HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 09172002 - D.3 BOARD OF SUPERVISORS - ---------- ' Contra
William Walker, M.D.
Health 'Services Director' ` Caste
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DATE: July 23, 2002 �°��-`co-i--
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SUBJECT: Proposed Amendments to the:industrial Safety Ordinance 4615
SPECIFIC REQUEST(S)OR RECOMMENDATION(S)&BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATION
RECOMMENDATION:
1. ACCEPT the attached report from the Hazardous Materials Commission and the Public and
Environmental Health Advisory Board.
2. CONSIDER the recommendations made in this report concerning proposed changes to the Industrial
Safety Ordinance.
BACKGROUND:
s�
At the December 4, 2001 meeting, the Board of Supervisors asked the Hazardous Materials Commission
and the Public and Environmental Health Advisory Board to review and provide recommendations on four
proposed amendments to the County's Industrial Safety Ordinance (ISO). Two of these proposed
amendments dealt with the role of Inherently Safer Systems in conducting Process Hazard Analyses at
facilities. The third proposed amendment recommended changes to the contractor training requirements
contained in the ordinance. The fourth proposed amendment suggested incorporating the elements of a
specific accident prevention program, the Triangle of Prevention program, into the ordinance.
The Hazardous Materials Commission had previously held a`retreat on March 22, 2001 to plan their
priorities for the upcoming year. One of the priorities that emerged from that planning process was to
undertake a comprehensive review of the ISO. In response to the December 4, 2001 referral from the
Board, the Hazardous Materials',Commission decided to review and develop recommendations for these
four new proposed amendments as part of their comprehensive review of the ISO.
CONTINUED ON ATTACHMENT: X YES SIGNATURE: / - k�
RECOMMENDATION OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR RECOMMENDATION OF BOARD COMMITTEE
APPROVE OTHER
SIGNATURE(S). '
ACTION OF B ON 'SE1'PMt'3Eft 17,2002 APPROVE AS RECOMMENDED X OTHER XX
SEE DEM FOR NOTIM AND VC)TE�S,
VOTE OF SUPERVISORS I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE
AND CORRECT COPY OF AN ACTION TAKEN
UNANIMOUS (ABSENT ) AND ENTERED ON THE MINUTES OF THE
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS ON THE DATE
AYES: NOES: SHOWN.
ABSENT: ABSTAIN:
ATTESTED SEPTH41M 17 2002'
CONTACT: Michael Kent(925)313-6587 JOHN SWEETEN,CLERK C
BOARD
OF SUPERVISORS AND COUNTY
ADMINISTRATOR
CC:
n
BY 6 --
.._.,DEPUTY
Section D
Date: September 12,2002
SECTION D: PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS/ACTION ITEMS
County Ordinance Code Chapter 450-8,Section 450-8.0,16(D)requires facilities to conduct a process
hazard analysis(PHA's)on each covered process at their facility. The PHA's and PHA revalidatons'
should be conducted in conformance with Section 2760.2 of the CaIARP program regulations and..
Section 7.3 of the Contra Costa County CaIARP Program Guidance Document except in assessing
whether seismic eventsmust be considered.
Seismic events must be considered (i,e., a veisrnic assessment must be conducted) if the covered
process (as defined in Section 450-8.014(a)of County Ordinance Code Chapter 450-8)contains a
regulated substance (as'defined in Section 2735.3(n)of the CalARP'program regulations) and the
distance to the nearest public receptor for a worst case release scenario'is within the distance to the
toxic or flammable endpoint..2 The seismic assessment should be conducted in accordance with
Section 7.3.4 and Appendix B of the Contra Costa County CaIARP Program Guidance Document.
Additionally,County Ordinance Cade Chapter 450-8,Section"450-8'016(D)requires the following
for conducting PHA's.
D.1 INHERENTLY SAFER SYSTEMS
The intent of the Inherently Safer Systems requirements is that each stationary source,using
good engineering practices and sound engineering judgment will incorporate the highest level
of reliable hazard reduction to the greatest extent feasible, to prevent Major Chemical
Accidents and Releases.
"Inherently Safer Systems(ISS)means Inherently Safer Design;Strategies as discussed in the
1996 Centerfor Chemical Process Safety Publication "Inherently Safer Chemical Processes„
and means feasible alternative equipment, processes, materials, lay-outs,, and procedures
meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a Major Chemical Accident or Release by
modifying'a process rather than adding external layers of protection. Examples include, but
are not limited to, substitution of materials with lower vapor pressure,'lower flammability,or
lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous processes;and use of processes which operate at lower
temperatures and/or pressures." County Ordinance Code Chapter,450-8 §450-8.014(g)
"For all covered processes, the stationary'source shall consider the use of inherently safer
systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from a process hazard
analysis and in the design and review of new processes and facilities." County Ordinance
Code Chapter 450-8 as amended by County Ordinance 2000-20, Section 450-8.016(D)(3).
The term inherently safer implies that the process is safer because of its very nature and not
because equipment has been added to make it safer.3
1996 Center for Chemical Process Safety Publication Inherently'Safer Chemical Processes has
defined four categories for risk reduction:
r As specified in California Cade of Regulations,Title 19,Chapter 4.5,Section 2750.3
2 As specified in California Code of Regulations,Title 19,Chapter 4.5,Section 2750.2(x)
3 Process Plants: A Handbook for Safer Design, 1998,Trevor Kletz
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}late:September 12,2002
• Inherent-Eliminating the hazard by using materials and process conditions which are
nonhazardous; e.g., substituting water for a flammable solvent.
• Passive - Minimizing the hazard by process and equipment design features which
reduce either the frequency or consequence of the hazard without the active
functioning of any device; e.g., the use of equipment'rated for higher pressure.
• Active'--Using controls,safety interlocks,and emergency shutdown systems to detect
and correct process deviations;e.g., a pump that is shut off by a high level switch in
the downstream tank when the'tank is 90% full. These'..systems are commonly
referred to as engineering,controls.
• Procedural - Using operating ;,procedures, administrative checks, emergency
response,and other management approaches to prevent incidents,or to minimize the
effects of an incident;e.g.,hot-work procedures and permits. These approaches are
commonly referred to as administrative controls.
"Risk control strategies in the first two categories, inherent and passive, are more reliable
because they depend on the physical and chemical properties of the system rather than the
successful operation of instruments, devices,procedures, and people. 4 The inherent and
passive categories should be implemented when feasible for new processes and facilities and
used during the review of Inherently S afer Systems for existing processes if these processes
could cause incidents that that could result in a Major Chemical Accident or Release. The
final two categories do require the successful operation of instruments,devices,procedures,
and people. The concepts that are discussed in the COPS book,Inherently Safer Chemical
Processes,A Life Cycle Ap' rp oath,for looking at active and procedural applications of risk
reduction, should be used in developing recommendations'and mitigations from process
hazard analyses along with the inherent and passive categories. This is goad risk reduction.
These concepts should also be used in the review and application of human'factors for
process hazard analysis of new and existing processes:
Approaches to consider Inherently Safer Systems include the following4:
• Minimization — Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances (also called
Intensification)
• Substitute—Replace a material with a less hazardous substance
• Moderate--Use less hazardous conditions, a,less hazardous form of a material,or>
facilities that minimize the impact of release of hazardous`material or energy(also
called Attenuation or Limitation of Effects)
• "Simplify Design facilities that eliminate unnecessary complexity and make
operating errors less likely,and that are forgiving of errors that are made(also called
Error Tolerance)
The following guidance on the review of Inherently Safer Systems is broken dawn into seven
separate sections. The first section addresses new covered'processes, the second section
addresses existing processes;the third section addresses mitigations resulting from Process
Hazard Analysis (PHA); the fourth section defines feasibility; the fifth section addresses
4 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes.A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
D-2
Section I)
Date: Se teber 12,2002
recommendations from process hazard analyses;the sixth section addresses Inherently Safer
System Deports;and the seventh section contains definitions.: As discussed in the fallowing
sections,the ISS analyses must be performed for situations where a major chemical accident
or release could reasonably occu
References on the approaches to Inherently Safer Systems to consider are listed at the enol of
this section
D.1.1 Inherently Safer Systems Analysis for New Covered Processes'
The Industrial Safety Ordinance requires a stationary source to consider Inherently Safer
Systems " . . in the design and review of new processes and facilities." (§450-
8.016(D)(3)). This section describes the different phases in the development of a project
that an Inherently Safer Systems analysis should be used. Inherently Safer Systems
should be reviewed early in the development phase of a new covered process and then
reviewed throughout the different project design phases. The objectives for an inherent
safety review are to employ synergistic teams to
• Understand the hazards
• Find ways to reduce or eliminate the hazards
Thefirst major objective for the inherent safety review is the development of a good
understanding of the hazards involved in the process Reducing and eliminating hazards
and 'their associated risks is the second major objective. Applying inherent safety
principles early in the productlprvicess development: effort provides the greatest
opportunity to achieve the objectives of the inherent safety review processfor the project
at hand,
The stationary source should use a review process for new processes that includes an
Inherently Safer Systems review at different phases of the design process such as the
following phases when applicable:
• During the chemistry forming(synthesis)phase for product/process research and
development to focus on the chemistry and process
5 Process Hazard Analysis methods determine the risk of a deviation or potential incident. The risk determination is
based on a combination of the hazard(severity)of the potential incident and likelihood(probability)of an incident
occurring. If the potential hazard(severity)of consequence of a deviation meets the definition of a Major Chemical
Accident or Release an ISS Analysis should be done for those that could reasonably occur.
6 Composition of the review teams will vary at different phases of the development cycle of the project and with the;
nature of the process. In product development and design scope,the team may comprise of chemist,process design
engineers,industrial hygienist,safety engineer,environmental,and control engineer etc. In the hazard and operations
review phase,the team may include operations and maintenance personnel as well. A stationary source may choose not
to use an ISS review team at a particular phase. If this does occur,the stationary source should document the reasons for
not using a;team for performing an ISS review during this particular phase. A multi-disciplined'group should be used
throughout the various phases of development.implementation,and operation.
7 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
D-3
Section D
Date:September 12 2002
• During thefacilities design scoping and development prior to completion of the
design basis to focus on equipment and configuration
• During the basic design',phase of the project
CCHS understands that for different stationary sources and different;projects that the
above phases,timing and sequencing,may not always be applicable. For some projects,
the chemistry may complete and the chemistry-forming phase is not applicable. For
some stationary sources` it may be more appropriate to do inherently safer system
analyses at phases that are not quite the same as described above, but is at the same
approximate timing in a''project development and design phases. The intent is that a
stationary source' conducts inherently safer system analysis early in the project
development and throughout the various phases of the design. Stationary Sources should
recognize that the earlierin a project development and design the easier and less costly it
is to make a'change to implement Inherently Safer Systems.
D.1.11 Applying Inherently Safer Systems Review—Chemistry-Farming Phase
Inherently Safer Systems should be evaluated early in the assessment of the project.
When applicable, this assessment''should be done in the chemistry-forming phase
during the product and process research and development. A team with diverse
background would best perform the assessment. The team assessment should address
such topics as:
• Understanding of the hazards
• Choice of best route to produce a'given chemical or product
• Process improvement
o Reactor types and conditions
o Intermediate storage optimization
o Waste'minimization
• Identify requirements for additional information
Some of the information that may need to be available'prior to this review includes
the followings:
• Simplified process flow diagrams
o Include alternative processes
• Defined chemical reactions
o Desired and undesired
o' Develop potential for runaway reactions/decompositions
• A list of all chemicals and materials employed
o Develop compatibility matrix
a' Include air, water, rust, etc.
• Defined'physical,chemical,'and toxic properties
sEarly review often will not have all of the information listed. Do not wait to complete the reviews before all of this
information is developed. The later reviews should cover the information that was not available in the earlier reviews.
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Section D
Date: September 12,2002
• Defined process conditions(pressure,temperature,etc.)
• Estimated quantities used in each process system (tanks, reactors, etc.)
-
o Estimate quantities of wastes/emissions
The review team should examine the following questions:
• Can safer chemicals be used?
• Can quantities be reduced?
• is the overall risk increased by implementing an ISS?
• Can waste be reduced? (Regenerable catalyst or recyclable.)
• What additional information is required'? (Toxicology information,heats of
reaction, or reactive,chemicals data.)
Documentation that should be kept for this phase of the project, when applicable,
includes, but not limited to:
• How the decision was made to perform an Inherently Safer Systems Review
at this phase
• How the assessment was performed
• The assessment team leader, including the relevant experience of the team
leader
• The makeup of the assessment team by discipline, experience, and name of
the participants
• The information that was prepared and available during the assessment
• How the hazards were understood, including flammability, toxicity, and
reactivity
• The different routes to produce a given chemical or product and how the best
route was determined, including the criteria and method used for this
determination
• How process improvements were reviewed and the determination of the
process that was determined to be the inherently safest process
• The answers to such questions as those listed above
• The identification of requirements for additional information
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Section D
Date:September 12,2002
D.1.1.2 Applying Inherently Safer Systems Review—Facilities Design Scoping
and Development
Inherently safer system should then be evaluated during the design-scoping phase of
the project when applicable. The evaluation should concentrate on the following:
• Minimizing equipment
• Reducing inventories
• Simplifying the process
• Reducing wastes
• Moderating process conditions
The preliminary information that should be available prior to the development phase
of the project ISS review may include the following.'
• Process flow diagram or simplified process flow diagram
• Material and Energy Balance
• Defined chemical reactions
• Defined physical,chemical, and toxic properties
During the review the team should examine questions such as
• Previously unanswered questions
• Can potential releases be reduced via lower temperatures or pressures, or
elimination of equipment
• Can quantities be reduced?
• Can waste be reduced? (Regenerable or recyclable catalyst.)
• Can different equipment be used resulting in safer conditions?
Documentation that should be Dept for this phase of the project includes, but not
limited to:
• How the decision was made to do an Inherently Safer Systems Review at this
phase
• How the assessment was performed
• The assessment team leader, including the relevant experience of the team
leader
• The makeup of the assessment team by discipline, experience, and name of
participants
• The information that;was prepared and available during the assessment
• The process used to determine that the equipment sizes are minimized and
the results of this determination
• The process used to determine the minimum inventories 'needed and .the
results of this determination
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Section D
Date: September l2,2002
• The process used to simplify the covered process', if applicable, and the
results of this process
• The process used to reduce the waste made from the project and the results of
the determination
• How the moderation of the process was done-the checklist in Attachment A
could be used in this determination
• The answers to such questions as those listed above
• The identification of requirements for additional information
D.1.1.3 Applying Inherently Safer Systems Review—During the Basic Design of the
Project
During this assessment phase,use of inherently safer systems should be reviewed and
documented. This may be achieved using :a checklist that incorporates ISS
considerations such as those listed in Attachment A. Another method that may be used is
the incorporation of additional parameters and guidewords such as those used in a Hurd
and Operability Study. An example of guidewords or parameters that could be used is
shown in Attachment B. These analyses would review the covered processes for ways to
eliminate or reduce hazards that are present in the covered process. Preliminary safety
critical devices and procedures should be examined to determine if there is a way to
eliminate the need for the device or procedure by applying;principles of inherently safer
systems. The information preparedprior to the design phase of the project should
include the process safety information that is required under the 'Industrial Safety
Ordinance and CaIARP Program. Some of the information to be included with the
process safety information is the following:
• Process Flow Diagrams (PFD's)
• Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID's
• Material and Energy Balance
• Equipment specifications
• Designing equipment for isolation when applicable—(P&ID's may be sufficient
to address this requirement)
• Preliminary safety critical procedures or guidelines
• Instrumentation logic information - (P&ID's .may be sufficient to address this
requirement)
During the ISS Study the team should consider such questions as:
• Can potential releases-,be reduced via lower temperatures or pressures, lower
concentrations,elimination of equipment,by using seatless pumps,etc.?
• Can quantities be reduced?
• Can waste be reduced?
The documentation that should be included'for the checklist analysis includes the items
that are applicable from the checklist in Attachment A,what items were considered,how
D-7
Section D
Date;September 1 ,2002
they were considered,and the results of the consideration. For items that were applicable
and not considered, document why each item was not considered.
The documentation for incorporating the guidewords for inherently safer systems into a
Hazard and{operability Study should be consistent with the documentation used during
any Hazard and Operability Study.
Other-methods for performing an Inherently'Safer Systems Analysis maybe appropriate.
If another method is used, the stationary source must work with Contra Costa Health
Services itt`&Wrli iniag that this method is appropriate for analyzing for inherently safer
systems prior to implementation.
The documentation must include the-makeup of the review team by discipline,relevant
experience, and the names of the review leader and participants.
D.1.2 Inherently Safer Systems Analysis for Existing Process Units
The Industrial Safety Ordinance requires that stationary sources consider hazards as part of
the process hazard analyses.
"The process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity of the Covered
Process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the Coverer
Process. The process hazard analysis shall address= the hazards of the process, the
identification of any previous incident which had a likely potentialfor catastrophic
consequences; engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and
their interrelationships such as appropriate application'of detection methodologies to
provide early warning of releases." 'Chapter 450-$ §450-$.016(D)(1)
NOTE: Inherently Safer Systems need'only be considered for scenarios where a Major
Chemical Accident or Release could reasonably occur. This could include a process or parts ,
of a process. The stationary source needs to establish a method to make the determination of
a potential occurrence of a Major Chemical Accident or Release. This could include
examining each consequence of a'deviation, including the severity of each consequence.
Stationary sources should perform one of the following methods to ensure that inherently
safer systems (inherent and passive categories) are considered and documented for the
covered,processes.
An independent inherently'safer system analyses that is done in addition to a PHA9.
These analyses should review the covered processes for ways to eliminate or reduce
hazards that are present in the covered'process. This may be achieved by using a
9 If the stationary source decides to do an independent inherently safer systems analysis,CCHS suggests that this be
donee in conjunction with the process hazard analysis,but it may be appropriate for a stationary source to perform an
inherently safer systems analysis that is done at a different time than the process hazard analysis.' Either approach
-meets the guidance from this document,as long as the inherently safer systems analysis is revalidated at least once
every five years.
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Section D
Date: SM !ember 12,2002
checklist (Attachment A) or guideword analysis (Attachment B)that incorporates
ISS.If the stationary source decides to use some other ISS checklist or other methods
to evaluate ISS,these must be approvedby CCHS prior to their use.
+ An inherently safer system analyses that is incorporated into the existing PHA review
process. This would require that each covered'process in its entirety have an initial
ISS analyses conducted. (Incorporating inherently safer systems into a revalidated
process hazard analysis may not be sufficient to satisfy the initial inherently safer
system review if the whole process is not evaluated.) This may be achieved using a
checklist (Attachment A);or guideword (Attachment B) that incorporates ISS
considerations into a Hazard and Operability Study where a Major' Chemical
Accident or Release could reasonably occur. These analyses would review the
covered processes for ways to eliminate or reduce hazards as well as risks that are
present in the covered process.
Whichever type of ISS analysis is implemented by the stationary source the following will
need to be done:
• The stationary source will develop and document their approach to evaluating
ISS'for existing processes. Contra''Costa Health Services will review the ISS
analysis method'selected to determine that the method meets the requirements of
the Industrial Safety Ordinance and this guidance document.
• The stationary source will document the qualifications of the team
facilitator/leader and team makeup,including positions,'names,and any relevant
experience or training.`
•' The stationary source will document the ISS's considered as well as those
implemented. Implementing only one option to address identified hazards may
not be adequate to address- the greatest hazard reduction or elimination.
However, it is not Necessary to implement more than one ISS if the
implementation of a second ISS does not add any significant hazard reduction or
has been documented as infeasible.
• If the stationary`source chooses to do an independent inherently safer systems
analysis,the stationary source should document the method used for the analysis,
what inherently safer' systems were considered, and the results of each
consideration. If the checklist for Inherently Safer Systems was used,for items
that were not considered,document why those items were not considered,i.e.,not
applicable or were already considered in previous consideration.
• The stationary source will document for the ISS considered and not implemented,
the grounds that were used to make the feasibility determination '(See D.1.4
Feasibility),
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Section D
Date:September 12 2002
• The documentation for incorporating,the guidewords for inherently safer systems
into a Hazard and Operability Study should be consistentwith the documentation
used during any Hazard'and Operability Study.
• For any other inherently safer system analysis, the stationary source should
document the inherently safer system considered, the inherently safer system
implemented, and the inherently safer systems not implemented.
•' The ISS analyses should be revalidated at least once every five years. The
revalidation should include and document the following:
• Incorporate improvements made in method since the last review was
conducted or select a new method to perform the ISS analyses.
o ISS review for all changes that have been made since the last ISS analysis.
o Review of all major chemical accidents or releases or potential major
chemical accidents or releases that occurred at the process under review.
o Review for any new and existing technologies not previously reviewed that
can be incorporated that will make the process under review inherently safer.
D.1.3 Process Hazard Analysis Reconunendations and Mitigations
The concepts as addressed in the CCPS book Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life
Cycle Approach for looking at all four categories of risk reduction(Inherent,Passive,Active,
and Procedural)should be used in the development and mitigation of recommendations from
process hazard analysis as well as for considering Human Factors.10 Chapter 4 of the COPS
book Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A life Cycle Approach discusses many inherently
safer system strategies that can be incorporated in the development of mitigations to address
the recommendations from process hazard analysis.
The stationary sources should provide guidance to personnel responsible for developing and
analyzing recommendations and mitigation items resulting from the unit PHA. The guidance
should include the concepts of inherently safer systems including:
• The different categories of risk reductions
• Moving up the different levels from procedural to active to passive to inherent
levels
• Approaches to apply inherently safer systems including minimization,
substitution, moderation; and simplification
10 County Ordinance Code Chapter 450-8,§450-8.016(D)(3) "For all Covered Processes,:'the Stationary,Source
shall consider the use of Inherently safer Systems in the development and analysis of mitigation items resulting from
a process hazard analysis :"and County Ordinance Code Chapter 450-8 §450-8.015(D)(4) "Far all Covered
Processes,the Stationary Source shall document the decision made to implement or not implement all process
hazard analysis recommended action items and the results of recommendations for additional study.. ."
D-10
Section D
Date: September 12,2.042
The stationary source should document how they used the inherently safer system strategies
for risk reduction in developing and analyzing mitigations to address the recommendations
from a process hazard analysis. There should be sufficient detailed documentation
satisfactory to CCHS and should at least include the following for the stationary sources ISS
program description:
•`' The facility has a'program in place to ensure that risk reduction actions taken to
address PHA recommendations incorporate inherently safer systems;
• The program incorporates at a minimum; the four levels of risk reductions
described beginning on page D-1 of this document.
• How the stationary source encourages moving up the levels from procedural to
inherent in the implementation of the inherently safer system strategies.
The stationary source should also document the implementation of ISS strategies and should
include the following.
• At least one risk reduction action was taken using inherently safer system strategy
for each PHA mitigation item for scenariosthat have the potential for a Major
Chemical Accident or Release:
• A description of the risk reduction method selected and the inherently safer
system strategy used.
• Details of risk reduction mitigation considered using the inherently safer system
strategy that was not implemented.
• Reasons the rejected risk reduction mitigation was determined to be infeasible
using the inherently safer system strategies.
D. 1.4. Feasibility
The Industrial Safety Ordinance requires the stationary source to select and implement ISS to
the greatest extent feasible(Section 450-8.016(13)(3)). The Industrial Safety Ordinance also
defines feasible . capable of being 'accomplished in a successful manner within a
reasonable period of time, taking into account economic, environmental,legal,social, and
technological factors. To assist in the determination of feasible, Contra Costa Health
Services is using a modification of the following guidance from OSHA (Federal OSHA
provided guidance for justifiably declining recommendations from incident investigations in
the September 1994,OSHA.Instruction CPL 2-2.45A CH-1. These criteria have since been
applied to recommendations formulated during PHA's.) and the U.S.EPA:
• The analysis upon which the recommendations are based contains factual errors.
• The recommendation is not necessary,'i.e.,the safeguards may be inadequate,but
the consequences are operational or the consequence or severity of the scenario
would not result in a Major Chemical'Accident or release.
• An alternative ISS°would'provide a sufficient level of hazard reduction(NOTE:
Implementing only one option to address identified hazards may not be adequate
to address the greatest hazard'reduction or elimination. However, it is not
necessary to implement more than one ISS if the implementation of a second ISS
does not add any significant hazard'' reduction or has been documented as
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Section D
Date:22amber 12,2002
infeasible'.}
• The recommendation is in conflict with existing federal, state, or local laws.
• The recommendation is in conflict with Recognized and Generally Accepted
Goad Engineering Practices (R.AGAGEP).
• The recommendation is economically impractical,such that the process unit can
no longer be financially operated. This can include the following factors:
o Capital investment
o Product quality
o Total direct manufacturing costs
o Operability of the plant
o Demolition and future clean-up and disposal cost
• The recommendation would have a negative social impact such that the project.
should not be implemented. Some examples of social impact include the
recommendation would have a visual or noise impact on the community that is
not acceptable and the recommendation would cause or increasethe traffic
congestion.
• The recommendation may violate a license agreement and the license agreement
cannot be modified and must remain in effect.
• The recommendation may decrease the hazard, but would increase'the overall`
risk.
• An alternative measure would provide more risk reduction than the ISS.
• If the ISS' recommended is determined not to be implemented because it will
create more risk,or if other modifications that are not ISS are made such that the
overall risk is less than if the ISS were implemented, the stationary source will
need to document how this determination was made. A qualitative risk
assessmentlanalysis could be used as a basis for the risk analysis. The facility
needs to document how they determined the qualitative severity and likelihood
for the existing' or modified conditions and for the conditions if the ISS is
implemented. If the qualitative risk analysis shows the same level of risk,then a
quantitative risk'assessment/analysis should be performed to compare the risk of
the existing or modified conditions to the risk if the ISS is implemented. The
documentation'should''include the background information that was used to do
the comparison of the existing or modified conditions to the conditions if the ISS
is implemented. Another method may be used by the stationary source,such as a
weighted'scoring decision matrix as shown on page 23 of CCPS book Inherently
Safer Chemical Process A Life Cycle Approach, if that method is approved by
Contra Costa Health Services prior to the use ofthe method.
County Ordinance Code Chapter 450-8, §450-8.016(D)(3) requires the following
"This documentation shall include (1) sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the
County's satisfaction that implementing this inherently safer system is impractical,
and (2) the reason for this conclusion." The documentation should include the
applicable background information,calculations,and the reasons that an inherently
safer system was not implemented. If there is any concern that the reasons for not
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Date: September 12,2002
implementing an inherently safer system would not satisfy Contra Costa Health
Services, the stationary source should consult with Contra Costa Health Services to
determine if the justification is satisfactory. The stationary source should then
receive in writing from Contra Costa Health Services their decision and how they
came to their decision including background information, calculations, and
alternatives considered.
D.I.S Completion of Recommended Action Items`
Stationary sources must document the decision made to implement or not implement all
process hazard analysis recommended action item and the results of recommendations for
additional study.This documentation must include the justification for not implementing,any
recommended actions. Federal 'OSHA provided guidance for justifiably declining
recommendations from incident investigations in the September 1994, OSHA Instruction
CPL 2-2.45A CH-1.These criteria have since been applied to recommendations formulated
during PHA's. NOTE: Additionally,CCHS encourages stationary'sources to consider the
impact on surrounding communities when declining recommendations.
• The analysis upon which the recommendation is based contains material factual errors
• The recommendation is not necessary to protect the health and safety of the employer's
own employees, or the employees of contractors
• An alternative measure would provide a sufficient level of protection`
• The recommendation is infeasible
Cal/OSHA issued the following clarification in Part 4 of the June 1994 Process Safety
Management Guidelines. "...Cal/OSHA's intent is that .an employer is required to
implement the teams' findings and recommendations except to the extent that an employer
can document that an alternative will be at least as effective or efficient in addressing the
safety concerns that are the subject of those findings and recommendations".
The stationary source must complete the recommended actions selected for implementation,
including'those formulated during PHA, as follows:
• All actions not requiring a process shutdown must be completed within one year after
submittal of the original Safety Plan or after completion of the PHA revalidation unless
the stationary source demonstrates to the satisfaction of Contra Costa Health Services
that within one year is infeasible
• All actions requiring a process shutdown shall be completed during the first,;regularly
scheduled turnaround of the applicable',process subsequent to one year after submittal of
the Safety Plan or after completion of the PHA unless the stationary source demonstrates
to the satisfaction of Contra Costa Health Services that such a schedule is infeasible
D-13
Section D
Dater September 12,2002
ISS Study and ISS Revalidation recommendations should be resolved in a timely manner.
CCHS Staff may request that the stationary source make the plans for completing these
recommendations available during facility,audits.
Examples of situations where the schedule may be infeasible include procuring customized
equipment requiring along lead time for fabrication and delivery,complex projects requiring
significant front-end engineering, facilities that require substantial time to construct, or
implementing a recommended action that requires the application of a local air district permit
to construct or county land use permit and its'requirements (a CEQA analysis may be
conducted.) NOTE: the stationary source must demonstrate that they initiated the land use
permit process in a timely manner.,
The stationary source must retain documentation of closure and any associated justification
of actions identified by the process hazardanalysis. CCHS interprets"actions"to include,
but not be limited to, all recommendations made for changes to physical equipment and
procedures, and for additional studies and information. The stationary source must also
retain documentation of communisation to operating, maintenance and ether employees
whose work assignments are in the process and who may be affected by the
recommendations or actions.'
D.1.6 Inherently Safer System Reports
An Annual report on the Industrial Safety Ordinance is made to the Board of Supervisors in
October each year. Each June,Contra Costa Health Services will request information from
the stationary sources for this report. Part''of this information includes information on the
inherently safer systems already implemented. The information on inherently safer systems
should include a brief description of each inherently safer system that was implemented from
June 1 — May 31 each year that meet the definitions of the inherent or passive levels for
processes..where a Major Chemical Accident or Release could reasonably occur. The
description should include the level of risk reduction(inherent or passive),and the basis for
the inherently safer system implemented (e.g., FHA, Inherently Safer System Analysis,
Review of Inherently Safer Systems for new processes or facilities).`'
D.1.7 Definitions
1. "Active - Using controls, safety interlocks, and emergency shutdown systems to
detect and correct process deviations, e.g., a pump that is shut off by a high level
switch in the downstream tank when the tank is 90C10 full. These systems are
commonly referred to as engineering controls."r1
2. Could Reasonably Occur 12= is a relative term that depends on the severity of the
incident that qualifies a scenario as a Major Chemical Accident or Release. A
C i CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes,A Life C jLle Approach, 1996
12 Canadian Study
D-14
Section D
Date: September 12,2042
scenario resulting in a Major Chemical Accident or Release could reasonably occur
if.
a. For a scenario resulting a Level 2 incident, or on-site property damage
(including clean-up and restoration activities)initially estimated at$500,000
or more,the Iikelihood can be described by"has happen in unit,or at least at
location"
b. For a scenario'resulting a Level 3 incident,the likelihood can be described by
"has happcned at location, but very rare"
c. For a scenario resulting in one or more fatalities, or greater than 24 hours of
hospital treatment of three or more persons, or off-site property damage
(including clean-up and restoration activities)initially estimated at$500,000
or more, or a flammable vapor cloud of more than 5,000 pounds, the
likelihood is greater than "has not happened at location, and very remote„
The shaded cells in the table below indicate what should be considered`reasonable for the
different severities
Has Happen at Severity(a)' Severity(b) Severity(c)
Process Unit
Stationary Source
Never
3. Inherently Safer Systems—"Inherently Safer Design Strategies as discussed in the
1996 Venter far Chemical.Process Safety Publication "Inherently'Safer Chemical
Processes'; and Feasible alternative equipment,processes,materials, lay';outs,and
procedures meant to eliminate, minimize, or reduce the risk of a Major Chemical
Accident or Release by modifying a process rather than adding external.'layers of
protection. Examples include, but are not limited to, substitution of materials with
lower vapor pressure,,lower flammability, or lower toxicity; isolation of hazardous
processes; and use of processes, which operate at lower temperatures and/or
pressures." (County Ordinance Code Chapter 450, §450-8.014(g)
4. "Inherent-Eliminating the hazard by using materials and process conditions which
are nonhazardous; e.g., substituting water for a flammable solvent.„13
13 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes,A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
D-15
Section D
Date:September 12 2002
5. Inherently Safer Systems Analysis — Performing a study to incorporate concepts of
inherently safer systems. The analysis will include recommendations on incorporating
inherently safer systems into a process. The analysis will include the documentation on
how the study'was performed, the recommendations`from the study, and how'the
recommendations were formulated.
6. Less Hazardous Form—Materials being handled under conditions that is considered
leas hazardous. Less hazardous conditions can be accomplished by strategies that are
either physical (lower temperatures, and/or pressures, dilution) or chemical
(development of reaction chemistry that operates less severe conditions).Examples
include; dilution, refrigerated liquids that are gases at standard temperatures and
pressures, and operating at lower temperatures and pressures.
7. Major Chemical Accident or Release-is defined by the ordinance(§450-8.014(h))as
" . . means an incident that meets the de,finition of a Level 3 or Level 2 Incident in
the Community Warning System incident level classification system defined in the
September 27,'1997 Contra Costa County guideline for the Community Warning
System as determined by the'Department;or results in the release including, but not
limited to, air, water, or soil'of a Regulated Substance and meets one or more of the
following criteria:
(1) results in one or more fatalities;
(2) results in greater than 24 hours of hospital treatment of three or more
persons;
(3) causes on and/or off-;site property damage (including clean-up and
restoration activities) initially estimated at $500,000 or more. On-site
estimates shall be performed by the Stationary Source. Off-site estimates
shall be performed by appropriate agencies and compiled by the
Department.;
(4) results in a flammable vapor cloud of more than 5000 pounds.
8. "Minimization Use smaller quantities of hazardous substances (also called
Intensification),14
9. "Moderate— Use less hazardous conditions,a less hazardous form of a material, or
facilities that minimize the impact of release of hazardous material or energy(also
called Attenuation or Limitation of Effects)"zs
10. New Process - The addition'of a process that did not,previously exist or a major
revamp of an existing process resulting'in a substantial change'in the process
configuration orprocess chemistry.
11. "Passive-Minimizing the hazard by process and equipment design features which
reduce either the frequency or consequence of the hazard without the active
functioning of any device; e.g., the use of equipment rated for higher pressure."1
14 CC1'S,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
s CCPS,Inhert-ndy Safer Chemical Processes A Life Cycle'Approach, 1996
D-16
Section D
Date: September 12,2002
12. "Procedural Using operating procedures, administrative checks, emergency
response, and other management approaches to prevent incidents,or to minimize the
effects of an incident;»e.g.,hot-work procedures and permits. These approaches are
commonly referred to as administrative controls."1 z
13. Process Any activity involving a regulated substance including any use, storage,
manufacturing,handling,or on-site movement of such substances,or combination of
these activities. For the purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are
interconnected, or separate vessels that are located such that a regulated substance
could be involved in a potential release, shall be considered'a single process. (CCR
Title 19 Section 2735.3(tt)
14. "Process.Flow Diagram—A diagram that shows the material flow from one piece of
equipment to the other in a process. It usually provides information about the
pressure,temperature,composition,andflow rate of the various streams,heat duties
of exchangers, and other such information pertaining to understanding and
conceptualizing the process.„1s
15. "Quantitative Risk Analysis—The systematic development of numerical estimates of
the expected frequency andlor consequence of potential accidents associated with a
facility or operation based on engineering evaluation and mathematical
techniques."19
16. Safer Chemicals — Chemicals where the acute and chronic toxicity, flammability,
reactivity,and instability are:lower. A chemical maybe safer in some of these hazard
categories and higher in others. The facility needs to determine the impact from a
release of a chemical based on the above hazards. The chemical with the least impact
should be safer.
17. "Simplify— Design facilities that eliminate unnecessary 'complexity and make
operating errors less'likely, and that are forgiving of errors that are made (also
called.Error Tolerance)„20
18. "Substitute—Replace a material with a less hazardous.substance ,21
19. Sufficient Level of Hazard Reduction The level where the accidental release
scenario being considered is not likely to occur.'
References
References include but are not limited to:
16 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life C c�le Approach, 1996
17 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
18 CCPS,Guidelines for Process Safety in Batch Reaction Systems, 1999
19 CCPS Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures,Second Edition,1992
20 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes A Life Cycle Anproach, 1996
21 CCPS,Inherently Safer Chemical Processes,A Life Cycle'Approach, 1996
D-1'7
Section D
Date:September 12,2002
CCPS, Guidelines for Engineering Designfor Process Safety, 1993
COPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes, A Life Cycle Approach, 1996
Process Plants: A Handbook for Inherently Safer Design, Kletz, 199$
D-1'8
INHERENTLY SAFER SYSTE s CHECKLIST
The intent of this checklist is to stimulate discussion and thinking about process improvements,
and to encourage the concept of avoiding and reducing hazards, not just preventing/ mitigating
consequences of hazard by adding protective equipment. "Out-of-the-box" thinking is strongly
encouraged. The content of this checklist'was extracted from COPS "Inherently Safer Chemical
Processes:A Life Cycle Approach"', and"Process Minimization: Making,Plants Safer`2
The checklist questions are not always pertinent for an individual facility or for every phase of a
project or an existing facility.' The checklist should be tailored for your facility and for the stage
the checklist is being applied for new processes,as follows:
• During the chemistry-forming (synthesis) phase' for product/process research and
development to focus on the chemistry and process
• During the 'facilities design scoping, and development prior to completion of the
design basis to focus on equipment and configuration
• During the basic design phase of the project'
The'checklist should also be tailored for existing process in your facility to be used during a
Process Hazard Analysis, when appropriate for the Process Hazard Analysis Team. Some items
may need to be reviewed by a'team that is outside of the Process Hazard Analysis Team,because
the personnel with the appropriate expertise or ability may not be a part of the'Process Hazard
Analysis Team. Issues, such as considering the transportation of hazardous materials, may
require the ability to renegotiate contracts with shippers.
CCHS will review how the stationary source determined the appropriate checklist for that facility
and for the stage of :.assessment, when the facility is audited or during an unannounced
inspection.
Approaches to inherently safer systems may be categorized into the following strategies:
I. Minimize
A. Inventory Reduction
1. Can hazardous raw materials inventory be reduced?
a) Consider just-in-tune deliveries
b) Supplier management including strategic alliance
C) On-site generation of hazardous material from less hazardous raw
materials
2. Can in-process storage and inventory be reduced?
a)' Direct coupling of process'elements
b) Eliminate or reduce size of in-process storage
C)' Design''process equipment'involving hazardous material with the
smallest feasible inventory
3. Can finished product inventory be reduced?
a) Improve production scheduling
b) Improve communication with transporters/material handlers
Revision 0 September 12, 2002
May 17,2002 InherentlySafer Systems Checklist Page 2
B, Process Considerations
1 Can the use of alternate equipment with reduced hazardous material
inventory requirement be clone?'Such as:
a) Wiped film stills in place of continuous still pots (distillation
columns)
b) Centrifugal extractors in place of extraction;.columns
C) Flash dryers in place of tray dryers
d) Continuous'reactors in place of batch'
e) Plug flow reactors'in place of continuous stirred tank reactors
f) Continuous in-line mincers in place of mixing vessels
g) Compact heat exchangers(higher heat transfer area per unit
volume)in place of shell'-and tube
h) Combine unit operations (such as reactive distillation in place of
separate reactor with multi-column fractionation train; installing
internal reboilers or heat exchangers)to reduce overall system
volume
i) Alternate energy sources (such'as lasers,LTV light,microwaves, or
ultrasound)to control reaction or direct heat to the unit operation
2. Has the length of hazardous material piping runs been minimized?
3. Has piping been designed)for reducing the piping diameters?
4. Can pipeline inventory be reduced by using the hazardous material as a
gas rather than a liquid(e.g.,chlorine)?
5. Can process conditions be changed to reduce production of hazardous
waste or by-products?
II. Substitute
A Is it possible to completely eliminate hazardous raw materials,process
intermediates,or by-products by using an alternative process or chemistry?
B Is it possible to completely eliminate in-process solvents and flammable heat
transfer media by changing chemistry or processing conditions?
C. Is it possible to substitute less hazardous raw materials?
1'. Noncombustible for flammable'
2. Less volatile
3. Less reactive
4. More stable
5. Less toxic
6. Low pressure steam rather than combustible heat transfer fluid
D. Is it possible to substitute less hazardous final'product solvents?
III. Moderate
A. Is it possible to limit the supply pressure of raw materials to less than the
maximum allowable working pressure of the vessels they are delivered.to?
B. Is it possible to make reaction conditions (temperature, pressure)less severe by
using a'catalyst,or a better'catalyst?
C. Can the process be operated at less severe conditions? By considering:
1! Improved thermodynamics or kinetics to reduce temperature or pressure
May 17,2002 Inherently Safer Systems Checklist Page 3
2. Changes in reaction'phase'(e.g., liquid/liquid,'gas/liquid,or gas/gas)
3. Changes in the order in which raw materials are added
D. Is it possible to dilute hazardous raw materials to reduce the hazard potential? By
using:
1. Aqueous ammonia instead of anhydrous
2 Aqueous HCl instead of anhydrous
3 Sulfuric acid instead of oleum
4. Dilute nitric acid instead of concentrated fuming nitric acid
5. Wet benzoyl peroxide instead of dry
E. Is It possible to design operating conditions such that materials that become
unstable'at elevated temperatures or freeze at low temperatures heating and
cooling medium will not be operating in those ranges?
F. Can process conditions be changed to avoid handling;,flammable liquids above
their flash points?
G. ` Is equipment designed to totally contain the materials that might be present inside
at ambient temperature or the maximum attainable process temperature(i.e.,
higher maximum allowable working temperature to accommodate loss of cooling,
simplify'reliance of external systems such as refrigeration systems to control
temperature such that vapor'pressure is less than equipment design',pressure)?
H. For processes handling flammable materials,is it possible to design the layout to
minimize the number and size of confined areas and to limit the potential for
serious overpressure in the event of a loss of containment and subsequent
ignition?
I. Can process units be located to eliminate or minimize:
1. .Adverse effects from adjacent hazardous installations
2. Off-site impacts
3. On-site impacts on employees and other plant facilities
J. Can process units be designed to limit the magnitude of process deviations:
L Select pump with maximum capacity for rate of addition lower than safe
rate of addition for the process
2. Maximum feed rate may be limited by pipe size to be within safe limits for
gravity fed systems
K. Can hazardous material liquid spill be prevented from entering drainage
system/sewer?
L. For flammable materials,can spills'be directed away from the storage vessel to
reduce the risk of a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion(BLEVE)in the
event of a fire?
M. Passive safety design is preferred. Can passive design be implemented? For
example,to prevent or reduce fire damage, an active method is automatic water
spray actuated by flame or heat detector; a procedural method by having an
operator turn on the water spray, or passive method by using fire insulation.
N. Can PSV's in flammable service be routed to flare header instead of atmosphere?
IV. Simplify
A. Can equipment be designed such that it is difficult or impossible to create a
potential hazardous situation due to an operating'or maintenance error?Such as:
May 17, 2002 Inherently Safer Systems Checklist Page 4
1 Easy operation of valves designed to prevent inadvertent errors
2. Simplified central displays
3 Design temperature-limited heat transfer equipment
4. Use corrosion resistant materials for the process
5. Operate at lower pressure to limit release
6. Operate at higher temperature to eliminate cryogenic effects such as
embrittlement failures
7. operate at lower temperature to prevent run away reactions or material'
failure
8. Use passive rather than active controls
9. Use buried or shielded tanks
10. Use fail-safe controls if utilities are lost
11. Limit the complexity and degree of instrumentation redundancy
12. Use refrigerated storage vs. pressurized storage
13. Spread electrical feed over independent or emergency sources
14. Reduce wall area to minimize corrosion/fire exposure
15. Minimize connections,paths and number of flanges in hazardous
processes
16. Use fewer bends in piping
17. Use expansion loops in piping rather than bellows ;
18. Design into the process,equipment isolationmechanism for maintenance
19. Limit manual operations such as filter cleaning, manual sampling, hose
handling for loading/unloading operations,etc.
0. Design vessels for full vacuum eliminating risk of vessel collapse
21. Design both shell and tube side of heat exchangers to contain the
maximum attainable pressure,eliminating the need for pressure relief
22. Can the equipment be designed to make incorrect assembly impassible
23. Use equipment that clearly identifies status:
a) Check valves with easy to identify direction of flow
b) Gate valves with rising spindles to clearly indicate open or close
position
C) Spectacle(or figure 8)blinds instead of slip plates
24. Design the equipment with sufficient strength to contain the maximum
pressure generated,even if"worst credible event" occurs?
B Can passive leak-limiting technology be used to limit potential loss of
containment? Some examples include the following:
1. Blowout resistant gaskets
. Increasing wall strength
3. Using fewer seams and joints
4. Providing extra corrosion/erosion allowance
5. Reducing vibration
6. Minimizing the use of open-Mended,quick-opening valves
7. Eliminating open-ended,wick-opening valves in hazardous service
8. improving valve seating reliability
9. Eliminating unnecessary expansion joints,hoses, and rupture disks
10. Eliminating unnecessary sight glasses/glass rotameters
May 17, 2002 InherentlySafer Systems Checklist Page 5
V. Transport of Hazardous Materials
A. Can the plant be looted to minimize need for transportation of hazardous
materials?
B. Can materials he transported:
1. In a less hazardous form
2. In a safer transport method
3. In a safer route
'Center for Chemical Process Safety, "Inherently Safer Chemical Processes:A Life Cycle Approach,"COPS,
AIChE,Neter York, 1996
'Hendershot,Dennis C., "Process Minimization: Making Plants Safer,"Chemical Engineering Progress,
pp.3540(January 2000).
Guideword Matrix*
Revision D-September 12,2002
Minimization Sub/Eliminate Moderate Simplify
Raw Material
Vit-process storage
Product Inventory
ProcessChemistry
ProcessControls
I
rocess Pipingrocess E ipment
rocess Conditions
aintenance
itingransporttion
isc.Material(ie.solvents)
*see Inherently Safer Systems Checklist for ISS examples.
ADDENDUM TO ITEM D.3
SEPTEMBER 17,2002
On this date,the Board of Supervisors considered the report from the Hazardous
Materials Commission and the Public and Environmental Health Advisory Board
concerning proposed changes to the Industrial Safety Ordinance and actions to be
takers.
Michael Kent,Ombudsman for the County's Hazardous:Materials Programs,and
Pandy Sawyer,Health Services Department,presented the staff report.
Silvano Marchesi County Counsel,requested that,to be in compliance with the
Better Government Ordinance,the Board accept his written explanation and
waive the 6-hour requirement for submission of the September 16,2002 report
from County Counsel.
Moved by Supervisor Glover and seconded by Supervisor DeSaulnier that
the Board accept County Counsel's written explanation,waive the 96-hour
requirement and accept the September 16, 2002 report from County Counsel,
Ayes: Supervisors Uilkerna, Gerber,DeSaulnier, Glover and Gioia
Noes: None
Absent: None
Abstain None
The motion passed.
Lillian Fujii,Deputy County Counsel,provided a<summary of the attachments to
the memo from County Counsel.
The Chair opened the matter for presentations and speakers.
The following persons spoke:
Crag Feere 985 Alhambra Avenue,Martinez,Contra Costa.Building Trades
Council;
Tom Adams, 176 Valdeflores,Burlingame,Contra Costa Building Trades'
Council,
Jim R.ebitzer, Case Western Reserve University(attempts at teleconferencing not
successful);
Rick Zalesky, 841 Chevron Way,Richmond,Chevron Richmond Refinery;
Willie Chiang, 1380 San Pablo Avenue,Rodeo, Conoco Phillips;
Aamir Farid,P.O. Box 711, Martinez, Shell Martinez Refinery;
Bill Haywood, 150 Solano Way,Martinez,'TESORO1Golden Carate Refinery;
1
Diane Rasnik,455 Golden Gate Avenue, 8th Floor, San Francisca, California
Division of Apprenticeship Standards;
Maria Alegria, 3781 Brazil Court,Pinole,Mayor Pro Tem;
Rev. Phil Lawson, 3911 Cutting Boulevard,Richmond,NAACP;
Stan.Bedard,2848 Encina Camino, Walnut Creek.;
Juliann J. Sum,J.D., M.S.,Coordinator of Public Programs,University of
California,2223 Fulton Street;
Glen Fuller, 1.63 Crestview, Orin€3a;
Leslie Stewart, 3398 Wren Avenue, Concord, Contra Costa County,Hazardous
Materials Commission;
John'Wolf, 600 Las Juntas Street,Martinez,Contra Costa.Taxpayers
Association;
Dr.Henry Clark, '1323 Battery Street,Richmond,West County Toxics Coalition;
Scott Anderson, 3505 Tabora Drive, Antioch, IndustrialAssociation of Contra
Costa County;
Dana Simon, 560-20"' Street,Oakland, SEIU 250;
Ray Trujillo, 1225 8`h Suite 375, Sacramento, State Building'Trades;'
Azibuike Akaba,'1611 Telegraph Avenue,Oakland;
John P. Kipp, 2480 Santa Barbara Court,Discovery Bay, IAFF 1230'
(Firefighters);
Anne Quick, 11875 Dublin Boulevard,Dublin,Associated Builders and
Contractors;
Steve Mikich, 1822 Clayton Way, Concord;
Jim Jakel, 877 Ygnacio Valley Road,No.202,Walnut Creek, Contra Costa
Council;
Darin Dennis,261 Cascade Drive,Vacaville;
Conrad Sorapuru 612 Louisana Street,Vallejo;
Dante Villa, 2761 Grant,No.26, Concord;
Mark Wolfe, 651 Gateway Boulevard, South San Francisco,Contra Costa
Building and Construction Trades Council
Pain Aguilar,Central Labor Council,
Norm Hattich, 4650 East-2"d Street,Benicia,California'Contractors.,Alliance;
Randy leMoine,611 Berrellesa,Martinez, Laborers Union,Local 324;
Garay L. Canopa, 3431 Brookside Drive,Martinez,Northern California Electrical
Construction Industry;
Pat Leiser,''1408 Harris Court,Antioch,California.Contractors Alliance;
Mike Heiner, 21.91 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
George Smith,2351 Dapplegray Lane,Walnut Creek;
Michael Hernandez, 2841 Ryan.Road, Concord,Local UA No.342
Mr. Kane;
Kevin Van Buskirk, 1720 Marina Boulevard, San Leandro, Sheet Metal Workers''
Local 104;
Brook Seymour, Shell Oil Company;
Tom Baca,213 Midway Drive, Martinez,Boilermakers,Building Trades and
NAACP;
Peter Hendricks, 28 Brianwood Court,Walnut Creek;
2
Rick Delagarza,PACE
Cynthia Ellis, 2191 Piedmont,(Pittsburg,Boilermakers,Local 549;
The following persons submitted speaker cards,but did not speak:
Leo Gomez, 1424 Pomona,Crockett, I.L.W.U.;
David Fowler, 741 Shady Glen,Martinez;
Jeffrey Tabron, 2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Gary L. Cox, 1720 Laguna, Concord, Boilermakers,Local 549;
John''W. Wilson,68 Poinsettia:Avenue,Bay Point,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Ken Camp, 210 W. Cypress Road,No.29, Oakley;
Kim Angus, 6377 Highland Avenue,Richmond,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Michael Conklin,4145 Blackhawk Plaza Circle,Danville, Alain Pinel Real
Estate Housing;
Michael Egger, 111 Castro Street,Point Richmond,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Ray Neuberger,2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers;Local 549;
Val King, 2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers Local 549;
Victor Ornelas, 544-41st Street,Richmond,Field Representative, Laborer Local
324;
Antonio Tolentino, 204 Westwood Street,Vallejo,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Buford Crosby, 5801 Adeline Street,'Emeryville, Local 549;
Cheryl Brown, 1333 Pirie Street,Centra Costa Central Labor Council,Martinez;
Chris Greaney,2429 Meadow:Drive,Lodi;
Curtis D. Richards,2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Danny Gomez,80 Atlantic 101, 2191 Piedmont Way, Pittsburg,Boilermakers,
Local 549;
Darrren Swygert 1184 79�h Avenue,Oakland,Boilermakers,Local 549;
Dave Berger,2191 Piedmont Way, ,'Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
David Meehan, 68 Pointsettia Avenue,Bay Point;
David Valentine, 27 Winslow'Avenue,'Vallejo,Boilermakers,Local 549;
Define R.'Eeten 2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers,Local 549;
Dennis Carpenter, 620 Sunbeam Avenue,Laborers Union,Boilermaker,
Sacramento;
Earl Hooker, Boilermakers, Local 549;
Ellie Schafer, 1333 Pine Street, Contra Costa Central Labor Council; Martinez;
Gene May,611 Berrellesa,Martinez, Laborers Union, Local 324;
Howard J. Fosilier, 63 Fairview,Bay Point,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Jeff Armstrong, 1001 Westside,San Ramon,Northern California Laborers'
Apprenticeship Training;
Jerry Morales,520 Sunbeam Avenue, Sacramento, Laborers Union
Jim Diveley, 2704 Cortez Court, Antioch,Boilermakers, Local 549
Joseph Walker, 2191 Piedmont,Pittsburg;
Ken Camp, 210 W. Cypress Road, Oakley;
Ken Pastega, 121'Denormandie Way,Martinez;
LeRoy Gomez, 80 Atlantic 101,Pittsburg, Longshoreman, Local 6;
Lou Paulson, 112 Blueridge Drive,Martinez;
Met BreShars,425 Yuba Street,"Vallejo,2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg;
3
Michael Anderson,2191 Piedmont"Way,Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Michael Cooper, 1455 Sprouz Avenue,Napa;
Nick Roscha, 1320 Willow Pass Road,No.500, Concord,Citizens for a Safer
Environment;
Patrick D.z Parsons, 1430 26`x'Street,Richmond,Boilermakers;Local 549;
Raymond R. Michel, 175 Clipper Drive,Pittsburg,Boilermakers, Local 549;
Robert Woodword,450 Cambridge Street, San Francisco;
Rodney Leggett, 701 East Travis Boulevard No.6,Fairfield, 1.333 Pine Street,
Martinez,Boilermakers; Local 549;
Roger Iker,2191 Piedmont,Pittsburg;
Sergio Lopez,4789 Mallord Common,Fremont;
Troy Garland, 1286 Raton Court,El'Sobrante;
William Redmond Walsh,2191 Piedmont Way,Pittsburg, Boilermakers, Local
549;'
All persons desiring to speak having been heard.,the Board discussed the matter.
Moved by Supervisor DeSaulnier and seconded by Supervisor Glover that
the Board support the recommendation of the Public and Environmental Health
Advisory Board C'PEHAB") and the Hazardous Materials Commission that:
1. The Industrial Safety Ordinance language pertaining to the role
of Inherently Safer Systems in conducting Process Hazard Analysis
("PHA")not be amended at this time.
2. Hazardous Materials Division Programs staff be authorized to
add a section to the existing ISO guidelines on conducting Inherently
Safer Systems analysis as part of, or in conjunction with,the PHA
process,while not limiting the analysis to PHA mitigation items. This
addition should modify the definition of"Inherently Safer Systems"to
limit it to the inherent and passive layers of protection; and
3. The addition to the guidelines should,provide a working;
definition of"feasible"that takes into consideration overall risk of
proposed action, and the need to balance negligible benefits against large
costs; and
4. Staff continue to monitor the implementation of the ISO and
report back to the Board on the need to revise the ISO,
The vote on the motion'was as follows:
AYES: Supervisors Uilkema DeSaulnier,'Glover and Gioia
NOES: Supervisor Gerber
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: Nene
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The motion passed.
Following furtherdiscussion, it was moved by Supervisor Uilkema'and
seconded by Supervisor Glover that the Board follow the recommendation of
PEHAB and the Hazardous Materials Commission not to mandate the
implementation of the TOP Program'at any specific facility.
The vete on the motion was follows.
AYES: Supervisors Vilkema, Gerber,DeSaulnier, Glover and Gioia
NOES: None
ABSENT:; None
ABSTAIN: None
The motion passed.
Following further discussion,it was moved by Supervisor Uilkema and
seconded by Supervisor DeSaulnier that
The proposals of PEHAB and staff on determining the best definition to
use to capture the widest range of incidents to be investigated be
explained'and described in sufficient detail to facilitate potentially
amending that section of the ISO.
The vote on the motion was as follows:
AYES: Supervisors Uilkema Gerber,DeSaulnier,Glover and.Gioia
NOES. None
ABSENT:' None
ABSTAIN': None
The motion passed.
Following further discussion,it was moved by Supervisor DeSaulnier and
seconded by Supervisor Gerber that:
1. Staff'is directed,to draft an ordinance for the Board's review in
two weeks that includes the following:
A. The following elements of the Refinery Manager's proposal:
1) .All contract workers must take the Bay Area
Training Corporation's eight hour Safety Orientation'Program.
2) "Journey"or"lead"workers must pass Bay
Area Training Corp.'s Refinery Safety Skills Test.
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3) Priority given to contractors with the best safety
record,with method of determining best safety record to be
determined.
4) Participation in the Bay area Training
Corporation Substance Abuse Testing Program.
B. The following elements of the Building Trades proposal with the
noted changes:
1) Skill's training to be required as set forth in the
Building Trade's ordinance,subject to the following
changes:
a In the event of an emergency,the
two-clay waiting requirement shall not
apply
b Skills test may be administered by a
two-year college.
2) The stakeholders are requested to meet and
establish or agree on how to establish an equivalency test for trades
involved in refinery contracting that raises the bar for all workers.
3) When the Board considers adoption of the
above discussed ordinance,the Board will further discuss the
amendments proposed by the Unwin Company concerning the role of
Inherently Safer Systems in conducting Process Hazard Analysis.
The vote on the motion was as follows:
AYES: Supervisors Uilkema, Gerber,DeSaulnier,Glover and Gioia
NOES: None
ABSENT: None
ABSTAIN: Nene
The motion passed.
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