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HomeMy WebLinkAboutMINUTES - 09171996 - C81 C.81 and C.82 THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA Adopted this Order on September 17, 1996 by the following vote: AYES: Supervisors Rogers, Bishop, DeSaulnier, Torlakson and Smith NOES: None ABSENT: None ABSTAIN: None SUBJECT: Cormspondence C.81 LETTER dated September 5, 1995, from Captain R. B. Lanning, Commanding Officer, Department of the Navy, Naval Weapons Station Concord, 10 Delta Street, Concord, CA 94520, transmitting a copy of the Navy Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact pertaining to the transshipment of foreign spent nuclear fuel through the Concord Naval Weapons Station. ""REFERRED**REFERRED TO COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR AND . HEALTH SERVICES DIRECTOR C.82 LETTER dated September 4, 1996, from Charlotte Powers, ABAG President and San Jose City Councilmember, Association of Bay Area Governments, 101 Eighth Street, Oakland, CA, 94607-4756, requesting the Board to send a letter to Governor Wilson in support of establishing the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) as provided in SB 1993 (Calderon), AB 2086 (Knowles), and AB 3232 (Knowles). ""REFERRED**REFERRED TO COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR IT IS BY THE BOARD ORDERED that the recommendations as noted (****) are approved. 1 hereby certify that this is a true and correct copy of an action take and entered on the minutes of the Board of Supe iso n th date sh . ATTESTED: PHIL T ELOR,Clerk of the goard af Supervisors anrunty Administrator By ,Deputy c. c. County Administrator Health Services Director Correspondents DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY NAVAL WEAPONS STATION CONCORD - 10 DELTA STREET CONCORD,CALIFORNIA 946245100 IN REPLY REFER TO: 5090 A:RBL:ds 0 5 SEP 1996 Contra Costa County Board of supervisors RECEIVED 651 Pine Street Martinez, CA 94553 SEP — 6 P96 Dear Supervisors : CLERK BOARD OF SUPERVISORS CONTRA COSTA CO. The attached Navy Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact pertaining to the transshipment of foreign spent nuclear fuel through Naval Weapons Station Concord are forwarded for your information. This Environmental Assessment is a subordinate document to the Department of Energy' s Environmental Impact Statement and was done to allow the Department of the Navy and the Department of Energy to enter into an interagency agreement . As you will note in these documents, the Environmental Assessment was an analysis of the transshipment procedures and their potential environmental impacts . This analysis, as stated in the Finding, revealed no significant impact on the quality of the environment . If you have any questions regarding these documents or the transshipment, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Michael Madden or Mr. Brad Marman of the Naval Ordnance Center. Dr. Madden may be reached at (301) 743-6092 . Mr. Marman may be reached at. (301) 743-6006 . Sincerely, R. B. ANN NG Captain, U. S . Navy Commanding Of icer Encl : (1) Environmental Assessment (2) Finding of No Significant Impact We believe in people, value our customers, and embrace our community. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS AT CONCORD, CALIFORNIA AND CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY SEA SysT � s 0 0 COMM 1 � August 1996 Department of the Navy Naval Sea Systems Command ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS AT CONCORD, CALIFORNIA AND CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: Department of the Navy ABSTRACT : This Environmental Assessment addresses the environmental effects of using the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC, and the Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA, as transshipment ports for spent nuclear fuel and target material from foreign research reactors during a 13 year period as part of a Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy adopted by the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of State . The spent nuclear fuel and target material will be transported by vessel in casks certified for such use by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and meeting Department of Transportation requirements . The casks would be transferred from ship to rail or truck at the Navy facilities for transportation to their final destination. Under normal circumstances, the casks would be in the secure Naval facilities for fewer than 24 hours. Tracking the time involved in handling the casks for each inspector and port worker will enable ensuring that each individual does not receive more than 100 mrem exposure to radiation in any year of the program. There would be no significant environmental impact as a result of the transshipping operation at the Naval facilities . CONTACT PERSON: Commander Naval Ordnance Center, Code N3 Attn: Dr. Michael T. Madden Farragut Hall BLDG. D323 Indian Head, MD 20640-5555 (301) 743-6092 x114 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION ITEM PAGE Cover Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii Listof Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv 1 . 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . 1 Need for Agency Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . 2 The Proposed Action and Alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . 3 The Affected Environments of the Proposed Action. . . . . . 1 1 . 4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Alternatives . . . . . . 1 1 . 5 Mitigation Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 . 0 NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 . 1 Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 . 2 Need and Purpose for Agency Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 . 3 Legislative and Regulatory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 .0 ALTERNATIVES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 . 1 The No-Action Alternative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 .2 The Proposed Action And Site Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 .2 . 1 Use of Military Ports of Entry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3 .2 .2 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 . 2 . 3 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4 .0 THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT AT SITE LOCATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 . 1 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 . 1 . 1 Environmental Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 . 1 . 2 Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4 . 1 . 3 Socioeconomic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4 .2 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4 .2 . 1 Environmental Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4 . 2 . 2 Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4 . 2 . 3 Socioeconomic Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5 .0 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. 1 Incident Free Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 5. 2 Accident Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 5.2 . 1 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 5.2 .2 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 5. 3 Cumulative Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT' D) SECTION ITEM PAGE 6. 0 MITIGATION MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7 . 0 RELATIONSHIP WITH APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7 . 1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, asamended. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7 . 2 Executive Order 12898 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7 . 3 Endangered Species Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 7 . 4 National Historic Preservation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 7 . S Clean Air Act Conformity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 7 . 6 Occupational Safety and Health Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 7 . 7 Regulations for Radioactive Material Packaging andTransportation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 7 . 8 Emergency Management and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 8 . 0 LIST OF PREPARERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 9 .0 REFERENCES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 LIST OF FIGURES 1 . 0 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Navy Ports for the Transshipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target Material and the No-Action Alternative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2 . 0 Typical Shipping Cask for Spent Nuclear Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 . 0 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4 . 0 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. 0 Incident-Free Port Activity Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 1 . 0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 . 1 Need for Agency Action This Environmental Assessment (EA) assesses the potential environmental effects of using the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC, and the Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA, as transshipment ports for spent nuclear fuel and target material from foreign research reactors as the result of the adoption of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State . 1 . 2 The Proposed Action and Alternative The proposed action is to receive shipments of spent nuclear fuel and target material at the two Navy ports, and transfer the material to rail or truck for transportation to its final destination. For each shipment, this operation is expected to be completed within 24 hours in a safe, secure and accident-free manner, without significant contamination or adverse environmental impact. In the No-Action alternative, the spent nuclear fuel would not arrive at Navy ports . There would be no support by the Navy of the federal government' s nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy. There would be no environmental impact at Navy locations associated with the No-Action alternative . 1 . 3 The Affected 8nvironments of the Proposed Action The affected environments of the proposed action are the Naval Weapons Stations at Charleston, SC, and Concord, CA. These facilities are coastal military bases . The bases have abundant surface waters, wetlands, wildlife, and endangered species . Activities within the bases are well separated from neighboring industry or residences by land that serves as a buffer zone owing to the military activities which the bases perform. 1 . 4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Alternatives . The advantages and disadvantages of transshipment of casks containing spent nuclear fuel and target material at Navy ports and the No-Action alternative are shown in Figure 1 . 1 Figure 1 . Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Navy Ports for the Transshipment of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target Material and the No-Action Alternative Navy Ports ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES • Fully supports nuclear Slight radiation exposure weapons nonproliferation to workers engaged in policy. transshipping operations . • Provides a secure, military port of entry into the United States . • Workers who would be engaged in transshipping operations are certified to handle ordnance and are trained in hazardous materials handling. • Transshipping operations would be expedited at port of entry. ' No significant environmental impact. No-Action Alternative ADVANTAGE S D I',SADVANTAGE S:.. ; : . • No environmental impact at • Does not support nuclear Navy locations . weapons nonproliferation • No additional exposure for policy. Navy port workers to low • Would lose benefits level radiation. associated with use of military ports. 2 1 . 5 Mitigation Measures Although significant exposure to ionizing radiation by workers at the Navy facilities would not be expected, certain mitigation actions are already in place or would be employed to ensure compliance with the principle of keeping radiation exposure "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) . The first mitigative measure would be to limit the number of casks of spent nuclear fuel and target material over the 13 years of the program to 38 casks at Concord Naval Weapons Station and 698 casks at Charleston Naval Weapons Station. Every shipment would receive a quick turn-around at the Navy facility, with each shipment of casks expected to leave within 24 hours of receipt. It is expected that the actual time between receipt and departure would average 4 hours or fewer based on experience with shipments of hazardous material . Tracking the time involved in handling the casks for each inspector and port worker would enable ensuring that each individual does not receive more than a 100 mrem dose of radiation per year . Radiation levels (dose rates) would be measured near the casks to help determine the extent of personnel radiation monitoring needed during the transshipping operation. In addition to operational type mitigation measures, the spent fuel and target material would be packaged and transported so as to minimize radiation exposure. Under normal conditions, there are no tasks that would require human contact with cask surfaces . All casks will be packaged in International Standards Organization (ISO) containers to facilitate remote handling, lifting, and stowage. The casks are type B packages certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 C.F.R. Part 31 and meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations under 49 C. F.R. Part 100 et seq. These requirements ensure the appropriate level of safety to protect workers, the public, and the environment from the radioactive material being transported. The Navy and DOE would also execute appropriate agreements governing the use of Naval Weapons Stations Charleston and Concord as ports of entry to implement the DOE alternative selected in their Record of Decision, including the mitigation measures discussed in the DOE Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel respecting ' emergency preparedness teams, training, and equipment. 3 2 . 0 NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION 2 . 1 Background On May 17, 1996, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) , in consultation with the Department of State, published in the Federal Register a Record of Decision on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (ROD) (DOE, 1996) (61 Fed. Reg. 26507). This ROD was based on an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter DOE EIS) (DOE/EIS-0218F) , prepared by DOE to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of a proposed policy to manage spent nuclear fuel and target material from foreign research reactors, and reasonable alternatives (DOE, 1996a) . DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, decided to implement the proposed policy as identified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the DOE EIS, subject to additional stipulations which were identified in Section VII of its ROD. The ROD was subsequently revised on July 25, 1996 to address acceptance of title of foreign research reactor spent fuel (DOE, 1996b) (61 Fed. Reg. 38720) . As described in the DOE EIS and RODS, implementing the nonproliferation policy will involve shipping approximately 19.2 metric tons of heavy metal of foreign research reactor spent fuel and approximately 0 . 6 metric tons of target material into the United States over a 13 year period. The spent fuel will be received from 41 countries; about 80 percent would arrive by ship at the Charleston Naval Weapons Station, SC, where it would be offloaded to railcar or truck and transported to DOE' s Savannah River Site in South Carolina or to Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho. About 5 percent of the spent fuel would arrive by ship at the Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA, where it would be offloaded to truck or railcar and transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho. Most of the target material and some of the spent fuel, representing the remaining 15 percent, will be transported overland from Canada. The DOE EIS included an analysis of candidate ports of entry through which the material would enter the United States and subsequently be transshipped to management facilities . After publishing their EIS in draft form (Draft Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, hereinafter referred to as the Draft EIS, DOE/EIS-0218D, March 1995) , DOE undertook an extensive outreach program to ensure that the public was aware of the proposed action and Draft EIS, and had an opportunity to provide comments pursuant to DOE and Council on Environmental Quality regulations implementing the 4 National Environmental Policy Act . For that purpose, on April 21, 1995, DOE published in the Federal Register (60 Fed. Reg. 19899) a Notice of Availability for the Draft EIS . DOE made copies of the Draft EIS widely available to members of the public in and around Charleston, South Carolina and Concord, California. This was accomplished (a) by placing copies of the Draft EIS in public libraries in Charleston and Concord, (b) by publishing in the April 21, 1995 Federal Register notice a toll free number which members of the public could call to request copies, and (c) by mailing more than 3000 copies of the Draft EIS, or the Summary of the Draft EIS, directly to potential interested parties, including approximately 350 copies to members of the public, organizations and public officials around Charleston and Concord, and another 350 copies to other locations in the Charleston and Concord areas . DOE held public hearings on the Draft EIS in both the Charleston and Concord areas . DOE held 15 additional public hearings in other locations within the United States . DOE announced these public hearings through advertisements placed in local newspapers and by public service announcements over local radio stations . News articles written by local reporters also helped publicize the public hearings . The public response to distribution of the Draft EIS and to the public hearings shows that the outreach process was effective in informing the public of the proposed action and Draft EIS . Specifically, DOE received approximately 220 comment documents containing 780 individual comments from the public in and around Charleston and Concord., Approximately 270 individuals attended the public hearings in the Charleston and Concord areas . DOE reproduced all of the comment documents submitted by members of the public in full in Volume 3 of the DOE EIS, along with DOE' s resolutions of the comments . Similarly, DOE also documented the main points of' discussion raised during the public hearings in Volume 3 of the DOE EIS, once .again with DOE' s responses . Specific comments received by DOE during the public comment period reflect the view that: 1) intermodal transfer of the spent nuclear fuel should be accomplished at military locations; 2) the spent nuclear fuel should be managed in the United States; 3) acceptance of the spent fuel would ensure that the highly enriched uranium contained therein could not be diverted into nuclear weapons use; and 4) the two Naval Weapons Stations selected to support the foreign research reactor spent fuel program would execute this mission safely. The Navy considers that the comments submitted by the Navy on the Draft EIS, and other comments submitted on the Draft EIS regarding the Naval Weapons Stations were accurately resolved by DOE in the Final EIS . 5 The Navy also notes that the adequacy of the DOE EIS with respect to the storage of the spent fuel at DOE' s Savannah River site is the subject of litigation recently filedby the State of South Carolina in the Case of South Carolina v. O' Leary, Case No . 3-96-2264-17 (D.C. S .C) . As discussed in the DOE EIS (see Section 2 .2 . 1 . 6 of the EIS and Summary and Chapter 3 of the EIS) , a number of locations were evaluated as candidate ports of entry. DOE and the Department of State concluded that the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material marine shipments should be made via the military ports because of the additional confidence in the safety of the shipments due to the security associated with the military ports . The personnel at a military ordnance facility are also particularly qualified to handle spent nuclear fuel by virtue of their training and experience performing their military function in dealing with hazardous materials . Although the Navy provided comments on the DOE EIS, the Navy was not a cooperating agency in its preparation. However, the Navy' s proposed use of these facilities as ports of entry for purposes of receiving shipments of foreign research reactor spent fuel is the same as the proposed use of these facilities for which the EIS was prepared. In addition, this proposed use is entirely consistent with their current use. No additional construction will be required. Except for emissions normally associated with off-loading activities, no other emissions or discharges would be expected. 2.2 Need and Purpose for Agency Action The Department of State and the Department of Energy have concluded that the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material should be managed in the United States and that the receipt of the spent nuclear fuel and target material should be accomplished via military ports of entry. Management of the spent nuclear fuel and target material in the United States would ensure that the highly enriched uranium (HEU) contained therein could not be diverted into nuclear weapons use. The two Naval Weapons Stations selected to support the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel program would execute this mission safely and with a high level of security. The proximity of both Naval Weapons Stations to rail lines and highways would facilitate the expeditious movement of the spent nuclear fuel and target material to their destination. This EA is an evaluation of the potential environmental impacts from the use of Naval Weapons Stations at Charleston and Concord as the ports of entry for the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material. The DOE EIS discusses the 6 entire program for implementation of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent fuel and the management by DOE of the spent fuel from initial receipt to its ultimate disposition. This EA is subordinate to that EIS and is limited to the potential impacts associated with Navy' s actions related to port of entry activities . Consequently, this EA does not address the actions planned by DOE regarding the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material prior to arrival at the port of entry or after departure from the port of entry. Those actions and the potential environmental impacts. from the actions are fully and adequately discussed in the DOE EIS and, to the extent necessary are incorporated by reference in this document. 2 . 3 Legislative and Regulatory Requirements This EA is prepared, consistent with the regulations at 40 C. F.R. Part 1500 and 32 C. F.R. Part 775. If the Navy decides its facilities are to act as ports of entry for the shipment of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material, the Navy and DOE would execute appropriate agreements governing the use of Naval Weapons Stations Charleston and Concord as ports of entry to implement the DOE alternative selected in their ROD, including the mitigation measures discussed in the DOE EIS and ROD. 7 3 .0 ALTEP14ATIVES The proposed action is to receive shipments of spent nuclear fuel and target material at the two Navy ports, and transfer the material to rail or truck for transportation to its final destination. In the No-Action alternative, the spent nuclear fuel and target material would not arrive at Navy ports . DOE, with input from a workshop conducted at the U.S . Merchant Marine Academy, developed and applied a careful set of criteria for evaluation and selection of suitable candidate ports of entry. Both commercial and military ports were evaluated. This analysis indicates that spent nuclear fuel and target material could be received safely via commercial ports, but that the use of military ports would provide additional safety and security over the commercial ports . Of the suitable candidate ports, only Naval Weapons Stations Concord and Charleston are Navy controlled. Since non-Navy controlled ports are available to implement the DOE action in support of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent fuel, it is appropriate for the Navy to limit its analysis to the impact at the Navy facilities . 3 . 1 The No-Action Alternative The No-Action alternative is not to use the Naval Weapons Stations at Charleston and Concord as the ports of entry for the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material. Since the No-Action alternative would have no environmental impacts at Navy locations, it is not analyzed further. 3 . 2 The Proposed Action And Site Locations 3 .2 . 1 Use of Military Ports of Entry The proposed use of these facilities as ports of entry is entirely consistent with their current use. No additional construction would be required. The spent nuclear fuel and target material would arrive in shipping casks certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 C.F.R. Part 71 and meeting Department of Transportation requirements under 49 C. F.R. Part 100 et seq. Over the 13 years of the program, up to 698 casks would be transshipped through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and up to 38 casks would be transshipped through the Concord Naval Weapons Station. Each shipment would consist of between 1 and 8 casks of spent fuel and target material . One example of such-casks can be found in Figure 2; it measures 8 feet high by 3 feet in diameter and weighs about 20 tons. The 8 cask typically is constructed with two stainless steel shells enclosing a lead shield. The casks are designed to withstand very severe accidents (fire, drops, immersion in water) without releasing their contents . In more than four decades of spent fuel transportation, no accident has ever occurred in which a type B spent fuel cask was punctured or released any of its contents (DOE, 1996a) . Total time between receipt of a shipment and its transfer out of the facility at either Naval Weapons Station is projected to be less than 4 hours and should not exceed 24 hours . This is possible because each facility has exceptionally good hazardous cargo handling capabilities and experience, as well as good access to interstate highways ,and rail service . 3 . 2 .2 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC The greater Charleston area is one of the major seaports on the East Coast of the United States . Charleston is located at the confluence of the Cooper and Ashley rivers, approximately 7 miles west of the Atlantic Ocean. The Naval Weapons Station is located on the west bank of the Cooper river, north of the city of North Charleston. The facility covers approximately 17, 500 acres and is about 19 miles from the Atlantic. Ocean (Figure 3) . The facility has two piers and two wharves . Cranes are available for loading trains or trucks directly from ships . The facility is served by good access to interstate highways and rail service. The Naval Weapons Station is a fenced facility with guarded gates and a full-time armed security force. The on-base emergency facilities are appropriate for fire and rescue response to potential accidents . The Naval Weapons Station would have in place with DOE an agreement to ensure that well trained and equipped personnel are present to make initial response and assessment of any accident with the potential for radioactive release or radiation exposure. 9 Figure 2 : Typical Shipping Cask for Spent Nuclear Fuel 875 0o� o 04 0 m - > - O o 0 -1 e Oyerd i 3,250 Unit=mm t 10 Figure 3 : Naval weapons Station, Charleston, SC i ��yy � OU Taw Pond Laadlat _ Afap/etaf[a wor - arNlaMe/ar W Ner Tc lenl Are Pow/ Navy lase G2b OU Cmk i � Lot Pow1 lack Stack lead Nava!Weapons Station Chari sta[ t n "0 ? ow Home C mk tuaw Hasse Laadlat Geek oUe Fey$Sllt LEGEND Scab 1:50.000(at cestet) PopUdatioa4aue 50W Peet Mat 13.00 ZLa Dec 19 11.12:29 1995 a tim RAWK — ,cm-Y Sawguy 1000 Mcteti —Setec%Road Majot&xe#jmd w 140fawd _ Rivet �LdM arm Op"WGA "Map(s)from MapEzpert,DeLarme Mapping,Freeport,ME." 11 3 . 2 . 3 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA. The Naval Weapons Station is located on the western edge of Suison Bay, an estuarine area carrying the flows of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers . It is about 35 miles northeast of the Golden Gate Bridge. The facility comprises about 7, 648 acres (Figure 4) . It is served by the Union Pacific, Southern Pacific, and Santa Fe Railroads with rail access to the piers . The facility is also served by good access to interstate highways . The entire pier operations waterfront is surrounded by barbed wire fencing with access through military guarded gates . The Station has a full-time armed security force, with a U.S . Coast Guard facility onsite to provide oversight services . There is a fire station in the immediate vicinity of the pier areas, with an estimated 3-minute response time . Additional support and training would be provided by DOE. 12 .•btt lr i�h r�a ', T7 r c ' _l s.. 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D � l ;'�•,":t;`�. � r t y�.—v�r�r t t ��.�. c t�,, ;xy a f: 4 •r S t4.y{a ���jJ� J' a f �-rn r•� -+�.; ��•�ti, .s�4�.ti,r a� ";•'il'. i ��" 5 t >,:t}�r�° c r� '^P'_ 7L '�! t �i �l+.l� f�tT'-' 4 J�a Z� � i1Q a•3 iA 'x jt �i �f��r•� r..�f.I' y�,rt1�,. :]�t*,,x �i e ` u�}.._��• r� y�?+t N r""�r ..fcr9 t.7... 5: r r r •. . ° •�� _ rJ � .•,�f --G.�' � L,t,l*.;�„t.i: r ••�.:-� •+c.v ..t•. y>t. 1 y...lco: .�.1 ��7 :i�'T.... � R5 1• } f r j v-� +1�'S'•Y t1..W ♦ r'-e.r.vtf-3F�'`!�^fi r.•-.. �' ;.{ _�r.C•. � 1 f�-�K '.t �"L:+.-.as�'.'i� jtF++ "• 1�T � �t k:t.,.•y,�w�t r ��' �•r �.. " '�� 111111 r� ... 4 .0 THE EXISTING ENVIRONMENT AT SITE LOCATIONS 4 . 1 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC 4 . 1 . 1 Environmental Resources The land resource adjacent to the military base is situated in a river-wetland habitat . Wetlands are extensive in the area and provide habitat for fish, birds, and other wildlife . Based upon the National Wetlands Classification, the Naval Weapons Station contains 1, 356 acres of estuarine, 1, 730 acres of palustrine (marsh type) , and 131 acres of lacustrine (lake type) wetlands . The State of South Carolina has classified the water quality of the portion of the Cooper River upstream from the confluence with the Ashley River as tidal saltwaters suitable for secondary contact recreation, crabbing, and fishing, except the harvesting of clams, mussels, or oysters for market: purposes and human consumption. State or federally protected threatened or endangered aquatic species in the vicinity of the Charleston Harbor include the shortnose sturgeon, Atlantic sturgeon, and the American shad. The U.S . Fish and Wildlife Service reports that several protected marine species are known to occur in Charleston County. These are the West Indian manatee (endangered) , Kemp' s ridley sea turtle (endangered) , leatherback sea turtle (endangered) , loggerhead sea turtle (threatened) , and the green sea turtle (threatened) . Protected bird species include the Arctic peregrine falcon (threatened) , bald eagle (endangered) , wood stork (endangered) , red-cockaded woodpecker (endangered) , and the piping plover (threatened) . Charleston, SC, is in seismic zone 2, which is approximately midway in the building code zone classifications . (BOCA, 1987) . Charleston is in attainment for all air quality standards . 4 . 1 .2 Climate The climate of this region is temperate, primarily due to its close proximity to .the Atlantic Ocean. The prevailing winds are generally northerly in the fall and winter months becoming more southerly during the summer months . Summer is the rainy season in Charleston, with the city receiving 41 percent of the annual rainfall during the summer months . Except for the occasional tropical storm or hurricane, the majority of rain occurs during afternoon and evening thunderstorms . Buildings within the Port of Charleston, in accordance with the Uniform Building Code, are 14 designed and built to withstand a wind speed of about 100 miles per hour. 4 . 1 . 3 Socioeconomic Characteristics The Naval Weapons Station employs about 6, 000 people. The 1990 population within 10 .miles of the pier area was 209, 188 . Minority groups comprised 35 percent of the total population. The percentage of low-income households near the Naval Weapons Station is nearly the same as that for counties in the surrounding area, which is about 40 percent. (See DOE EIS Vol . 1, Chapter 3 or Vol . 2, Appendix A) . 4 . 2 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA 4 . 2 . 1 Environmental Resources Almost 60 percent of the facility land is tidal . Wetlands comprise 3, 002 acres of the tidal area. The waters of Suison Bay are characterized as a mid-salinity estuarine habitat with salinities of 5 to 16. 5 parts per thousand. Parts of the tidal area are leased to local cattle growers to keep the grass down for fire protection purposes . The facility is a wildlife sanctuary for migratory birds, and hosts native Tule elk, which formerly were on the endangered species list. Chinook salmon (endangered) , steelhead trout, striped bass, sturgeon, and American shad are typically found in the area. The base supports shorebirds, wintering waterfowl, raptors, and seabirds . Shorebirds, wading birds, waterfowl, seabirds, and songbirds migrate through this coastal area. Adult concentrations and nesting areas of the California clapper rail (a federally protected species) and the California black rail (a State protected species) are found. Winter-run chinook salmon (endangered) , Aleutian Canada goose (threatened) , California brown pelican (endangered) , California least tern (endangered) , and the salt marsh harvest mouse occur in the general area. Concord, CA, is in seismic zone 4, which is the zone with the greatest seismic risk. (BOCA, 1987) . The San Francisco Bay area is a non-attainment area for o.zone and carbon monoxide: 15 4 . 2 . 2 Climate Climate is generally mild with precipitation generally occurring between November and April . Thunderstorms are infrequent and occur on the average of four days per year. The Uniform Building Code requires buildings in the area to withstand wind speeds up to 70 miles per hour . 4 . 2 . 3 Socioeconomic Characteristics The 1990 population within 10 miles of the port terminals was 381, 070 . Minority groups comprise about 30 percent of the total population. The percentage of low-income households near the facility is nearly the same as that for counties surrounding the facility, which is about 40 percent. (See DOE EIS, Volume 1, Chapter 3 and Volume 2, Appendix A) . 16 5 . 0 ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS The DOE conducted extensive analyses of the potential impacts associated with transshipment of spent nuclear fuel and target material at ports of entry including Naval Weapons Stations Charleston and Concord. The results of their analyses are thoroughly documented in section 4 .2 . 2 and 4 . 7 . 3 of the DOE EIS . The relevant sections of the DOE EIS are incorporated herein and are briefly summarized below. The operations associated with the task of transshipment are not substantially different from the routine weapons loading operations conducted at the Naval Weapons Stations . As a result, the proposed action would have no additional environmental impact on the environmental resources, climate, or socioeconomic characteristics at either Naval Weapons Station, other than potential radiation exposures . Under incident free conditions, the estimated impacts per cask shipment are the same for both locations . 5 . 1 Incident Free Impacts Release of radioactive material is not considered as part of the incident-free analysis. The only impact considered is that caused by ionizing radiation. exposure due to radiation emitted by foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material contained within the transportation casks. Since no radioactive material would be released and no activation of non-radioactive material would occur, there would be no impacts on land, water, or air quality in any of the parts or any of the waterways used by ships in the transport of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Risks . associated with the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material in incident-free conditions in port are predominantly those to inspectors and port workers. Port workers and inspectors are not radiation workers as defined under federal regulations. Thus, the maximum allowable annual exposure for these personnel would be 100 millirem (mrem) , the same radiation dose limit established by the NRC to protect individual members of the public. When a ship arrives at its destination, the spent nuclear fuel packages would be inspected by customs officials, U.S. Coast Guard personnel, and others. Each cask is conservatively assumed to be subject to six different inspections with each inspection estimated to take up to 15 minutes per person per spent nuclear fuel cask. Once inspections are complete, the ship would be unloaded. At the port of entry, the casks would be off-loaded by port workers, and arrangements would be in place for the immediate departure of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel from the port. In recognition of instances where some delay may occur, DOE and the Department of State conservatively assumed a delay of 17 up to 24 hours in a secure staging area. The 24-hour period for the staging of spent nuclear fuel casks was selected because it is possible that, on occasion, the spent nuclear fuel casks would not leave the secure staging area the same day that they arrived, depending on variables such as the time of day the casks clear customs, and the weather. Nonetheless, DOE and the Department of State consider it unlikely that the casks would remain in the staging area for longer than 24 hours, and the Navy agrees with their conclusion. Over the entire program, the Charleston Naval Weapons Station would receive approximately 698 casks and the Concord Naval Weapons Stations approximately 38 casks . The incident free analysis made the very conservative assumption that the same inspectors and workers would handle every cask shipment and that all of the casks would be emitting radiation at the regulatory limit. The per-shipment doses were then multiplied by the number of shipments for the Charleston Naval Weapons Station to determine the maximally exposed worker dose. (DOE EIS, Volume 11, section 4 .7 .4) . In determining the worker population- exposure, all shipments at Charleston Naval Weapons Station and Concord Naval Weapons Station were considered. This results in the integrated dose which would span 13 years. The maximum estimated incident-free risks to port personnel are presented in Figure 5. The incident-free risk to the general public would be zero because only workers would be near the casks in port. Figure 5 shows the dose to the maximally exposed worker, worker population dose, and associated risks for the shipment of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel as containerized cargo on a breakbulk vessel and as cargo on a container vessel . These figures represent the range of maximum estimated impacts for the various shipping modes available for the ocean transport of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The doses and risks in Figure 5 were calculated with the same procedure used in the DOE EIS as described in Section 4 .2 .2.2 of that document, excluding impacts at intermediate ports of call. The estimated maximally exposed worker risk is 0.00052 latent cancer fatalities (LCF) . This risk calculation is based on the assumption a worker receives 100 mrem a year for the 13 years of the program. This means that the chance of this hypothetical individual dying from cancer caused by the radiation exposure would be less than one in a thousand. The highest total population risk for all port workers including inspectors, handlers, etc. , . is 0.007 LCF. This means that there is less than one chance in 140 that a single worker among those involved would die of cancer resulting from working on the 18 transshipments over the 13 year program. This estimate conservatively assumes that all casks are emitting radiation at the regulatory limit of 10 mrem per hour at a distance of 2 meters from the surface of the container holding the spent fuel cask. 19 Figure 5 : Incident-Free Port Activity Impact sa,b - Impacts per Cask Transfer Break Bulk Ship Container Ship Maximally Maximally Population Exposed Exposed Dose to Maximally Maximally Population Worker Worker Workers per Exposed Exposed Dose to Population Dose Risk Cask Population Worker Worker Workers Risk(LCF) (mrcm) (LCF) (person-rem) Risk(LCF) Risk Group Dose Risk .Per (mrcm) (LCF) Cask (person- rem) Inspcaors 3.8 0.0000015 0.013 0.0000052 0.0000021 1.3 5 x 10'' 0.0053 Pon Handlers 2.0 8 x 10" 0.0066 0.0000026 0.46 1.8 x 10'' 0.0015 6 x 10"' Pon Staging Personnel 0.36 1.4 x 10'' 0.0045 0.00MI8 0.4 2 x 10'' 0.0046 0.0000018 Maximum 3.8 0.0000015 - - 1.3 5x10-' - Total - - 0.024 0.0000096 0.011 0.0000045 Impacts for the Entire Proposed Action Break Bulk Ship Container Ship Maximally Maximally Exposed Exposed Population Maximally Maximally Population Worker Worker Dose to Exposed Exposed Dose to Population Dose Risk Workers Population Worker Worker Workers Risk(LCF) Rist:Group (mrcm) (LCF) Risk(LCF) (person-rem) Dose Risk (person- (mrcm) (LCF) rem) Inspectors 1.300- 0.00052` 9.6 0.0038 907 0.00036 3.9 0.0016 I Pon Handlers 1.300' 0.00052` 4.9 0.0020 321 0.00013 1.1 0.00044 Pon staging Personnel 251 0.00010 33 0.0013 279 0.00011 3.4 0.0014 Maximum 1300` 0.00052` - - 907 0.00036 - - _ 1 Total - - 17.8 0.0071 - - 8.4 0.0034 ' Theta results are based on the assumption that the dose rate associated with the casks arc all based on the regulatory limit. Historically,the averse of these dose rates has been equal to about one-tenth of the regulatory limit.zo this assumption is conservative. These results are based on the assumption that each voyage carries two casks. This assumption is conservative because chartered ships may cam up to eight casks. ` With all the conservative assumptions in this analysis.the maximally exposed worker dose could theoretically exceed the annual regulatory limit of 100 mrem for a member of the general public. Therefore,DOE and the Naval Weapons Stations would require mitigation measures to keep the maximally exposed worker dose within allowable limits. These results are based an the conservative assumption that one individual receives the maximum annual dose(100 mrcm)every year for 13 years. 20 5 . 2 Accident Impacts This analysis of reasonably foreseeable accidents evaluates the consequences of possible accidents and the probability that such an accident would occur. In incident-free marine transport, some exposure would be expected from radiation emitted from the casks. In the case of accidents, the probability of exposure is an estimate of a hypothetical event. Accident probabilities are derived in part from published maritime accident rates. (DOE EIS Volume 1, Section 4 .2 .2 . 3) . The analysis of ship collisions concludes that only one hold of the ship carrying the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel transportation casks would be subject to sufficient forces to potentially result in cask damage. There is no difference between the risks associated with a single shipment with two casks in a hold, and two shipments of a single cask each. The consequences of the accident with two casks in the hold may be as large as twice the consequences of an accident involving one cask. But the probability of an accident involving the ship carrying the two casks is half the probability of one of the two ships carrying a single cask being involved in an accident. Therefore, the potential accident analyzed was an accident involving a one cask shipment. Because accidents can be of any degree of severity, from a "fender bender" to one involving severe impact and prolonged fire, the severity spectrum is divided into a number of accident severity categories . Each category is assigned a conditional probability of. occurrence [i .e. , a probability (given that an accident occurs) that it will be of that particular severity) . In general, the more severe the accident, the more remote the chance that such an accident will occur. In tiis analysis, the accident severity spectrum is divided into six categories. The accident scenarios considered in this analysis fall into the three most severe of the six categories. (DOE EIS, Volume 1, Section 4 .2 .2.3) Accidents in the first three, least severe, categories result in no release of material from the spent nuclear fuel transportation cask. These categories include all the accident scenarios associated with handling the spent nuclear fuel cask, including dropping the cask during transfer from the vessel to the truck or train. The accidents analyzed in the three highest severity categories include collision of vessels, either in the approach to the harbor or when the vessel transporting the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel was docked. The category 4 accident analyzed involves a collision of two vessels that results in the breach of the transportation cask. Severity categories S and 6 model collisions that would breach the cask and then involve fires that would cause 21 the release of additional material, with category 6 fires being more intense than those for category 5. The consequence modeling for the port accident analysis was performed using the MELCOR Accident Consequences Code System (MACCS) , a code developed for the conservative modeling of accident consequences for nuclear powerplants and approved by the NRC. This code uses site-specific information, including population and meteorology, along with the identified radionuclide inventory and release fractions to determine the consequences of the accident scenarios . In determining the effects of the release of radioactive material, the MACCS code evaluates the direct dose to the public as well as several additional pathways including inhalation, ingestion, and groundshine. Groundshine is the dose received from radioactive material deposited on the ground' s surface. A conservative assumption incorporated into the risk assessment is that the entire population would remain in the area for 24 hours and therefore would be exposed to the greatest extent possible to radioactive material deposited on the ground from' the plume of material released from a cask. In reality, individuals close to such an accident would be evacuated. Atmospheric transport is usually the primary mechanism for dispersing any material that might be released in a severe accident. For the ship-collision-without-fire scenario (category 4) , the release is modeled as occurring at the water surface level. For shipboard fires (categories 5 and 6) , an elevated release due to the lifting effect of the fire is modeled. The likelihood that an earthquake would occur during the brief process of unloading a spent fuel shipping containers, or during the brief period while the container is being placed on the truck or railcar for transport, or actually being transported off-site, is remote. Even if such an event were to occur, it would at worst cause a container to fall over or drop onto a surface. Since containers are designed to withstand a thirty foot drop onto an unyielding surface (which is the equivalent of a sixty foot drop onto a reinforced concrete surface) without breaching, it is unlikely that any drops induced by an earthquake would cause a container to breach. Even if a container were to breach, allowing some of its contents to be released, the consequences of such a breach would be small compared to the marine transportation accidents involving fires because the marine accidents assume breach of a container with a means (fire and smoke) to widely disperse the contents of the container. Therefore, there is no need for separate analysis of the consequences of an earthquake during the unloading or transport off-site of containers since such consequences are bounded by the 22 evaluation of more serious marine transportation accidents involving container breach with a fire . 5. 2 . 1 Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, SC The accident analyses show that under severe accident conditions there would be no immediate radiation-induced fatalities . The .population risk per shipment of one cask at Charleston Naval Weapons Station is estimated to be 1 . 3x10_9 LCF. This means that there is less than one chance in 700, 000, 000 that a person would eventually die from a cancer resulting from an accident. For the entire program envisioned at Charleston the population risk is 9 . 1x10-7 LCF or less than one chance in 1, 000, 000 of a single person dying from cancer resulting from an accident. 5 . 2 . 2 Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA Based on the different population at Concord, the per shipment population risk is estimated to be 7 . 1x10-9 LCF or less than one chance in 100, 000, 000 of a latent cancer fatality. The total program risk would be 2 .7x10-7 LCF or less than one chance in 3, 000, 000 of a latent cancer fatality. 5 . 3 Cumulative Impacts The Naval Weapons Stations at Concord and Charleston are both active facilities with substantial ship, truck and rail traffic. As discussed in the DOE. EIS in Volume 2, Appendix D, the two Naval Weapons Stations met the criterion for appropriate port experience. This criterion required that a port handle on the order of 20, 000 20-foot contaifiers per year on an average basis . Over the 13 year term of the program, the proposed action would result in up to 698 containers holding spent fuel casks being transshipped through the Naval Weapons Station in Charleston, and up to 38 containers through the Naval Weapons Station in Concord. As a result, the proposed action would increase the average container traffic through the Naval Weapons Station in Charleston by less than one third of one percent (698/260, 000 = 0 . 0027) , and through the Naval Weapons Station in Concord by less than one fiftieth of one percent (38/260, 000 = 0 .00015) . Neither increase would cause significant cumulative impacts. With respect to exposure to ionizing radiation, the Naval Weapons Station personnel who will be engaged in unloading, inspecting or handling the foreign research reactor spent fuel or target material do not receive either occupational or measurable radiation exposure from other man-made sources at either Naval Weapons Station. Thus, the exposures evaluated in this environmental assessment for those personnel are unaffected by other work done at either Naval Weapons Station. 23 6 . 0 MITIGATION MEASURES Although significant exposure to ionizing radiation by workers at the Navy facilities would not be expected, certain mitigation actions are already in place or would be employed to ensure compliance with the principle of keeping radiation exposure "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) . The first mitigative measure would be to limit the number of casks of spent nuclear fuel and target material over the 13 years of the program to 38 casks at Concord Naval Weapons Station and 698 casks at Charleston Naval Weapons Station. Every shipment would receive a quick turn-around at the Navy facility, with each shipment of casks expected to leave within 24 hours of. receipt. It is expected that the actual time between receipt and departure would average 4 hours or fewer based on experience with shipments of hazardous material . Tracking the time involved in handling the casks for each inspector and port worker would enable ensuring that each individual does not receive more than a 100 mrem dose of radiation per year . Radiation levels (dose rates) would be measured near the casks to help determine the extent of personnel radiation monitoring needed during the transshipping operation. In addition to operational type mitigation measures, the spent fuel and target material would be packaged and transported so as to minimize radiation exposure. Under normal conditions, there are no tasks that would require human contact with cask surfaces . All casks will be packaged in International Standards Organization (ISO) containers to facilitate remote handling, lifting, and stowage . The casks are type B packages certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 C. F.R. Part 71 and meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations under 49 C.F.R. Part 100 et seq. These requirements ensure the appropriate level of safety to protect workers, the public, and the environment from the radioactive material being transported. The Navy and DOE would also execute appropriate agreements governing the use of Naval Weapons Stations Charleston and Concord as ports of entry to implement the DOE alternative selected in their Record of Decision, including the mitigation measures discussed in the DOE Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel respecting emergency preparedness teams, training, and equipment. 24 7 . 0 RELATIONSHIP WITH APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS This section identifies and summarizes the major laws, regulations, and Executive Orders that may apply to the transshipment of the spent nuclear fuel and target material at the Concord and Charleston Naval Weapons Stations . 7 . 1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended, contains policy and guidance to ensure that potential impacts from proposed Federal actions are assessed using a systematic and interdisciplinary approach. This EA has been prepared in accordance with Section 102 of NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality regulations on implementing NEPA procedures (40 C.F.R. 1500-1508) , and Department of Navy regulations on implementing NEPA procedures (32 C. F.R. 775) . 7 .2 Executive Order 12898 Consistent with Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low- Income Populations, " it is the Navy' s policy to identify and address disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects on members of minority and low-income populations . The relevant sections of the DOE EIS Environmental Justice Analysis in Appendix A are incorporated by reference here. As discussed in Section 5 of this EA, the transshipment poses little or no risk to the general population in the areas of the Naval Weapons Stations, thus the proposed action would not have a disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effect on any minority or low income group. 7 . 3 Endangered Species Act The operations involved in transshipment of the spent nuclear fuel and target material are substantially similar to current weapons loading operations and would not be expected to have any impact on any wildlife at the Naval Weapons Stations, including any protected species . The additional ships and truck or rail traffic would be a small increase over the current or expected activities at the Stations and well within the capacity of the Stations . 7 . 4 National Historic Preservation Act The operations involved in transshipment -of the spent nuclear fuel and target material are substantially similar to current weapons loading operations and would not be expected to have any 25 effect or impact on historic or cultural resources at the Naval Weapons Stations . 7 . S Clean Air Act Conformity Analysis Section 176 (c) of the Clean Air Act requires that Federal actions conform to the appropriate State Implementation Plan (SIP) in air quality non-attainment areas . Conformation to a SIP requires eliminating or reducing the number and severity of violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards . The rule for determining conformity of general Federal actions was promulgated by the EPA and became effective in January 1994 (40 C. F.R. 93) . Naval Weapons Station Charleston is located in an attainment area. Therefore, no conformity analysis is required. Naval Weapons Station Concord is located in a non-attainment area. However, the number of shipments expected to occur at Naval Weapons Station Concord is a maximum of 38 truck shipments over the entire 13 year period; as such, all reasonably foreseeable direct and indirect emissions are de minimis, and no further conformity analysis is required. 7 . 6 Occupational Safety and Health Act The Occupational Safety and Health Act establishes standards to enhance safe and healthful working conditions in places of employment throughout the United States. Department of the Navy has an effective occupational safety and health program which is followed at the Naval Weapons Stations and would be applicable to the proposed action. 7 . 7 Regulations for Radioactive Material Packaging and Transportation Transportation of hazardous and radioactive materials are governed by regulations of the Department of Transportation and Nuclear Regulatory Commission; regulations of Environmental Protection Agency may also apply if there is a release of materials to the environment. All activities associated with the transshipment would be conducted in accordance with applicable requirements for packaging and transportation of radioactive materials . 7 . 8 Emergency Management and Response The DOE and the Department of the Navy would establish procedures, training, and mechanisms to ensure that all applicable requirements for emergency management and response would be met in relation to the transshipment of the spent nuclear fuel and target material. 26 8 .0 LIST OF PREPARERS United States Navy Iona Evans, Director, Office of Environmental Protection and Occupational Safety and Health, Naval Sea Systems Command: 10 years with the Department of the Navy including experience with environmental law and environmental policy issues . Bowling Green State University, 1978, BA, American Studies; Ohio State University College of Law, 1981, JD. Richard A. Guida, Associate Director for Regulatory Affairs, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program; 23 years with the Department of the Navy including experience with spent nuclear fuel management and transportation. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972, S .B. (Electrical Engineering) ; M. I .T. , 1973, S.M. (Nuclear Engineering) ; George Washington University, 1981, M.B.A. ; professional engineer in the -Commonwealth of Virginia, 1979, #11476. ADI Technology Corporation Environmental Technology Directorate Matthew P. Hanke, Program Director: 10 years experience related to environmental compliance and Navy programs . Marquette University, 1986, BS, Electrical Engineering. Kenneth M. Mackenthun, Principal Scientist: 50 years experience with government environmental programs, author of several books related to National Environmental Policy Act requirements and environmental regulations . College of Emporia, 1941, BA, Biology; University of Illinois, 1946, MA, Zoology (Ecology) . Cynthia B. Manapsal, Environmental Analyst: 2 years experience related to waste management, water quality, and air programs . Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1994, BS, Environmental Science. J. Alex Will, Senior Environmental Engineer: 11 years experience related to environmental compliance and Navy programs . University of Michigan, 1985, BS, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering; Johns Hopkins University, 1995, MS, Technical Management. 27 9 . 0 REFERENCES CITED BOCA. 1987 . The BOCA National Building Code/1987 . Tenth Edition. Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc. , County Club Hills, IL. DOE, 1996 . Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, 61 Federal Register 25092, May 17, 1996. DOE, 1996a. Final Environmental Impact Statement on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (February) . U.S . Department of Energy, Washington, DC. DOE, 1996b. Revision to the Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, 61 Federal Register 38720, July 25, 1996. 28 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY - OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 2000 NAVY PENTAGON - WASHINGTON. D.C. 20350-2000 IN REPLY REFER TO- 5090 Ser 456C/6US98311 19 AUG 96 From: Chief of Naval Operations To: Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command Subj : FINDING :F NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS AT THE NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS CHARLESTON, SC, AND CONCORD, CA IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY Ref : (a) COMNAVSEASYSCOM ltr 5090 Ser OOT/180 of 16 Aug 96 (b) OPNAVINST 5090 . 1B Encl : (1) Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) 1 . An Environmental Assessment (EA) for the subject action was forwarded by reference (a) for review in accordance with reference (b) . It has been determined that preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is not required. Accordingly, it is considered that, with implementation of the following paragraph and any mitigation measures described in enclosure (1) , compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act has been effected and, in this regard, the project may be initiated. 2 . The Council on Environmental Quality regulations require public notification of the availability of the EA and of the decision not to prepare an EIS . Enclosure (1) should be mailed to any interested parties and printed in local newspapers in Charleston, SC and Concord, CA. Please provide verification of local publication to the Chief of Naval Operations (N456) upon implementation. The EA should be retained in project files for possible future use . Distribution: (See Next Page) Subj : FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN _ RESEARCH REACTORS AT THE NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS CHARLESTON, SC, AND CONCORD, CA IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY 3 . Questions concerning this Finding Of No Significant Impact may be directed to Mr. Thomas Peeling (N456) , Special Assistant for i Environmental Planning, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations at (703) 604-1232 . THOMAS J. PEELING By direction Distribution: DASN (ES/IF) COMNAVSEASYSCOM (OOT, 08U, OOL6) NAVORDCEN NWS Charleston (00) NWS Concord (00) CHINFO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS AT THE NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS, CHARLESTON, SC, AND CONCORD, CA IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY Pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 C. F.R. Parts 1500-1508) implementing procedural provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) , the Department of the Navy gives notice that an Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared for transshipment of spent nuclear fuel and target material from foreign research reactors at Navy facilities in South Carolina and California. On May 17, 1996,. the United States Department of Energy (DOE) , in consultation with the Department of State, published in the Federal Register a Record of Decision on the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (ROD) . (61 Fed. Reg. 25092) . This ROD was based on a Final Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter DOE EIS) (DOE/EIS-.0218F) , prepared by DOE to evaluate the potential environmental impacts ,of a proposed policy to manage spent nuclear fuel and target material from foreign research reactors, and reasonable alternatives. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, decided to implement the proposed policy as identified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the DOE EIS, subject to additional stipulations which were identified in Section VII of its ROD. The ROD was subsequently revised on July 25, 1996 to address acceptance of title of foreign research reactor spent fuel. (61 Fed. Reg. 38920) . Since DOE' s ROD identified the Naval Weapons Stations at Concord, California and Charleston, South Carolina as the ports through which foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material would enter the United States, the Navy has prepared an EA to analyze the potential environmental impacts associated with this use of the Navy ports. Over the 13 years of the program, up to 698 casks would be transshipped through Charleston Naval Weapons Station and up to 38 casks would be transshipped through Concord Naval Weapons Station. The spent nuclear fuel and target material will arrive at the ports packaged in casks certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The casks will be transferred from ship to railcar or truck for transportation to their final FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS AT THE NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS, CHARLESTON, SC, AND CONCORD, CA IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY destination. Under normal circumstances, the casks would leave the Naval facilities within 24, hours. Based on DOE experience with prior shipments, estimates have been made that the operation can be completed in 4 hours or less . The Naval Weapons Stations would provide a secure location for the transfer and a trained workforce experienced in the handling of ordnance and hazardous materials. The Naval Weapons Stations would have agreements in place with DOE to ensure that adequately trained and equipped personnel are present to make initial response and assessment of any incident with the potential for radioactive release or radiation exposure. _ The alternative to the proposed action is no action. In this case, the spent nuclear fuel and target material would not be handled at Navy facilities. Analysis in the EA, which incorporates the extensive analysis of DOE' s EIS, indicates that spent nuclear fuel and target material could be received safely via commercial ports, but that the use of military ports would provide additional safety and security over the commercial ports . Implementation of the proposed action will result in no significant environmental impact. The operations associated with the task of transshipment are not substantially different from the routine weapons loading operations conducted at the Naval Weapons Stations. As a result, the proposed action would have no additional environmental, impact on the environmental resources, climate, or socioeconomic characteristics at either Naval Weapons Station, other than potential radiation exposures. Under incident free conditions, the estimated impacts per cask shipment are the same for both locations. Although significant exposure to ionizing radiation by workers at the Navy facilities would not be expected, certain mitigation actions are already in place or would be employed to ensure compliance with the principle of keeping radiation exposure. "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA) . In addition to the expected quick turn-around at the Navy facility, tracking the time involved in handling the casks for each inspector and port worker will enable ensuring that no individual receives more than 100 mrem in any year. The analysis in the EA also demonstrates that under any accident condition associated with transshipping the spent nuclear fuel and target FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT FOR THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND TARGET MATERIAL FROM FOREIGN RESEARCH REACTORS - - AT THE NAVAL WEAPONS STATIONS, CHARLESTON, SC, AND CONCORD, CA IN SUPPORT OF FEDERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION POLICY material that the risk to the human environment is so minimal that there would be no significant impact. Based on analysis contained in the EA, the Navy finds that implementation of the proposed action does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. The EA addressing this action may be obtained . from: Commander Naval Ordnance Center, Code N3, Farragut Hall BLDG. D323, Indian Head, MD 20640-5555, (Attn: Dr. Michael T. Madden) , telephone (301) 743-6092 x114 . A limited number of copies of the EA are available to fill single copy requests. Dated Kimberly DePaul Acting Special Assistant for Environmental Planning Environmental Protection, Safety and Occupational Health Division Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)