HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 01281997 - SD1 SD.1
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA
Adopted this Order on January 28, 1997, by the following vote:
AYES: Supervisors Rogers, Uilkema, Gerber, Canciamilla and DeSaulnier
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: None
SUBJECT: January 21, 1997, Tosco Incident
Phil Batchelor, County Administrator, and William Walker, M.D., Health Services
Director, reported to the Board of Supervisors regarding the January 21, 1997,
explosion and fire at the Tosco refinery. Mr. Batchelor advised the Board that
CAL/OSHA is the on-site lead agency investigating the incident and some
information cannot be shared with the County until CAL/OSHA has completed the
investigation. Dr. Walker provided a written report (Attached) and orally outlined
the areas of concern during the incident including County notification, County
access to the Tosco facility and Tosco's 72 hour report (Attached).
Subsequent to the staff reports, Clark Wrigley, Tosco Plant Manager, and Jim
Simmons, Tosco representative, commented on the incident and reaffirmed Tosco's
commitment to work with County staff on this incident and all other safety matters.
Following comments and questions from Board members, Chairman DeSaulnier
invited the public to comment on the issues. The following persons addressed the
Board:
Henry Clark, West County Toxics Coalition, 1019 Macdonald,
Richmond;
Don Gosney, 929 Lassen Street, Richmond;
Elizabeth Hull, East Bay Campaign Director, Ca1PIRG, 15 Shattuck
Square, Suite 210, Berkeley;
Denny Larson, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE)/RAP
Coalition, 500 Howard Street, Suite 506, San Francisco;
Tom Adams, Contra Costa Building Trades Council, 651 Gateway
Boulevard, Suite 900, South San Francisco; and
Donald R. Brown, member Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers, Board
of Directors, Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), 1801
Sonoma Boulevard, Suite 117, Vallejo.
All persons desiring to speak having been heard, Chairman DeSaulnier closed public
comment on the matter.
Page 1 of 2
Following further comment from Board members, the Board took the following
action:
1. ACCEPTED both oral and written reports from the County Administrator and
the Health Services Director regarding the January 21, 1997, Tosco refinery
explosion and fire, including the issues of County notification, County access
to the Tosco facility, the continuing investigation and the content of the 72
Hour Report issued by Tosco;
2. CONSIDERED oral reports from Tosco representatives Clark Wrigley and Jim
Simmons in the continuing investigation and access issues; and
3. DIRECTED the County Administrator and the Health Services Director to
report to the Board of Supervisors within 30 days on issues including:
options to facilitate County staff access to refineries during emergencies, a
status report on the investigation of the January 21, 1997, explosion and fire
at the Tosco refinery and options to prevent the malfunction of the
Community Warning System in the future.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
correct copy of an action taken and entered on
the minutes of the Board of Supervisors on the
date shown.
ATTESTED: Januar 28, 1997
Phil Batchelor, Clerk of the Board of
Supervisors and County Administrator
ri tinge Deputy erk
cc: County Administrator
Health Services Director
Page 2 of 2
Contra Costa County
The Board of Supervisors HEALTH SERVICES DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
Jim Rogers, 1st District ti st William B.Walker, M.D.
Jeff Smith,2nd District
Director&Health Officer
Gayle Bishop,3rd District .•
Mark DeSaulnier,4th District r 20 Allen Street
Tom Torlakson,5th District - ` Martinez,California 94553-3191
n, -
(510)370-5003
County Administrator ., =w o FAX(510)370-5099
Phil Batchelor
County Administrator a counts
January 28, 1997
TO: Board of Supervisors
FROM: William Walker, M.D. � •
Health Services Director
SUBJECT: Tosco Incident
January 21, 1997
On January 21, 1997 at approximately 7:41 PM, an explosion and fire occurred within the Hydrocracker Unit
at Tosco's Avon Refinery. This incident resulted in the death of a Tosco employee and in injuries to an
additional 44 people including 7 Tosco employees and 37 contract employees. These injuries included a fractured
foot,emotional trauma,and more minor physical injuries such as headaches,ringing ears,minor cuts and scrapes,
and twisted knees.
As of Monday afternoon, January 27, 1997 thirteen employees were reported to be transported by ambulance
to area hospitals and were treated and released. The remainder were treated at TOSCO and released or refused
care and went home.
The Health Services Department has some concern regarding Tosco's handling of this incident: immediate
notification to the Department's Hazardous Material Incident Response Team; access of an Incident Response
Team member to Tosco's Emergency Operations Center (EOC); and prompt transmittal of requested
information to the Department.
I called a meeting on Monday, January 27, 1997 with Tosco representatives and an OCAW (Organization of
Chemical and Atomic Workers) member of their investigation team and members of my staff. During that
meeting we received assurances that Tosco will work with Health Services in assuring the safety of the
Community by immediate notification of incidents to us; by having a member of our Incident Response Team
at the Tosco EOQ and by cooperating fully with requests for information needed for our investigation. A copy
of Tosco's 72 hour report is attached.
Additional requested information will be given to us directly by Tosco or obtained through CAL/OSHA which
is the on-site lead agency for information requested by the six (6) other agencies investigating the incident.
Our investigation will be ongoing. As relevant information becomes available we will be reporting back to the
Board.
Merrithew Memorial Hospital&Health Centers - Public Health - Mental Health - Substance Abuse - Environmental Health
Contra Costa Health Plan - Emergency Medical Services - Home Health Agency - Geriatrics
A-345 (1/96)
72-Hour Written Follow-up Notification
Hydrocracker Explosion and Fire
Tosco Avon Refinery
January 21, 1997
This report on the January 21, 1997 Hydrocracker explosion and fire at the Avon Refinery is
submitted to the Contra Costa County Health Services Department at its request.
The Incident
On January 21, 1997, at approximately 1944 hours, an explosion and fire occurred within the
Hydrocracker Unit at Tosco's Avon Refinery. This incident resulted in the death of a Tosco
employee, an Operator who was on duty at the Hydrocracker. It also resulted in injuries to an
additional 25 people, including seven Tosco employees and 18 contractor personnel working at
Tosco who were on site at the refinery at the time of the incident. These injuries included a
fractured foot, emotional trauma, and more minor physical injuries such as headaches, ringing
ears, minor cuts and scrapes, and twisted knees. Thirteen personnel were transported by
ambulance or other means to various area hospitals, including Mt. Diablo, County, John Muir
and Kaiser. Others went home or returned to work. All of the individuals transported to
hospitals for treatment were subsequently released; there were no hospital admittances required.
There were no reported injuries to the public or any offsite personnel as a result of this incident.
The wind during the initial stages of the incident was out of the south-southwest. As a result,
most of the smoke resulting from the fire was carried over the uninhabited area north of the
refinery and Suisun Bay. It does not appear that there was any significant community impact
resulting from the smoke. The wind speed was estimated at 5=7 mph during the initial stages of
the incident.
Material Involved
The material involved in the explosion and fire was the combined product from one of the.
Hydrocracker Stage 2 reactors consisting of butane, light gasoline, heavy gasoline, gas oil and
hydrogen. Because the feed to the second stage is hydrotreated (desulfurized), the material does
not contain hydrogen sulfide or other acutely hazardous materials (AHM's) as defined in the
State's Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP).
Emergency Notifications
Within minutes of the explosion, the Shift Superintendent called Tosco's Security Control and
requested activation of Tosco's emergency procedures and immediate notification to the Contra
Costa County Health Services Department (CCCHSD) and the California Office of Emergency
Services (CAOES).
Upon witnessing the explosion, Security Control had already begun to activate the emergency
procedures by sounding the fire horn. Immediately following the explosion, all five of
Security's phone lines were activated with incoming calls. This presented two problems. First,
due to the sheer volume of incoming calls, Security was overwhelmed. Secondly, it left no
outside lines available to make outgoing phone calls, including agency notifications. However,
Security Control was able to make the following emergency response notifications:
At approximately 1947, Security Control activated the numeric Tosco first responder
pager.
At approximately 1947, Security Control called 911 and requested four ambulances to
stand by.
At approximately 1952, Security Control activated the alphanumeric Tosco first
responder pager.
The Tosco Emergency Command Center (TFCC) was also activated within minutes of the
explosion. From TECC, additional notifications were made independently of those made from
Security Control. At approximately 2015, a Tosco representative called the CCCHSD
emergency reporting phone number (646-1112). The call was answered by a Sheriff's
Department emergency dispatcher. The Tosco representative informed the dispatches- that he
was attempting to reach CCCHSD to report an emergency at the refinery. The dispatcher
inquired about the nature of the emergency and was informed about the explosion and fire. The
dispatcher informed the Tosco representative that the phone had rolled over to him, and that both
the Sheriffs Department and CCCHSD were aware of the incident and were en route to the
refinery.
Additional subsequent agency notifications made from TECC included the following:
At approximately 2010, the Bay Area Air Quality management District was notified. A
voice mail menu was reached, the option for emergency breakdowns was selected, and a
message was left.
At approximately 2026, Mr. Jim Hattum of CCCHSD was informed of Tosco's request
to activate the Community Alert Network and sirens for a Level 3 incident.
At approximately 2030, the California Office of Emergency Services (CAOES) was
notified. Mr. Bill Rennington took the call (report number 97-0302).
At approximately 2040, the California Department of Fish and Game was notified. Lt.
Bono took the call.
At approximately 2050, the National Response Center (NRC) was notified. Mr. Bright
took the call (report number not available).
At approximately 2103, EPA Region IX was informed (Mr. Dunkelman).
At approximately 2235, Cal-OSHA was informed (Mr. John Cayiak).
The Santa Fe railroad was also notified of this incident. See the attached summary for further
information regarding emergency notifications.
Emergency Response
Tosco activated its employee volunteer fire brigade for this incident. The Incident Commander
was on site at the time of the explosion and immediately set up an Incident Command post.
Personnel were sent to the scene to assess the situation, and to the Hydrocracker control room to
check on the Operators. At that time, they learned that the unit was being shut down, isolated
and depressured, and that one Operator was missing. Tosco also began a systematic search for
all employees and contractor personnel throughout the refinery.
Response consisted of applying cooling water to the affected area and surrounding structures
using firefly portable fire monitors and all of the stationary fire monitors in the area. Additional
fire pumps were started throughout the refinery as required to maintain fire water pressure. The
fire was contained to the Hydrocracker Stage 2 No. 3 Reactor outlet, control valves and
associated piping, and allowed to burn out. Approximately 50 Tosco firefighters were utilized to
contain and control the fire.
Incident Investi ag tion
The explosion appears at this point to have originated in the outlet piping from the Hydrocracker
Stage 2 No. 3 Reactor, at a point just prior to entering the feed-effluent heat exchangers. The
root cause of the incident is unknown at this time. Tosco is conducting an investigation of this
incident, and is cooperating with investigations being conducted by several agencies. Tosco will
keep the County informed of the progress of its investigation.
Summary of TECC Notifications
Hydrocracker Explosion and Fire
Tosco Avon Refinery
January 21, 1997
Approximate
Time
1944 Explosion and fire at Hydrocracker.
1945 Security Control sounds fire horn.
1947 Security Control activates the numeric Tosco first responder pager.
1947 Security Control calls 911 and requests four ambulances to stand by.
1947 Shift Superintendent calls Security Control and requests notification of CCCHSD
and CAOES.
1952 Security Control activates the alphanumeric Tosco first responder pager.
2010 TECC notifies Bay Area Air Quality Management District.
2015 TECC notifies CCCHSD at phone number 646-1112. Phone rolls over to
Sheriff's Dispatch, who informs Tosco that the Sheriff's Department and
CCCHSD are aware of the incident and are en route to the refinery.
2020 Two ambulances standing by.
2026 CCCHSD (Jim Hattum) calls. TECC requests that CCCHSD activate the
Community Alert Network and sirens for a Level 3 incident.
2030 TECC notifies the California Office of Emergency Services. Report number 97-
0302.
2037 Tosco receives first Community Alert Network notification.
2040 TECC notifies California Department of Fish and Game.
2041 Tosco receives second Community Alert Network notification.
2047 Sheriff and Consolidated Fire on stand-by at D Street Gate.
2050 TECC notifies the National Response Center.
Approximate
Time
2103 TECC notifies EPA Region IX(Mr. Dunkelman).
2136 Faxed product MSDS to local hospitals.
2140 Returned call to Linda Pappeson of California State Fire Marshal's office.
Reported that no jurisdictional pipelines were involved.
2209 Cal-OSHA(Mr. John Cannec) calls and is updated on incident by TECC.
2245 Received call from CAOES (Jim Maquis). Updated on incident. Asked for call
back if something significant changes.
2248 Fire Chief reports deceased located.
2300 On-site representatives from CCCHSD (Charles Nicholson) and BAAQMD
(Mike Weedl) notified of fatality.
2300 Coroner notified.
2315 Coroner on site.
2333 Cal-OSHA(Rick Ullerich) notified of fatality.
2347 Department of Toxic Substance Control (Allan Freihoffer) offered assistance.
0055 All Clear.
C�,C
�.~ RECEIVED
JAN 2 g 19T Don Gosney
929 Lassen Street
:g?
COSTA
CO.SUPERVISORS Richmond, California 94805-1030
(510) 233-2060
IF IT'S NOT AIR
IT DOESN'T BELONG IN YOUR LUNGS
All through the evening of Tuesday, January 21, Tosco spokesman Jim Simmons kept
telling the television reporters that the deep black smoke emanating from the fire in their
Hydrocracking unit wasn't toxic and that Tosco's nearby neighbors in Clyde had nothing to fear.
Surely, if Mr. Simmons had thought out the situation more carefully, he might not have
suggested that it was perfectly all right to breath the acrid smoke of burning petroleum products
mixed with asbestos and other insulating fibers. The natural assumption should be that if it's not
air, then it doesn't belong in your lungs. As an industry spokesman during a time of emergency,
it might have been more prudent to calm the immediate fears ofthose listening and then advise
people to take the necessary precautions by staying inside their homes with doors and windows
securely closed.
DON'T WE HAVE
AN
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM?
OK, SO WHAT HAPPENED?
The County and the industries have established an emergency notification system designed
to keep the public health specialists informed of the details and specific dangers resulting from an
industrial accident. These public health specialists are then able to make the proper call in
determining the appropriate course of action and alleviate the public's fears by informing them
how they can stay out of harm's way. While the system is well intended, there appear to be a
few flaws that prevent the system from achieving its stated goals.
Although Tosco spokesman Jim Simmons states that he made the appropriate calls to the
numbers he was provided, his calls were subsequently rerouted to other parties. The end result
was that the appropriate officials did not receive the proper information from Mr. Simmons so
they were unable to relay that information to their associates and to the public. Mr. Simmons
indictaed that Tosco's switchboards were inundated and he was unable to get an outside line in a
timely manner. It seems only appropriate that each of these industrial giants should have a single
dedicated phone line that ties them in directly with the appropriate county emergency safety
officials so that when an accident occurs, the phone call can be made immediately and directed to
the people responsible for acting upon that information. This would be something similar to the
"red phone" tying the White House in to the Kremlin. There should be a person at the refinery
whose sole responsibility during an accident is to be- the liaison between the refinery and the
safety officials. On ,the County's end, there should be at least one person tied in to that
emergency phone ,line-100% of the time. That person should either- be around that phone or-a
transfer system utilized ;that redirects the call to the appropriate person (e.g. call forwarding,
beepers, cellulars;,,etc.),.!' There is absolutely no excuse why the refineries should not be able to
GNO-1 — 1— 01/28/97
—DON GOSNEY—
contact the County's emergency safety personnel when these accidents occur.
Apparantly, only 4,000 of the 4,500 homes in the affected area of Clyde were contacted by
the emergency notification system. No explanation was provided to explain why the remaining
11% of the homes were not notified. If the system is to be effective and the public's confidence
in the system is to be restored, the deficiencies must be found and remediated so that every
single home in the affected area is contacted. Had this been an accident of catastrophic
circumstances, a loss of 11% of the residents would not be considered to be acceptable losses.
WHY CAN'T WE TRUST
THE
REFINERY SPOKESPEOPLE?
Whenever there is an accident at one of the refineries, many of the neighbors around these
plants rely upon the news media for information about what's happening. They need to know
whether to board up their families or to evacuate. The news media are almost totally dependant
upon the refinery spokesperson for information and they then pass that information along to the
public. What happens, though, when the public knows more than what the spokesperson is
telling them? And what's to be done when the public feels that the refinery spokesperson is
withholding information? What really happens is that when the people lose their confidence in
the industry spokesperson, they no longer believe a single word that the spokesperson says.
On Tuesday evening, Tosco spokesman Jim Simmons stated that there was one person
unaccounted for and they were checking to determine if that person had left the refinery earlier in
the day. It came out later that this individual had died in the blast and his coworkers not only
knew where the body was but knew his identity. More than a day later, the spokesperson was
still telling the public that the body was unidentified yet refinery personnel had visited the man's
parents only hours after the blast to inform them of their loss.
Mr. Simmons told the public that there were only five or six minor injuries that consisted
of ringing ears and cuts from flying glass. It turns out that 25 people were sent to the hospital
with two in serious condition.
Mr. Simmons stated categorically that the smoke contained no toxics but that line has been
used so often that there are few that believe it any longer.
Isn't honesty the best policy when keeping the public informed and maintaining credibility.
If a spokesperson knows something, he should tell the public If the information is unknown, he
should tell the public that it's unknown. If it's an important piece of information that's being
requested, he should get the answers. He should never lie, never hedge and never give the
appearance of holding back. If.there's a reason why he can't divulge information, he should tell
the public why the information needs to be withheld.
VMY WERE THE INSPECTORS
REFUSED ACCESS?
As soon as they were notified, inspectors from varying regulatory agencies rushed to the
scene at Tosco to evaluate the situation. They were denied access by the refinery and, only after
GNO-1 -2- 01/28/97
—DON GOSNEY—
being threatened with legal action, did the refinery security personnel allow one of them inside.
During an emergency situation like the fire at Tosco, it only makes sense that the refinery safety
personnel would want to keep unnnecessary persons away from the site until the problem can be
brought under control. Since the inspectors have a legal right to be at the site, though, doesn't
it make sense to have a refinery representative be the liaison between the refinery and the
regulatory agencies, guide them to a safe vantage point and provide them with the information
they need to perform their jobs? Since they're not going to go away, rather than fight the
regulatory agencies, wouldn't it seem prudent to formulate a plan so they could be worked with?
When an inspector is denied access to the site, as they were that evening, the first response and
conclusion is that there's something being hidden. If there truly is nothing to hide, access should
never be a problem. The only problem is the mechanism to provide that access and that's a
problem that can easily be solved.
WHY IS GETTING INFORMATION
LIKE PULLING TEETH?
After an accident like Tosco's, to show their good faith and willingness to cooperate,
shouldn't a complete and full report be offered to the County and to the public? The information
made public to the County in Tosco's "72 hour" report was vague and diffuse and although it
presented a lengthy time line of the incidents that happened, it offered more from what it did not
say rather than what it did. If Tosco had wanted to present the appearance of cooperation
shouldn't their report have left no questions to be asked? Instead, their report suggested that
information had been withheld and when information is withheld, it suggests a coverup.
Considering that the industry has been trying to convince the public and the County Supervisors
that their industry needs no further regulation and that their compliance has met both the "letter
and the spirit" of the law, wouldn't it seem appropriate that this would be a just the opportunity
the industry needs to prove their point? If Tosco is as cooperative as they claim, why are so
many people still asking their questions and why are they going unanswered?
IF THEY'RE COMPLYING
WITH
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW,
THEN HOW COME WE HAVE TO FORCE THEM
TO DO THE RIGHT THING?
Every time there's an explosion or a release of toxic gases or a chemical spill into our Bay,
we keep hearing that these industries are complying with the "letter and spirit of the law". Did
any of these refineries agree on their own to reformulate their fuels so they would burn cleaner
and emit fewer toxins into the air? If so, why did they all wait until the very last minute before
building their Clean Fuels Projects? Does Unocal deny that they're dumping selenium into the
straits or do they claim instead that they can't be fined twice for the same crime? Did Unocal
rebuild their waste water treatment facility because it was the right thing to do or was it a trade-
off for the 26 million dollar fine they were facing for earlier selenium dumping? Did Chevron go
into the Point Richmond neighborhoods before dawn a few years back to wash all of the cars and
homes because they're good neighbors or were they trying to clean up that night's catalyst
GNO-1 -3- 01/28/97
—DON GOSNEY—
release before their neighbors woke up? Did Unocal shut down their Unicracker in September Of
'94 because they were concerned about the nearly 200 tons of Catacarb they were dumping on
their neighbors or did they shut it down because they had been threatened by regulatory agencies
with criminal action if they did not?
The letter of the law is the minimum level of compliance that we all have to live with but if
we're going to claim that we're following the spirit of the law then we have to move on to a
higher level of compliance. When it comes to protecting the safety and lives of the community,
are we required only to meet the letter of the law or do we have a higher moral imperative to
aspire to? Imagine what kind of a commercial they could make if instead of telling us how they
protected some butterflies in southern California, they protected their human neighbors instead.
Wouldn't this be a catchy slogan: 00 PEOPLE CARE? (�W in the name off, yowl, Ovohite oil
company) CARES.
WHY DON'T THEY GO BACK
WHERE THEY CAME FROM?
Every time a big industry has a problem that infuriates the locals, the cry goes out that
maybe those offending industries ought to just go back where they came from. The truth is,
though, that each of these industries were built long before the people moved next door to them.
If anything, shouldn't it be the people that should go back where they came? The reality is,
though, that neither the industries nor the people are going anywhere. The owners of the
industries may change and the owners of the homes may change.but chances are that somebody is
going to be living next to these industries for a long while to come. If nobody's going to budge,
wouldn't it seem logical that there needs to be found a way for both to exist next to each other
without the people dying off or the industries going broke? The times are changing quickly and
the petroleum industry needs to understand that an era of cooperation must exist. The area
needs the revenues and the jobs from the industries and the industries need the people to work
their plants and buy their goods. Unless everyone opens their minds to creative ideas and
compromise nobody but the lawyers are going to come out ahead.
ACCIDENTS HAPPEN,
DON'T THEY?
We've all said it at one time or the other: "it was just an accident" or "accidents happen".
The oil industries themselve will be the first to tell the public, just as they preach to their own
workers, that there are no such things as accidents. There's a reason for everything and all
accidents are preventable! If all accidents are preventable, why do these places keep blowing up,
burning down, or spitting their messes into our air and water? Was it human error, fatigue,
poor maintenance, unqualified workers, or just plain corporate greed? Whatever the reason, all
of these accidents could have been forecast and prevented. All it takes is a little bit of human
compassion for others and the willingness to spend some money to do the right thing.
GNO-1 —4 — 01/28/97