county may legally exclude all or part of a Root Cause analysis from disclosure in a legal proceeding. 4. Section 450-8.016(d) should be amended to clarify that the Stationary Source must address all the action items in implementing the Process Hazards Analysis. 5. Section 450-8.018(a)should be amended to expand the time for public review of a proposed Safety Plan from 30 days to at least 45 days. The section should also be modified by adding language to allow flexibility in timing for the public meeting and to specify that the public meeting be held in the affected community 6. Section 450-8.016(d) should be amended to clarify that all action items identified by Process Hazards Analyses must addressed. 7. Section 450-8.018(b)should be amended to allow the.Department discretion is conducting safety inspections following Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. The Department should write implementing policies to indicate under which circumstances the Department will and will not conduct such inspections. NILS recommends that the Department be given discretion and that"shall"be changed to"may"and the phrase"at the discretion of the Department"be deleted. 8. Section 450-8.018(b)should also be amended to require that Safety Plans and Programs be audited by HSD staff or consultants for compliance at least once every three years. 9. Section 450-8.018(d)should be amended to clarify that required modifications to a Safety Plan apply not just to the document but to all programs contained within the plan. 10. Section 450-8.018(f)should be amended to make Safety Plans valid for three years from the date of final action. This should not be discretionary and the phrase"at the discretion of the Department"should be deleted. 11. Section 450-8.022 should be amended to delete the reference to"complaint prevention" as one of the jabs of the Community Ombudsperson. 12. The Health Services Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient qualified staff to handle the expected workload increase resulting from adding processes to the existing RMP requirements,including new processes within 12 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) facilities covered by CalA.RP; conducting root cause analyses of major accidents and releases; and reviewing and evaluating Human Factors programs. Similarly, the Community Development Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient staff in the event it is determined that the proposed risk management program will require review under CEQA. 13. The county legal staff should review existing enforcement authorities to clarify which tools are available to the county to enforce the proposed ordinance. Section 450-8.028 should be amended to more clearly identify these enforcement options. 14. The Board, after consultation with County Counsel, should consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance classifying certain serious violations, such as false filing of information, as misdemeanors. Proposed Chapter 84-63,Land Use P=its 1. Section 8463.602 should be amended by deleting the proposed language and re-inserting the current language from Ordinance 96-50 stating that the land use provisions will apply in all nonagricultural zoning districts. Additional Recommendations I. The Board should direct staff to eliminate cross-references to other ordinances to the extent possible without significantly lengthening the proposed ordinance: This would help make the proposed ordinance a more complete document and minimize the need to consult other references in order to fully understand the new requirements. 2. The Board should consider including a provision that would require the ordinance to be reviewed triennially, after three years of full implementation. This would enable the Board to review the performance of county agencies and the regulatedindustries under the new requirements,evaluate the effectiveness of the ordinance, and determine whether any changes are needed to improve public safety. 13 ............................ Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NTCS) Appendix A: COUNTY OFFICIALS CONTACTED' Phil Batchelor County Administrator Claude Van Marter Assistant County Administrator Dennis Barry Community Development Director Dr. William Walker Health Services Director Michael Kent Hazardous Materials Ombudsperson Lew Pascalli,Jr. Hazardous Materials Program Director Elinor Blake Executive Assistant, Hazardous Materials Commission Jo Haegert Hazardous Materials Program Accidental Release Prevention.Program Specialist Bill Alton Hazardous'Materials Program Accidental Release Prevention Program Specialist Silvana Marchi Office of the County Counsel Lillian Fujii Office of the County Counsel 14 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICE) Appendix B: KEY STAKEHOLDERS CONTACTED Denny Larson Communities for a Better Environment David Nesmith Sierra Club Kathy Adams, Scott Anderson,and Mario DiGiovanni Industrial Association of Contra Costa County Laura Brown and Marjorie Leeds Martinez Refining Company Paul Borenstein and Sabiha Gokcen Tosco Refining Company Jim Payne and Steve Sullivan Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union Greg Feere Contra Costa Building and Construction and Trades Council Dennis Spaniol Council of Industry 15 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) Appendix C. DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Background Information County Ordinance 96-50; proposed ordinance from Supervisor Uilkema; proposed Safe Communities Ordinance; and proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance SB 1889, California Accidental Release Program (9-23-96) Response to comments submitted on Draft CalARP Program Guidance Document(May, 1998) Contra Costa County CalARP Final Program Guidance Document(June, 1998) Contra Costa County Hazardous Waste.Management Plan(June, 1989) Excerpt from Contra Costa County General Plan, Section 10.9, "Hazardous Materials Uses" (date unknown) CEQA Process Flow Chart and Summary. California Resources Agency web page (April 22, 1998) List of stationary sources covered by the CalARP Program. CCHS interoffice'memo from Randall Sawyer(August 11, 1998) Contra Costa County Code Chapter 14-4,Appeals; 14-6, Civil Enforcement; and 14-8, Criminal Enforcement California State Code 25500 et seq., State Business Plan law Application for Certified Unified Program Agency. CCHS (1995) Ordinance Summaries Questions and Answers from the Hazardous Materials Commission Meeting, September 14, 1998(document authored by Jo Haegert,CCHS,October 1, 1998) The New Industrial Safety Ordinance--A White Paper. Sabiha Gokcen, Tosca Refining Company(September 8, 1998); Summary Fact Sheet and Side-by- Side Comparison of 96-50, Uilkema proposal, Safe Communities Ordinance,and Industrial Safety Ordinance(date unknown); and Questions and Answers Regarding the New Ordinance(date unknown) 16 ......._. ......__. ........ ............ ........... ......... ......... ....._ _.............. .......... ......... ..._... .. ......................................................................................... _ _ .......______.. ........... ... ................................. ............................. Report to the Centra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) Check List for Critical Health and Safety Issues Alternatives to Replace Good;Neighbor Law. Citizens for a Better Environment(date unknown) "Do You Have Questions about the Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance?" Q&A from October 8, 1998 public meeting in Rodeo,prepared by CCHS staff Accident History Summary of industrial accidents in Contra Costa County, 1989-1997. Prepared by Citizens for a Better Environment(date unknown) Report on Hazardous Materials Data Incidents,Notifications, and Complaints in Contra Costa County, 1989-1996. Contra Costa Health Services (August 8, 1997) 1997 Selected Facilities Incident List. Contra Costa Health Services(January 15, 1998) Tosco Avon Refinery Maintenance project Initial Study/Proposed Mitigated Negative Declaration. Contra Costa Community Development (date unknown) Comments submitted by Citizens for a Better Environment regarding the proposed mitigated negative declaration(September 2, 1998) Supplemental staff report to the Contra Costa County Planning Commission(September 8, 1998) Media Coverage "Deal reached on law on oil refinery safety,"Centra Costa Times, date unknown. "Tosco Avon Refinery gets first permit under`96 Safety Law," Contra Costa Times, October 7, 1998 "Community Groups Demand Investigation into Industry Abuse in Refinery Law Battle--Public Meetings Announced,"Citizens for a Better Environment/Sierra Club media release, September 30, 1998 "Refinery, Unions back proposed changes to safety ordinance,"680 Business Journal, October, 1998 17 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) "Public Hearings on Replacing Good Neighbor Ordinance Law Expected to Show Public Mistrust of Supervisors' New Proposal,"Citizens for a Better Environment media advisory, October 14, 1938 "Martinez Hearing on Replacing good Neighbor Law Reveals Industry Public Relations Scheme to Demonstrate `Community Support' for Industry Proposal," Citizens for a Better Environment/Sierra Club media release, October 15, 1998 Comments from Public Meetings Videotapes of public meetings October 7, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 29, 1998 Audiotapes of public meetings October 14& 15, 1998 Summary notes prepared by county staff of October 28 public meeting Flipchart notes from October 7, 1998 public meeting Letter to Supervisor Uilkema from Howard Adams, August 11, 1998,with attachment: CLCD interoffice memo Final Committee Report of Ad Hoc Committee, May 7, 1996. "Improvements Needed to Make New `Industrial Safety ' Ordinance Enforceable and Effective for Impacted Communities,"Citizens for a Better Environment, date unknown Other Draft recommendations from the Hazardous Materials Commission regarding the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Summary and full text of Passaic County,N.J. Neighborhood Hazard Prevention Law, enacted September 8, 1998. Provided by the New Jersey Work Environmental Council through Citizens for a Better Environment. 18 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chenucal Studies(NICS) Appendix D: EVALUATION OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY'S HAZARD SCORING METHODOLOGY Contra Costa County, California uses a point scaring system to evaluate the degree of hazard associated with land use projects. One objective of this regulation is to encourage the use of chemicals,transportation, and siting that results in a project with hazards that are below an established threshold value, and are thus considered to have minimal risks. The incentive to project owners is to eliminate the need to go through the expensive and time consuming process of obtaining a land use permit for those projects that have a hazard score less than the threshold.value. Several examples of the application of the scoring methodology to real life examples were provided by the Health Services Department, Hazardous Materials Program. The formula used to calculate the hazard score is straight-forward and should be within the capabilities of most individuals to evaluate. The evaluation of the project information to obtain the data necessary for each of the variables in the formula is also straight forward for most projects. Each of the project scenarios were reviewed, and each option was considered for those projects. For the formula provided, it appears that a hazard score of 80 points is a reasonable threshold value. The Hazard Scores obtained in many cases did a good job of representing the hazards associated with the process. There are however, some areas where the scoring system can be improved. Percentage Increase The hazard score is in part determined by the increase in the amount of hazardous materials that the new project or change-in-risk project uses or produces, calculated as a percent over the base value. It appears that in some cases,the project owner could stay under the threshold value for numerous incremental expansions that would exceed the threshold value in aggregate. A potential solution to this is to have a baseline based on a certain fixed date, or the average of the past three years,whichever gives the highest score. Multiple Chemicals Many processes will have multiple hazardous raw materials, or multiple products. The examples provided show that the Hazard Score is determined for each individual chemical and the highest score for a single chemical is then selected to represent the score for the project. This methodology could cause some hazardous projects to be considered as having minimal risk when the hazards may actually be significant. In many incidents,multiple sections of the process and/or 19 Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NICS) multiple chemicals are involved. This is certainly the case for most fires and would also be the case for many other types of leaks or releases. Consideration should be given to, in some way, taking into account that several hazardous materials are present. Process Considerations Scenario B-3 provided by the HSD concerns the installation of a new MTBE process that will use an existing isobutylene stream, and methanol that will need to be brought into the facility. The Hazard Score determined for this process was relatively low at 79 because only the hazards associated with the new methanol requirements were considered. Under the existing ordinance 96-50, the hazards associated with the existing isobutylene were not considered because it was already in the facility. This methodology does not take into consideration that a new process unit needs to be constructed, and that the hazards will, as a result, necessarily increase. A pipeline or a tank containing a chemical is inherently safer than a chemical process that uses or manufactures that same chemical. It is not uncommon for a refinery or chemical plant to build a new processing unit that uses raw materials exclusively from the facility. The methodology shown would not consider the new process to have any significant hazards and no land use permit would be required. Considering the impact of on-site chemicals used as raw materials could eliminate this problem. However, in the proposed ISO, this possibility is also eliminated with the addition of the required land use permit for new projects using Hazard Category A or B chemicals. Distance to Receptor The table for determining the"Distance to Community" factor D, does not take into consideration the mobility of the hazardous material. Gases, vapors, and smoke will travel much further than a solid or liquid material. By not distinguishing between the mobility of the hazardous materials, the table penalizes low mobility materials while being lenient to high mobility materials. For certain gases that have very low limits for toxic exposure,releases may have the potential for serious health impacts beyond the 3 miles shown in the Hazard Score tables. Consideration should be given to providing tables that take mobility into consideration or providing adjusted factors for volatile materials. Conclusion No information was provided concerning the rationale behind the proposed.Hazard Score formula. The formula contains most of the variables that affect hazards if you assume that the DOT hazard rating is appropriate for a process facility. The way that the variables are used in the formula however,is not completely logical. For example, the formula indicates that the amount of hazardous material and the distance to the receptor 20 _.. ...._. ......... ...__.._. .. . ........... ....__...... ......... ......... _..... _. ... ..... ......... ......... _ . ................................................................................._..........__. _............................... Report to the Contra Costa Board of Supervisors National Institute for Chemical Studies(NILS) are independent of the hazards associated with the materials. That is, 20 tons of methyl isocyanate and 20 tons of dirt contaminated with fuel oil would both have the same value in the hazard score as far as the A and D factors are concerned. Yet the MIC has the potential for killing or seriously injuring tens, or hundreds of thousands of people but the dirt does not. Even though the formula developed scores that were realistic for many of the scenarios, there were others where it did not strongly correlate with the risk in the described project. Consideration should be given to further developing the formula so , that it better represents the risks associated with development projects. 21 cd ray 4 fs cn e C, 0 � a� �y t•y 0 z Ac c e O � � ami � 'rt .µ •� cu ro tw fltom + z cd u o cq 0 c ,v " va $. a a w, - r'v � cli 0toaf -r4 ° to -j viz 0 o0 o to ca * 0 w rnsr w Sv ST a� 0 c� o � as v m a ` ccscd �. > c� 4-4 o 4t 4-4 c„ Cd to + c+ (D ` Cl) Ic . o C6 C13 -� . � v o v v n. 0 `n fiL 3J .- pY cn o �' 0xi � w 0 4.0. o 504 2 Cd •-. o 43 . . • 4+ 0. ba "Zi cn rn btt ami IR, u 0 co 0 ,. ori 0 .0 C-4ci W � tlS U MEM0101298.00c DRAFT 10/2919$ ATTACHMENT E Section III. C of the preamble to the federal Accidental Release Prevention Requirements. Risk Management Programs, 40 CFR Part 68, states the following: "EPA agrees that an informed public is a key element of a sound chemical emergency prevention, preparedness, and response. However, EPA also believes that it is essential for the public to focus on the information essential at the local level for prevention, preparedness, and response and has decided to maintain its proposed requirement that the RMP provide certain information about the risk management programs at a source. EPA notes that its previous use of the word summary was not intended to imply that the source prepares a "full" RMP document from which a source extracts summary information that is shared with the public. Rather, the source is obligated to develop certain information about the hazards, prevention, and emergency response programs from the array of documentation at the source to prepare an RMP. EPA believes it would be impractical to require sources to share all documentation used for the safe operation of the processes at a source. Not only is much of this information likely to be confidential, but significant technical expertise and time are necessary to extract, understand, and to make meaningful judgements about the adequacy of the information. The RMP will consist of an executive summary and required data elements addressing all elements of the risk management program as described below. Detailed supporting documentation will be maintained on site available to the implementing agency for review." Additionally, page 31713 subsection IV of the federal preamble states the following: "...The summary shall include brief description of the following items: the source's prevention and emergency response approach, the stationary source and regulated substances, worst-case release scenarios) and alternative release scenarios), including any administrative controls applied to limit the release quantity; the general prevention program and chemical-specific prevention steps; the five-year accident history; the emergency response program;; and planned changes to improve safety. EPA anticipates that none of these :items should require more than a half page of text." mEmol01398A.DOC APPENDIX B CCHS REDLINE DRAFT ORDINANCE NO. 98- INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the official text of the enacted or amended provisions of the County ordinance Code): SECTION 1. SUMMARY. This ordinance adds Chapter 450-8 to the County Ordinance Code. Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations which supplement the requirements of California Health and Safety Code Article 2 (commencing with section 25531) of Chapter 6.95 concerning hazardous materials management by enacting measures to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental releases of regulated substances that have the potential to cause significant harm to the public health and increase participation by industry and the public to improve accident prevention. These measures include submission of a Safety Plan to the County, stringent requirements for the contents of a Safety Plan and Safety Program, public review of the Safety Plan,authorization for the County to require changes in the Safety Plan or Safety Program,_an expansion of the list of regulated substances beyond those covered by RMP, and �e�rsauthorizaton of the County to expand audits and inspections to all units within the Stationary Source. Root Cause is required for all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. A public outreach and information program is established This ordinance substantially readopts Chapter 84-63, originally added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance No. 96-50, and repeals Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-50. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as added by this ordinance, set forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material which encourage business and other entities,in planning such projects, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Article 84-62.14 is readopted in its entirety. SECTION IL Chapter 450-8 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read: CHAPTER 450-8 RISK MANAGEMENT 45{1-8.0€12 BACKGROUND and FINDINGS. The Board of Supervisors on Contra Costa County finds as follows: (a) Recent incidents in Contra Costa County at industrial chemical, petrochemical, and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews, inspections, and audits that supplement existing federal and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public health and safety from accidental releases. 11119/98 Page 1 __ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (b) Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(4)) required the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to promulgate the "Risk Management Program" intended to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur. All Sta4en -facilities subject to the federal regulation must prepare a Risk Management Plan based on a Risk Management Program established at the Visite, that includes a hazard assessment of the facility and accidental release prevention program,and an emergency response program(44-Q CFR.§68.12). The g�-faciliiy must submit the federal RMP to the EPA by June 21, 1999 (440 CFR § 68.10). The federal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (c) The California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1, 1997 to implement the federal EPA's Risk Management Program rule with certain state-specific amendments. The State's RMP is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention(CalARP)Program. (d) The County recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safety, and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention, preparedness, and response at the local level. Preventing accidental releases of regulated substances is the shared responsibility of industry, government, and the public. The first steps toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and assessing the risks. Once information about chemical hazards in the community is openly shared, industry, government, and the community can work together towards reducing the risk to public health and safety. (e) The success of a Safety Program is dependent upon the cooperation of industrial chemical and oil refining facilities within Contra Costa County. The public must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented, including changes or actions required by the Department or the Stationary Source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS, (a) The purpose of this ordinance is to impose regulations which improve industrial safety by the following: (1) requiring the conduct of process hazards analysis for Covered Processes handling hazardous materials not covered by RMP; (2) requiring the review of action items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the Stationary Source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3) requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of Stationary Sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and analysis for the determination of the Root Cause for certain incidents; (4) providing review,inspection, auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and regulations; (5) providing for public review of the Safety Plan; (6) facilitating cooperation between industry, the County, and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at Stationary Sources; 11/19/98 Page 2 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (7) expanding the application of certain provisions of the fe4efel-RMP to processes not covered by the F44W-RMP;and (8) requiring the development of a written human factors program. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.006 AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.008 ADMINISTRATION. The Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.010 APPLICABILITY. (a) This ordinance shall apply to Stationary Sources, and (b) The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except,Sections 450- 8.01.6(e) and(g),and Sections 8.01&ft and(g): (1) storage tanks -containing a notated substance,except for storage tanks that contain a material that meets the combustible liquid definition of 49CFRI73.120fb),. (2) drum storage.,of a non-regulated substance,• less than 10 000 Bounds of a HazardCategory B material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release• and for a Hazard Cg g ary A material located such that the drums could reasonably be expected to be involved in a single release,less than the rguantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity onthe Extremely Hazardous Materials list-j6"endix A to 40 CFR Chapter I Subcha ter J Part 355, as amended from-time to time or 500 unds whichever is less. (3) activities in process plant laboratories_ or laboratories that are under the supervision of a technically qualified individual as defined in Section 720.3(ee)of 40 CFR. This exemn tion doe nota 1 to s ial chem production; rimanufacture, pr_..c�essm. or use of substances in pilo plant scale ol2eratiLo= ar�d activities conducted outside the laboratory. (4) utilities, except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit. (5) any waste tank& containers or other devices subject to the federal and state hazardous waste laws Resource Conservation and Recove Ac C 40 CFR Chapter I. Subchapter I. commencing with Part 260 d the California:Hazardous Waste Control Law, California Health and Safety Code romrnencing_wi�th 11/19/98 Page 3 _........ ......... ......... ....._... .............._.......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .... ......... ......... ......... ......... _ ........................................................................................ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Section 25100, and California Code of Regulations Title 22 division 4.5 Environmental Health Standards for the Management of Hazardous Waste. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450$.012 INSPECTION. The Department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter and to supporting documentation retained by the Source for the purpose of determining compliance with this chapter. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 45-{0-8.014 DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this chapter the definitions set forth in this section shall apply. Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40 CFR § 68.3) and in California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95, unless the context indicates otherwise. u xy (ab) "Covered Process"means any process -at a Stationary Source' (_be) "Department"means the Contra Costa County Health Services Department. (cd) "Feasible" means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,taking into account economic,and technological factors. (do) "Industry Codes and Standards" means the edition of the codes and standards in effect at the time of original design or construction for the design, construction, alteration, maintenance or repair of process units, industrial equipment, or other industrial facilities, structures or buildings published by the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CASA), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASE)or the American National Standards Institute(ANSI). e _"Inherently Safer Systems" means Inherently Safer Design Strategies as discussed in the 1996 Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication "Inherently Safer Chemical Processes"and means Feasible alternative equipment,processes,materials, lay- oats, and procedures meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a Major Chemical Accident or Release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples including, but not limited to,substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure, lower flammability,or lower toxicity, isolation of hazardous processes; and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. 11/19198 page 4 __ ......... ......... ..._..__. ......... ._....... ......... ......... ............_.. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _ .................................................................................................. _ ........ ..... ............................................ .......................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (fg) "Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that the Department determines meets the definition of a Level 2 or Level 3 Incident in the Community Warning System incident level classification s s� tem defined in the 9/27197 county guideline for the Community Warning System, or results in the release of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) results in one or more fatalities; (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or more persons, (3) causes on and/or off-site property damage mcludin clean-u and restoration activities) initially estimated t $500,000 or more. Can-site estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off--site estimates shall be performed bv- Fprolrriate agencies and compiled by the Department, (4)--_4) flammable vapor clouds of more than 5000 pounds. (gh) "Regulated Substance" means (1) any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California Health and Safety Code section 25532 (g), as amended from time to time, or (2) a'substance which is listed in Hazard Categories A or B in section 84- 63.1016. Mixtures containing less than 1% of a Regulated Substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. Lhi) "RMP" means the Risk Management Plan required to be submitted and Risk Management Program requited to be implemented pursuant to the requirements of the California Health and Safety Code article 2(Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95. &f) "Root Cause" means prime reasons, such as failures of some management systems, that allow faulty design, inadequate training, or improper changes, which lead to an unsafe act or condition, and result in an incident. If root causes were removed, the particular incident would not have occurred. (ilk) "Safety Plan" means the Safety Plan which is required to be; submitted to the Department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.016 of the chapter. Wsafety Progrram°' means the documentation. development, implementation and into tion of m e ent s sterns _by the SIgt2nM Source to cam l with the safe requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016. Q) "Stationary Source" or "Source" means a facility which includes processes u s-as ' defined in 40 CFR 68.1 that are subject to federal Risk Management Program Level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code (NAICS) is 324 (Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing) or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 11114/98 Page 5 ......._. ......... ......._. ..........._......._... ......... ......... ......... .._........_. .... _. ._.__.... ......... ......... ......... ......... ...................................................................................................... ._.............................. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 450.8.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.Uaa The Stationary Source shall submit a Safety Plan to the Department within one year of the effective date of this ordinance that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection (qac,;) below. In addition, the Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections (lac)through (eg) of this section and include a description of the manner of compliance in the Safety Plan. 1 A facility that becomes a StationM Source after the effective a of this ordinance shall submit a Safety Plan to the Department within three years of becoming a Stationary Source that that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection c below. In a0bi-tiom the StatifflM Source shall coml2ly with the safe re uirements set forth in subsections c through of this section and include a description of the manner of compliance in the Safety Plan. (2) A new covered process at an existing Stationary Source shall comply with Sections c) through(g)ILnor to initial startup. (ac-) RMP Elements. = Covered Processes RMA-shall be subject to the RMP program 3 elements and emergency response plograrn listedbelow. The Safety Plan shall include a description of the manner in which the RMP elements listed below shall be applied to the Covered Process. These RMP elements shall be implemented in conformance with RMP and the Safety Plan shall follow Cb tees 6 and 7 dated July 1 1998. and Chapter 9 dated November 2, 1998 of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department Risk Management Plan guidance document,June 1998. ♦ Process Safety Information a Operating Procedures ♦ Employee Participation ♦ Training-for each employee in such Covered Process ♦ Mechanical Integrity-including the use of Industry Codes and Standards ♦ Management of Change Pre Start-Up Sett Reviews ♦ Com In lance Audits ♦ Incident Investigation: The written wmmm of an incident investigation required by-Section-2755.7 of the CaIARP regulations shall indicate whether the cause of the incident and/or recommendations resulting from the invest /ion are s cific only to the rocess or NWgment involved in the incWgnt or are Wficable to other processes or equipment at the ►tionary source. The incident investigation report shall be made available to the Department upon req-ugt r Hot Work ♦ Contractors ♦ Emergency Response Prograrn 11/19/98 Wage 6 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (bd) Human Factors Program. (1) Stationary Sources shall develop a written human factors program that follows the Gefga Gesta Couffty WeAlth 5ZAptiges wpV814ffieHt udance document developed or adapted by the DepartrnentThe praram shall be developed within one year following the issuance of the Countv guidance documents or the effective date of the ordinances whichever is later. The Human Factors Program shall4hat-addressee: (i) the inclusion of human factors in the Process Hazards Analysis process; (ii) the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for incident that could reasonably hav resulted in a Major Chemical Accident or Release; (iii) the training of employees in the human factors program; (iv) operating procedures;and (v) the requirement to conduct Management of Change prior to staffing changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations or emergency response. Employees and their Representatives shall be given;the opportunity to participate in such Management of Changes. (2) Employees and their Representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3) The program shall include, but not be limited to, issues such as staffing, shiftwork and overtime. (4) A description of the human factors program (4)(1) through (d)(3) above shall be included in the Safety Plan prepared by the Stationary Source. (eee) Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. Stationary Sources shall conduct a Root Cause analysis for each Major Chemical .Accident or Release which occurs after the effective date of this on facts related to the release or incident and the status of a Root Cause areal sis conducted ursuant to this section at mcetipgs scheduled h the Demartnignt and the Sgg2n=Source. To the maximum extent feasible the De ,artment and Statin Source shall coordinate these meetm s with other a encies with jurisdietim over the statimM source. The StatignM Source shall allow the Department to review the final Root Cause anal sis re2grt including recommendations to be implemented lemeented to mitigate against the release or incident re-occurring. Within 30 days of corn tin a Root Cause_gn&sis Wrfomod nursuant to this section, the Stationary Source shall submit a written sUmMM of the Root Cans anal sis to the Dgpartment that includes the recommendations to be i emented and a schedule f com letion of the recommendations. The methodology of the Root Cause analysis shah be one of the recommended methodologies from the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall be reviewed by the Department to determine substantial equivalency. The Department may elect to do its own independent Root Cause analysis or incident investigation for a Major Chemical Accident or Release. if the Department elects to conduct a Root Cause analysis or incident investigation. the Stationary Source shall cooperate with the Department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of 11/19/98 Page 7 _ _...... ................................ . _ _ _.... ......... ......... ......... .._............ ....... _ _ .... ........... ......... ......... ......... ......... _ . ...................................................................................................... _ ................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Department and Stationary Source personnel and without placing undue burdens on the operation of the Stationary Source: (i) allow the Department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms, physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment, (ii) provide the Department with pertinent documentation, (iii) and allow the Department to conduct independent interviews of Stationary Source employees, subject to all rights of the Stationary Source and employees to be represented by legal counsel and/or management and union representatives during such interviews. If in the course of the Department's Root Cause analysis or incident investigation, access is required to areas of the Stationary Source which in the judgement of the Stationary Source require personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the Department shall provide it's personnel with such equipment and training. To the maximum extent feasible the Department shall coordinate any Root Cause analysis or_incident investigation-it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source to minimize the adverse impacts on the Stationary Source and/or its employees. No part of the conclusions, findings or recommendations of the Root Cause analysis or incident investigation conducted by the Department or Stationary Source, relating to any Major Chemical Accident or Release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. (df) Process Hazard*Analysis/Action Items. UProcess hazards analyses will be conducted for each of the Covered Processes not included in the federal program level 3 RMP according to one of the following methods: t What-If ♦ Checklist ♦ What-If/Checklist ♦ Hazard and Operability Study_(HAZOP) ♦ Failure Mode and Effects Analysis(F EA) ♦ Fault Tree Analysis-, or * An anr2rox>riate equivalent methodology VRroved by the Department prior to conducting the process hazard analysis. speeified=4a .The process hazards analyses shall be conducted within 1 year of the effective date of this Chapter and no later than the submittal date of the Safety Plan. Previously completed process hazards analyses that comply with Section 5189 of Title 8 of CCR or CaIARP are acceptable for the purposes of this Chapter. LUProcess hazards analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least every>5 years after completion of the initial PHA Updated and rev i& I�HA(S completed to ggmamly with Section 5189 of Title 8of CCR or CalARP are tab/ f>r mer the update and revalidation requirement. 21/19198 Page 8 _........ ......... ......... ......_.. .......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ..........._.. .... . ._...._. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ....................................................................................... ................. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (41 All PHAs shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations. and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific PHA methodology being used as Sa4ty ). (51 External events, including seismic events shall be considered for processes containing, a substance defined in the California Code of R aglations Title 19 Chapter 4.51, Section 2770.5 if the distance to the nearest public recti top r for a wo release scenario specified by the-California Code of Re ulations Title 19, Chapter 4.5 1, Section 2750.3 is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable en_Mint as defined in California Code of Regulations Title 19, Chanter 4.5 1 Section 2750.2Ca). to For all covered processes, the Stationary Source shall consider the use of Inherently Safer Systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazards analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities. aFor all Covered Processes, the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source as follows. all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed within one year alter submittal of the Safety Plan; all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround of the applicable process subsequent to one year after submittal of the Safety Plan unless the Stationary Source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Department that such a schedule is infeasible. For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall retain documentation of closure, and any associated justifications,of actions identified by the process hazards analysis. (eg) Accident History, The Stationary Source shall include in the Safety Plan an k accident history of all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases from June 1, 1992, through the date of Safety Plan submittal to the Department. For each Major Chemical Accident or Release the Stationary Source shall report the following information,to the extent known. date,time and approximate duration of the release; chemicals released; estimated quantity released in pounds; type of release event and it's source; weather conditions at the time of the release; on-site impacts;' known off-site impacts; initiating event and contributing factors; Root Cause(s); 11/19/98 Page 9 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT whether off--site responders were notified, and operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. (2) The Stationary Source shall annually submit an accident history report to the 13 artment. The first annual retort shall be due two years after this effective date of this ordinance, and subsequent reports shall be due on the anniversaries„ref the effective date of the ordinance. 450-8.018 REVIEW,AUDIT,AND INSPECTION. (a) Upon submittal of a Safety Plan by the Stationary Source, the Department shall review the Plan to determine if all the elements re aired by Section 450-8.015 are included and cornDlete. The-Doo—rtm- pat shall Rtovide the StatioRM Source a written Notice of Deficiencies. lbe.StationM Source shall have, 60 calendar days from receipt of the Notice of Deficiencies to make any corrections The Stationm Source ma asst in writin a one time 30 calendar day extension to correct deficiencies. By the end of the 50 calendar days or-my,extension period.the sWfionary source shall resu m it the revised safe Plan to the Department.—and-After:the Department determines that the Safety Plan is complete T-the Department shall issue a public notice per the Department's Public Participation Policy and make portions of the Safety Plan which are not protected trade secret information available for public review. Public comments on the Safety Plan shall be taken by the Department for a period of 45-34 days after the S_ afety Plan is made available to the public. The Department shall schedule a public meeting per the Department's Public Participation Policy on the Stationary Source's Safety Plan within the 4540day comment period (4h) UBased upon the Department's review of and public comment on the Safety Plain or, following a safety inspection or incident inspection dome pursuant to Seefigns f or (g), or following an audit required by Section tea, the Department may require modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Prog m submitted by the Stationary Source to bring the 5gfet y Plan or Safety Program into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program are required, and any determination that no modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety Program are required shall be in writing, (collectively referred to as the " reliminary Determination") shall be mailed to the Stationary Source and shall be made available to the public. Preliminary ,Determination shall incl de an ex lanation for I the s_of the revisions reflecting ja4u--s4y standards anduideline su h as AI hEICCPS guidelines and ASME and API standards to the extent that such euidelines are applicable, and shall' include a timetable for their implementation. (2) The Station Source shall respond in writing to g Preliminary Determination made in accordance with Section. The response shall state that StationStationga Source will im lament the revisions contained in the PrelimiaM Determination or shall state that the Stationary Source refects the revisions in whole or in For each rejected revision. the Stationary Source shall explain the basis fir rejecting such: revision Such explanation may include substitute revisions. 11/19/98 'age 10 __ _. .. ......._. ......... ......... ......__. ........ ........... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _ ................................................................................................................................................. . .............................................................................. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (3) The written response under Section 1b)2) shall be received by the D,eyaartment within 90 days of the issue of the Preliminary Determination or a shorter time the Department specifies in the Preliminary Determination as necessary to protect public health and the environment. Prior to the written response being due and uvon written request from the Stationary Source the Department may provide in writing additional time for the response to be received. (4) After receiving the response from the Stationary Source required in Section(b)(3) the Dmartment the Dep—artnient will issue a nublic notice per the Poartment's Public Participation Policy making both the-PrelimiM Determination and the Station Sources me nse available for a 45-public review and comment period. The Department will schedule a public meeting per the Department's Public Participation Policy on the PrelimiaM Determination and the Station=Sources responses within the 45-da ublic response period. (5) Following the public review and comment period required in Section jb)(4) the Department shall issue a Final Determination of necessary revisions to the Safely Plan and Safety Program to the Stationary Source. The department shall develop a time table for implementing these revisions to consultation with the Stationm Source The Final Determination may adapt or modify the substitute revisions provided in the response under Section (b)(2). A Final Determination that adapts a revision rejected by the Stationary Source shall include an explanation for the basis for adapting a revision A Final Determination that does not adol2t a substitute revisionprovided under Section (b)(2) shall include an explanation of the basis for finding such substitute revision unreasonable. The Department shall snake the Final Determination available for public review per the Department's Public Participation Policy (6) The Department may not impose additional requirements in a Safety Plan or Safety Program which would cause a violation of, or conflict with, any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency } 11/19/98 Page 11 __ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (c) Within 30 days of the Department's Final Determination made Dirsuant to Section (b)t5)on the Safety Plan and Safety Prokram the Stationaa source and/or any person may Meal the Final Determination to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14 4 by a verified written notice of anneal filed with the Clerk of the Board of supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee The appeal must be limited to issues raised in comments submitted during the public comment period The notice shall state the arounds for any such appeal. in acting on the s eal the Board shall have the same authority over the Safety Plan and SO Program as the Department The decision of the Board of Supervisors shall be final with respect to the Safety Plan and Safety Program F (d) The Safety Plan shall be valid for a period of three to five years at the discretion of the Department from the date of final action and shall be reviewed and updated by the Stationary Source every three to five years at the discretion of the Department pursuant to the_LeguireMents of this ordinance. Any revisions to the Safety Pl?- as a result of the review and update shall be submitted to the Department and shall be subject to the provisions of this Section. The Department shall review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 at least once eyM three years Audits will be prioritized according to the follsw jM criteria. (1) Accident history of the Stationary Source. (2) Accident history of other Stationary Sources in the carne industry. (3) Quamiiy of Regulated Substances present at the StationM Source, (4) Location of the Stationary Source and its proximity to the public and environmental receptors, (5) The presence of specific regdated substances (6) The hazards identified in the Safety Plan. The Stationary Source shall allow the E7epartment to conduct these audits The Department, at its option, mgy select an outside consultant to assist in conducting said audit. ff) Within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release the Dwartment may commence a gafe1y inspection to review,and audit the StationarSource's,compliance therp ovislons of Section 450-8.016. T e Stationary Source shall allow the Demrtment to conduct these ' flans. The Poartment at its option, ma,y select aq consultant to assist in conducting sa�dd inspection. f ) Within 30 -days of a Ma Chemical Accident or Release, the Department may commence an incident ''fiction with respect to the process involved in the incident 0411—ant to the provisions of Section 450-8.()16 11/19/98 Page 12 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT appeal filed- A,A-40h- Ohe Gwc of tha Re"d of gepen,issrs and payment ef tho "lisable appeal &e., this er-di hA he (+:h) Nothing in this section shall preclude, limit, or interfere in any way with the authority of the County to exercise its enforcement, investigatory, and information gathering authorities underany other provision of law nor shall anything in the Chapter effect or diminish the rights of the Stationary Source to claim legal privileges such as attorney client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the Department. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.020 TRADE SECRET. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section 25538, as amended from time to time,or as otherwise protected or required by law. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.022 COMMUNITY OUTREACH. The Department shall by December 31, 1998, employ an ombudsperson for Hazardous Materials Programs. The ornbudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in Contra Costae County regarding environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about Hazardous Materials Programs. The ornbudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the Department. The ombudsperson's role will be one of `complaint prevention" as well as investigating concerns and complaints, facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs,procedures, or issues. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BANK The Department shall collect and provide ready access, including the use of electronic accessibility as reasonably available, to public documents which are relevant to the goals of this chapter, including at a minimum, business plan inventories and emergency response plans, Risk Management Plans, Safety Plans, and Department incident reports. This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 11/19198 Page 13 ......... ......... .._......11.11 ...._. .......... ......._._. ......... ......... ......... ._....... ......... ......... ......... ................. .......... _........ ......... ......... ......... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 450-8.026 FEES. The Department may, upon a majority vote of the Board of Supervisors, adopt a schedule of fees to be collected from each Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter. Any review, inspection, audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those costs reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter, including costs of staff and/or consultant time or public hearings and administrative overhead. The fee schedule shall include the cost of the ombudsperson position. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.028 PENALTIES. Regardless of the availability of other civil or administrative remedies and procedures for enforcing this chapter, every act or condition prohibited or declared unlawful by this chapter, and every knowing or willful failure or omission to act as required herein, is a violation of this code and shall be punishable and or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-6 of the County Ordinance Code specifically including but not limited to Article 14-6.4 thereof(public nuisance). (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) SECTION Ill. ORDINANCE NO. 96-50. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-50 is Hereby repealed. SECTION IV. ORDINANCE NO. 96-20. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance 96-50, is modified and added to the County Ordinance Code. CHAPTER 84-63 LAND USE PERMITS FOR.DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN'V'OLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL Article 84-63.2 General Ordinance No. 98- (Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Material) The Contra Costa: County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Code): 11/19'98 Page 14 ......... ......... ......... ......... ........ . ..... .............._....._.. ......_.. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......._. .......................................................................................................................................................................... ........................................ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT SECTION I. SUMMARY. The County Ordinance Code requires land use permits for the specified development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material in the L-I light industrial, W-3 controlled heavy industrial, and H-I heavy industrial land use districts. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 86-100, regulates land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material. This ordinance repeals Chapter 84-63, and adds a new Chapter 84-63 in its place. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as added by this ordinance, sets forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material, which encourages business and other entities, in planning the project, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of the new Chapter 84-63 continue to require land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. Article 84-53.12 of Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 90-73, is renumbered and readapted in its entirety as Article 84-63.14. SECTION H. Chapter 84-63 of the County Ordinance Code, added by Ordinance No. 86-100 and amended by Ordinances Nos. 9149, 90-92 and 90-73, is repealed in its entirety, and is replaced by new Chapter 84-63,added by Section III of this ordinance. SECTION IIL Chapter 84-63 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read: 84-63.202 Purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to promote the health, safety and general welfare of residents and persons in the County by encouraging businesses and other entities, in planning and developing projects involving hazardous material or hazardous waste, to consider factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community, and by requiring land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. (Ords. 98-_ § 5,96-50,96-20, 90-92, 86- 100.) 84-63.204 Conflict. This chapter is not intended, and should not be deemed, to prevent or preempt compliance with federal or state laws, regulations, rules or orders, or to excuse compliance with any other County ordinance, including other requirements of this code. (Ords. 98-_§5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.4 Definitions 84-63.402 General. As used in this chapter,the words and phrases defined in this article shall have the meanings given unless the context otherwise requires. (Ords. 98-_§ 5,96-50,96-20.) 11/19/98 Page 15 __ _... ............................... ......_.... 1.11.1 ............. _...._... ..._..... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ..............._. ............................................................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 84-63.404 "Baseline Period." "Baseline period" means the consecutive twelve month period of time during which activity is measured for purposes of this chapter. The baseline period shall be any twelve consecutive month period within five years of the date of the submittal of the application that is reflective of a normal year of operation. (Ords. 98 § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.406 "Change-in-risk project." A "change-in-risk project" means a new use of an existing building, structure,or facility, not involving construction other than minor alterations, which use will involve ahazardous material or hazardous waste in a higher hazard category and which use will result in a hazard score higher than the hazard score of the previous use. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.408 "Commercial property." "Commercial property" means all properties with a commercial designation in the general plan including but not limited to the following. commercial, regional commercial, airport commercial, office, and business parr. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.410 "Development project." (a) A "development project" means a new permanent building, structure or facility to be constructed that will manage hazardous materials or hazardous waste, or a permanent change-in-risk project. As used in this section, "permanent" when used to describe a building, structure, or facility, or the new use of an existing building, structure, or facility (change-in-risk project) means that the building, structure, facility or use is intended to be in operation for more than six months. (b)A "development project" does not include: (1) Pipelines and related equipment more than 300 feet from commercial or residential property. Related equipment includes, but is not limited to, items such as valves, fittings, pipe supports, insulation, instrumentation, corrasion protection systems, heat tracing systems, leak containment systems, and fire protection systems. Related equipment does not include storage tanks, storage vessels, process units or plants, mechanical rotating equipment (e.g., pumps, compressors, motors, turbines, internal combustion engines, etc.). However, the Zoning Administrator may determine, at the Zoning Administrator's sole discretion, that minor equipment defined above as not related is exempt from the ordinance. (2) Any project consisting only of maintenance, repair, and replacement or minor modification of existing equipment provided the storage design capacity is not increased and the hazard category of hazardous material or hazardous waste handled is not increased. (3) Any transportable treatment unit that has obtained all required permits and is used solely for site remediation or waste treatment purposes, provided the transportable 11119198 Page 16 ......... ......... ............._. ......... .. .......... .......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _.... . ... ._....... ......... ......... ......... ......... ...................... . .................................................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT treatment unit will be located on site for a maximum time limit of one year. The Director of Community Development will have the authority to grant a one year time extension if the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director that the unit is temporary. Otherwise, a land use permit will be required if the unit will remain on the site beyond the time limit specified above. (4) Any project for which permit applications have been deemed complete on or before the effective date of this chapter by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District or other government agency with jurisdiction over the project provided the project application has been deemed complete within one calendar year and has completed CEQA documentation. The proponent of a project described by subsection (4) of subdivision(b) of this section may elect to be subject to the requirements of this chapter in lieu of any requirements in effect prior to the effective date of this chapter. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) 84-63.412 "Dispose." "Dispose" means to discharge, deposit, inject,dump, or place any hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.414 "Equipment." "Equipment" means pipes, pumps, vessels and other similar types of apparatus. j (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.416 "Facility." "Facility" means a group of buildings, structures, or units with the same purpose on contiguous parcels (including parcels separated by a right-of-way, as defined in section 1002-2.002 of this Code)under common ownership or control. (Ords. 98-- § 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.418 "Finished Product" means a material which can be scald to market as a commodity. 84-63.420 "Hazardous material." "Hazardous material" means any material that, because of its quantity,concentration,or physical or chemical characteristics,poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if released:into the workplace or the environment, and includes any material that is listed in the Cade of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Section 172. 101 (Hazardous Materials Table),as amended from time to time. (Ords. 98-_ § 5,96-50, 96-20, 86.100.) 84-63.422 "Hazardous waste." "Hazardous waste" means any substance which is regulated as a hazardous waste by the California Department of Health Services under 22 11/19/98 Page 17 ....... ......... ......... ......... ......... ....... .........._... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ............_. ._.. _. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... -- ....................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT California Administrative Code, Division 4, Chapter 30, or defined as a hazardous waste under Health& Safety Code section 25117,generally as follows: (a) "Hazardous waste" means either of the following (1) A waste, or combination of wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristic may either: (A) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible,or incapacitating reversible illness. (B) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or environment when improperly treated, stored,transported,or disposed of,or otherwise managed. (2) A waste which meets any of the criteria for the identification of a hazardous waste adopted by the State Department of Toxic Substance Control pursuant to the Health & Safety Code section 2514 1. (b) "Hazardous waste" includes,but is not limited to,federal Resource Conservation and Recover Act("RCRA")hazardous waste, extremely hazardous waste and acutely hazardous waste. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) 84-63.424 "Intermediate Product" means a material which requires further process treatment on-site or off-site to produce a finished product which can be sold as a commodity. 84-63.426 "Manage." "Manage" means to generate, treat, store, transport, use or dispose of hazardous material or hazardous waste. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.428 "Process Unit" means a collection of interconnected vessels and equipment designed to separate, purify, react, combine or otherwise chemically or physically alter one or more feed materials, to produce one or more finished or intermediate products and associated wastes, defined by plot or boundary limits. For example, a catalytic cracking unit, a hydrocracking complex, etc. Pieces of a process unit such as pumps, corepressors, towers, reactors, vessels, and ether such equipment and appurtenances, do not constitute a process unit. 84-63.430 "Project Description." "Project description" means a written description and explanation of the construction. and operation of a development project. A project description shall address all phases of and for the life of the project. The project description shall include the following information as well as any other information deemed necessary by the Community Development Director for the purpose of determining the hazard score: 11/19198 Page 18 __ _....... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ....... . . . .. . ....___._..... .......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ............... _...._.. ......... ......... ......... . ........ ......... ... ........................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (a) A description of the facility location with respect to major freeways and immediate neighbors, and the size (in square footage or acreage) of the property on which the facility is located. (b) An area map showing the facility in relationship to the surrounding community, and (c) A description of all significant operations involving hazardous material anchor hazardous waste currently being managed, and/or proposed to be managed, including a brief general history of the facility. (d) A summary of the baseline data for all five years and a justification for the selection of the representative baseline year of data used in the calculation of the hazard score. The Community Development Director may waive the requirement of submitting any or all of the information required by paragraphs(a)through(d), above. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.432 "Residential property". "Residential property" means all properties with a residential designation in the general plan, including but not limited to the following: single family residential, multiple family residential, and mobile homes. (Ords. 98 § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.434 "Sensitive receptor." The term "sensitive receptor" includes schools, general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, licensed child day care facilities, and similarly less-mobile populations, and detention facilities including jails, youth camps and other locked facilities. These facilities have more than twelve people. For the purposes of this section, "general acute care hospital" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1250(a), "long term health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1418(a),and "child day care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1596.750. "School" means any school used for the purpose of the education of more than 12 children in kindergarten or any grades 1 to 12, inclusive. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.436 "Store." "Store" means an act to contain hazardous waste or hazardous material for any period of time in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste or hazardous material. (Ords. 98-- § 5,96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 86-100.) 84-63.438 "Transport`" "Transport" or "transportation" meansan act to move hazardous waste or hazardous material by truck, rail,marine vessel or pipeline. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.6 Applicability 11119198 Page 19 ......... ......._. ......... ......... .............._._. ..... ....__ ..... ..__........ .. ......... ......... ......... ......... ._....... ......... ......... ......... ......_.. _.. ......... ......... ......... ......... .. ....... ......... ...................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 84-63.602 Applicability. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person proposing a development project in the L-1 light industrial district, the W-3 controlled heavy industrial district, or the H-1 heavy industrial district shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. In addition, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person proposing a development project in a P-1 planned unit district on land designated for industrial use in the general plan shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.604 Exemptions. The following projects and structures are exempt from the provisions of this chapter: (a) Any project built solely to comply with federal, state, regional or local agency enforcement orders under a compliance time schedule that precludes timely review under this chapter. This section is primarily intended to allow exemptions for compliance with laws, regulations, rules, or administrative or judicial orders such as nuisance abatement orders or other short-term or immediately necessary actions. This section is not intended to allow automatic exemptions for projects being undertaken to comply with changed federal, state, regional or local laws. A facility claiming an exemption under this section, must file a copy of the enforcement order and proposed project description within thirty(30)days of receipt of the order. (b) If any building, structure, or facility is destroyed or damaged by disasters such as earthquakes, floods, offsite fires, or an act of god or the public enemy,the facility may be rebuilt under the following conditions: (1) The rebuilt project is used for the same purpose as the destroyed damaged project; (2) The rebuilt protect complies with all environmental regulations in effect at the time of rebuilding, including Best Available Control Technology (BACT) or at least the same level of control that previously existed, whichever provides the greater level of protection to the public; (3) The rebuilt project does not have a higher hazard scare than the destroyed or damaged project (both rebuilt and destroyed or damaged project to be scored as if they are new); (4) The hazard category of chemicals used in the rebuilt project is not greater than used by the destroyed or damaged project; (5) Construction is commenced within one year unless an extension is granted by the Community Development Director, (6) The rebuilt project is at bast 300 feet away from the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor and no closer to the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor than the destroyed or damaged proj ect; and (7) The rebuilt project will not manage Hazard Category A materials in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project, will not manage hazardous wastes in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project, will not manage Hazard Category B materials in quantities greater than 10% more than the amount managed by 11119/98 Page 20 CCIS REDLINE DRAFT the destroyed or damaged project, and will not manage Hazard Category C materials in quantities greater than 10% more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project. (c) A development project in which both the size, as defined in section 84-63.1012 and the monthly transportation quantity are less than: (1) for Hazard Category C materials -4000 tons (2)for Hazard Category B materials-5 tons (3) for Hazard Category A materials - the quantity specified:as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials List (Appendix A to 40 C.F.R Chapter I, Subehapter J, Part 355, as amended from time to time), or 500 pounds, whichever is less. (Ords. 98-®§ 5,96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) Article 84-63.8 Standards and Procedures 84-63.802 Application for Applicability Determination; Exemption. Any person proposing a development project which may be used to manage hazardous waste or hazardous material shall apply to the Community Development Director for review and a determination whether a land use permit may be required under Article 84-63.10 or whether the project is exempt under section 84.63.604(a) or (b) or 84-63.60,6. Projects exempt under section 8463.604(c)are not required to submit an application pursuant to this section. If the hazard score of a project is 69 or less and the project does not increase the amount of hazardous waste or hazardous:material managed as compared to the baseline of the last three years, a determination of non-coverage and an application therefor are not required. The application shall include all information necessary to complete and verify the hazard scare of the project, such as chemical identification,distances to nearest receptors, transportation routes, and u summary of the five year baseline data. The application shall be accompanied by all fees established by the Beard of Supervisors. (Ords. 98 § 5,96-50,96-20,91-49, 90-92, 86-1000.) 84-63.804 Application, Review, Determination. No later than ten calendar days after receipt of an application, or the submittal of additional information, the Community Development Director shall inform the applicant in writing that the application is complete or shall inform the applicant what additional information is required. Within twenty calendar days of the application being deemed complete, the Community Development Director shall issue a written determination of non-coverage pursuant to section 8463.806, an exemption pursuant to section 84-63.604 (a) or (b), or a determination that a land use permit is required pursuant to section 84.63.1002. (Ords. 98 §5, 96-50,96-20,90-92.) 11/19198 Page 21 ......... ......... ......... ......... .............. .. ...... ............... .......... ......... ......... ......... ._....... ......... ......... ......... - _ _. ._._. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... . ................................................................. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT 84-63.806 Determination of non-coverage. Upon determining that a proposed project has a hazard score up to and including 79 or that the project is exempt pursuant to section 84- 63,604, the Community Development Director shall issue a determination of non-coverage or exemption. A determination of non-coverage for projects with a hazard score between 70 and 79, inclusive, means that the project is not subject to the requirements of article 84-63.10, but is subject to sections 84-63.848 and 84-63.810. Projects with a hazard score below 69 and projects which are exempt pursuant to sections 84-63.644 are not subject to the requirements of sections 84-63.808 and.84-63.810. (Ords. 98-_ § 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.808 Determinations - Public Notice. All determinations of non-coverage made pursuant to section 84-63.806 shall be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator within ten calendar days of issuance of the determination. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20, 91-49, 90-92,86100.) 84-63.810 Determinations - Further Public Notice. For projects with a point assignment between 70 and 79, inclusive, within five working days of issuing a determination of non-coverage, the Community Development Director shall mail notice on the date of the determination to all organizations and individuals who have previously submitted a written request for such notice. The Community Development Director shall publish a four-inch by six inch advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation within ten calendar daysof issuing a determination of non-coverage. The notices required by this section shall state the name of the applicant, briefly describe the project, provide the names and phone numbers of a representative of the Community Development Department and a representative of the applicant who will be available to answer questions about the project, and shall state the date by which an appeal must be filed, (lards. 98 § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49,90-92.) 84-63.812 Appeals. Any appeal of a determination of non-coverage shall be filed within ten calendar days of the date the determination is listed on the Zoning Administrator`s agenda or ten calendar days from the date of publication pursuant to section 84-63.810, whichever provides the longer period of appeal. Appeals from a determination of non-coverage shall be heard by the Board of Supervisors. Except as expressly provided in this section, appeals from all decisions and determinations made pursuant to this chapter shall be governed by the land use permit provisions of article 26-2.24 and are subject to the provisions of article 26-2.30. (Orris. 98-_ § 5,96-50,96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.10 Land Use Permits -When Required 11/19/98 Page 22 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT" 84-63.1002 Hazard Score; Permit Required. Unless otherwise exempt from the requirements of this chapter, a land use permit shall be required for a development project proposed for the management of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste if any of the following apply: (a) the development project obtains a hazard score of 80 or more pursuant to the formula set forth in section 8463.1004; or (b) for hazard category A materials, the development project stores twice the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials List (Appendix A of 40 Coda of Federal Regulations Chapter I, Subchapter J Part 355), as amended from time to time,or 2000 pounds,whichever is less;or (c) for hazard category A or B materials, the development project will result in a new process unit(s) unless the process unit complies with Section 84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6 - Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. Modifications to an existing process unit does not constitute a new process unit; or (d) for hazard category B materials, any single vessel that has a fill to the maximum capacity of 40,000 tons or more unless the vessel complies with Section 84-63.1004 (d) 1 through 6-Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. subject to the provisions of this article. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1004 Hazard Score. (a) Formula. The hazard score of a proposed development project shall be determined pursuant to the following formula: [(T+ C+P)x H] +D+A; where the following symbols have the following designations: "T" refers to the point assignment for "Transportation Risk"; "D" refers to the point assignment for"Community Risk-Distance from Receptor"; "C" refers to the point assignment for "Community Risk-Type of Receptor"; "A" refers to the point assignment.for "Facility Risk- Size of Project-Total Amount"; "P" refers to the point assignment for"Facility Risk-Size of Project- Percent Change"; and "H" refers to the point assignment for "Hard Category of Material or Waste." (b) Project Herd Score. If more than one category of hazardous material or hazardous waste is used, the formula set forth in this section will be used to calculate a'separate score for 11/19198 Page 23 __ _. ...._ ......... ......... ......... ....._... 111.1 _ ............ .. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .......... . ................................................................................................................................................ .................................1111........................... CCAS REDLINE DRAFT each material category. The material hazard category which results in the highest hazard score - for the project will be used. (c) Paint Assignment. The factors set forth in subdivision (a), above, shall have the following point assignments: TRANSPORTATION RISK(T) POINTS Truck-residential/commercial 10 (>25%increase or new) Truck-residential:/commercial 9 (>5 -25 % increase) Truck-Industrial (>25%increase or new) 8 Truck- Industrial(>5 - 25% increase) 7 Rail-(>25% increase or new) 6 Rail - (>5 - 25%increase) 5 Marine Vessel-(>5%increase) 3 Pipeline - (>5%increase) 1 0- 5%increase 0 COMMUNITY RISK Distance of project from receptor(D): 09300 feet 30 >300-400 feet 29 >400 - 550 feet 28 >550 - 700 feet 27 >700- 900 feet 26 >900- 1200 feet 25 11/19/98 Page 24 .. ......... ......... ......... ...._.... ....... _........ ._...... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ....... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ................. . ... ......_................................................................ .............. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT >1200 - 1500 feet 24 >1500 - 1800 feet 23 >1800 -2100 feet 22 >2100 - 2500 feet 21 >2500 -2800 feet 20 >2800 - 3200 feet 19 >3200- 3500 feet 18 >3500 - 3800 feet 17 >3800 -4000 feet 16 >4000 -4200 feet 15 >4200- 4500 feet 14 >4500 -4800 feet 13 >4800 -5400 feet 12 >5400 - 5700 feet 11 >5700 - 6000 feet 10 >6000- 6500 feet 9 >6500- 7300 feet 8 >7300- 8000 feet 7 >8000 - 8600 feet 6 >8600- 10,000 feet 5 >10,000- 11,000 feet 4 >11,000- 12,500 feet 3 11/19/138 Page 25 ......._. ......... ......... ......... ._..._._. _ _.............___.. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... _.._. ._.. ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... .......... ................................................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT >12,500 - 14,000feet 2 >14,400 - 15,840'feet 1 Type of receptor(C): Sensitive Receptor 7 Residential Property 5 Commercial Property 4 FACILITY RISK: SIZE OF PROJECT Total Amount of Change,tons(Conversion to tons; 1 ton=2000 pounds) (A): >40,000 30 >32,000 -40,000 29 > 18,000 - 32,000 28 >10,000 - 18,000 27 >6,000- 10,000 26 >4,000-6,000 25 >2,100 -4,000 24 >1,200-2,100 23 >750- 1,200 22 >400 - 750 21 >200-400 20 >150»200 19 11/19/98 Page 26 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT j >90 -150 18 >50 - 90 17 >30 - 50 16 >20 - 30 15 >10- 20 14 >6- 10 13 >4 -6 12 >2 -4 11 >1 -2 10 >0.8 - 1 9 >0.5 - 0.8 8 >0.35 -0.5 7 >0.25 -0.35 6 >0.20-0.25 5 >0. 18 -0.20 4 >0. 14-0.18 3 >0. 12 -0.14 2 >0. 10 - 0. 12 1 no change(0. 10 or less) 0 Percent Change(P) New 6 >200% 5 11/19/98 Page 27 CCAS REDLINE DRAFT >I 00%- 200% 4 >50%- 100% 3 >10% - 50°/a 2 >1% - 10% 1 0%-1%► 0 HAZARD CATEGORY OF MATERIAL(H) Category A 5 Category B 3 Category C 1 (d) Credit for reductions or projects to he closed. A development project that would have a hazard score of 80 or more as determined by the formula in this section shall be entitled to a reduction credit for project closures and/or reductions in accordance with the criteria set forth in this subdivision. Reduction credit shall be,given if the Community Development Director determines that the applicant will concurrently close another project or reduce its operations and finds that all of the following criteria are met: (1) The project to be closed or reduced is in the same facility in which the development project is proposed. (2) The project to be closed or reduced is currently in operation and has been in operation for at least three years prior to the date of application, during which period the production schedule has been reflective of a normal production schedule; (3) The project to be closed or reduced is the direct resultof the proposed development project; (4) The project to be closed or reduced has a higher hazard score than the proposed development project; (5) The hazard category of the material or waste in the development project will be no greater than the hazard category of the material or waste in the project to be closed or reduced; and (6) The development project will be more than 300 feet from the property line of the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor. The hazard score for the project to be closed shall also be determined by the formula set forth in subdivisions (a) and(b) of this section and pursuant to the provisions of this article. An 11/19198 page 28 CCHS REDLINE DRAFT determining the hazard score for the project to be closed or reduced, said project shall be deemed a new project. The hazard score of the development project shall be subtracted from the hazard score of the project to be closed or reduced. The resulting difference will then be subtracted from the hazard score of the development project to obtain a hazard score adjusted for the closure or reduction. The adjusted hazard score shall be the basis for determining whether a land use permit shall be required under this chapter. A determination by the Community Development Director that a project is not subject to the land use permit requirement of this chapter as a result of credit afforded for a project closure or reduction shall be reported to the Zoning Administrator pursuant to section 84-63.808 and shall be subject to the public notification requirements set forth in section 84-63.810. (e) Closure, reduction required. Projects proposed for closure or reduction for which closure or reduction credit was afforded under this section shall be closed or reduced as proposed within one year of completion of the development project. This subdivision (e) applies only in cases where a land use permit would have been required but for the closure or reduction credit afforded under this section. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1006 Determination of Transportation Risk. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated based upon planned total quantities of materials in a hazard category, measured in terms of tans per year for each hazard category proposed. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated for each mode of transportation proportionally within a single hazard category. That transportation point assignment shall be compared by hazard category with the total amount of material in the hazard category transported during the baseline period in order to obtain the percent change in section 8463.1004(b), Transportation Risk. For purposes of determining whether truck transportation is through residential/commercial or industrial areas, the shortest legal route from the closest two-lane (or larger) freeway shall be considered. If the route used in the County does not traverse a two-lane (or larger) freeway,the entire route shall be considered. (Orris. 98-- § 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1008 Determination of Community Risk - Distance to Receptor. "'Distance to Receptor" shall be the shortest distance between an exterior wall or other part of the development project and the property line of the residential property, commercial property or the sensitive receptor used to determine the hazard score of a development project. (Orris. 38'-- § 5, 96-50,96-20.) 8"3.1010 Determination of'Community Risk - Type of Receptor. A hazardscore shall be developed for each type of receptor (residential property, commercial property and sensitivereceptor) within three miles of the development project based upon the distance of the 11/19/98 Page 29 ......................................................................... .................................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT parcel of each type of receptor that is closest to the development project. The receptor that produces the highest hazard score shall be used to determine the hazard score of the development project. Receptors more than three miles from a development project shall not be considered. (Orris. 98--§ 5,96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1012 Determination of Project Risk - Size. The size of a development project shall be measured in terms of tons of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste stored as a result of the development project, based upon the fill-to-the-maximum capacity of the development project, including amounts stored in tanks; reactors; columns; process lines; tank cars, tank trucks or rail cars when connected to process equipment; or any other receptacle used for the containment of hazardous materials and/or hazardous wastes. The amount of material in hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project will be used to determine the total amount of change. If more than one category of hazardous material is used, the amounts of materials (A, B, or Q shall be used with the respective hazard category in the formula in section 84-63.1004. The specific gravity of hazardous materials or hazardous wastes may be required to calculate the number of tons(or pounds)of hazardous materials and/or hazardous waste managed at the development project. The standard of 2000 pounds equaling one(1)ton shall be used. The point assignment for storage of containerized material in buildings, such as labs or warehouses, shall be based upon the maximum anticipated amount of materials for each hazard category as a result of the development project. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1014 Determination of Project Risk-Percent Change. The percent change of a hazard category shall be determined by comparing the amounts of materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project to the total amount of all materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C handled at the site from the baseline period. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1016 Determination of Hazard Category. (a) Method of Determination. The hazard category of a material or waste shall be determined pursuant to this section. (1) The primary method of determining the material hazard category of a hazardous waste or material shall be by reference to the Winter 1994 version of the U.S.Department of Transportation ("D.O.T.") Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49 ("49 CFR"), Section 172. 101, Hazardous Materials Table." From columns (3) and (5), extract the "Hazard Class or Division" and "Packing Group" information, then proceed to 49 CFR 173.2 to determine the "Name of Class or'Division." Proceed to subdivision (c) of this section to 'determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. If a material is listed in 49 CFR 172. 101 more than once, the rating that results in the highest hazard category shall be used. The hazard category of a mixture is determined according to its common name as defined in Title 49. 11/19/98 Page 30 ........................................................ CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (2) Where a hazardous material, waste, or mixture is not referenced in 49 CFR 172. 101, and the hazard category cannot be determined using the primary method, refer to the manufacturer's MSDS for the D.O.T. "Hazard Class or Division," "Packing Group" and "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision (c) of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. (3) Where the preceding methods are not successful, the Centra Costa County Health Services Director or his designee shall be responsible for determining a material's hazard category. (4) Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth above, materials with the word "poison" in column(6) of 49 CFR 172. 101, Methyl chloride, and the metals Antimony, Mercury, Lead, Arsenic, Thallium and. Cadmium and their compounds, shall be Hazard Category.A materials, and denatured alcohol and methanol shall be Hazard Category B materials for purposes of this chapter. (b) Exclusions. Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth in subdivision (a), above, Hot Coke, Hot Coal Briquettes, and materials not regulatedby D.O.T. or which have no D.U.T.Hazard Class or Division are not regulated by this chapter. (c)Hazard Categories. Lazard CatWor„y A Materials I. Forbidden.Materials As referenced in 49 CFR 173.21 and 173.54. II. Explosives and Blasting Agents Class 1,as defined in 49 CFR 173.50(b)(1)through 173.50(b)(6). III. Reactive Materials A. Air Reactive Materials - Class 4, Division 4.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(b)(1) and.(2). B. Water Reactive Materials -Class 4, Division 4.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(c). C. Organic Peroxides-Class 5,Division 5.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.128. Ill. Radioactive Materials Class 7 as defined in 49 CFR 173.403(y). V. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group I 11/19/98 Page 31 .......................................................................................... CCHS REDLINE DRAFT Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a) when Packing Group I is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(1). VI. Poisons, D.O.T. A. Poisons, Class 6, Division 6.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.133 (applies to all hazard zones). B. Infectious Substances, Class 6,Division 6.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.134. VII. Poison Gas Class 2, Division 2.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(c). Hazard Category B Materials VIII. Flammable Liquids Class 3 Packing Groups I and 11 as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(a). IX Flammable Solids Class 4,Division 4.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(a). X. Oxidizers,D.O.T. Packing Group 11 Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a) when Packing Group 11 is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(ii). XI. Flammable Gases Class 2, Division 2.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(a). XII. Corrosives,D.O.T. Packing Group I or H Class 8 Packing Groups I or 11 as defined in 49 CFR 173.136(a)and 173.137(a)and(b). Hazard Category C Materials X111. Non-flammable Compressed Gases Class 2,Division 2.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(b). 11/19/98 Page 32 .............. ............................................................................................ .................................................................................................................. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT XIV. Combustible Liquids Class 3 Packing Group III as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(b). XV. Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials Class 9 as defined in 49 CFR 173.155. XVI. Oxidizers D.O.T.Packing Group III Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a) when Packing Group III is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(iii). XVII. Corrosives D.O.T.Packing Group III Class 8 Packing Group III as defined in CFR 49 173.136(a)and 173.137 (c). (Orris. 98--§5, 96-50, 96-20.) Article 84-63.12 Land Use and Variance Permits 84-63-1202 Granting. An applicant for a land use permit shall submit a project description. Land use permits required under this chapter may be granted in accordance with the provisions of chapters 26-2 and 82-6. (Orris.98-- § 5,96-50,96-20, 86- 100.) Article 84-63.14 Offsite Hazardous Waste Facility Compliance With County Hazardous Waste Management Plan 84-63.1402 Authority. This article is enacted pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 25135.4 and 25135.7, concerning the siting of offsite hazardous waste facilities. (Orris. 98--§ 5, 96-50,96-20, 90-73.) 84-63.1404 Definitions. (a) General. Unless otherwise specified in this section or indicated by the context, the terms used in this article have the meanings ascribed to them in Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.5(§ 25 100 et seq.). (b) "County Hazardous Waste Management Plan" means the county hazardous waste management plan adopted by the Board of Supervisors on August 29, 1989 and amended by the Board of Supervisors on January 30, 1990,approved by a majority of the cities within the county which contain a majority of the population of the incorporated area, and approved by the State Department of Health Services on February 28, 1990, as said plan is amended'from time to time. 11/19/98 Page 33 .............11......................I.............. ...................... ............................................................................. I ....11. .. CCHS REDLINE DRAFT (c) "Hazardous waste facility" means all contiguous land and structures, other appurtenances, and improvements on the land used for the treatment, transfer, storage, resource recovery, disposal, or recycling of hazardous waste. A hazardous waste facility may consist of one or more treatment, transfer, storage, resource recovery, disposal, or recycling hazardous waste management units, or combinations of these units. (d) "Offsite hazardous waste facility„ means a hazardous waste facility at which either or both of the following occur. (1) Hazardous waste that is produced offsite is treated, transferred, stored, disposed or recycled. (2) Hazardous waste that is produced onsite is treated,transferred,;stored,disposed or recycled and the hazardous waste facility is not owned by, leased to or under the control of the producer of the hazardous waste. Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-20, 96-50, 90-73.) 84-63.1406 County hazardous Waste Management. All land use permit,variance or other land use entitlement granted for the operation or expansion of an offsite hazardous waste facility shall be consistent with the portions of the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan which identify siting criteria, siting principles or other policies applicable to hazardous waste facilities. Before granting the application,the division of the planning agency hearing the matter initially or on appeal shall find that the application complies with the applicable siting criteria, siting principles and other policies identified in the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan, and that the proposed offsite hazardous waste facility is consistent with the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73; Health& Safety Code, §§ 25135.4. 251.35.7.) 84-63.1408 Exclusion. The requirements of this article do not apply to projects which are exempt projects under section 84-63.604. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73.) SECTION V. SEVERABILTTY. This ordinance shall be construed to achieve its purpose and preserve its validity. If any provision or clause of this ordinance or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the ordinance are declared to be severable and are intended to have independent validity. 11/19/98 Page 34 - .::: CCHS REDLINE DRAFT SECTION VI. PREEMPTION. Nothing in this ordinance is intended, and nor shall it be deemed, to excuse or prevent compliance with any state or federal law. If any prevision of this ordinance, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be preempted by any applicable state or federal law, the Board of Supervisors declares that its intent (1) that such provision be severable from the remainder of the ordinance, and (2) that the remainder of the ordinance be given effect in accordance with the provisions of Section I of this ordinance. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between this ordinance and applicable federal or state statutes or regulations, the federal or state requirements shall control. SECTION VI. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance becomes effective 30;days after passage, and within 15 days after passage shall be published once with the names of the Supervisors voting for and against it in the CONTRA COSTA TIMES, a newspaper published in this County. PASSED on by the following vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTEST: Phil Batchelor, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and County Administrator By: Deputy Chair [SEAL] hmind6.doc 11/19/98 Page 35 . CS-/NORAhi V 415-243-8373 11/23/98 (D9:40 AM � ER' Zb V Communities for s Better Environment November 23, 1998 Centra Costa Beard of Supervisors 651 Pine Street Martinez, CA 94553 RE: Independent Analysis on the Proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Dear Supervisors: On behalf of our over 3,000 members who live in Contra Costa County, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) would like to submit an independent analysis of the the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance for your review. This review was commissioned by CBE and the Bay Chapter of the Sierra Club to ensure that the Board received the most complete ,analysis of this critical health and safety issue. Please find enclosed a copy of this analysis by Fred Millar, Ph.d.,of Arlington,VA, as well as his resume. As you will nate Dr. Millar has worked for labor, government and public interest groups berth nationally and internationally. :His experience should compliment the other consultant reviews you have commissioned by industry groups. We look forward to working, with you on improving the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance so that communities will be protected and empowered. Our detailed recommendations will be mailed to you individually when the new draft of the ordinance is available for the public to review. Sincerely, Denny Larson (via fax) N. cal. Director CBE ONE , 599 Neward , # 555 , S . F . , CA 241 . 5 4111 - 743 - 5371 • small : cbebucket0loc . ern CBE/NORAN 415-2438373 Ma 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 1/4 FRED MHJ AR Ph.D, 5049 S. 7th ROAD No. 201 ARLINGTON VA 22244 TFL: 703-998-0996 a-mall: thifflargervls-cvm Experienced public interest and environmental advocate,policy analyst and educator,based in Washington, D.C., with skills, technical expertise and national,local and international contacts in a wide range of issues and strategies. Recognized international expert and lobbyist in nuclear waste transportation and chemical accident prevention,consultant to the major U.S.chemical and oil worker unions,networked with industry, government, and citizen groups. Recent accomplishments include: o Developed and focused national and grassroots action strategies on chemical hazard assessment,emergency planning,accident prevention, and public access to information. Researched problems and educated citizens,workers and public officials in scores of petrochemical communities on disaster risk issues and on existing risk documents such as worst- case orstcase accident scenarios. Results: many risk reduction activities by companies and governments. o Conceived,initiated and lobbied successfully for new legislation enacting a major new federal regulatory program on prevention of chemical accidents: The Clean Air Act .Amendments of 1990 impact an estimated 60-100,000 U.S.chemical and oil facilities and provide an estimated $3 billion of worker safety training,and new risk documents for workers, government officials and the public. o Coordinated lobbying,organizational and membership development and fundraising for the Nuclear Waste Citizens Coalition, a national network of nonprofit groups focused on the 1996- 98 nuclear waste legislative proposals in Congress. 19'95-97 D.C. Coordinator, Nuclear Waste Citizens Coalition, Washington, D.C. Coordinated the work of a coalition of national and regional groups,from both commercial nuclear power plant communities and nuclear weapons site communities,focused an issues of centralized interim storage of irradiated fuel and of proposed reversal of the U.S.ban since 1977 on commercial spent fuel reprocessing. Researched and wrote issue papers,talking points for lobbying, weekly reports to membership. 199498 Consultant, nuclear waste and chemical accident prevention policies Clients included Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,Operating Engineers International Union,Friends of the EardvEngland and Wales,National Environmental Law Center,Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Indiana State Emergency Response Commission,Women's Action for New Directions,Labor Ministry of Brazil. C8�/NORAN 415-243-8873 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 2/4 1989-94 Director of the Toxics Project,Friends of the Earth,Washhwton,D.C. Responsible for rewarch,policy development,lobbying and organizing in chemical accident prevention,risk assessment, sit toxics emissions,right to-ltnow issues, hazardous materials transportation and multinational corporate accountability. Utilized the political opportunities presented by the 1384 Bhopal (India)toxic gas disaster to mobilize and focus citizen and government action in the U.S.and abroad on chemical accident prevention, pollution prevention, and community Right-To-Know. Initiated and coordinated the environmental community's response to the 1986 Right-To-Know law,the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act. • Built a network of activists, workers, state and lural officials and media contacts in chemical communities and provided technical and strategy assistance. Founded and initially steered the Working Croup on Community Right-To-Know,comprised of national and local environmental groups and labor unions. Meeting regularly in Washington,D.C.to share information and plants the Working Group staff also serves several hundred activists with a monthly newsletter. * Researched and raised concerns locally,nationally and internationally on three key disaster- risk chemicals: chlorine,ammonia,and hydrogen fluoride. One result: the twelve Los Angeles- area cities enacted local regulations promoting risk reductions in five major facilities by 1998. As a policy expert,addressed international conf=nces on chemical accident prevention. Served as advisor to the U.S.government delegations and addressed conferences with industry and government participants in London,Manchester, Stockholm, Berlin, Boston, Milan,Goa and Ahmedabad(India), and Tokyo. * As a national environmental point person,pressured the oil and chemical;industry to make good on their promises of new openness to the public. Built bridges nationally and internationally between the industry and engineering communities,activist groups, labor unions and public officials. Addressed snores of state and local meefings,including,many in communities of color. Initiated strategy of national "corporate-specific networks" for tracking the performance of petrochemical companies. • Coordinated the environmental and labor coalition that in 1991-94 lobbied OSHA and EPA on their regulations to implement the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Wrote and delivered testimony for Congressional hearings and wrote technical comments on proposed regulations. CBF/NORAN 475-243-8373 Ro 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 3/4 As an OSHA grant-funded consultant to the three major U.S. petrochemical labor unions, trained groups of workers in several cities on chemical accident risks and accident prevention. Lobbied,Congress for two major unions for new training funds. • Initiated a bi-lateral Right-To-Know strategy between Friends of the Earth/U.S. and NOO groups abroad to ask multinational petrochemical companies for their torics :missions information which they must make public in the U.S.but not elsewhere. Projects completed in England and Germany,begun in India and Mexico. * International advocacy. gave invited presentations on chemical accident prevention and community right-to-know policy and legislation to government and industry officials, universities and citizens groups in Canada,Lithuania,Latvia,Bulgaria,Nicaragua, Medco, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Germany, and Australia. 1979-88 Director of the Nuclear and Hazardous Materials Transportation Project at the Environmental Policy Institute, Washington, IXC Spearheaded the environmental community's efforts,educated the public and lobbied the government and corporations on issues of nuclear waste and hazardous materials storage and transportation. o Initiated and implemented major strategy approaches for tonics activists and national and local legislators and periodically implemented national media campaigns. o Created and nurtured a network of local environmental groups and state and local officials who successfully lobbied Congress: --to make public the routes of civilian nuclear waste shipments, and --to preserve existing authority for state and local regulations on nuclear and hazardous materials transportation. Worked vvith Capitol Hill, several regulatory agencies,national trade associations,national media, environmental NGOs, labor unions,petrochemical industry, investor groups,and funders. Testified before several House and Senate committees. • Worked with international agencies,media,international and national NGOs,and consultants,,and traveled widely and addressed international symposia on nuclear and toxics issues. tIUL CSE/KORAN 415-243-8373 RD11/23/98 9:41 AM 4/4 Communicated technical and strategy information continually and widely by a variety of means: media work,newsletters, public speaking in several types of fora, continents on rulemakings, mailings to networks of interested parties. Wrote and disseminated model tribal, state and local laws to regulate nuclear and hazardous materials transportation. Aided the development of tribal and state stakeholder groups to participate actively in nuclear waste policy issues. 1978-79 Research consultant for the Ohio Public Interest Campaign. Worked under federal grant;researched and wrote final evaluation of a four-year project on dant closings in Ohio. 1972-78 Assistant Professor of Sociology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Taught political sociology, social problems, sociology of war and peace, social theory. PUBLICATIONS * Researched, wrote and edited "The Community Plume",a foundation-funded publication that Friends of the Earth sent to 4100 Local Emergency Planning Committees in the U.S., 1988-91. * "Winning the Right-To-Know", in The.Environmental Forum, December, 1992 * Op-Ed piece,New York Times Business Section, "Braking the Slide in Chemical Safety", May 1986 * "Regulations on the Routing of irradiated Fuel," a chapter in The Urban Transport of Irradiated Fuel(Macmillan Press, 1984) * "Hazardous Materials Transportation",a series of three articles for International Fire Chief magazine, 1981. EDUCATION B.A. in Philosophy from Notre Dame University(1966) M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology from Case Western Reserve University(1975).' Cm CBS/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 9:41 AM 1/16 Re port to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy Analyst REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY EFFORTS TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL RELEASES A REPORT TO THE CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS Fred Millar, Ph.D. a November 19, 1998 Executive Summary: We outline herein the current system of federal and state regulation to prevent accidental releases, pointing out strengths and weaknesses. Based on this analysis, we suggest amendments to improve the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance in Contra Costa County (CCCo), which would apply to the unincorporated areas of Contra Costa County. Our recommendations include new and improved provisions for the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: •A broad authority for local regulation for risk reduction,similar to U.S.EPA's under the Clean Air Act. -Clarify County Health Department and County Supervisors' authority and discretion to ensure safe operations and accident prevention improvements at facilities. =More scope for meaningful public participation in regulatory proceedings •A program to facilitate nwaningful public understanding and participation through technical assistance: grants. -More adequate definitions of some terms. adequacy, audit, accidental release,major accidental release, environmental receptor,and public receptor. *An annual report on progress on rrmeasurreable risk reduction. •A local`General Duty' clause to ensure overall safe operations at facilities,similar to the federal Clean Air Act. -Prompt release of some facility documents to inform the local discussion on risk reduction. including Worst Case Scenarios, Process Hazard. Analyses of Year 2000 safety assessments and exercise of Year 2000 contingency plans +A more comprehensive scope of information provided for the public in a Public Information Bank and a timetable to accomplish this. I. Introduction: Any now local chemical safety ordinance in Contra Costa County(CCCo)will be layered on top of the existing Federal and State law; which Ileal with chemical accident prevention, and a new local law is likely in part to share their strengths and weaknesses, and will have a chance in part to remedy the latter andtor to exacerbate them. So we must first consider the ways in which the Federal and State laws are inadequate, as well as the ways in which a local ordinance can improve upon them. Il. Local Regulations CCCo has had historically one of the strongest AA implementations of California s RMPP, administered by the Health Services Department(FISD) This is no doubt in part a response to a series of significant accidental releases. From 1959 through 1997,some 62 major releases left 4 workers dead and 141 injured. Fully 31,050 members of the public have been injured,hospitalized or sickened.i ' [Source: 'Rising Risks to Refinery Communities",by CB&Sisordine Environmental Alliance,and the Central Labor Council of Contra Costa County,June 19971 {PAGE } CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 � 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 2/16 Reprsrt to the Board of Supervisors lied Millar,Ph.d., Policy Analyst 1. CCCo provided a strong basic public participation process in its RMPP. The county staff`was rightly proud of it as"the most extensive in the country" a we their 5)1.2195 "Comments to EPA.".The county program included using the public library for documents, solicitation of public comments,and the scheduling of public meetings. CCCo HSD staff recommended(5/12/95)that U.S. EPA include a similar strong public participation process in the federal RMP<but EPA declined. Although the County s program was commendable, meaningful public participation must include more than making documents available, and also include providing a real opportunity to modify facility plans to improve safety and an appeal to top elected officials. 2. CCCo has also, to its credit, been somewhat keen on promoting facility use of Inherent Safety(IS). CCCo staff s 5/12/95"Comments to U.S. EPA", for example, gave examples where CCCo facilities have switched to safer chemicals. And HSD staff recommended that U.S. EPA in its RMP regulations adopt an "IS checklist"for ensuring a consistent and focused approach by facilities and administering agencies, (but not what they described as the more costly Technology Options Analysis requirement that national enviTmmentalists and labor unions had recommended in vain that EPA include in the RMP regulations). See also Appendix C-1 in the June 1995 CCCo"CaIARP Guidance"which provides a list of sources on IS practices that facilities might utilize. But without some kind of systematic HSI) annual report based on goals and measures of risk reduction, the public has only a vague idea of how effective the local regulatory program has been in encouraging more use of IS practices. I The CAvinty rP.pnrtPdly interpreted the.RWP program to he PmAmtially ulleuruicuitbic wlr," it caaxm to loquhiux nafcty iutpluvrine"ls at Lite facilities. Instead,the County relied on its ability to"jawbone", i.e., to convince companies to make improvements voluntarily. Although' thin did raaalt in n nun-.br r erf aafehy iattprartmonta, t�rtain f"ititir,e resisted and accidents throughout the county increased. Without clear enforceability provisions, a new ordinance would suffer from the same flaw. 4. The recent,and in most aspects excellent, "Contra Costa County CaIARP Program Guidance Document",dune 1998, also demonstrates how the local program can carry along flaws stemming from the base layers of federal and state regulation. Just one example: the lack of a firm federal regulatory floor regarding public access to all of the new risk information(which the federal CAA Section 112(r)law explicitly calls for)can lead to a similar problem on the local level,even when there seems to be an awareness by the local regulators that providing public access to more information might be appropriate and useful: " CCCHSD believes that an informed public is a key contributor to chemical emergency prevention,preparedness and response and the best way to inform the public is to provide an RMP that will help them focus on information directly or immediately useful to local level prevention, preparedness,and response. You [covered facilities]are not required to provide the public with access to other documentation developed under (PAGE } CBEMORAN 415-243-8373 rft� 11!23198 0 9:41 AM 3116 RjtLmrt to the Board of Supervisors bred Millar,.Ph«d:,Polig Analyst this rule. if the public requests access to the other documentation, you must decide whether and how to provide it. We suggest that you work with the public to find a way to meet reasonable community needs." (p. 9-56) We suggest that it is the County Board s(and HSD s)job to determine how and how much of such information to provide for"an informed public". The CCCo CaLMRP Guidance Document makes explicit that although the federal RMP to be submitted to U.S. EPA shall be in electronic forrm.the RMP for CCCo s CaIARP program will be submitted as a paper copy(p. 1-4). A major failing in current law at all levels is that it provides almost no sway for the public nor public officials to employ measurable goals in risk reduction nor measures of progress in achieving those goals. A new local ordinance should require a package of some beginning facility and public sector efforts to set risk reduction goals and efforts to use rough measures of risk reduction. Some of the latter could include: a. Worst Case Scenario blast zones, radiation zones,and downwind cloud distances: accident"footprints"already required in law, and which provide rough but useful measures of risk to surrounding neighborhoods. b. "Near Zone"calculations. The same gas dispersion models used to produce downwinddistances can also produce cloud speed calculations and infiltration estimates: how fast clouds could arrive at and infiltrate various downwind receptors such as residences, hospitals, or schools. When combined with estimates of how marry minutes it night take to begirt and carry out anZ kind of public protection activities such as evacuation and shelter-in-place", such cloud speed calculations allow the identification of some calculable "new zone"(a term fust used in the Cleveland Local Emergency Planning Committee) to identify the neighborhoods newest chemical facilities where neither evacuation nor sheltering in place can be effective in the plant s own Worst Case Scenario. c. The facilities own catastrophic insurance documents,although premiums are largely market-driven, might provide some rough measure of risk reduction. d. More complex but important measures of risk reduction,especially those which can get at the reduced probability of accidents through better management systems,etc.,can be seen interspersed in the various technical documents which include discussions of"planned changes to improve safety",or lists of the "action items"to prevent accidents that are included in PHAs and recommendations from incident investigations,etc. For these to be meaningfully assessed, the public sector chemical engineers should do a professional assessment in an annual summary report by facility. An annual summary r mrt on accident risk roducti m by RSD would twovide, an annual scorecard,albeit with only rough measures. As with the (PAGE } CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 RD 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 4116 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.,Policy Analyst annual federal Toxics Release Inventory,such an annual scorecard could be a powerful incentive for pushing risks downward. III. Conclusions and Recommendations for amending the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to promote a more effective program of accident prevention. A. Analysis and critique of the proposed "Industrial Safety" ordinance (ISO): Given the inadequacies of federal law, state lave and current local ordinances,and continued local accidental releases, a new local ordinance is needed to strengthen chemical accident prevention efforts. Neither federal nor star law preempts more stringent local laws. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance(ISO) provides a very useful framework and a substantial stride forward in improving local regulation on accident prevention. TSO provides a useful extension of local regulatory oversight to some of the most dangerous facilities,but it also needs to be supplemented by some additional provisions. It is not explicit in ISO, although it seems implicit, that it is intended to be the county s program for implementing CaLkRP and that the CaIARP fee structure will fund the program. The proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance(ISO),as a modification of existing law, seems essentially designed : 1. To allow most major facility maintenance projects to proceed without a land-use permit as is currently required. 2. To impose some specific additional local safety requirements on the most dangerous facilities(called "Stationary Sources"and defined as only those with Program Level 3 units and in the 0H or Chemical Manufacturing sectors), including requirements on some processes in those Stationary Source facilities which processes are not covered by current federal and CaIARP laws. On its face, the proposed ISO does not attempt to remedy some of the key flaws in the federal 112(r)program,and it would not substantially affect the County s implementation of CaIARP except in a narrow range of Stationary Sources. For example, ISO would not provide overall more meaningful public participation, hearings,the ability of elected officials to require safety improvements,or the right of citizens to appeal to board of supervisors as an integral part and within the general framework of the CaIARP processes. The new Safety Plan regime is to be applied to a narrower universe of facilities than C..alARP presumably covers, and some local facilities which pose substantial risks and which could benefit from increased public oversight may fall through the cracks. A key recommendation here,therefore, is that ISO should seek to remedy some of the serious base-line deficiencies in the federal and state programs as they apply in CCCo, as well as specifying key additional (PAGE C8E/NORAN 415-243-8373 RE 11/23/98 (D 9:41 AM D5/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy,Analyst features for adequate local oversight needs. Some of the main features of the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance: A. tinder ISO, a Stationary Source must submit a Safety Plan with 12 "safety elements"and comply with neve requirements: i. Human Factors ii. Root Cause analysis iii. Process Hazard Analyses if not already covered in Federal Program:Level 3 iv. Accident History<must cover since 1992, so longer than the federally-required 5 year accident history. B. In all PHAs submitted to the local AA, Stationary Sources must: i. Conaidor uou of Inhoront Sufor Syatonw CIS%)under Dorno conditions. ISS must also be considered in the design and review of new facilities and processes. ii. Complete action items within a specified time frame. C. HSD will review the Safety Plan, allow public comment, and schedule a public meeting. D. After an accident, HSD shall inspect and audit the facility, and may require modification of the Safety Plan. E ISO makes an assertion of attorney-client privilege(which should already be available in current law). F. An Ombudsperson position is created for public outreach, specifically for*complaint prevention". (Since this program is already available,it should be clarified whether its inclusion here is meant to limit its scope to aspects of this ordinance only.) G. A Public Information Bank shall include*ready access"to"public documents"_ There is no specification as to how soon this facility shall be available. Specific Amendments that are needed (by Section) in tate proposed Industrial Sa&ty Ordinance: CHAPTER 450-8 RISK MANAGEMENT 4511-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS This section should specify"Prevent and reduce the number, frequency, and severity of accidental releases in the County;" And"Provide a local General Duty clause" And "Provide for a broad authority for the HSD in prevention of accidental releases." (PAGE } .... . : : ........ t19 CBE/NORAN V 415-243-8373 � 11/23/98 0 9:41 AM ['J 6/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,PhA Policy Analyst And "Provide for increased public access to, and input into the review of,risk management plans and other accident prevention documents under federal,state and local regulations, and provide for public review of the inspection and audit resultsl`" And "Ensure a permanent role for a well-informed public,with access to documents and to technical assistance grants from the Health Service Department, in review of technical documents, participation in comment periods and hearings." And "Provide for early release of risk documents necessary for an informed public discussion of accident prevention." Ansi"Address potential public safety risks of accidental releases from covered facilities arising from failures of computer programs or chips due:to Year 2000 failures." 450-8.0038 ADMINSTRATION. Substitute for"The County Health Officer is charged": "The Department is charged". 4501-8.0312 INSPECTION. Add in this section: "Inspection shall not be merely for purposes of determining completeness of documentation , but also for determining the adequacy of the source's equipment and risk management programs to prevent accidental releases and to reduce the severity of those that occur." 450-8.014 DERNI TIONS. "Accidental Release" -- should include releases into "ambient air, water, or soil". "Adequacy of safety programs"shall mean the ability of these measures to prevent and reduce the probability and consequences of accidental releasess of regulated substances which have the potential to cause significant harm is workers,the public or the environment. This ,judgment shall be made by HSD Rtaff utsing a combination of industry codes, accepted standards. "Adequacy of safety programs"shall mean the ability of these measures to prevent and reduce the probability and consequences of accidental releases of regulated substances which have the potential to cause significant harm to workers, the public or the environment. This judgment shall be made by HSD staff using a combination of industry codes, accepted standard industry practices, and inherent safety options. "Audit"includes "a review of the relevant documentation and process safety information,inspection of the physical facilities, and interviews with all levels of plant personnel [Comment. this part of {PAGE } CBUNORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 7/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy Analyst the definition is taken verbatim from CCCo CalARP Guidance Document, June 1998, P. 7-22.1 in order to identify safety issues that need to be addressed to prevent and reduce the consequences of accidental releases." (g)"Major chemical accident or release" : Amend(2)to read: "results in admission of one or more persons to a hospital." And include as(6) "any release in which the Health Officer or stationary source determines that there was an imminent and substantial threat to safety, public health, property, or the environment." "Environmental Receptor"shall include,in addition to categories covered in the Federal and CalARP(Section 275(3.6)definitions, actual environmental media such as ambient air, land and water resources including groundwater, wetlands,ocean and rivers. "Public receptor" should be defined as in 40 CFR Part 68.3. "Review by the Department"of facility plans, programs and processes shall include review of facility compliance in terms of completeness of documents and adequacy of onsite programs. Add as new Section 45(3-8.(315 GENERAL DUTY AND AUTHORITY TO REGULATE TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL RELEASES. (a) General duty. "The owners or operators of facilities covered under the CalARP program or this rule have a General Duty to prevent accidental releases of hazardous substances." [This would provide a new local General Duty Clause(the facility has a general duty to prevent accidental releases,even in the absence of specific regulations on the cause of the accident): as already exists in the federal OSHA and the federal CAA Section 112(r)raw, and which allows the regulating agency to enforce(usually after accidents or inspections),cite and issue fines. This enforcement action is usually followed by settlements in which the facility agrees to make safety changes not strictly required by,or even explicitly covered in,current regulations. Enforcement of the federal CAA general Duty Clause is currently reserved by U.S. EPA< i.e., not delegated to states or locals <as if U.S. EPA had any significant resources to enforce it.) (b) Authority to Regulate. [a broad, explicit mandate for HSD to regulate in any way necessary to prevent chemical accidents, similar to the CAA s broad grant of authority to U.S. EPA in Section 112(r x7)(A):] "In order to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances,the Health Officer is authorized to promulgate release prevention,detection,and correction requirements which may include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting,training, vapor recovery, secondary containment,and other design, equipment, work practice and other operational requirements. The Health Officer may require compliance as expeditiously as passible". 450-8.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. Within(b)Human Factors Program, add as new(5). " Within one year {PAGE } CSE KORAN 415-243-8373 � 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 8/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy A►nxlyat the Stntiona<y soutane shall implealent training,fm its elliployees in the human factors program and ensure that their contractors comply with it. Add as new(f) Pre-Startup Safety Review: "For all projects that constitute a"change-in risk project"' or a"development project" as defined in the CCC,v Coale,a scheduled shutdown maintenance turnaround project,or that trigger both institution of the management of change procedures and change in operations procedures: (1) The stationary source shall perform a pre-project safety review which demonstrates that, with respect to the project,the source has complied with all "management of change"provisions incorporated in the source s RMP pursuant to 40 CFR.Section 68.75 or its counterpart in CaIARP; the RMP process safety information(40 CFR 68.65)has been amended and updated;and the project otherwise complies with all applicable requirements of federal and state RMP laws and regulations and the approved R.M.P. (2) This safety review shall be submitted to the Officer for examination prior to project commencement,and the.CWfwe.r shall review and approve the safety review upon determining that the project will be undertaken in compliance with all applicable regulations of state and federal RMP laws and this Ordinance. Add as new: (g) Facility release of Worst Case Scenario maps and related documentation. Within 90 days of the effective date of this ordinance, each Stationary Sources shall provide to the Health Officer and make available to the public : (1) accident scenarios as calculated for the federal.RMP, with the addition of related documentation and maps. Such documentation shall include the Source s calculations of arrival times of WCS toxic clouds at various public receptors nearby,the typical infiltration times for buildings within the danger zones,the time needed for effective evacuation and other public protection measures, as well as eventual maximum cloud(or radiation or blast zone)distances. [Comment The idea is to get at the determination of the possible "near zones"(as done by Cleveland LEPC), where neither evacuation nor sheltering in place could work. The federal law intended the facility RMP information,including the WCS,to be available as an underpinning of future community legislative discussions.] (2) Process Hazard Analyses with summaries by process of serious accident risk problems identified, "action items" recommended by the PHA teams, and subsequent facility resolution/implementation of these action items. (3) By 90 clays after the effective date of this ordinance, the Stationary Source shall provide the first of semi-monthly periodic facility reports,on safety-related Year 20010 problems and on facility progress in remediating where necessary facility systems that are {PACE } __ COUNORAN 7W 415-243-8373 Q0 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM ( 9/16 Report W the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d,, Policy Analyst safety-critical and vulnerable to Year 2000 failures. (4) By March 1, 2999,the Stationary Source shall submit a facility Year 2000 contingency plan taking into account the possible lass of outside utilities such as water,pourer and wastewater treatment, and outlining plans for potential fail-safe shutdown and safe startup, and by June 1, 1999 shall test that plan in coordination with the HSD and the Fire Department.. 450-8.018 REVIEW, AUDrF AND INSPEMON. Clarify the authority of the HSD,the Off icier and the Board of Supervisors to add safety improvements to the facility's plan and the mechanism by which it would be enforced if the facility is unwilling. Public comments on the Safety Plan should be taken for a period of 45 days. Hearings shall be held in communities where the facility is located on evenings and weekends. A firm schedule should be provided for the HSD s review of the initial Safety Plans . HSD should conduct a compliance audit every year (not 3 to 5 years). HSD shall conduct'interim safety inspections,to protect public and worker health and safety, until the Safety Plans are due one year after the effective date of this chapter. Add: "In addition to the RMP progress and compliance audits,the Officer shall conduct a public safety and health inspection at every stationary source approximately every three years(or more frequently if so required by the California health and Safety Code article 2(Sections 25531 et seq.)of chapter 6.95, as amended from time to tune)to assess compliance with the provisions of the RMP and to determine that necessary measurer are being taken to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances and to reduce the severity of those releases that may occur." Add: Interim Inspections. Prior to approval of a stationary source s RMP by the County.the Officer shall conduct up to two on-site inspections to review implementation of those action sterns previously selected by the source s process hazard analysis team for implementation from prior process hazards analyses or hazard and operability studies. Based on the results of that inspection,the Officer may require the facility to implement those action items prior to approval of the RMP. "HSD s review of source's safety programs shall include a determination' that,in regard to all critical safety systems,a source s,actions in: "addressing the findings" of facility s PHA►s(p.39) - "addressing "incident investigation recommendations(p.36) making an "appropriate response"to Compliance Audits(p.45) [PAGE } __ t1 CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 MG 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM 10/16 Repan tothe Burd of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.,Policy Analyst result in facility safety equipment and programs which are adequate to prevent accidental releases." HSD may require changes in both the Safety Plan and the safety programs and equipment of the Source. Add: "In the Department s review of facilities covered under CalARP, there shall be a 45-day comment period and a public hearing shall be scheduled after the Department completes its draft evaluation review of the facility`s RMI'but before it completes its final review, recommendations and approval of the RMP. " In section(c )eliminate the words: "with respect to the equipment involved in the incident" [The inspection should consider management systems and safety programs' as well as equipment] 450-£3.022 COMMUNITY OUTREACH [Comment: the goal of meaningful public participation includes the right to have technical assistance in order to understand and assess the sometimes-complex documentation submitted by Stationary Sources. The standard of achievement here: are typical workets, residents and citizens able to act in protecting public health and safety?] Substitute: "In order to encourage meaningful public review of Source documents and government reviews, the HSD shall develop a Public Outreach and Information Program,including the utilization of one or more non-profit community-based organizations as a public outreach contractor. The Program shall make affected members of the community aware of the opportunities for public review of Safety Plans and other related documents and shall provide members of the public with technical assistance in such review. A non-profit-community-based organization may contract for expert and technical assistance. The Public Outreach and Information Program shall be approved by the Board of Supervisors. Cornmencing on January 1, 1999,the HSD shall annually place in its proposed budget a request for the sum of at least$50,000 for the Program. HSD shall establish procedures to review the activities of any public outreach contractor and to monitor the program." Add: "HSD shall transmit 0174to Consequence Analysis information and traps for all covered facilities to the CCCo Zoning Commission and to the School Board,for potential use in land-use planning and specifically in siting decisions for schools, hospitals and other sensitive facilities, as well as for new siting or major expansion of potentially hazardous facilities close to such public receptors." 450-5.024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BANK.. A starting date for this facility should be specified. The Public Information Bank should include facility documents generated under the federal RMP and CaIARP, except for the most voluminous. Those held as a public repository at the Public Information Bank shall (PAGE __ ..... ...... _.. CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 1 1!23}98 0 9:41 AM Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy Analyst include, at a minimum: LSnder th� ral j�1vit�: Safety Information PHAs Offsite Consequence Analyses documentation(cf. CaIARP Section 2750.8): i.e., not just the maps but the assumptions and calculations Compliance Audits Incident Investigation reports Unde Ca A P: Evaluation review documents and Inspection records AA completeness reviews AA evaluation reviews AA inspection documents<for compliance with all levels of regs: federal,state and local AA annual performance self-audits 450-8.028 PENALTIES. Should be retitled "ENFORCEMENT ANIS PENALTIES" Add: "and shall be punishable as a criminal misdemeanor." IV. Background: The Federal and State Laws that any County Ordinance will build on; their strengths and weaknesses. A. The federal level: In the 1990 Federal Clean Air Act(CAA) Amendments,Sections 112(r)on "Prevention of Accidental Releases"and Section 304 on"Chemical Process Safety Management"were explicitly designed by Congress to"deputize"the chemical workforce(under OSHA' regulations)and the public and stateAocal agencies(under EPA regulations), with significant amounts of new risk information< 13 new risk documents total for workers, and a similar number for the public. The aim is to promote a vigorous public debate among workers(arid their union representatives the public(mord their governmental representatives), and the facilities posing the risks, and thereby to establish a new form and a higher level of public oversight and pressure on facilities for accident risk reduction and accident Prevention. The new CAA provision making worst case scenarios public,for example, is designed to in€orm the public debate as to what is at stake,as well as to allow stakeholders in a rough way to prioritize community risks and to measure progress in reducing them. The law intends to create a well-informed set of stakeholders who are presumably able to use the information for optimal community risk reduction; the law also provides for a data set that can be used nationally as well as locally for comparison of facility risks and risk reduction efforts. Thus the federal law, while not specifying the form of local community debate and action to reduce risks, explicitly encouraged that and fueled it with a powerful set of new information available to the workers and the public. Congress neither discussed nor placed any economic limitations on the use of the new risk data. In the CAA,Congress enacted a safety law which provided a minimal federal floor of safety information and {PAGE } CBS/N©RAN 415-243-8373 RE 11/23/98 (D 9:41 AM 12/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d:,Policy Analyst practices and which explicitly would.not preempt more stringent state and local laws and regulations. Congress provided a potentially powerful but sketchy framework for federal enforcement and future regulatory development, without specifically funding the enforcement part and without#Wther specifying the direction of future regulations. Congress left any balancing of economic and safety factors to the workings of democratic debate at local and mate levels. Although a promising and usefully detailed law,CAA 112(r)has been si.gnificandy weakened by U.S. EPA.s(much-delayed) 1996 promulgation of the mandated federal Risk Management Plan(RMP)regulations(40 CFR Part 68). The most significant weaknesses in the existing California state(CaIARP)and proposed local laws stern from the federal regulations having set far too low a federal floor,in particular for public access to information and for public involvement. It is useful to describe these weaknesses in order to appreciate in which ways local laws might remedy therm. (This discussion will focus mainly on the Risk Management Pian program(EPA's regulatiorm),but will also take into account the simultaneous impacts of the federal Process Safety Management program(QSHA's). A brief outline of the inadequacies of the 1996 federal RMP regulations, many of which were carried forward into the subsequent CaIARP regulations, includes the following- a. EPA's regulatory re-definition of Congress s herrn"Risk Management Plan" < as a summary only of the voluminous documentation required under the.Act. EPA calls the remaining substantive material the"Risk Management program" which must be implemented by the facility. EPA's re-definition is probably illegal,and almost certainly will be subject to legal challenge in raid-1999. This summary"RMP"created by EPA is a barely adequate set of information for electronic submission to the new federal database, but wholly inadequate for underpinning the vigorous and well-informed rale Congress envisioned for the public and workers. b. The main impact of the EPA "creative re-definition"of Risk Management Plan is severely limited availability of documents to the public: only the summary "RMP". Important underlying documents are to be left on site, for state and local agency use only and if needed. c. 'Vagueness regarding standards for judging adequacy. e.g., of safety-related equipment, Process Hazard Analyses,audits, inspections, etc. d. Vagueness regarding adequacy of facility responses to such analyses as audits and incident investigations,and to recommendations from various analyses. e. No Technology Options Analysis. f No substantial provisions for public participation or oversight. {PAGE } CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 RE 11/23/98 (D9:41 AM [ 13/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors bred Millar,Ph.d.,, Policy Analyst g. No provisions for public officials participation/oversight. h. No tie-in to the normal protections of the overarching National Environmental Policy Acta since no federall approvals are involved to trigger NEPA, only federal enforcement. i. No technical assistance for the workforce or the public in order to facilitate their oversight roles. j. Lack of a federal regulatory floor for the Congressionally-mandated EPA system for periodic "audit"of RMRL Under the 1996 federal RMP regulations it is not clear if implementing agencies must do a certain number of inspections or only paperwork reviews. k. No right to file a"citizen suit" under 112(r); in other parts of the CAA,citizens have this right in case enforcement by government falters. 1. No substantial rale specified for workers, beyond the mandated worker participation in the creation of facility PHAs(under 1992 federal OSHA regs). The PHA documents must be made available to workers on the site. in. An inadequate definition of"environmental receptor"as only referring to designated wildlife areas, parks, etc., versus actual environmental resources such as the ocean, rivers,and groundwater. (See the similar formulation in Section 2750.6 of CalARP). B. The state levels Since at least the early 1980 s Californians have progressively increased public sector oversight of what has too often been shown as an accident-prone state petrochemical industry. The California state accident Prevention law, with its implementing regulations called CalARP, includes the federal RMP program, and takes delegation of the federal RMP program. CalARP adds some useful provisions of its owns lower Threshold Planning quantities(TPQs)for some chemicals and a larger list of covered chemicals,for two examples. C;aIARP has superseded the earlier statewide Risk Management and Prevention Program(RMPP)which operated for some years,but CaIARP has retained its basic structure of implementation by local;Administering Agencies(AAs). RMPP had been implemented unevenly, to varying degrees by various local AAs, hence in part the need for new public sector oversight by the state and by responsible localities. (As an aside,of course California has consu tently paid more attention than other"us to seismic possibilities as one external factor that could trigger accidental releases. One of the areas in which many AAs failed to perform was the provision of public participationin the RI process and in oversight of the facilities. The new+CaIARP tracks closely the federal RMP program, and shares its key flaws, but it usefully adds more public sector review of facility RMPs and a fee system to fund the public sector regulatory program. (PAGE } CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 11/23/98 9:41 AM [ 14/16 Report to the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph.d.,Policy Analyst U.S. EPA,s responsibility to "audit" the RMPs will be delegated,through CalARP regulations,to California s implementing agencies. This arrangement promises to be much more suitable than leaving such a key responsibility, as would otherwise occur, with U.S.EPA.s regional office, and with no targeted federal resources to fund implementation or enforcement. Some features of CaLkRP that are most relevant here: [Regular page numbers here are from the"Proposed Regulations" dated 4/21/98< a quick review of the later versions,dated fsl10198,and 913/98 suggests they are not significantly different. We were advised by state and CCCo officials to ignore the"Emergency Regulations" promulgated 7/7/98. Hyphenated page numbers are from "CCOO CalARP Guidance Document",June 19981 • The AA can bump up a facility which under the federal RMP would classify as(less risky)Program Level 1 or 2 to(more risky)Program Level 3,and consequently require a full RMP at the local level(p.7). • "RMP"is defined narrowly, as having the 7 Component Elements outlined in.Article 3. So it is similar to the federal definition of "RMP", as summary data only, plus a registration. This is the "RMP"to be made available to the public under boot federal and CalARP ,regulations. • Most of the information in CalARP s"RMP" summary document(see p. 15)consists of summaries of policies and programs. Categories of hard data that it will include: ----substances handled ----chemical-specific prevention steps(perhaps only examples) ----five-year accident history ---- "planned changes to improve safety"(see CCCo Guidance, p. 9-43 for the county s recommendations(only)on what to include here) a CalARP requires all facilities(p.7-26)to"consult" with(see p. 9-37 for definition of"consult",taken from CALOSHA) employees regarding PHAs and other elements of the facility s Process Safety Management program, and to inform employees about the findings and recommendations from incident investigations. • The AA must coordinate with the facility (Section 2735.5(a))to determine how much and what kind of detail in"documentation" is required for an RMP to be considered adequate. [ft is not clear if this also refers to what information must be maintained on-site.] • In calculating the Worst Case Scenarios,the facility may take credit for the facility s measures for passive mitigation(e.g., dikes), but not for administrative controls(as to the federal RMP regulations). (p. 27) [The latter means the facility promises to implement management measures, e.g., not to fill a storage tank beyond 1/3 of its capacity.] (PAGE } ...............I....................................................................................................................... ..................I........................................................................................ ig-CBE/NORAN 415-243-8373 RE 11/23/98 (D 9:41 AM 15/16 Report tt) the Board of Supervisors Fred Millar,Ph-d.0P0l!a Analyst Trade secrecy is according to current state law. We present here a brief outline of the main stages and associated problems of the new CaIARPprocess(pp. 14-15) (the core of which the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance does not substantially modify, but adds onto in some aspects}: [Page numbers here are from the proposed CalARP regulations,dated 4/21/98.] In the next section of this report we will recommend some legislative changes to remedy the defects of both the federal and the CA ARP programs. 1. The AA conducts a completeness review of the facility s RMP under CalARP. (The facility also submits a copy of its federal RMP to the A.A.) 2. Formal public review of the RMP consists of a 45-day public comment period. No provision for public hearing. 3. The AA does an evaluation review of the RMP (within 24 months for a Program 3 facility). [CaIARP does not limit AA activity to Program 3 facilities only) No provision for public continent or hearing. 4. The AA shall do inspections for regulatory development and for enforcement of the federal CAA (P.6(,). 'Inspection* is not defined, nor is the frequency of inspections. No public access is provided for inspection records. (p. 68) S. The AA shall inspect all sources every 3 yam for compliance with all provisions of the CalARP regulations. *Inspection" is not defined. No public access is provided for inspection records. 6. The AA shall periodically "audit"facility RMPs for adequacy and for compliance [.( with Article 3 only.](p. 66) [Apparently not with other dMumentation/pro*Mn-K?] Public access to the audit process documents is provided. (p.67) *Audit*, an absolutely key enforcement operation, is not defined,so it is not clear whether"audit"involves an inspection. 7. On site documentation: The facility operator(p. 30)maintains OCA documentation(2750.8) on-site, with no provision for putific access. Atao the operator maintains safety information on-site(p.3 1). Other documents(pp. 14,38 and 68)to be maintained on-site include, e.g-, . equipment documentation PHAs A nAtto .............................................. CBE/NORAN V 415.243-8373 11/23/98 (,D 14:34 AM E! rt to the Board of Su rvisors Fred Millar,Ph.d., Policy Analyst Incident Investigations S. Public access is to the RIvIP only (p. 15), not to onsite documents (p. 30). But workers seem to have access to all documents produced under+C;alARP (p.46) 9. A persistent problem is+CalARP s vagueness regarding the adequacy of the required facility actions to - "address findings" of facility s PHAs(p. 39) - "address"incident investigation recommendations(p.36) - snake an "appropriate response'to Compliance Audits(p.45) 10. The State Office of Emergency Services(OHS)can oversee the adequacy of local AA programs . ?f). The AA does annual self-audits of its performance. The State OES can take control if any local A.A, progritm Proves inadequate,either administratively or in reducing risk under C'..alARP. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAMS 20 NOV 98 To: Board of Supervisors From: William B. Walker, M.D., Health Se es D ctor by Lewis G. Pascalli,Jr., Director, . Hazardous Materials Programs Subj: Staff Report on Safe Work Practices P ocol The Board of Supervisors on l 1 AUG 98 directed the Health Services Director to convene the appropriate stakeholders to provide recommendations regarding the development of a safe work practices protocol in order to assure the highest possible level of worker safety. This report summarizes the information gathered and makes a recommendation for further direction by the Board. BACKGROUND During discussions surrounding the Draft Industrial Safety Ordinance, the issue of worker safety arose around concerns involving contractor safety training. At the major petrochemical plants contractors are utilized to perform work during large maintenance and unit turnaround projects. The presence of these temporary workers in facilities having large processing units with high pressure and temperature parameters raises safety concerns. The question posed is whether the contract workers are adequately trained in safety protocols around these plants. To address this concern the industry formed the non-profit Bay Area Training Corporation (BATC) in 1991 whose stated primary goal is to maximize the safety of their employees, contractors and the community. A board was formed with voting and non-voting memberships involving industry, employee representatives and contractors. The BATC established a contractor training program,through a Curriculum Development Committee, which required that all contract workers who would be in a facility performing work receive eight (8) hours of training in a Contractors Refinery Safety Skills Testing Program. They would have to pass a test and receive a certificate of training before being allowed in the facility to work. Once in the facility they would then have to attend a site specific training orientation for 1-11/2 hours before being allowed on the job site. Every three (3) years the contractor would have to attend a four (4) hour refresher training course given by BATC; pass a test and be given a certificate. Page 1 Contractor Skills Tests for crafts were created for skilled crafts. These involved metal skills, millwright, electrician and instrument technician crafts. There was agreement that these tests, based on testing the skill of the craftsperson appears to address concerns of safe work being performed on refinery pressure retaining or energized equipment that have the potential to produce an ignition source, cause a process upset or cause a release to the environment. Industry believes that the BATC has accomplished a contractor safety orientation program, Contractor Process Safety Management, which is seen as a standard for the industry. The employee representatives are of the opinion that while',this was a good start, there needs to be a mechanism to assess the ongoing effectiveness of the safety training. Once the contractor workers have received their BATC training, been issued a certificate and are given the site specific training at the facility; the way that a facility monitors the contractor's safety performance and the effectiveness of their overall contractor safety program varies among facilities. PROCESS Discussions were held with interested stakeholders at a meeting convened by the Health Services Department. The background and history of the safe worker protocol issue was shared by all. The BATC program was reviewed with a focus on what could be done to assess the progress made to date and evaluate the effectiveness of BATC's overall safety program in the refineries. The attendees believe that there has been no third party evaluation of the BATC program to date. There was an interest that such an evaluation would be worthwhile if it included the internal auditing policy and procedures of the refineries' contractor safety programs. CONCLUSION The stakeholders at the meeting reached a consensus that it may be appropriate to have a third party evaluate the BATC training program, the effectiveness of the program in the refineries and the refineries' contract worker safety audit programs. Toward this end the Health Services Department recommends that the Board order the Department to convene additional meetings of the stakeholders to develop a bid package and recommend an entity to contract to assess and report back to the Board on the Bay Area Training Corporation's safe contract worker protocol program, its effectiveness in the refineries and the refineries' internal auditing policy and procedures of contract workers safety. There are no fumds allocated in the Hazardous Materials Programs budget for this contract. An allocation for costs will need to be made to the participating refineries. Page 2 CONTRA COSTA HEALTH SERVICES HAZARDOU A IALS PROGRAMS TO: BOARD OF SUPERVISO S FROM: LEWIS G. PASCALLI JR. SUBJECT: PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SA TY DINANCE DATED NOVEMBER 23, 1998 CONSOLIDATED REDLINE DAT 14123/98 DATE: 41/23/98 CC: The following reviewers submitted their reports, including recommendations, on the proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance to the County Administrator`s office on November 19, 1998: ♦ Consultants: Ray Witter and the National Institute for Chemical Studies, t Contra Costa Health Services Department ♦ Contra Costa Hazardous Materials Commission ♦ Contra County Planning Commission The attached Consolidated.Redline dated 11/23/98 incorporates changes to the ordinance submitted by the preceding reviewers. Additionally, the reviewers made the following recommendations for further consideration. National Institute for Chemical Studies a The county legal staff should review the provision in Section 1454-8.016(c) to detertnine whether the county may legally exclude all or part of a Root Cause analysis from disclosure in a legal proceeding. ♦ The Department should write implementing policies to indicate under which circumstances the Department will and will not conduct such inspections (meaning Root Cause analysis and incident investigations). ♦ The Health Services Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient qualified staff to handle the expected workload increase resulting from adding processes to the existing RMP requirements, including processes within facilities covered by CaIARP; conducting root cause analysis for major accidents and releases; and reviewing and evaluating Human Factors 1 programs. Similarly, the Community Development Department should review its staffing capabilities to ensure there will be sufficient staff in the event it is determined that the proposed risk management program will require review under CEQA. ♦ The county legal staff should review existing enforcement authorities to clarify which tools are available to the county to enforce the proposed ordinance. Section 450-8.028 should be amended to more clearly identify these enforcement actions. ♦ The Board, after consultation with County Counsel, should consider adding a provision to the proposed ordinance classifying certain serious violations, such as false filing of information,as misdemeanors. ♦ The Board should consider including a provision that would require the ordinance to be reviewed triennially after three years of fullimplementation. This would enable the Board to review the performance of county agencies and the regulated industries under the new requirements, evaluate the effectiveness of the ordinance, and determine whether any changes are needed to improve public safety. Flay E.Witter ♦ The County Health Services Department develop a criteria document outlining the requirements for a written human factors program. r Two of the proposed ordinance discussed training as an element of process safety. One proposal only addressed contractor-training programs while the second recommended that training be developed as a separate ordinance. Training for process safety includes supervisors, operators, plant maintenance personnel as well as contractors performing plant maintenance work, major maintenance projects, new construction, and specialty operations. It also requires qualifications for the trainers, development of training modules, and methods of determining that the participants understood the training. Based on the complexity of the element and the various groups that need to be involved in the development of an overall training program,it is suggested that training not be included in the proposed ordinances but rather be developed separately. Hazardous Materials Commission ♦ The Commission recommend that issues raised during the public meeting may be the basis of an appeal,and is concerned that the legal definition of"public meeting" (as distinct from"public hearing")may not allow for that. Th Board 2 should direct County Counsel to include the issue in his review of the ordinance. ♦ That the Board direct Health Services to solicit questions and concerns from the public prior to the public meeting so that staff can better act as a technical resource for the public a That the Board set aside$50,000 from the General Fund for a eine-year technical assistance grant pilot project to assist in the review of Safety Plans. Contra Costa Health Services ♦ County Counsel will be specifically asked to review sections 450-8.022 and 450- 8.018 of the proposed ordinance and add language, as necessary,to ensure that within. 30 days following a Major Chemical Accident or Release it is at the discretion of the Department when(within the 30 days)the safety inspection or incident safety inspection will commence. 3 DRAFT CONSOLIDATED REDLINE ORDINANCE NO. 98-_ INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ORDINANCE The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the official text of the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Code): SECTION I. SUMMARY. This Ordinance adds Chapter 450-8 to the CountyOrdinance Code. Chapter 450-8 imposes regulations which supplement the requirements of California health and Safety Code Article 2(commencing with section 25531)of Chapter 6.95 concerning hazardous materials:management by enacting measures to prevent and reduce the probability of accidental releases of regulated substances that have the potential to cause significant harm to the public health and increase participation by industry and the public to improve accident prevention. These measures include submission of a Safety flan to the County,stringent requirements for the contents of a Safety Plan and Safety Program,public review of the Safety Plan,authorization for the County to require changes in the Safety Plan or Safety Program,an expansion of the list of regulated substances beyond those covered by the Federal and State Risk Manap,Ment Pro, am regulations, and authorization for the Couno expand audits and inspections to all units within the Stationary Source. Root Cause Analysis is required for all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases. A public outreach and information program is established. This ordinance substantially readopts Chapter 84-63, originally added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance No. 96-50,and repeals Chapter 84-63,added by Ordinance No. 96-50. Articles 84-63.2,84-63.4,84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63,as added by this ordinance,set forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material which encourage business and other entities,in planning such projects, to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Article 84-62.14 is readopted in its entirety. SECTION II. Chapter 450-8 is added to the County Ordinance Code, to read: CHAPTER 450-5 RISK MANAGEMENT 450-8.402 BACKGROUND and FINDINGS. The Board of Supervisors oft Contra Costa County finds as follows: (Aa) Recent incidents in Conga Costa County at industrial chemical,petrochemical,and oil industry facilities have prompted the consideration of reviews,inspections,and audits that supplement existing federal and state safety programs and the imposition of additional safety measures to protect public'health and safety from accidental releases. 11123/98 Page 2 DRAFT (13#) Section 112(r)(7)of the Clean Air Act(42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(4))required the Ffederal Environmental Protection Agency("EPA")to promulgate the rule known as the "Risk Management Program",which is intended to prevent accidental releases of regulated substances,as defined in the Federal pLo gran,and reduce the severity of those releases that do occur. All Sta4eaafy Se ees facilities subject to this federal regulation must prepare a Risk Management Plan aMPZbased on a Risk Management Program established at the facility et ,that includes a hazard assessment of the facility,and accidental release prevention program,and an emergency response program(404- CFR§ 6944). Thet facili must submit the Ffederal RMP to the EPA by June 21, 1999 (404-CFR§ 68.150-68.185). The Ffederal RMP will be available to state and local government and the public. (_Ce) The California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95 was amended effective January 1, 1997 to implement the Ffederal EPA's Risk Management Program rule with certain State-specific amendments. The State's Risk Management Pro ' am is known as the California Accidental Release Prevention(CalARP)Program. (W) The County recognizes that regulatory requirements alone will not guarantee public health and safety,and that the public is a key stakeholder in chemical accident prevention, preparedness,and response at the local level. Preventing accidental releases of regulated substances is the shared responsibility of industry,government,and the public. The first steps toward accident prevention are identifying the hazards and assessing the risks. Chace information about chemical hazards in the community is openly shared,industry,government,and the community can work together towards reducing the risk to public health and safety. LEe) The success of a Safety Program is dependent upon the cooperation',of industrial chemical and oil refitting facilities within Contra Costa County. The public must be assured that measures necessary to prevent incidents are being implemented,including changes or actions required by the Department or the Stationary Source that are necessary to comply with this chapter. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 45€1-8.004 PURPOSE and GOALS. (An) The purpose of this ordinance is to impose regulations which improve industrial safety by the following: (1) requiring the conduct of process hazards analysers for Covered Processes handling hazardous materials not covered by the Federal_or State Risk Manarrement PrW"ns; (2) requiring the review of action items resulting from process hazard analyses and requiring completion of those action items selected by the Stationary Source for implementation within a reasonable time frame; (3) requiring the review of accidental release prevention efforts of Stationary Sources and providing for the conduct of investigations and analysers for the determination of the Root Cause for certain incidents; (4) providing review,inspection,auditing and safety requirements that are more stringent than those required in existing law and regulations; 11123198 Page 2 DRAFT (5) providing for public in utre*i into-4the Safety Plan and Safety Program and Rublic review of any inspection and audit results, (6) facilitating cooperation between industry,the County, and the public in the prevention and reduction of incidents at Stationary Sources; (7) expanding the application of certain previsions of the Ffederal and d State Risk Eggeernent ProgMs to processes not covered by the Federal or State Risk. Mgnagpment qgLams;-Yad requiring the development and implementation of a written human factors program;and ' Menti and reducing then ber uencand seven of accidental releases in the County. (Ord. 98--, §2.) 450-8.006 AUTHORITY. This ordinance is adopted by the County pursuant to its police power for the purposes of protecting public health and safety by prevention of accidental releases of hazardous materials and to assure protection of the environment. (Ord. 98- , § 2.) 450-8.008 ADMINISTRATION. The Department is charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing this chapter. (Ord. 98-._, § 2.) 450-8.010 APPLICABILITY. (Aa) This ordinance shall apply to Stationary Sources; and (Bb) The following are exempt from the provisions of this chapter except Sections 450- 8.415(C}and tE), and 8.018(F) and(G). (1)-_s1goge jaks containin a non-re dated bstaiice me-e t for storrage tanks that contain a material that meets the combustible li uid definit'<n of 49 CFR 173.120(b); s (2) drum storage of a non-regulated substance,less than 10 040 pounds of a Hazard Cate&MB material located such that the dMMs could Mgoaably be ex to to be involved in a single release• and for a H d Ca oU A material located such at the 4could MMAn-a-b-1y be ex clod o be iiavolved_in a single release t less than the ti s died the' fires o d Pdanniin Ohua—nty on the Extr el Hairdo s S bgWce list(AD-Dendix A to 40 CFR ha ter 1 Subcha ter 3 -Part-,3 55 as amended from time to timeor 5 ounds mWehever is less; (3) activities in process plant laboratories of Iaborateri s that are under the supervision of a tcghpically gualifiggindividual as defined in Sertion 720.3lee) of 40 CFR. This exemption does not apply to smeiaLty chemical oro uction- t 1/23198 Page 3 DRAFT manufacture, pLocessing or use of substances in ilot plant scale o rations• and activities conducted outside the laboratory;-aad utilities,except for fuel gas and natural gas systems to the battery limits of a process unit• and 5 an waste tanks containers or other devices subject to the Federal and State hazardous waste laws including the Resource Conserv tion and Rave Act R.CRA 40 CFR Chapter l Subcha ter l commencing withP 260 e California Hazardous Waste Control L.aw, California-Health and Safety, Code co mencin with Section 25100 and the California Code of Regulations,,Title 22 Division 4.5 Environmental Health Standards for the Mgngggnient of Hazardous Waste. (Ord. 98--, § 2.) 450-8.012 INSPECTION. The Department shall be allowed reasonable access to any part of the Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this Cshapter. Sections 450-8.016 and 450-8.018 and to supporting documentation retained by the Source for the purpose of determining compliance with this Cshapter. (Ord. 98-____, § 2.) 450-8.014 DEFINITIONS. For purposes of this chapter the definitions set forth in this section shall apply. Words used in this chapter not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Clean Air Act Regulations (40 CFR§ 68.3)and in California Health and Safety Code article 2 (§ 25531 et seq.) of Chapter 6.95,unless the context indicates otherwise. (44) "Covered Process" means any process w4t-at a Stationary Source. (bo) "Department"means the Contra Costa County Health Services Department. (cd) "Feasible"means capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within a reasonable period of time,taking into account economic;and technological factors. d "HazardCateggly A Materials"Me substances which meet the Hazard Cate o Material def„iiti2n as set forth in Section 84-63.1016. e "Hazard ate o B Mate—rials" e substances which meet the Hazard ate o B Material definition as set forth in Section 84-63.1016. (fa) "Industry Codes,Standards,and Guidelines"means the edition of the codes,standards, and guidelines in effect at the time of original design or construction for the design,construction, 11/23/98 Page 4 DRAFT alteration,maintenance or repair of process units,industrial equipment,or other industrial facilities, structures or buildings published by the American Petroleum Institute(API),the Chemical Manufacturers Association(CMA),the American Society of Mechanical Engineers(ASME)or the American National Standards Institute(ANSI). (go "Inherently Safer Systems" means Inherently Safer Design Strategies as discussed in the 1996 Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication"Inherently Safer Chemical Processes" and means Feasible alternative equipment,processes,materials, lay-outs,and procedures meant to eliminate,minimize,or reduce the risk of a Major Chemical Accident or Release by modifying a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples includes,but are not limited to,substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure,lower flammability,or lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous processes;and use of processes which operate at lower temperatures and/or pressures. (hg) "Major Chemical Accident or Release" means an incident that meets the definition of a Level 3 or Level 2 Incident in the Community Warning s stem incident level classification system defined in the Se ,tember 27 1997 Contra.Costa County guideline for the Communily Warning,System as determined by the Department, or results in the release including,but not limited to air, water, or soil of a Regulated substance and meets one or more of the following criteria: (1) results in one or more fatalities; (2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or more persons; (3) causes on and/or off-site property damage • cludin clean-u and restoration activities)initially estimated by the Stmisaa15,Seufee at $500,000 or more. an-site estimates shall be performed by the Statioam Source. Off-site estimates shall berforrrted by a ro nate Ktncies and compiled by the Department.; ; Of { }- results in a flammable vapor cloud of more than 5000 pounds. Cih) "Regulated Substance"means (1)any chemical substance which satisfies the provisions of California Health and Safety Code section 25532(g), as amended from time to time, or(2)a substance which satisfies the,provisions of jo-1i a l- Hazard Categories A or B in section 84-63.1016. Mixtures containing less than 1%of a Regulated Substance shall not be considered in the determination of the presence of a regulated material. "Risk Mgp ggment Prog="means the d cujmentatiorl develo meet im le entation and int roti n of mane a ent s stems b the acili t com dy with the reggglatianssot forthin 40 CER art 68 and the California ILe_aA and Sgf=C94e.Article 2 ggMMpAcing with Section 25531. 11/23/98 Page 5 DRAFT (ki) "RMP" means the Risk Management Plan required to be submitted pursuant to the requirements of the 40 CFR 68.150-68.18.5 and the California Health and Safety Code article 2(Section 25531 et seq.)of Chapter 6.95. (j) "Root Cause"means prime reasons, such as failures of some management systems, that allow faulty design, inadequate training, or improper changes,which lead to an unsafe act or condition,and result in an incident. If root causes were removed,the particular incident would not have occurred. (x ) "Safety Plan" means the pagkW Plan whieli required to be submitted to the Department pursuant to the requirements of Section 450-8.016 of the chapter. n "Safe Pro ram"means the documentation development—im lementation and integration of mana ement s stems by the StatiogM S2urce to comply with the s e requirements set forth in Section 450-8.016 of this chanter. (o) "Stationary Source"or"Source"means a facility which includes at least one process w4t+as defined in 40 CFR 68.10 that isare subject to fPederal Risk Management Program Level 3 requirements and whose primary North American Industry Classification System code(NAILS)is 324(Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing)or 325 (Chemical Manufacturing). (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.016 STATIONARY SOURCE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. The Stationary Source shall submit a Safety Plan to the Department within one year of the effective date of this ordinance or within three;ygars of the date a facilfty become a Station So e' that complies with the provisions of this section and that includes the safety elements listed in subsection(Aa) below. In addition,the Stationary Source shall comply with the safety requirements set forth in subsections(Ab)through( e)of this section and shall include a description of the manner of compliance with thele subsection,in the Safety Plam_A new Covered Process at an existing Static Source s 1 rbm l with subsections A throu 6(r to i 'tial (Aa) RLsk Mnagement P�Elements. Those Covered.Processes not included in tfe/Federal program level 3 Rislk I'goge ent Pro m shall be subject to the Risk Mapagement Prot elements listed below. The Safety Plan shall include a description of the manner in which these Ris�l Management Program elements listed below shall be applied to the Covered Process. These Risk Magement Pry elements shall be implemented in conformance with the Federal and Stagy:Risk Management P s and the Safet�Plan shall follow Chanters f and 7 elated July 1, 1998 and Alter 9 dated Nowmber 2 1998 of the Contra Costa County Health Services Department I?MP guidance document,Joe, 199$.A95= f 1}: Process Safety Information: a The Station c�urce shall co ete a com i1a ion of written j2rocess s enformati n beforecon- ct n an race hazard analysis as required b this ch ter.The Mm at`on of wrist n rocas sof of rmation i o enable the tatio Source and the ern Io ees involved in ei eratin the Covered Process to hien and un-ers - 11/23/98 Page 6 DRAFT the hazards posed b the Covered Process. This rocess safe information shall include information pertaining to the hazards of the regulated substances used or r aced _b_y the pLoces& infooLation.12ertaining to the technology of theprocess— and infoEMation pgIgning to the e ui ment in the process. Information'Pertaining to the hazards of the Regulated Substances in the tarocess. i This information shall consist of at least the following: to2iicily info ation pgngi:ssible ex<osure limits-, physical data-, reactivi data: corrosivit data; thpMal and the ical stabili • and hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of different materials that co ld foreseeably occur. Cit) Ma rial SgfM Data Sheets meetin the r uirem nts of Section 5189 Title,8 of Cali ornia Code of Regulations,Ma be used to corn-ply corn—plywith this rNuirement to a extent th contain the information required by this subsection. (iii) Information ertainn to the technology of the process §hall includet least the followin : a block-flow diagram or simplified process flow di am, process the is • maximum intended nvento safe upper and lower limits for such item as tem estates pressures, flows or compositions, and an evaluation of the conse a aces of deviations. lore the ori incl technical information no longer exists such information mgy be developed in conjunction with the pLocess hazard analysis insufficient detail to sgp2Qrt the an-a--lysis. Civ) Information pertaining,to the equipment in the process shall include; materials of construction,• pipiagand instrument dia ams P&ID's - electrical classification• relief ustem deli n and ei n basis ventilation system design, design codes and standards sin l ed material and ens balances for rocesses built after the com fiance date of this Cha ter, and sAfety age—ms Le.g. interlocks detection or su ression systems). The StatiogM, Source shall document that e ui ment corn ties with recd m and generally"ccepted good engineering practices. c For existing e ui mens desigmed and construe in accordance with code.. standards or radices that are no lon er in general use the SM—ti-o-n-mary Source shall determine and document that the gguipment is designed, rnaintairted ins ted tested and oRgmti_n-g in a safe manner. Q Operating Procedures„_r(a) The St#fioaM Source shall deveign and im lement written o ratin rocedures that pmvide clear instrcictions fr safelyco'' u ti activitiga inv ved in each Coy red. Process consistent with a process gg&V informabon and shall address at least the followi elements. i tos for each a statin h e 'nidal s normal o ations r pWx9jong emer enc h tdo inclu ' the con " . ns under whi eMgW,encX shutdown ig required— and the assi amen of shutdownnsbi i t ualified operators to ensure that er enc shut own is executed in a safe d timelyr e er enc o ratio normal shutdown and startu follo.Wft 1& a WMKound, or after-an MgrgeM shutdo ii O statin limits. corse uences of deviation; and ste s re uired to correct or avoid deviation. 02) S e d health ct> siderations: ro rties of and hazards resented b the Lh_emiggls u ed in the 12mess• preogfigns necess4a to prevent sure hicLuAing ongineghag cgntpols.. adin` ative controls, and persnal protective a ui ment• control rneasur to be taken cal contact or airborne a sure occurs uali c trot for raw rials and control of hmlevels,to cial r ani ue hazards. 11/23/98 Page 7 DRAFT (c) Safes sterns and their functions. d Operating rocedures shall be readily accessible t em to ees who work in or maintain aprocess. e e a ratin rocedures shall be reviewed as often as neves to assure that the reflect current opgating Rractice includin chars es that result from c'an es in process chemicals technology, and gguipment, and char es to station sa ces. Th StatignM Source shall certify u l that these operating rocedures are current and curate. The Stari n Source shall developand im le ent safe war radices to provide for the control of hazards during operations such as lockout/ to out confined s ce en • a nin recess a ui ment orpiping- -overand control entr ce into a stn 'a sour e b mairrtenance. contractor. lab..,o or other s ort ersonnel. These safe work ractices s all a l to employees and contractor employees. Q 1 Employee Participation: a The Station Source hall devela a written lan of action regardim the im lementa ion of the employee pgrficipation re uired by this phavAer. The StatiopM Source shall consult with em to ees and their representatives on the conduct and deveLQMent of process hazards anal ses and on the develo meat of the other elements of the Safety Program in this charter. c The Statin Source shall ravide to em to ees and their re resentatives access to process hazard analyses and to all other information re uired to be developed under this chapter, (4) Training_ for each employee in such Covered Process: a Initial training. CiEach em to ee presently involved in operating a Covered Process d each ern to ee before being involved iR oygrgfing a newly assigned Covered Process shall be gained in an n erview of the rocess and ig the pperating proceduresas s ecifiod in Section 450-8.016 LA . The training shall include em basis an the s cific saffew and health hazards e er enc o gratia s including shutda and saLe work practiqgs Mlicable to the em to gee's job-tasks. In lieu ofn'tial trainin for those e to ees ahead involved in o roti a rocess on owrr or gggrygor May ge Aify in writin tha t the em to ee has the re uired cowled e skills and abilities to safidy a t e duties and re nsibilities as eeified in the a tin racsdures. R freshertrainin Refresher traiWin ided shall be ravat least eve three ears and more oft if n cgs to each ern to <e involve o rating avered Proge s to fissure that the employee uncle and adheres to the current p MrgLpjgggdurAe of the Covered P ocesg. tin ource in consuliatigp with the ern ees involved in o Ating the rocess shall deteMine the W=Rdate freuenc o refre her training. c Train daumentation. The Stgtio So a shall asteach to ee involved' rgtin a rocess has received d understood a Linin r uired.b this s n. The Stgtto S_ource shall re e a record_w_h_ic_h contains the ids ti f the `gMloyee.the to of trair:irs and e means used to verify that the ern la ee M&Mod the jr ng. (5) Mechanical Integrity-. including the use of Industry Codes, Standards,and Guidelines: WAMlicafign. Para rVk M throe h of this section Mly a1to the f 11 win roggss egw:pmen ensure yes el and:stora e s i in s rn cludi` i in m an g has valves relief and vents sterns and d vi es- timer e c shuWoymsygiwas.� c rttrrsis includin mdevices and sensors, an um s. 11123/98 Page 8 DRAFT b Written 12rocedures. The Stationer Source shalt establish and ins ement written rocedures to maintain the on-going integrily of process Nuil2mgnt. Lc) Training for recess maintenance activities. The StationM Source!shalt train each ern 10 ee involved in maintaining the on-going into rit of l2rocess equipment in an overview of that pLocess and its hazards and in the rocedures licable to the em toe 's `ob tasks to assure at the etn to ee can m0buu,the job tasks in a safe manner. d Inspection and testing. 1 InsRgctions and tests shall be mffo rmed on plocess e ui ment. Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized andenerall acre ted good engiaw!Lring pTactices. The fro uenc of"ns ctions and tests of roe a ui meat shad be consistent with livable manufacturers' recommendations and oed en ince " actives d ore fre uentl if determined to be necess b or o ratin ex erience. The Station S urce shall ocument each inspgction and test that has been r&fformed on rocs s ui ment. The documentation shall identify the date of the ins ection or test,the name of the Mrson who rfoe the insRection or test the serial number or other Iden ifier of the e 'i meat on which the ins coon or test was performed, a description of the inspectionor testerfoML an the results of the inspection or test. e ui ment deficiencies. The Stationw Source shall correct deficiencies in e ui ment that are outside acre table limits(defined,by the process safe1y information in Section 450-8.106(A1))before further use or in a safe and time! m er when necess means are taken to assure safe operation. Quafity assurance, In the construction of new plants and a ui ment' the Station Source shalt assure that e ui ment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process ap lioat'on for which fty will be used, ARprgpriate becks and inspections shall be erformed toass a that eguiRMent is installed rci rl and consistent with desi n specifications and c manufacturer's instructio s. The StatioaM Source shall assure that maintenance materials e arts and equipment are suitable for the process application for which fty will be used. (6) Management of Change.�a�The Station ary Source shad establish and implement written pKpgedures to pjgpUe changes,(except for°`re lacements in kind")topsom, ss chemicals technolo went and rocedures• and char Aes to statin sources lb4t affect a covered rop cess. The gEpgLdures shall assure that the followin consider ons are addmssc d ILno r to an c e: the tec ical basis Irr the pro sed chat - irn act of ch e on safe health" mod ifica 'ons too esti rocedures~ nesey time period for the char e' LrLd.oath rization reguirernents for the raWposed change. Lc)Em to e involved in o titin a races and maintenance and contract a to ees whose`ab tasks wilt be affected by a change in the proces§sh1 be inf ed of and 'n d in the chap a pdor to start-IM of the. rocess or affec d art of a rocess. d If a Qb=e covered by tis section results in a thani the rove et info tion re aired ection 450_g 16 A 1 such info+ anon shall be u dated accordin -1 y. Cc)If a cbange covered by this section results in a chatgo in the o in&mocqdures or ra i s reguired by Section 450-8,016(A)(2). such proceduresr ra tishall be dated accordingly. 11/23/98 Page 9 DRAFT {7) Pre Mart-Up gofot�-Reviews: (a) The Stationary Source shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new stationM sources and for modified station sources when t e modification is si nificant enough to re wire a chane in the process safe in ormatio . b The pre-stadupsafqV review shall confirm that prior to the introdu tion of regulate substances to a Covered Process: construction and e ui ment is in accordance with design s cifications• sg&ly.operating.,maintenance and emergency. rocedure axe in Ia and are aeste for new Covered Processes a process hazard an i sis has been rfermed and recd a da ions ha ,e been resolved:or implemented before st • and modified Covered Processes net the.reguimmmenta contained in-management of chane Section 450-8.106 A 6 and training of each em to ee invo ved in o eratin a recess has bee corn feted. (81 Compliance Audits:-,.La The $tationM Source shall ceftilfy that the have evaluated com lian e with the provisions of this section at least eYM three ears to verify at the procedures gad practices developed under this Ch ter are ade nate and are bein followed. 02) The compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person kagwledgeable in the process. c A re rt of the findings of the audit shall be develo d. d The StatioLiM Source shall Rro=tly determine and document anro riate re ansa to each of the findings of the compliance audit,,.and document thatdeficiencies have been corrected. Le) The S_tationary Source shall retain the two most recent cam liance audit re arts. 0 Incident Investigation �) The Stationary Source shall investigate!each incident which res Itd in or couldreasoobly have resulted in a catastro his release of a regelated substance. incident investigation shall be initiated as Ptorn-ptly as ssible 'but not later than 48 hours following the incident= Lc) incident investigation team shall be established and consist of at least one rson knowled ea e inft Covered Process involved ins uding a contras employee if the' cident involved wor of the contractor and other persons with a ro nate knowledge and V 'ence to til orouahly investi=ate a analyze ft incident. d A r ort shall be re ed at the conelusion of the investi anon whit iBe odes at a nimYn: to cif incident date nvesti anon be a descn #ion of the incident•the fgptors that contributed to th i cident• and recommendations resultin from the investi aticin. The Mjjt_ten&iMMM sh 1 i dicate wheth r e cause of the ins` ant dlor res mine dations resulti from the roves i ation a clic onl to the rose or ui menti 'v Ived in the incident or licable to othir rocesses ore ui rnent at the SWtignm Source. The incident vesti titian re all be made av.Table to the aQpgjMient u on MQMPA. e The Statin Source-shall establish a system to ro tl addr s d resolve the incident re ndin sand recornmendations. Resolutions and correptive actign s all be documented. Thee rt shad be re iewed with all acted rsonnel whose job task are relevant to the i ci ant findings 'ncjuding contrasI=tees whe e1`cable. Incident nvesti a i n re its shall b stained for five e s. 11123198 Page 10 DRAFT (10) Hot Work: a The S#atian Source shall issue a hot work ermit far hat work operations conducted on or pSar a covered process. b The pgnit shall document that the fire revention and roiection requirements in 5189 of Title 8 of Ca ifamia Cade Regulations have been implemented riotbe i n the hat work a stations it shall indicate the date(s) authorized for hat work and identif y the abject on which hat workk is to be pgrformed. The pgrmit shall be kept on file until com letion of the hat work operations. f 1_l}__Contractors Pro � ��a�A�pl cation. This section applies to eantractars rf renin maintenance<or re it turnaround major or renovation or s-ecialty warp on or adjacent to a cover d process. It does of aMly to contractors providing incidental services w ch do not influence jRrQcess safe1y,such as janitorial work faced and drink services lawnlaun4a,.delivery or other supyly services.. b Station= Source res nsibilities. fb The Station= Source when selegfing a contractor,shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the contract-gMer oro ra or's safely perforMance and ro s. ii The Station Source shall infarm contract owner or o rotor of the)mown j2otential fire ex losion or toxic release hMards related to the contractor's work and the l2roggss. (iii) The SLatioaM Source shall ex Iain to ft contract owner or operator the ggplicable provisions of the emergency response orggram Section 450-8.016(A)(12). iv The Stationary Source shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with Section 450-8.016C 2 to control e entrance resence and exit of the contract wrier or attar and contract em to ees in Covered Process areas, (y) The StatignM Source shat riodicad evaluate the l2egformance of the contract owner or o ;star in fu f l in their a li ations as specified in Section 450-8 016(Al(l 1ICc) Cc) Contrast gMMer ora erator res onsibilities: i The contract owner car o rotor shall assure that each contract ernto ee is trained in the Work actives u& ss to safelydorm hisfher`o ii The contract owner or omerguor shall assure That each contra t cm to tie is instructed in ft known tential fire eUlosioll,or tonic release hazards rela—cqd to his/her job arilthe process, d the livable rovisions of the erne enc tion plan. `i The contract g_mMer or o for hallo,-cmMent that each contract ern. ice► ee has res ivied and and god the training aired b this secti n. The contract owner or o erator shall are a:record which g2ngdns the ids ti of the contract en to tie the date at teal and the e s used#o verify at the em to tie e toad the train iv Th contract er oro erator hall assure at each co act e to tie ow s the safe rules of the S atio Source includn a safe work actives r fired b Seco 45 -8.016A_ v The co tract owner o rotors advise the Statio arse ref an ani ue hazards resen#ed b etr ct awnsr ors rator's work or of My hazes found bacthe contrt owner or,a e ator's work. f 121—Emergency Response Pro ram: a The Station Source shall develo and irn le tint an timer res rise ro ram far t e se of r tectin u is health and e e vironm nt Such ra shall include the follo ` elements: i emer e c res rise lan which .shall be maintained at the stat o source d contain a I est the fo lo35d elements. ptqgedWes for in am the public and I ai eerier en res a envies about accide releases a enc l in and ernes c re e. dos to#ion r first-aid and e r enc medical treatment neves to #teat accide tal human. ex sures and 11/23198 Page I I DRAFT procedures and measures for emergency response after an accidental rel ase of a regulate subggg , Ctil. Procedures for the use of timer enc re onse e ui Ment and for its inspection, testin d maintenance; (iii)Training for all emi2loyees in relevant procg&Les and.the Incid nt Command tem, and iv Procedures to review and u to as Wpm riate the emerge resp2nse 2lan to reflect chars es at the station source an ensure that em to ees are informed of chances. -(bJ A written plan that corn lies with other Federal condagengy ILIgn re lations or is consistent wit thea roachin the National Response Team's Inde rased' C ntin enc Plan Guidance f"One Plan" and that among other matters includes the elemM provided in Sec ion 4513-8.131 fi A 12 a sWI satisfy the Egguirements of this section if the Station Source also co lies d Section 450-8.t}16 A i2 c). c e emergency res2gnse plan developed under this section shall bo coordinated with the common emer enc res ,onse Ian develo ed under 42 U.S.C. 11 3. on e nest of the local emer enc Tann` committee or emer enc res nse officials the Sta 'on Source shall promptly provide.to the local emeWncy response officials information necesm for dev-lo in and iml2lementing the community emergency response 121an. ($b) Human Factors Program. (1) Stationary Sources shall develop a written human factors program at follows the human factors guidance document develo ed<or adopted by the Department The program shall be developed within one year following the issuance of the Contra Costa Count guidance documents or the effective date of the ordinance=wh chever is later. The Human Factors Program shall addressdt (i) the inclusion of human factors in the Process Hazards Analysis process; (ii) the consideration of human systems as causal factors in the incident investigation process for Major Chemical Accidents or Releases or for an incid.,keesidefAal Releaser, efRegolated SobstaRees that could reasonably have resulted in Major Chemical Accident or Release; (iii) the training of employees in the human factors program; (iv) operating procedures;and (v) the requirement to conduct a Management of Change prior to staffing changes for changes in permanent staffing levels/reorganization in operations or emergency response. Employees and their Representatives shall be consulted in th Management of Changes-. (2) Employees and their Representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program. (3) The program shall include,but not be limited to, issues such as staffing, shiftwork and overtime. (4) A description of the human factors program l thro h(bJ3)above shall be included in the Safety Plan prepared by the Stationary Source. (Ce) Root Cause Analysis and Incident Investigation. W_Stationary Sources shall conduct a Root Cause analysis for each Major Chemical Accident or Release which occurs after the effective date of this chapter. ftfioaM Source shall gLnQdically up te ON QgDgMUgnt on facts l ted to the relme or incident,and the tatus of a Root Ca se An&sis co c' d V_ursuant s sectio at meetin s scheduled-b_y,the Laeartment'n coo anon with the Statio Sgurce. To 11/23/98 Page 12 DRAFT the maximum extent feasible the De artment and the StatioM Source shall coordinate these meetings with ether agencies with iurisdiction over the StationM Source. Within 30 days of com letin a Root Cause Analysis rformed pursuant to this section the SWionM Source shall submit to the Department a final re ort containing that analysis,includingrecd endations to be irn lemented to mitigate against the release or incident re-occurring,if an and a schedule for completion of resulting,recommendations. The methodology of the Root Cause analysis shall be one of the recommended methodologies from the Center for Chemical Process Safety or shall be reviewed by the Department to determine substantial equivalency. f2 The Department may elect to do its own independent Root Cause analysis or incident investigation for a Major Chemical Accident or Release. If the Department elects to conduct a Root Cause analysis or incident investigation the Stationary Source shall cooperate with the Department by providing the following access and information in a manner consistent with the safety of Department and Stationary Source personnel and without placing unduuee>e burdens on the operation of the Stationary Source: (i)allow the Department to investigate the accident site and directly related facilities such as control rooms,physical evidence and where practicable the external and internal inspection of equipment,(ii)provide the Department with pertinent documentation,(iii)and allow the Department to conduct independent interviews of Stationary Source employees, subject to all rights of the Stationary Source and employees to be represented by legal counsel and/or management and union representatives during such interviews. If in the course of the Department's Root Cause analysis or incident investigation access is required to areas of the Stationary Source which in the `u�ddaeu of the Stationary Source require personnel entering the area to use protective equipment and/or have specialized training the Department shall provide itis personnel with such equipment and training. To the maximum extent feasible the .Department shall coordinate any Root Cause analysis or incident investigation it conducts with investigations conducted by other agencies with jurisdiction over the Stationary Source to minimize the adverse impacts can the Stationary Source and/or its employees. (3) No part of the conclusions,findings or recommendations of the Root Cause analysis conducted by the Department or Stationary Source,or incident investigation conducted by the Department,relating to any Major Chemical Accident or Release or the investigation thereof shall be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter mentioned in such report. (D4) Process Hazards Analysis/Action Items. _Process hazards analyses will be conducted for each of the Covered Processes not included in the Federal program level 3 Risk Management Pro according to one of the following methods: What-lf, Cklista What- If/Cheeklig,Hazard and Operabili1y Stud OP Failure Mode and Effects al sis-ffMEA Fault Tree_Analysis or an gpppg2n&t&equivalent methodoio app-roved by the De artmentri r to conducting�the process bazar_danalysis. The process hazard analysis shall be aplaropriate to the comyl"Lty of the Covered Process and shall identi evaluate and control te hhazards invo ved in the Covered Process. The pMessh4d analysis shall address: the hazads of the process,the identification of an revious incident which had a likelypotential for catastro hic consg uenee , engineering and administrative controls ARplicable to the hazards and their 11123/98 Page 13 DRAFT interrelationships such as approp riate application of detection methodolo Les Lorovide earl warning of releases. Acceptable detection methods mi ht include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms and detection hardware such as h drocarbon sensors. consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls,,Covered Process and StationM Source sitin • Human Factors-, and a qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safet and health effects of failure of controls. All rocess hazard anal ses s l be /formed by a team with expertise in en ineerin and rocess o erasions and the team shall inc ude at least one emto ee who has ex /lance and knowledge s ecific to the rocess kinp,evaluated. Also ane member of the team mut be knowled eable in the s cific process hazard analysis m hodola bein used. (2) The process hazards analyses shall be conducted within 1 year of the effective date of this Chapter and no later than the submittal date of the Safety Plan.-Previously completed process hazards analyses that comply with the California Code of Regulations,Title 8, Section5189, and/or the California Cade of Regulations, Title 19, Section 2760.25 89 of Tid are acceptable for the purposes of this Chapter. Process hazards analyses shall be updated and revalidated at least once every 5 years after coWletion of the initial process hazard analysis. Updated and revalidated process hazard analyses completed-to-comRly with the California Code of ReguIV tions Title $ Section 5189,and/or the California Code of Regulations,.Title 19 Section 2760 are acce table for meeting the update and revalidation requirement. . :External events including seismic events shall be considered for rocesses containin asubstance defined in the California Cade of Regulations,Title 19 Cha ter 4.51 Section 2770.5 if the distance to the neareq Public receptor for a worst e e release scenariospecified by the California Code of RegWations,Title 19 Cha ter 4.51 Section 2750.3 is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint as defined in California Code of Regulations Title 19 Chapter 4.5 1 Section 2750.2fa�. Q) For all Covered Processes,Tthe Stationary Source shall consider the use of Inherently Safer Systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazards analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities. (4) For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall document the decision made to im lament or not irn lament all process hazard anal sis rec mmended action items andft, results of recommenddLons for additional stud . tThe Stationary Source shall complete recommended actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source as follows: all actions not requiring a process shutdown shall be completed within one year after submittal of the Safety Plan; all actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled.turnaround of the applicable process subsequent to one year after submittal of the Safety Plan unless the Stationary Source demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Department that such a schedule is infeasible. For recommended actions not selected for irn le entaton the Station Source shall include the 'ustification for not im lementin the reggM ended action. For all Covered Processes,the Stationary Source shall retain documentation of closure,and any associated justifications,of actions identified by the process hazards analysis. 11/23/98 Page 14 ............. ................. ...................... DRAFT (Ee) Accident History._aThe Stationary Source shall include an accident history in the Safety Plan of all Major Chemical Accidents or Releases from June 1, 1992,through the date of Safety Plan submittal to the Department. For each Major Chemical Accident or Release the Stationary Source shall report the following information,to the extent known: date,time and approximate duration of the release; chemicals released; estimated quantity released in pounds; type of release event and it=s source; weather conditions at the time of the release; on-site impacts; known off-site impacts; initiating event and contributing factors; Root Cause(s); whether off-site responders were notified; and operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release. ( 2The Station Source shall annually submit a re ort of the accident histo to the) D2pgjj�ent- The first report shall be due two yand gars after the effective date of this ordinance gLbseguent re its shall be due on the anniversaries of the effective date of the ordinance. 450-8.018 REVIEW,AUDIT,AND INSPECTION. (Aa) Upon submias_ionffiabf�of a Safety Plan by the Stationary Source,the Department shall review the 5gfet y Plan to determine if all the elements required by,Section 450-8.016 are included and c�Iete. The De artmen I shall prgv ide to the Statin M Source a written Notice of Deficiencies, if py.-The a1gggn=Source shall have 60 calendar d4ys from receipt of the Notice of Deficiencies to make My corrections. The S calendar extension to t Agdon ay Legg"s in.writing,a one time 30 day daycorrect M Source M. deficiencies, L3y the end of the 60 calendar days or M extension Rgdod,the&atiojkla Source shall resubmit the revised Safe ly Plan to the DgRg_tment. After the De artment determmes that the adet Plan is co=Lfete the Dgpartrnent shall schedule a public mwting on the Station Source's y _ Safe Plan to=lain,its contents to the public and take pub-lie comments. The Dkpwment§hall ni&e portions of ft Safe Plan,which are not gWLected trade secret Lnformation.available to,the public for the public meeting. The Dep - @qnent shall,within.one ym of!be submission of the StwtjonM Source's Sdr &Plan,gconduct an initial audit and inspection of the Station ary Source's Safety Pro to determine coMfiancpwith this ChUter. Base-d u the DqparUnofs review of the Plan . and the au --y Source,1he DWa_rtment mgy re vire 1 It and inspection of the Station _nWilcations or a ftio, to to b ddi —as the Sgfgly Plan submitted by the Staticin Sgurce,or Safely Promm ring the Safe V Pla n or Safe ty Pro g=into compliance with the Leggiryments of this Cha ter. AM detetrninationthat modifications or additions to the Safe Plan or Safe amaired are Mg shall beinMILting.collegfiXelref erred to as the"F!relimiM Determination". The PrelimiaM t- 1 Dee rm 'Igaton shall opain the basis for-the modifications gr additionsMquired to-bAng ft SaLety — - Man or SdeAy Pro g _s of this QW_te ram into owliance with the re -L. The Prelimip= Determination -Stationary Source. , mination shall be mailed to the Stationg 11/23/98 Page 15 DRAFT 2 The StatioM Source shall respond in writing to the Preliminga Determination issued by the Dejoadment, The res nse shall state that the Station-w Source will inco orate into the Sgfqjy Plan or Sgqly Program the revisions contained in the preliminga determination or shall state that the StatiopM Source rejects the revisions in whole or in . For each rejected revision the StatioaM Source shall ex lain the basis for rejecting such revision. Such a lavation may include substitute revisions. 3 The Station Source's written response-to the Department's Prelimin Determinatio shall be received b the De ailment within 94 da s of the issuance of the PreljMjDM Determination or such shorter time as the De artment specifies in the Prelimin Determination as beiniz necessM to protect Rpblic health and safety. Prior to the written response beiLig due and unon written r-quest from the Station Source the De art ent may Mr vide,in writingadditional time for the response to he received. 4 After receiving the written res nse from the Station Source the Ike artent shall issue a public notice per the Dep,.rtMent's Public Participation Policy and make portions of the agfety Plan,the Preliminary Determination and the Stationary Source's responses,which are not protected trade secret informations available for public review. Public comments on the Safety Plan shall be taken by the Department for a period of 45-39 days after the agfety Plan the Preliminary Determination and the Stationary Sources responses are-is made available to the public. The Department shall schedule a public meeting on the Stationary Source's Safety Plan dp& f the 459 day comment period. The public meetings shall be held in the affected corrunity on evenings or weekends. (b) The pepaf4ml# 5 ;is4hiff;Q days of a Major-Ghem-io-41 Ae-eidenter.Release at the4 knApOe6efis and MW4. ;4e , (Cd) Based upon(+the Department's Preliminary Determination,review of the Stationary Sources responses and review ofpublic comments on the Safety Plans_the Prelinxiary Determination and the Statovarg.Source's responses, insident in"+s4:e%,-the Department may require modifications or additions to the Safety Plan submitted by the Stationary Source or Safety Program to bring the Safe Plan or,Safety Program into compliance with the requirements of this Chapter. Any determination that modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safety.Program are required,and any deternunation that no modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safe Program are required shall be in writing, 11123/98 Page 16 DRAFT (collectively referred to as"fFinal dDetermination")shall be mailed to the Stationary Source and shall be made available to the public. The Department may not include in a Find Determination gflLjpe�i�ie�a requirements toi*a Safety Plan or Safety Program which!would cause a violation of, or conflict with,any state or federal law or regulation or a violation of any permit or order issued by any state or federal agency. (De) Within 30 days of the Department's€Final dDetermination,the Stationary Source and/or any person ay appeal the€Final 4Determination to the Board of Supervisors pursuant to Chapter 14-4 by a verified written notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and payment of the applicable appeal fee. e a al must be limi ed to issues raised Burin the ublic comment rind. The notice shall state the grounds for any such appeal,including(i.)the reasoning that the appeal}s necessary because the Stationga Source is in corn Bance with this Ch ter or(ii)the reasoning that the Mal is necess to-bring the Statioggy Source into compliance with this Cha' ter. In acting on the appeal,the Board shall have the same authority over the Final DeterminItioII&We#y-Pkm as the Department. The$oard mgy re uire modifications or additions to the Safety Plan or Safe Pro ram to bring the SgfqIX Plan or Safely-Program into conn fiance with the Lqguirements of this Cha pter-The Board May not include in its decision on the Final Determination any requirements to a SdM Plan or SgfgV Pro ram which would cause a violation of or conflictwith M State or Federal law or regulation or a violation of My permit or order issued by any Stag or E§kral a enc . The decision of the Board of Supervisors shall be final with respect to the Final Determination Safety Plan. (_F The Safety Plan shall be valid for a period of three to-f -year9A"disamtiea of the Depameat from the date of final action and shall be reviewed and updated by the Stationary Source every three eve-years ursuant to the requirements of this ordinance. Any revisions to the Safety Plan as a result of the review and update shall be submitted to the Department and shall be subject to the previsions of this Section. ff4) The Department mayeha4,within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release-at the&Gfe69O ef the Pep conduct a safety inspection to review and audit the Stationary Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016. The Department shall review and audit the Statio gatieawy Source's compliance with the provisions of Section 450-8.016 at least once every three t94*e-years. The Department mU audit the Stationw Source based upon any of the f llowin crite "a: accide t histo of the Station Source accident histo of o er Statin ur sin the same Indus uantit of Re aced Substances resent t e Statio So arca location of Lhg 5tationM5oprce and its proximity to the public and environmental race tors .the presoce of s ecific re Mated substances and the h s identified in the Safe Plan. The Stationary Source shall allow the Department to conduct these inspections and audits. The Department,at its option,may select an outside consultant to assist in conducting said inspection. Qej Within 30 days of a Major Chemical Accident or Release the Department may commence an incident safety inspection with respect to the proceLs@qWpfa@t#involved in the incident pursuant to the provisions of Section 450-8.016(Ce). 11/23/98 Page 17 DRAFT 1 Based u n the De artment's audit safet ins ection or an incident ins action the De artiixent rna require modifications or additions to the Safely Pian sub mitted by the StationM Source or Safely Program to briLig the Safety Plan or Safety Program into c m liance with the uirementof this cha ter. An determination b the De artment shall be in 35tting and shall be mailed to the StatipM Source Creferred to as the Notice of Findings). The SlatLioum Source shall have 60 calendar days from receipt of the Notice of Findings to make any corrections. The StationM S arca ina r nest in writin a rine time 30 da.y calendar day exte ,ion to make correction . e De artrnent manot include in its Notice of Fin in s re uirements to a Safe Plan or Sgfely Pro am which wo ld cause a violation of or conflict with an state or federal law or regglation or a violation of an emit or order issued b any state or federal gggricy. The Notice of Findings made by the Department will be available to the public. Within 30 days of the De artirient's Notice of Findings,the Statin Source andlor ari arsonma Weal the Notic of Findings to the Board of Su ervisors pursuant to Cha ter 14-4 by a verified written notice of a eal filed with the Clerk of the board of Supervisors and RUment of the a livable a al fee. Thea must state the rounds for an uch a cal includingi the reasoning that the Wpeal is necess •because the-SjgLon=Source is in coin liance with this Cha ter or(ii)the reasonthat the Veal is neces to bring the Statio ource into compliance with this C ter. In actin on thea al the Board shall have the s` e ffig#Lority over the Notice of Findin s as the De ant. The Board ma re uire modifications for additions to the Safe Plan or Safe Pro airi to brin the Safe Plan or Safe Pro am into comp liance with the uirements of this Chant gr. The Board May not include in its decision on LILe Notice of EindiLigs an re uirements to a Sde&Plan or SgfgV Program which would cause a violation of or cong with State or Federal law or le y,ulation or a violation of M permit or order j§sued by an State or,Federal a enc . The decision of the Board of Su ervisors shall be final with re§Pect to the Notice of Findings. (Ig) Nothing in this section shall preclude,limit,or interfere in any way with the authority of the County to exercise its enforcement,investigatory,and information gathering authorities under any other provision of law nor shall anything in the Chapter effect or diminish the rights of the Stationary Source to claim legal privileges such as attorney client privilege and/or work product with respect to information and/or documents required to be submitted to or reviewed by the Department. (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) 450-8.020 TRADE SECRET. The disclosure of any trade secret information required by this chapter shall be governed by California Health and Safety Code Section 2.5538,as amended from time to time,or as otherwise protected or required by law. (turd. 98-� § 2.) 11/23/98 Page 18 DRAFT 450.8.022 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OMBUD PERSC}NrnMnWNxJry OU-SACH., The Department shall continue to , , employ an ombudsperson for Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work.in.Contra Costa County regarding environmental health concerns, questions, and complaints about Hazardous Materials Programs. The ombudsperson will be empowered to identify and solve problems and make recommendations to the Department. The ombudsperson's role will be one of"Gemplaint prevei4ion"as well as investigating concerns and complaints, facilitating their resolution and assisting people in gathering information about programs,procedures, or issues. The Ombuds erson May provide technical assistance to the public if it is requested. (Ord. 98-____, § 2.) 450-8.024 PUBLIC INFORMATION BANK. The Department shah collect and provide ready access, including the use of electronic accessibility as reasonably available,to public documents which are relevant to the goals of this chapter, including at a minimum, business plan inventories and emergency response plans, Risk Management Plans, Safety Plans, and Department incident reports. This section shall not apply to trade secret information or other information protected from disclosure under federal or state law. The public information bank shall be coWleted by December 31,2000. (Ord. 98-_, §2.) 450-8.02+6 FEES. The Department may,upon a majority vote of the Beard of Supervisors,adopt a schedule of fees to be collected from each Stationary Source subject to the requirements of this chapter. Any review, inspection, audit fee schedule shall be set in an amount sufficient to pay only those costs reasonably necessary to carry out the requirements of this chapter, including costs of staff and/or consultant time or public hearings and administrative overhead. The fee schedule shall include the cost of the ombudsperson position. (Ord. 98- , § 2.) 450-8.028 PENALTIES. Regardless of the availability of other civil or administrative remedies and procedures for enforcing this chapter, every act or condition prohibited or declared unlawful by this chapter, and every knowing or willful failure or omission to act as required herein, is a violation of this code and shall be punishable and or subject to enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-6 of the County Ordinance Code specifically including but not limited to.Article 14-6.4 thereof(public nuisance). (Ord. 98-_, § 2.) SECTION 111. ORDINANCE NO. 96-50. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63,added by Ordinance No. 96-50 is hereby repealed. 11/23/98 Page 19 DRAFT SECTION IV. ORDINANCE NO. 96-20. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 96-20 and repealed by Ordinance 96-50, is modified and added to the County Ordinance Code. +CHAPTER.84-63 LAND USE PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS WASTE OR HAZARDOUS MATERIAL Article 84-63.2 General Ordinance No. 98- (Land Use Permits for Development Projects Involving Hazardous Waste or Hazardous Material) The Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors ordains as follows (omitting the parenthetical footnotes from the enacted or amended provisions of the County Ordinance Cade): SECTION L SUMMARY. The County Ordinance Code requires land use permits for the specified development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material in the L-I light industrial, W--3 controlled heavy industrial, and H-1 heavy industrial land use districts. County Ordinance Code Chapter 84-63, added by Ordinance No. 86-100, regulates land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material. This ordinance repeals Chapter 84-63, and adds a new Chapter 84-63 in its place. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-63.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63, as added by this ordinance, sets forth criteria for land use permits for development projects involving hazardous waste or hazardous material, which encourages business and other entities, in planning the project,to give greater emphasis to factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community. Articles 84-63.2, 84-63.4, 84-63.6, 84-53.8, 84-63.10 and 84-63.12 of the new Chapter 84-63 continue to require land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. Article 84-63.12 of Chapter 84-63,added by Ordinance No. 90-73, is renumbered and readopted in its entirety as Article 84-63.14. SECTION iL Chapter 84-63 of the County Ordinance Code, added by Ordinance No. 86-100 and amended by Ordinances Nos. 91-49, 90-92 and 90-73, is repealed in its entirety,and is replaced by new Chapter 84-63, added by Section III of this ordinance. SECTION III. Chapter 84-63 is added to the County Ordinance Code,to read: 11/23/38 Page 20 DRAFT" 84-63.202 purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to promote the health, safety and general welfare,of residents and persons in the County by encouraging businesses and other entities, in planning and developing projects involving hazardous material or hazardous waste, to consider factors which involve potential health and safety risks to the surrounding community, and by requiring land use permits for development projects which could significantly and adversely affect public health, safety and the environment. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86- 100.) 84-63.204 Conflict. This chapter is not intended, and should not be deemed,to prevent or preempt compliance with federal or state laws,regulations,rules or orders,or to excuse compliance with any other County ordinance,including other requirements of this code. (Ords. 98-_§5,96-50,96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.4 Definitions 84-53.402 General. As used in this chapter,the words and phrases defined in this article shall have the meanings given unless the context otherwise requires. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.404 "Baseline Period." "Baseline period" means the consecutive twelve month period of time during which activity is measured for purposes of this chapter. The baseline period shall be any twelve consecutive month period within five years of the date of the submittal of the application that is reflective of a normal year of operation. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.406 "Change-in-risk project." A "change-in-risk project" means a new use of an existing building, structure, or facility, not involving construction other than minor alterations, which use will involve a hazardous material or hazardous waste in a higher hazard category and which use will result in a hazard score higher than the hazard score of the previous use. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.408 "Commercial property." "Commercial property" means all properties with a commercialdesignation in the general plan including but not limited to the following: commercial,regional commercial, airport commercial, office, and business para. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.410 "Development project." (a)A "development project" means a new permanent building,structure or facility to be constructed that will manage hazardous materials or hazardous waste,or a permanent change-in-risk project. As used in this section, "permanent" when used to describe a building, structure,or facility,or the new use of an existing building, structure, or facility(change-in-risk.project) 11/23/98 Page 21 DRAFT means that the building, structure, facility or use is intended to be in operation'for more than six months. (b)A „development project" does not include: (1) Pipelines and related equipment more than 300 feet from commercial or residential property. Related equipment includes, but is not limited to, items such as valves fittings. e supports, insulation instrumentation corrosionrotection systems, heat tracin s stems leak containments stems and fire protection s ste s. Related equipment does not include storage tanks storage vesselsprocess units or RLants. mechanical rotatin ui ment e. um s compressors,motors turbines internal combustion engines,etc. . However,the Zoning Administrator mgy determine at the Zoning Administrator's sole discretion that minor e ui ment defined `hove as not related is exempt from the ordinance.. (2) Any project consisting only of maintenance, repair, and replacement or minor modification of existing equipment provided the storage design capacity is not increased and the hazard category of hazardous material or hazardous waste handled is not increased. (3) Any transportable treatment unit that has obtained all required permits and is used solely for site remediation or waste treatment purposes, provided the transportable treatment unit will be located on site for a maximum time limit of one year. The Director of Community Development will have the authority to grant a one year time extension if the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director that the unit is temporary. Otherwise, a land use permit will be required if the unit will remain on the site beyond the time limit specified above. (4) Any project for which permit applications have been deemed complete on or before the effective date of this chapter by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District or other government agency with jurisdiction over the project- applimfionhas been deemed com fete within one calendar year and has c eted CEQA documentation. The proponent of a project described by subsection(4) of subdivision(b)of this section may elect to be subject to the requirements of this chapter in lieu of any requirements in effect prior to the effective date of this chapter. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) 84-63.412 "Dispose." "Dispose" means to discharge, deposit,inject,dump,or place any hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. (Orris. 98--§ 5,96-50,96-20, 86-100.) 11123/98 Page 22 DRAFT 84-63.414 "Equipment." "Equipment" means pipes, pumps, vessels and other similar types of apparatus. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.416 "Facility." "Facility" means a group of buildings, structures, or units with the same purpose on contiguous parcels (including parcels separated by a right-of-way, as defined in section 1002-2.002 of this Code)under common ownership or control. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.418 "Finished Product"means a material which can be sold to awket as a commodity. 84-63.44820 "Hazardous material." "Hazardous material" means any material that, because of its quantity, concentration,or physical or chemical characteristics,poses a significant present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if released into the workplace or the environment, and includes any material that is listed in the Cade of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Section 172. 101 (Hazardous Materials Table), as amended from time to time. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-63.42822 "Hazardous waste." "Hazardous waste" means any substance which is regulated as a hazardous waste by the California Department of Health Services under 22 California Administrative Code, Division 4, Chapter 30, or defined as a hazardous waste under Health& Safety Code section 25117, generally as follows. (a) "Hazardous waste" means either of the following: (1) A waste, or combination of wastes,which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical,or infectious characteristic may either: (A) Cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality',or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible illness. (B) Pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or environment when improperly treated., stored,transported, or disposed of,or otherwise managed. (2)A waste which meets any of the criteria for the identification of a hazardous waste adopted by the State Department of Toxic Substance Control pursuant to the Health& Safety Code section 2514 1. (b) "Hazardous waste" includes, but is not limited to, federal Resource Conservation and Recover Act("RCRA")hazardous waste,extremely hazardous waste and acutely hazardous waste. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) 11/23198 Page 23 DRAFT 84-63.424 "Intermediate Product" means a material which requires further process treatment on-site or off-site to produce a finished product which can be sold as a commodity, 84-63.4U26 "Manage." "Manage" means to generate, treat, store,transport, Use or dispose of hazardous material or hazardous waste. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) 84-6 .428 "Process Unit" means a collection of interconnected vesse s and equipment designed to separate.purify, [pact,combine or otherwise chemicalfy or physieglly alter one or more feed mater/gl&to produce one or more finished or intermediateproducts--Md associated wastes defined b lot or boun limits. For exam e a catal tic crackin unita hydrocracking com lex etc. Pieces of a process unit such asurn s corn ressors towers reactors vessels and other such e ui merit and AppjLrtenances, do notnstitute a recess unit. } 84-63.42Q0 "Project Description." "Project description" means a written description and explanation of the construction and operation of a development project. A project description shall address all phases of and for the life of the project. The project description shall include the following information as well as any other information deemed necessary by the Community Development Director for the purpose of determining the hazard score: (a) A description of the facility location with respect to major freeways and immediate neighbors,and the size(in square footage or acreage)of the property on which the facility is located. (b) An area map showing the facility in relationship to the surroundingcommunity; and (c) A description of all significant operations involving hazardous material and/or hazardous waste currently being managed, and/or proposed to be managed, including a brief general history of the facility. (Q, A LummM of the baseline data for all five years and a'ustifzeationlfor the selection of the rwresentative b eline year of data used in the calculation of the hazard score. The Community Development Director may waive the requirement of submitting any or all of the information required by paragraphs(a)through(ed), above. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.42432 "Residential property". "Residential property" means all properties with a residential designation in the general plan, including but not limited to the fallowing: single family residential,multiple family residential, and.mobile homes. (Ords. 98-_§'5,96-50,96-20.) 11/23/98 Page 24 } DRAFT 84-63.42434 "Sensitive receptor." The term "sensitive receptor" includes schools, general acute care hospitals, long-term health care facilities, licensed child day care facilities, and similarly less-mobile populations, and detention facilities including jails,youth camps and other locked facilities. These facilities have more than twelve people. For the purposes of this section, "general acute care hospital" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Cade section 1250(a), "long term health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1418(a), and "child day care facility," has the meaning set forth in Health and Safety Code section 1596.750. "School" means any school used for the purpose of the education of more than 12 children in kindergarten or any grades 1 to 12, inclusive. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.4306 "Store." "Store" means an act to contain hazardous waste or hazardous material for any period of time in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste or hazardous material. (Ords. 98-_§ 5,96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 86-100.) 84-63.43238 "Transport." "Transport" or "transportation" means an act to move hazardous waste or hazardous material by truck, rail,sh4p-marine vessel or pipeline. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.6 Applicability 84-63.602 Applicability. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any person proposing a development project which might otherwise be allowed inMy zoning;district�e hall be subject to the provisions of this chapter. use in aw''Iftneral Dion glWAI be s4jeat-4944 39 this (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-104.) 84-63.604 Exemptions. The following projects and structures are exempt from the provisions of this chapter: (a) Any project built solely to comply with federal, state,regional or local agency enforcement orders under a compliance time schedule that precludes timely review under this chapter. This section is primarily intended to allow exemptions for compliance with laws, regulations, rules,or administrative or judicial orders such as nuisance abatement orders or other short-term or immediately necessary actions. This section is not intended to allow automatic exemptions for projects being undertaken to comply with changed federal, state,regional or local laws. A acili claimi an exam tion under this section must file a co of a enforcement order and regppsW project descri tion within thin 3 days of receipt of the order. 11123/98 Page 25 DRAFT (b) 1f any building, structure, or facility is destroyed or damaged by disasters such as earthquakes, floods, offsite fires, or an act of god or the public enemy,the facility may be rebuilt under the following conditions: (1) The rebuilt project is used for the same purpose as the destroyed damaged project; (2) The rebuilt project complies with all environmental regulations in effect at the time of rebuilding, including Best Available Control Technology(BACT)or at least the same level of control that previously existed, whichever provides the greater level of protection to the public; (3) The rebuilt project does not have a higher hazard score than the destroyed or damaged project(both rebuilt and destroyed or damaged project to be scored as if they are new); (4) The hazard category of chemicals used in the rebuilt project is not greater than used by the destroyed or damaged project; (5) Construction is commenced within one year unless an extension is granted by the Community Development Director; (6) The rebuilt project is at least 300 feet away from the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor and no closer to the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor than the destroyed or damaged project; and (7) The rebuilt project will not manage Hazard Category A materials in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project,will not manage hazardous wastes in quantities greater than the destroyed or damaged project,will not manage Hazard Category B materials in quantities greater than 10%more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project,and will not manage Hazard Category C materials in quantities greater than 10%more than the amount managed by the destroyed or damaged project. (c) A development project in which both the size,as defined in section 84-63.1012 and the monthly transportation quantity are less than: (1)for Hazard Category C materials-4000 tons (2)for Hazard Category B materials - 5 tons (3)for Hazard Category A materials-the quantity specified as the Threshold Planning Quantity on the Extremely Hazardous Materials List(Appendix A to 40 C.F.R Chapter 1, Subchapter J, Part 355, as amended from time to time), or 500 pounds, whichever is less. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92, 86-100.) Article 84-63.8 Standards and Procedures 84-63.802 Application for Applicability Determination; Exemption. Any person proposing a development project which may be used to manage hazardous waste or hazardous material shall apply to the Community Development Director for review and a determination 11123/98 Page 26 DRAFT whether a land use permit may be required under Article 84-63.14 or whether the project is exempt under section 84-63.604(a)or(b)or 84-63.606. Projects exempt under section 8463.604(c)are not required to submit an application pursuant to this section. I If the hazard score of a project is 69 or less and the project does not increase the amount of hazardous waste or hazardous material managed as compared to the baseline of the last three years, a determination of non-coverage and an application therefor are not required. The application shall include all information necessary to complete and verify the hazard score of the project, such as chemical identification, distances to nearest receptors,ead transportation routes-,,Aqd a summary of the five year baseline data. The application shall be accompanied by all fees established by the.Board of Supervisors. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 90-92, 86-100.) 84-63.804 Application,Review,Determination. No later than ten calendar days after receipt of an application, or the submittal of additional information,the Community Development Director shall inform the applicant in writing that the application;is complete or shall inform the applicant what additional information is required. Within twenty calendar days of the application being deemed complete, the Community Development Director shall issue a written determination of non-coverage pursuant to section 84-63.806,an exemption pursuant to section 84-63.604 (a)or(b), or a determination that a land use permit is required pursuant to section 84-63.1002. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-92.) 84-63.806 Determination of nein-coverage. Upon determining that a proposed project has a hazard score up to and including 79 or that the project is exempt pursuant to section 84- 63.604,the Community Development Director shall issue a determination of non-coverage or exemption. A determination of non-coverage for projects with a hazard score between 70 and 79,inclusive,means that the project is not subject to the requirements of article84-63.10,but is subject to sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. Projects with a hazard score below 69 and projects which are exempt pursuant to sections 84-63.604 are not subject to the requirements of sections 84-63.808 and 84-63.810. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.808 Determinations -Public Notice. All determinations of non.-coverage made pursuant to section 84-63.806 shall be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator within ten calendar days of issuance of the determination. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50, 96-20,91-49, 90-92, 86100.) 84-63.810 Determinations -Further Public Notice. For projects with;a point assignment between 70 and 79, inclusive, within five working days of issuing a determination of non-coverage,the Community Development Director shall mail notice on the date of the determination to all organizations and individuals who have previously submitted a written request for such notice. The Community Development Director shall publish a four-inch by six inch advertisement in a newspaper of general circulation within ten calendar days of issuing a determination of non-coverage. The notices required by this section shall state the name of the 11/23/98 Page 27 DRAFT applicant, briefly describe the project, provide the names and phone numbers of a representative of the Community Development Department and a representative of the applicant who will be available to answer questions about the project, and shall state the date by which an appeal must be filed. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 91-49, 90-92.) 84-63.812 Appeals. Any appeal of a determination of non-coverage shall be filed within ten calendar days of the date the determination is listed on the Zoning,Administrator's agenda or ten calendar days from the date of publication pursuant to section 84-63.810,whichever provides the longer period of appeal. Appeals from a determination of non-coverage shall be heard by the Board of Supervisors. Except as expressly provided in this section,appeals from all decisions and determinations made pursuant to this chapter shall be governed by the land use;permit provisions of article 26-2.24 and are subject to the provisions of article 26-2.30. (Orris. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86-100.) Article 84-63.10 Land Use Permits-When Required 84-63.1002 Hazard Score; Permit Required. Unless otherwise exempt.frorn the requirements of this chapter,a land use permit shall be required for a development project proposed for the management of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste if env of the following apply: as the development project obtains a hazard score of 80 or more pursuant to the formula set forth in section 8463.1004;=or b for hazard-atewry A mat rials the development o'ect stores twice the uan#it ecified asthe Threshold PlMing uantily on the Ext emely 1-laza; ous Materials List A radix A cif 40 Code of Federal Re lations Cha ter I Subc-anter J Part 355 as amended from time to time, or 2000 nomadds., mahichever is less, or c for Lazard categoeL A or B materials,the development project will result in anew ocess unit unle the rocess unit com lies with Section 4-63.1004 d 1 ou h 6-Credit for re actions or proicos.to be closed. Modifications to an existin rocess unit does not constitute a new grocers ani#-, or d for hazard tate o B materials any develo went pLoject that has a fill to the maucimurn c it of 40(300 tons nr more unless the develo mens ro° co lies with,Section 4-63.1004 cl 1 throe h 6-Credit for reductions or ro'ee#s to b closed. 11/23/98 Page 28 } DRAFT subject to the provisions of this article. (Orris. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1004 Hazard Score. (a)Formula. The hazard scare of a proposed development project shall be determined pursuant to the following formula: [(T +C +P) x HI +D +A; where the following symbols have the following designations: "T" refers to the point assignment for "Transportation Risk"; ""D" refers to the point assignment for "Community Risk- Distance from Receptor"; "C" refers to the point assignment for "Community Risk- Type of Receptor", "A" refers to the point assignment for "Facility Risk- Size of Project- Total Amount"; "P" refers to the point assignment for"Facility Risk - Size of Project- Percent Change", and "H" refers to the point assignment for"Hazard Category of Material or Waste."` fb)Project Hazard Score. If more than one category of hazardous material or hazardous waste is used,the formula set forth in this section will be used to calculate a separate score for each material category. The material hazard category which results in the highest hazard score- for the project will be used. (be) Paint Assignment. The factors set forth in subdivision(a), above, shall have the following point assignments: TRANSPORTATION RISK(T) POINTS Truck - residential/commercial 10 (>25%u increase or new) Truck-residential/commercial 9 (>5 -25 %increase) Truck- Industrial (>25% increase or new) 8 Truck-Industrial (>5 - 25%increase) 7 Rail-(>25% increase or new) 6 13.123198 Page 29 DRAFT Rail - (>5 - 25% increase) 5 Marine Vessel- (>5%increase) 3 Pipeline - (>5% increase) l 0 - 5% increase 0 COMMUNITY RISK Distance of project from receptor(D): 0-300 feet 30 >300 - 400 feet 29 >400 - 550 feet 28 >550 - 700 feet 27 >700 - 900 feet 26 >900- 1200 feet 25 >1200- 1500 feet 24 >1500 - 1800 feet 23 >1800 -2100 feet 22 >2100 - 2500 feet 21 >2500 - 2800 feet 20 >2800- 3200 feet 19 >3200 - 3500 feet 18 >3500 - 3800 feet 17 >3800 -4000 feet 16 >4000 -4200 feet 15 12/23/98 Page 30 DRAFT >4200 - 4500 feet 14 >4500 -4800 feet 13 >4800 - 5400 feet 12 >5400- 5700 feet 11 >5700- 6000 feet 10 >6000 - 6500 feet 9 >6500 - 7300 feet 8 >7300- 8000 feet 7 >8000 - 8600 feet 6 >8600 - 10,000 feet 5 >I 0,000- 11,000 feet 4 >11,000 - 12.,500 feet 3 >12,500 - 14,000 feet 2 >14,000 - 1-6;009-15,840 feet 1 Type of receptor(C): Sensitive(Receptor 7 Residential Property 5 Commercial Property 4 FACILITI'RISK: SIZE OF PROJECT Total Amount of Change, tons (Conversion to tons; 1 ton 2000 pounds) (A): 11/23/98 Page 31 DRAFT >40,000 30 >32,000 - 40,000 29 > 18,000 - 32,000 28 >10,000 - 18,000 27 >6,000 - 10,000 26 >4,000 - 6,000 25 >2,100 -4,000 24 >1,200 - 2,100 23 >750 - 1,200 22 >400 - 750 21 >200 -400 20 >150 - 200 19 >90-150 18 >50 - 90 17 >30 - 50 16 >20 -30 15 >10 - 20 14 >6- 10 13 >4 - 6 12 >2-4 11 >1 -2 10 >0.8 - 1 9 >0.5 - 0.8 8 11/23198 Wage 32 DRAFT >0.35 - 0.5 7 >0.25 - 0.35 6 >0.20 - 0.25 5 >0. 18 - 0.20 4 >0. 14- 0.18 3 >0. 12 - 0.14 2 >O. 10- 0. 12 1 nes change (0. 10 or less) 0 Percent Change(P) New 6 >200% 5 >100% - 200% 4 >50% - 100% 3 >10%- 50% 2 >1%- 10% 1 0%-1% 0 HAZARD CATEGORY OF MATERIAL (H) Category A 5 Category B 3 Category C 1 11/23/98 Page 33 DRAFT (ed) Credit for reductions or projects to be closed. A development project that would have a hazard scare of 80 or more as determined by the formula in this sectionshall be entitled to a reduction credit for project closures and/or reductions in accordance with the criteria set forth in this subdivision. Reduction credit shall be given if the Community Development Director determines that the applicant will concurrently close another project or reduce its operations and finds that all of the following criteria are met: (1) The project to be closed or reduced is in the same facility in which the development project is proposed. (2) The project to be closed or reduced is currently in operation and has been in operation for at least three years prior to the date of application, during which period the production schedule has been reflective of a normal production schedule; (3) The project to be closed or reduced is the direct result of the proposed development project, (4) The project to be closed or reduced has a higher hazard score than the proposed development project; (5) The hazard category of the material or waste in the development project will be no greater than the hazard category of the material or waste in the project to be closed or reduced; and (6) The development project will be more than 300 feet from the property line of the nearest residential property or sensitive receptor. The hazard scare for the project to be closed shall also be determined by the formula set forth in subdivisions(a)and(b) of this section and pursuant to the provisions of this article. An determining the hazard scare for the project to be closed or reduced, said project shall be deemed a new project. The hazard score of the development project shall be subtracted from the hazard score of the project to be closed or reduced. The resulting difference will then be subtracted from the hazard scare of the development project to obtain a hazard score adjusted for the closure or reduction. The adjusted hazard score shall be the basis for determining whether a land use permit shall be required under this chapter. A determination by the Community Development Director that a project is not subject to the land use permit requirement of this chapter as a result of credit afforded for a project closure or reduction shall be reported to the Zoning Administrator pursuant to section 84-63.808 and shall be subject to the public notification requirements set forth in section 84-63.810. (dem) Closure, reduction required. Projects proposed for closure or reduction for which closure or reduction credit was afforded under this section shall be closed or reduced as proposed within one year of completion of the development project. This subdivision(d_e)applies only in cases where a land use permit would have been required but for the closure or reduction credit afforded under this section. (Orris. 98--§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 11 t23198 Page 34 DRAFT 84-63.1006 Determination of Transportation Risk. The transportation risk point assignment shalt be calculated based upon planned total quantities of materials in a hazard category, measured in terms of tons per year for each hazard category proposed. The transportation risk point assignment shall be calculated for each mode of transportation proportionally within a single hazard category. That transportation point assignment shall be compared by hazard category with the total amount of material in the hazard category transported during the baseline period in order to obtain the percent change in section 8463.1004(b), Transportation Risk. For purposes of determining whether truck transportation is through residential/commercial or industrial areas, the shortest legal route from the closest two-lane(or larger) freeway shall be considered. If the route used in the County does not traverse a two-lane (or larger)freeway, the entire route shall be considered. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1008 Determination of Community Risk- Distance to Receptor. "Distance to Receptor" shall be the shortest distance between an exterior wall or other part of the development project and the property line of the residential property,commercial property or the sensitive receptor used to determine the hazard score of a development project. (Ords. 98-- § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1010 Determination of Community Risk-Type of Receptor. A hazard score shall be developed for each type of receptor(residential property,commercial property and sensitive receptor)within three miles of the development project based upon the distance of the parcel of each type of receptor that is closest to the development project. The receptor that produces the highest hazard score shall be used to determine the hazard score of the development project. Receptors more than three miles from a development project shall not be considered. (Ords. 98-_§ 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1012 Determination of Project Risk-Size. The size of a development project shall be measured in terms of tons of hazardous material and/or hazardous waste stared as a result of the development project,based upon the fill-to-the-maximum capacity of the development project, including amounts stored in tanks;reactors;columns; process lines;tank cars,tank:trucks or rail cars when connected to process equipment, or any other receptacle used for the containment of hazardous materials and/or hazardous wastes. The amount of material in hazard categories A, B,or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project will be used to determine the total amount of change. if more than one category of hazardous material is used,the amounts of materials(A,.B,or C) shall be used with the respective hazard category in the formula in section 84-63.1004. The specific gravity of hazardous.materials or hazardous wastes may be required to calculate the number of tons(or pounds)of hazardous materials and/or hazardous waste managed at the development project. The standard of 20U0 pounds equaling one(1)ton shall be used. 11/23198 Page 35 DRAFT The point assignment for storage of containerized material in buildings, such as labs or warehouses, shall be based upon the maximum anticipated amount of materials for each hazard category as a result of the development project. (Grds. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20.) 84-63.1014 Determination of Project Risk-Percent Change. The percent change of a develepinea4 pr- hazard cateory shall be determined by comparing the amounts of materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C to be added to the site as a result of the development project to the total amount of all materials for the respective hazard categories A, B, or C handled at the site from the baseline period. (Grds. 98--§ 5, 96-50,96-20.) 84-63.1016 Determination of Hazard Category. (a)Method of Determination. The hazard category of a material or waste shall be determined pursuant to this section. (1) The primary method of determining the material hazard category of a hazardous waste or material shall be by reference to the Winter 1994 version of the U.S. Department of Transportation("D.G.T.") Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49("49 CFR"), Section 172. 101, Hazardous Materials Table." From columns (3)and(5), extract the"Hazard Class or Division" and"Packing Group" information,then proceed to 49 CFR 173.2 to determine the "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision(c)of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. if a material is listed in 49 CFR. 172. 101 more than once,the rating that results in the highest hazard category shall be used. The hazard category of a mixture is determined according to its common name as defined in Title 49. (2) Where a hazardous material,er-waste, or mixture is not referenced in 49 CFR 172. 101, and the hazard category cannot be determined using the primary method,refer to the manufacturer's MSDS for the D.G.T. "Hazard Class or Division," "Packing Group" and "Name of Class or Division." Proceed to subdivision(c)of this section to determine the material hazard category as either A, B or C. (3) Where the preceding methods are not successful,the Contra Costa County Health Services Director or his designee shall be responsible for determining amaterial's hazard category. (4) Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth above, materials with the word "poison" in column(6)of 49 CFR. 172. 101,Methyl chloride, and the metals Antimony,Mercury, Lead, Arsenic,Thallium and Cadmium and their compounds,shall be Hazard Category A materials,and denatured alcohol and methanol shall be Hazard Category B materials for purposes of this chapter. (b) Exclusions. Regardless of the hazard category obtained using the methods set forth in subdivision(a),above, Hot Cope, Hot Coal Briquettes,and materials not regulatedby D.G.T. or which have no D.G.T. Hazard Class or Division are not regulated by this chapter. (c) Hazard Categories. } 11123198 Page 36 DRAFT Hazard Categoa A Materials I. Forbidden Materials As referenced in 49 CFR 173.21 and 173.54. II. Explosives and Blasting Agents Class 1, as defined in 49 CFR 173.50(b)(1)through 173.50(b)(6). III. Reactive Materials A. Air Reactive Materials - Class 4, Division 4.2 as defined in 49 CFR! 173.124(b)(1) and(2). B. Water Reactive Materials - Class 4, Division 4.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(c). C. Organic Peroxides - Class 5,Division 5.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.128. IV. Radioactive Materials Class 7 as defined in 49 CFR 173.403(y). V. Oxidizers D.O.T. Packing Group I Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group I is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(I). VI. Poisons,D.O.T. A. Poisons, Class 6, Division 6.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.133 (applies to all hazard zones). B. Infectious Substances, Class 6, Division 6.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.134. VII. Poison Gas Class 2, Division 2.3 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(c). Hazard Category B Materials VIII. Flammable Liquids Class 3 Packing Groups I and II as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(a). 11/23/98 Page 37 DRAFT IX :Flammable Solids Class 4, Division 4.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.124(a). X. Oxidizers, D.O.T. Packing Group 11 Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group 11 is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(ii). XI. Flammable Gases Class 2, Division 2.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(a). XII. Corrosives, D.O.T. Packing Group I or II Class 8 Packing Groups I or 11 as defined in 49 CFR 173.136(a) and 173.137(a)and(b). .Hazard Categoa C Materials XIII. Non-flammable Compressed Gases Class 2, Division 2.2 as defined in 49 CFR 173.115(b). XIV. Combustible Liquids Class 3 Packing Group III as defined in 49 CFR 173.120(b). XV. Miscellaneous Hazardous Materials Class 9 as defined in 49 CFR. 173.155. XVI. Oxidizers D.I .T. Packing Group III Class 5, Division 5.1 as defined in 49 CFR 173.127(a)when Packing Group III is required per 49 CFR 173.127(b)(2)(iii). XVII. Corrosives D.O.T. Packing Group III Gass 8 Packing Group III as defined in CFR 49 173.136(x)and 173.137(c). (Orris. 98-_§5, 96--50,96-20.) Article 84-63.12 11123198 Page 38 DRAFT Land Use and Variance Permits 84-63-1:202 Granting. An applicant for a land use permit shall submit a project description. Land use permits required under this chapter may be granted in accordance with the provisions of chapters 26-2 and 82-6. (Ords. 98-_ § 5, 96-50, 96-20, 86- 100.) Article 84-63.14 Offsite Hazardous Waste Facility Compliance With County Hazardous 'Waste Management Plan 84-63.1402 Authority. This article is enacted pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 25135.4 and 25135.7,concerning the siting of offsite hazardous waste facilities. (Orris. 98--§ 5, 96-50, 96-20, 90-73.) 84-63.1404 Definitions. (a) General. Unless otherwise specified in this section or indicated by the context,the terms used in this article have the meanings ascribed to them in Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.5 (§ 25100 et seq.). (b) "County Hazardous Waste Management Plan" means the county hazardous waste management plan adapted by the Board of Supervisors on August 29, 1989 and amended by the Board of Supervisors on January 30, 1990,approved by a majority of the cities within the county which contain a majority of the population of the incorporated area.,and approved by the State Department of Health Services on February 28, 1990, as said plan is amended from time to time. (c) "Hazardous waste facility" means all contiguous land and structures,other appurtenances,and improvements on the land used for the treatment,transfer, storage, resource recovery, disposal,or recycling of hazardous waste. A hazardous waste facility may consist of one or more treatment,transfer,storage,resource recovery, disposal,or recycling hazardous waste management units, or combinations of these units. (d) "Offsite hazardous waste facility" means a hazardous waste facility at which either or both of the fallowing occur: (l) Hazardous waste that is produced offsite is treated,transferred,stored, disposed or recycled. (2) Hazardous waste that is produced onsite is treated,transferred,stored, disposed or recycled and the hazardous waste facility is not owned by,leased to or under the control of the producer of the hazardous waste. Cards. 98-_§ 5,96-20, 96-50, 90-73.) 84-63.1406 County Hazardous Waste Management. All land use permit,variance or other land use entitlement granted for the operation or expansion of an offsite hazardous waste facility shall be consistent with the portions of the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan 11123/98 Page 39 DRAFT which identify siting criteria, siting principles or other policies applicable to hazardous waste facilities. Before,granting the application,the division of the planning agency hearing the matter initially or on appeal shall find that the application complies with the applicable siting criteria, siting principles and other policies identified in the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan, and that the proposed offsite hazardous waste facility is consistent with the County Hazardous Waste Management Plan. (Ards. 98-_ § 5,96-50,96-20, 90-73; Health& Safety Code, §§ 25135.4. 25135.'7.) 84-63.1408 Exclusion. The requirements of this article do not apply to projects which are exempt projects under section 84-63.604. (Orris. 98-_§ 5,96-50,96-20, 90-73.) SECTION V. SEVERABILITY. This ordinance shall be construed to achieve its purpose and preserve its validity. If any provision or clause of this ordinance or application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of this ordinance which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of the ordinance are declared to be severable and are intended to have independent validity. SECTION VI. PREEMPTION. nothing in this ordinance is intended, and nor shall it be deemed, to excuse or prevent compliance with any state or federal law. If any provision of this ordinance, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is found by!a court of competent jurisdiction to be preempted by any applicable state or federal law,the Board of Supervisors declares that its intent(1)that such provision be severable from the remainder of the ordinance, and(2)that the remainder of the ordinance be given effect in accordance with the provisions of Section.I of this ordinance. In the event of any conflict or inconsistency between this ordinance and applicable federal or state statutes or regulations,the federal or state requirements shall control. SECTION VI. EFFECTIVE DATE. This ordinance becomes effective 30 days after passage, and within 15days after passage shall be published once with the names of the Supervisors voting for and against it in the CONTRA COSTA TIMES, a newspaper published in this County. PASSED on by the following vote: AYES: NOES: ABSENT: ABSTAIN: ATTEST: Phil Batchelor,Clerk of the Board.of Supervisors and County Administrator 11/23/98 page 40 DRAFT By: Deputy Chair [SEAL] 11123/98 Page 41 REPORT TO CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ORDINANCE REVIEW PROJECT PREPARED BY RAY E. WITTER REW CONSULTANTS, TNC. ST. LOUIS, MO TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. Scope of Work B. Methodology II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Good Neighbor Ordinance III. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDINANCES A. Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Good Neighbor Ordinance IV. REVIEW OF OTHER ORDINANCES A. Safe Communities Ordinance B. Supervisor Ulkema' s proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance V. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS A. Comparisons with Industrial Safety Ordinance B. Review of point score with Midwest refineries C. Conclusions D. Recommendations ORDINANCE REVIEW PROJECT I. INTRODUCTION A. Scope of Work Review the Industrial Safety Ordinance dated August 11 , 1998 and the existing Ordinance 96-50 focusing on: o technical aspects of addressing industrial safety o whether public and worker safety will be increased due to adoption of the ordinance o ability of industry to comply with ordinance requirements Provide comment on the Safe Communities Ordinance and Supervisor Ulkema`s proposed Industrial Safety Ordinance Discuss with appropriate environmental, labor, and industry representatives their perspectives on the Industrial Safety Ordinance Consider concerns from citizens heard at public meetings regarding the issues of public and worker safety in the ordinance and industries ability to comply Prepare report and make brief presentation at the Board of Supervisors meeting on November 3, 1998 and be available to answer questions B. Methodology Review ordinances for: -New or expanded requirements from existing county safety ordinances -Determine relationship between new ordinances and current federal and state safety regulations -Attempt to compare these ordinances with ordinances of counties in other states with similar industries -Determine and evaluate the requirements of the ordinance relating to community and public right to know Meet, one on one, with representatives of environmental groups, labor organizations, industrial trade groups, and industries involved. Follow up on meetings with telephone calls and FAX communications Analyze the new requirements to determine whether o public and worker safety will be improved ' o industry has ability to comply with ordinances Evaluate only those portions of land use ordinances that pertain to process safety Evaluate the resources and expertise of the County Health Services to monitor and audit the ordinances II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. Industrial Safety Ordinance Overview This ordinance is on the cutting edge of providing improved worker and public safety at the local level and well ahead of the current federal and state safety requirements. It focuses on those safety management systems which are most necessary for improvement in worker and public safety. Specific areas of improved incident prevention measures: o Requires written safety plan submitted to the county o Requires adherence to national codes and standards and Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) o Extends the prevention program elements of the risk management program and emergency response program to all units in a covered facility o Requires root cause analysis for major chemical accidents or releases o Requires specific considerations of human factors o Establishes a time frame for implementation of Process Hazard Analysis action items Areas of county monitoring and auditing o Facilities must provide history for major chemical accidents or releases o Provides Health Services Department review of safety plans, auditing and plant inspection o Allows the Health Services Department to perform a root cause analysis at their discretion following a major chemical accident or release Community and public information o Provides public review of safety plans o Establishes ombudperson position o Establishes a Public Information Bank B. Ordinance 96-54 - Good Neighbor Ordinance Overview The emphasis of this ordinance is on land use permits. It does not address the elements of a safety management system that are generally accepted as required for process safety improvement. It specifies requirements for Major Maintenance Projects, however, based on review of hazardous material incidents, there have been few, if any, major releases or incidents associated with major maintenance or turnaround projects. This conclusion is based on -2- Ordinance 96--54 - Good Neighbor Continued an analysis of two reports. First, the "Report on Hazardous Material Data Incidents, Notifications and Complaints in Contra Costa County 1989-1996" of Level I incidents showed that process safety elements, such as mechanical integrity, procedural, and human systems during operation were the causes of these incidents. The second report "1997 Selected Facilities Incident List" dated January 15, 1998 for Level I and Level II incidents did not identify any incident relating to a major maintenance project. Provisions relating to safety o Establishes definitions of Serious Incident, Major Incident, and Major Maintenance Projects, based on a shutdown of more than two weeks and costing $1 ,000,000 or more. However, there have been questions regarding specifically what is included in the $1 million as well as what is included in the 2 weeks shutdown. o Establishes Public Safety Agreement between the county and a facility that meets certain requirements o Provides for exemptions for projects or facilities meeting certain criteria County monitoring o Provides review of applications and notification to applicant by the Community Development Director o Determination of non--coverage to be summarized on an agenda of the County Zoning Administrator' Community and public information o Provides for public notice in newspaper and notices to interested organizations and individuals o Establishes procedure for appeals to be heard by the Hoard of Supervisors III. ANALYSIS OF THE ORDINANCES A. Industrial Safety Ordinance 450--8.004 - Purpose and Goals The ordinance focuses on imposing regulations which will result in improved safety management systems. OSHA, EPA, the Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical. Engineers, American Petroleum Institute, and various consulting groups have concluded that the most effective way to improve process safety is to develop and implement key elements of process safety management systems. This is the basis for the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard and the prevention section of the EPA Risk Management Program. -3- 450-8. 004 Continued This ordinance builds on the OSHA and EPA base by requiring additional components of the process safety management systems. These include requirements for completion of action items from process hazard analyses, root cause analysis of major chemical accidents and releases, development of a written human factors program, and including additional operating units in facilities covered by the Federal and state risk management programs. These key elements focus on reducing releases and accidents in processes handling hazardous materials. 450-8.012 - Inspection This section allows the county access to any part of a Stationary Source covered by this ordinance and to supporting documentation pertaining to compliance with the ordinance. This ensures that the county will be able to determine any deficiencies that exist in the management systems of the stationary source. 450-8.014 - Definitions (e) Industry Codes and Standards not only include the organizations listed in the ordinance, but also the broad spectrum of codes, standards, recommended practices, and guidelines considered as "Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices", commonly called RAGAGEP. These have been developed over many years to provide a criteria for design, installation, and inspection of process equipment. The process safety information element of the OSHA PSM Standard requires documentation of the codes, standards, and practices used in the design of facilities. Examples of RAGAGEP utilized in design are National Fire Protection Association publications on Venting of Deflagrations and Explosion Prevention Systems and American Institute of Chemical Engineers Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems. Examples used in mechanical integrity are American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice for Pressure Vessel Inspection and Inspection of Piping, Valves and Fittings. ( f) It is recognized that no chemical process is totally without risk, but all chemical processes can be made safer by applying inherently safer concepts. These concepts include reduction of inventory of hazardous materials, substitution of a less hazardous material, process design improvements, facility siting, and process and procedural simplifications. The use of inherently safer concepts in process design and process hazard reviews will enhance overall risk management programs, both in reducing frequency of incidents and consequences of a potential release or accident. This is a key element in improving safety management systems. -4- 450-8. 1016 - Stationary Source Safety Requirements (a) This section provides for additional processes to be covered that are not included in federal program 3 RMP. The result is that processes in Program 1 and 2 in a facility covered by RMP will be required to be in conformance with the elements in the OSHA Process Safety Management Standard and the prevention section of EPA RMP. This provision significantly broadens the number of processes covered by process safety management requirements. (b) This section requires a stationary source to develop a written human factors program within one year based on criteria listed in the section. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only regulation or ordinance requiring this depth of human factor considerations for chemical process safety. This requires inclusion of human factors in root cause analysis, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training in human factors, and management of change rather than only man-machine interface ergonomic issues. Employees and their representatives shall participate in the development of the written human factors program, ensuring that worker input is achieved. The program includes staffing, shiftwork, and overtime which includes scheduling of rotating shifts and work practices. These issues can involve labor contract issues, human resources input, and employee needs, in addition to human factors issues. In addition, well-designed human systems can produce inherently safer plant designs and operating procedures. Human systems include: o appropriate training o design reviews o audits and inspections o error correction cycles Likewise, the equipment can be made inherently safer for human factors by: o making the operation of equipment easier to understand o making it easier to do what is intended o limits on what be done to equipment This section provides a systematic approach to human error including techniques for human error analysis. (c) This section requires a root cause analysis for each Major Chemical Accident or Release. This procedure is much more rigorous than the requirement outlined in the OSHA PSM Standard the EPA RMP Rule, and the CalARP program regulations. It provides flexibility to allow the facility to select a recommended methodology from many that are available. Methodologies include Tap Root, Fishbone, Multiple Causal Factors, and others listed in the literature. This is a significant step forward in incident investigation. -5- 450-8. 016 - Stationary Source Safety Requirements - Continued An accident investigation that only considers the initiating cause of an accident will help in preventing that particular accident in the future, but does not determine the underlying causes that could result in similar failures in different processes or units in the future. As an example, the cause might be Listed as "operator error" . This does not determine why the error occurred. It might be due to inadequate operating procedures, procedure difficult to understand, lack of procedures, insufficient training, inadequate equipment or piping design, or lack of proper identification of controls, valves, or interlocks. Another example would be failure of a pressure relief valve to open at the desired pressure, causing alvessel rupture. This could be listed as "valve failure" without determining the cause of the failure. This might be due to pluggage of the valve seat, corrosion, spring failure, or other reasons. Without root cause analysis the failure may be repeated in the future as the deficiency in the process safety management system has not been properly identified and addressed. The above examples might require a change in developing operating procedures to ensure operator understanding, revised training programs, or improved equipment identification. The valve failure might be the result of incorrect materials of construction, poor installation, need of rupture disc under relief valve to prevent pluggage, or long interval between valve inspections. By identifying causes and revising safety management systems, both worker and public safety will be enhanced. (d) This section requires that process hazard analyses be conducted on both Program 3 RMP processes and 'those covered processes not included in federal program level 3. These process hazard analyses shall be conducted within 1 year of the effective date of this ordinance and no later than the submittal date of the Safety Plan. Previously completed process hazard analyses complying with state requirements are acceptable. This is a marked improvement as it now requires a process hazard analysis on all covered processes in a facility, not just ',those in program level 3. The required use of considering inherently safer systems concepts will result in improved mitigation of potential releases and a reduction of incidents involving releases of hazardous chemicals. By incorporating inherently safer design concepts into existing safety and process hazard reviews a' facility will improve the effectiveness of hazard reviews in reducing risk. Emphasis on inherently safer systems will promote an awareness among engineers, chemists, and managers. This heightened awareness will encourage the application of inherently safer principles as part of the normal, everyday work process, instead of something that is only considered at safety review meetings. -6- 450-8.016 - Stationary Source Safety Requirements - Continued The importance of incorporating inherently safer systems concepts into the process hazard analysis procedure cannot be over emphasized. Experience with inherent safety reviews indicates that frequently equipment can be eliminated thus reducing the number of places where releases might occur. Another area of improvement from federal and state regulations is the time frame to complete safety action items identified in the process hazard review. Items not requiring a shutdown shall be completed within one year with the only exception being that the facility can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the county that such a schedule is not feasible. This might include long delivery items such as special alloy steel or scheduling fabrication of a major piece of equipment. These exceptions would be documented. All items requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first regularly scheduled turnaround. These provisions ensure that action items are promptly addressed with documentation of closure. The county has the authority to inspect both the facility for compliance and the documentation to be certain all items have been completed as required. The requirements for inherently safer system considerations, inclusion of detailed human factor issues, and completion of safety action items within one year or by the next turnaround are all over and above current state and federal requirements. (e) This section requires a facility to report specific information concerning major chemical accidents or releases from June 1 , 1992 to the date of submittal of the Safety Plan. The section provides the criteria for reporting, including root causes. In addition, operational or process changes that resulted from the investigation of the release or accident must be included. This will require the stationary source to provide documentation that the safety action items on the reports have had closure. These reports must be kept for five years as the incidents and the action items must be considered during the next process hazard analysis (A PHA is required every five years on covered processes) , or when a management of change review is required. 450-8.018 (a) This section ensures that Safety Plans submitted by stationary sources will be made available for public comment for 30 days. The county shall then schedule a public meeting on the Safety Plan after the 30 day period. (b) This section provides the authority for the county to conduct a safety inspection in the event of a major chemical accident or release and periodic audits of the safety program. -7- 450-8.018 - Review, Audit, and Inspection (e) This section provides an appeal process to the County Board of Supervisors, which has the final decision with respect to the Safety Plan. This allows for a prompt, orderly appeal process. 450-8.022 - Community Outreach The ordinance requires the county to hire an ombudsperson for hazardous materials program by December 31 , 1998. This person has been on board for some 5 months with no cost to the county as the budget is fee based to industry. The ombudsperson will serve as a single point of contact for people who live or work in the county and should provide an effective voice in solving problems, investigating concerns and complaints, and in providing information about issues and procedures. 450-8. 024 - Public Information Bank This program is an unique approach at the county level of government. While use of electronic accessibility is in use by OSHA, EPA, and state agencies, this is an excellent step forward to provide this information at the local level. This will probably require additional effort to provide information at additional locations. III. B 95-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance 84-63.202 Purpose The stated purpose is to promote health and safety of persons in the county by encouraging businesses involved ', in handling hazardous materials to consider factors which involve hazardous material, to consider factors which involve health and safety risks, and by requiring land use permits for certain projects. The scope of my review was to focus on the technical aspects of process safety, whether safety will be increased, and the ability of industry to comply with the ordinance requirements. Therefore, as major maintenance projects are considered both process safety and land use permit issues, these will be reviewed from the process safety point of view. The purpose does not provide guidance regarding aspects of process safety management that businesses are to address to improve and decrease the safety risks to residents and persons in the county. It is my understanding that some process safety procedures are included in sections of CEQA, without some degree of specificity it is difficult to evaluate the technical aspects of the ordinance. -8- 84-63 . 421 Definitions The definitions of "Serious Incident" and "Major Incident" focus on release of hazardous material that may have posed an imminent threat to the public health, the environment or property. It does not address worker safety other than persons being sent to the hospital. The relationship between process safety management and safety risks to the surrounding community is not addressed in the Purpose and Goals or in the Definitions. 84-63.425 Public Safety Agreement It is my understanding that the Public Safety Agreement was prepared to allow flexibility in developing agreements with various facilities that had different situations.', However, it does not provide criteria for determining the process safety systems necessary to meet the requirements of the Public Safety Agreement. I was informed that no Public Safety Agreements have been requested, perhaps due to the lack of a criteria document. As an example, the Public Safety Agreement requires "a commitment to use best technology for safety improvements" which is vague and ill-defined. 84-63.602 - Applicability Both development projects and major maintenance projects are covered by this ordinance. It is difficult to determine the technical basis for including major maintenance projects as a review of releases and accidents indicates that none of the major releases or accidents occurred during turnaround operations. The data to substantiate this is given in the Overview section of the Executive Summary of the Ordinance. 84-63.604 Exemptions {b} 3 -- Provides for exemption for a rebuilt project destroyed by disasters if the rebuilt project has , a hazard score lower than 50% of the destroyed project. In instances such as these the rebuilding is normally accomplished by replacement in kind and it is improbable that any of these type of projects could achieve a 50% reduction. {f} The exemption for emergency repairs is ambiguous as it does not define unexpected event. For example, ',a unit is taken down for a routine repair to unplug a pump. When the unit is opened up, it is discovered that there isnot only one piece of refractory plugging the pump but an entire area needs replacement. This results in the column being dawn 15 days with $1 ,500,000 repair costs. This would be an unexpected event, however, it is not clear if this the intent of the exemption. -9- Ordinance 96-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance - Continued 84-63.806-8-10 Determinations - Public Notice These provisions provide for County review of projects to determine that a land use permit is required, or a written determination of non-coverage or an exception. This requires public notice to inform the community of the project and appeal procedure. 84-63.812 - Appeals Appeals that are filed shall be heard by the Board of Supervisors. IV. REVIEW OF OTHER ORDINANCES A. Safe Communities Ordinance This ordinance provides many common provisions relating to safety that are included in the Industrial Safety Ordinance. While there are some differences in language, the intent appears to be similar for: o PHA required for defined covered processes o Root cause analysis o Safety Plan coverage o County audits and inspections o Considerations of Industry Codes and Standards o HSD Authority to require program change o County enforcement, including provisions for misdemeanors o Public hearings and community input Differences in the Safe Communities and Industrial Safety Ordinance include: o Applicability-differences in definition of covered processes o Additional requirements for information submitted with RMP, such as process safety information and operating procedures o Human factor considerations are contained in the elements of the process safety management program o Plan contains requirements for contractor training not in other ordinances, including apprenticeship at an approved training center for each craft or equivalent certificate and annual skill training for journeymen at an approved training center. o Requirement that projects costing $100,000 or more by authorized by the County o Provides an annual grant of $50,000 for community outreach -10- B. Proposed ordinance submitted by Supervisor Uilkema This ordinance also provides many common provisions relating to safety that are included in the Industrial Safety ordinance. While the wording may be different, the intent appears to be similar for: o PHA coverage o Root cause analysis o County audits and inspections o HSD authority to require program to reduce risks o County enforcement provisions o Public hearings on development projects Differences in this proposal and the Industrial Safety Ordinance include. o Proposal dues not require safety plan o Proposes task force to develop Worker Training and Safety Ordinance o Proposal relies on federal Process Safety Management Standard provisions for Human Factors considerations V. ADDITIONAL RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS A. Comparisons with Industrial Safety Ordinance Contacts were made to determine the existence of local safety ordinances in communities with heavy concentration of chemical and petro-chemical facilities in the mid.-west, gulf coast, and the east coast. A representative sampling of communities indicated that there was no ordinance similar to the Industrial Safety ordinance. There were provisions for boiler inspections, fire code requirements, and building code requirements, but no overall safety ordinance. Closest to this ordinance is the New Jersey Toxic Catastropic Prevention Act and the proposed ordinance expands on the scope of that act. B. Review of point score of midwest refinery projects Reviews of multi-million dollar safety projects for two refineries in the midwest (neither company has a facility in California) were used to develop point-scores for projects developed to reduce the potential for a release of hazardous chemicals to the atmosphere. In one case the facility was installing a spare vessel with auxiliaries to provide storage in the event to a rupture or leak of hydrofluoric acid in the existing tank. There was no increase in inventory, so the score should remain the same. However it could be interpreted that there is an ability to increase inventory, so the point score would be increased anda land use permit would be required. This seems to defeat the purpose of the ordinance. -19 - In the second case the point score would not reflect the reduction in risk, although community safety would be improved. The refinery is installing a sulfur recovery unit to convert hydrogen sulfide to sulfur rather than transfer it by pipeline to an adjacent plant. The adjacent plant will receive credit for the point score reduction, however, the point scare for the refinery will not be decreased. The evaluation indicates that the refinery would require a land use permit for this installation. C. Conclusions Industrial Safety Ordinance The ordinance addresses those technical elements of a safety management program which are accepted by safety professionals as critical to the reduction of incidents: o Adherence to national codes, standards and Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (REGAGEP) in developing process safety information o Use of root cause analysis in investigating incidents o Development of a written human factors program o Concepts of inherently safer processes o Establishes specific time frame for PHA action items o Requires audits and review by local agency to ensure continued compliance with the ordinance The ordinance extends the process safety management requirements to all operating units in a covered facility, which will ensure consistency of application in a stationary source. Implementation of these elements of PSM will result in improved worker and public safety as these provisions are on the leading edge of local safety regulation. The stationary sources covered by this ordinance have the resources and expertise to meet the requirements and effectively implement the process safety management program. However, as this ordinance only applies to the unincorporated areas of the county, facilities in incorporated areas were not reviewed in this study. In my opinion, the county has the staff and expertise to monitor and audit the program. The staff has four degreed chemical engineers and one mechanical engineer with 5 to 35 years experience in safety and health activities in industry and government. This, with leadership in the Health Services Department, should provide the proper control of the program and improve the safety of both the public and workers. -12- Ordinance 95-50 - Good Neighbor Ordinance This ordinance appears to apply to existing covered processes only when there is a major maintenance or turnaround situation. The procedure for obtaining a permit can result in delays of major maintenance shutdowns. Based on information received from various stakeholders, there is a belief that neither the refineries, workers, or the community are best served by a delay of maintenance projects, and I concur with this belief. As previously discussed, a review of previous incidents did not indicate any major release as a result of a turnaround. Therefore, this provision does not appear to enhance worker or public safety. D. Recommendations 1 . The County Health Services Department develop a criteria document outlining the requirements for a written human factors program. 2. 450-8. 016 (d) Process Hazard Analysis states that "the Stationary Source shall complete actions identified by the process hazards analysis and selected for implementation by the Stationary Source---" This tends to imply that the source can select which safety action items are to be completed, which is not the intent. Perhaps stating "the Stationary Source shall resolve and document closure on actions identified by the process hazards analysis as follows--". This, or similar language would allow for closure based on criteria that the actions were not related to safety, a different action was deemed to be more effective, factual errors in developing the action, or the action item rendered obsolete by ether process changes. ' 3. Two of the proposed ordinances discussed training as an element of process safety. One proposal only addressed contractor training programs while the second recommended that training be developed as a separate ordinance. Training for process safety includes supervisors, operators, plant maintenance personnel as well as contractors performing plant maintenance work, major maintenance projects., new construction, and specialty operations. It also requires qualifications for the trainers, development of training modules, and methods of determining that the participants understood the training. Based on the complexity of the element and the various groups that need to be involved in the development of an overall training program, it is suggested that training not be included in the proposed ordinances but rather be developed separately. -13- REFERENCES PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS Center for Chemical Process Safety (COPS) ( 1992 ) , Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition With Worked Examples, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Wagoner, R. I. , Hazards Analysis of Petroleum Systems (HAPS) : An Adaptation of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Technique, AREYE Corporation, Friendswood, TX 1988 INHERENT SAFETY SYSTEMS Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) ( 1996 ) ► Inherently Safer Chemical Processes - a Life Cycle Approach, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Englund, S.M. ( 1993 ) , Process and Design Options for Inherently Safer Plants, Prevention and Control of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Gases, ed. V.M. Ftthenkis, 9-62, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS Cemnter for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) ( 1994) , Guidelines for Preventing Human Error in Process Safety, New York, American Institute of Chemical Engineers Lorenzo, D.K. ( 1990) , A Manager' s Guide to Reducing Human Errors: Improving Human Performance in the Chemical Industry, Washington, D.C. , Chemical Manufacturers Association ROOT CAUSE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) ( 1992) , Guidelines for Investigating Chemical Process Incidents, New York, American Istitute of Chemical Engineers TapRoot (TM) Incident Investigation System, Systems Improvement, Inc. , Suite 301 , 238 Peters Road, Knoxville, TN 37920 Multiple-Cause, Svstems-Oriented Incident Investigation (MCSOII ) Rohm & Haas Texas Incorporated, P. O. Box 672, Deer Park, TX 77536